Rethinking the National Question in Nigeria: Issues and Challenges

Article Citation: Samuel Segun OJO (2020). Rethinking the National Question in Nigeria: Issues and Challenges. DEGEL: The Journal of the Faculty of Arts and Islamic Studies, Vol. 18, No. 2. ISSN 0794-9316

RETHINKING THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN NIGERIA: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES

By

Samuel Segun OJO

Abstract

Between 1861 and 1914, the British subdued the different nationalities in the Nigerian region and brought them into one country. Nigeria’s political leaders and the British colonial officials negotiated all the constitutional issues prior to Independence on 1 October, 1960. Considering the ethnic diversities of the country and the circumstances through which the country was brought together as one, Nigeria’s constitution-making process had experienced significant changes, particularly, between 1922 and 1960. Thereafter, though, many controversial constitutional and political issues were entrenched but not adequately addressed. The lack of consensus on such very critical issues with different epochs of inordinate tinkering of the constitution-making processes in the post-Independence era has undoubtedly resulted into plethora of contradictions in the nation’s federal system. The effect of this was the subsequent political conflict and instability which have hindered Nigeria’s quest for sustainable corporate existence. The objective of this paper is to interrogate the contentious constitutional and political issues which remain un-addressed at various levels of Nigeria’s constitutional developments and the subsequent perusal of how these have hindered the sustainability of the national unity.

Introduction

The gradual emergence of Nigeria as an independent nation was accompanied by various Constitutions which governed the people since the Amalgamation of 1914. Considering the ethnic diversities of the country and the circumstance through which the country was brought together as one, Nigeria’s constitutional development has experienced significant changes from 1922 to 1960, when independence was achieved. During these periods, many controversial constitutional and political issues came up and not resolved. The effects of these were the subsequent political conflicts and instability which have hindered Nigeria’s quest for sustainable corporate existence since independence.

Contextualising the National Question Conundrum

What is referred to as the “National Question” arose from the diverse characters of Nigeria as a plural and multi-ethnic society. The notion is traceable to the structural defects and imbalance created by the Amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates of Nigeria, in 1914, to form a unified Colony of the British (Momodu, 2013: 9). Since political independence in 1960, Nigeria’s challenges have been manifesting themselves in the heightened state of intolerance, insecurity and strife, often in the form of religious and ethnic crises, and attempts by the few political elite to appropriate the privileges of the state and manipulate the structure, at the expense of large population (Ajayi, 1990: 2). Thus, the National Question is tied to the failure of the state to meet the needs of the citizens, often by the unscrupulous politics of exclusion and injustice in securing and protecting the lives and welfare of the various ethnic groups inhabiting the national space. The National Question is a composite of several burning issues, all relating to the challenges of citizenship rights and national integration. Some of the sub-categories of the question include the following: To what extent do citizens and groups feel a sense of identity with the Nigerian State? Does the State protect our interests? To what extent is the political leadership of the Nigerian State just in its administration of matters affecting various ethnic groups and constituencies?

Answers to these questions show clearly that there is an urgent need for a fundamental reform of the faulty political architecture of the country through a constitutional process that would deal with powers, privileges and scarce resources, and how they are shared across the various levels of government. It is this basic premise that lies behind the views of the advocates of a Sovereign National Conference in Nigeria, so as to learn from the experiences of successful multi-nationality states like the United Kingdom and increasingly the European Union, as against unsuccessful ones like Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. The clamour by Nigerians for a National Conference to unearth the National Question conundrum has remained a mirage for years. Nigerian leaders, especially the military that ruled for most of the years after independence, were/are fully aware of the challenges posed by the National Question as well as persistent clamour for a public debate. Unfortunately, they lack(ed) the political will to tackle the question frontally. The nearest to an attempt was the Constitutional Conference convened by former President Olusegun Obasanjo in February 2005. However, the exercise was reportedly generally linked to Chief Olusegun Obasanjo’s Third Term Agenda, and its (Constitutional Conference’s) reports and recommendations were completely rejected by Nigerians. Not even the Sovereign National Conference constituted by the Goodluck Jonathan’s presidency in 2014 could serve as a panacea to the pending constitutional conundrum due to needless over-politicisation of what the nature of restructuring the country might be.

The challenges facing Nigeria grew by the day as disenchantments, tension, ethno-tribal marginalisation/domination, social inequality and injustice accentuate, and spread across the nation. Ethnic formations develop – Afenifere, Ohanaeze Ndigbo, Arewa Consultative Forum, among others – all expressing deep ethno-tribal sentiments and animosities, capable of stifling national cohesion and integration (Momodu, 2013: 5). Nevertheless, it is apposite to mention that an issue becomes unresolved constitutionally if it is not bound by law and incorporated into the constitution, and timeously addressed, but rather mere recommendations are churned out or silent kept on the matter. Thus issues which remain unresolved constitutionally at Nigeria’s independence, and for which attempts are still being made to be resolved shall now be examined.

Unresolved Constitutional and Political Issues at Nigeria’s Independence

Ethnicisation and regionalisation of Nigeria’s politics are major devastating issues that have remained unresolved at Nigeria’s independence. As the British proceeded to create districts, provinces and regions for administrative purposes, they sowed the seeds for the growth of regional and provisional affiliations. The divisions of the country under the 1946 Richards Constitution into three regions – Northern, Western and Eastern – and subsequent emergent political parties followed the pattern of the regions. In other words, each political party had its base. Its leader and vast majority of its followers in one region. For example, the Action Group (AG) under the leadership of Chief Obafemi Awolowo was in the Yoruba-dominated West; the Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC) under the leadership of Alhaji Ahmadu Bello (the Sardauna of Sokoto), was based in the Hausa-dominated North; and the National Council of Nigerian Citizens (NCNC) had its leadership in the person of Dr Nnamdi Azikwe, and was located in the Igbo-dominated East (Omu, 1996: 173-177). What this arrangement meant was that all the regions were controlled by the major ethnic groups in the country.

In the decolonisation process of the country, there were constitution-making epochs that prepared Nigeria for independence. The constitutions provided for the elective principle creation of legislature and formation of political parties. However, instead of forming parties along national loyalty, ethnic cleavages and regional animosities prevailed. One of the political organisations that were formed in the early part of the decolonisation period (exactly in 1938) was the Nigeria Youths Movement (NYM), which was composed of intellectually minded youths. In 1941, the Movement suffered an internal crisis of ethnic prejudice (Omu, 1996: 176). This crisis led to the resignation of the Igbo members and the subsequent formation of the NCNC in 1944 with Herbert Macaulay and Nnamdi Azikiwe as President and Secretary-General, respectively. The objective was to form a body comprising all political parties’ representatives, the press, ethnic and trading groups, market women, among others (Omu, 1996: 177).

In 1951, Macpherson Constitution facilitated a call for the election of members to the regional legislatures. Consequent upon this, two new political parties were formed, the AG and the NPC. Unlike the NCNC, the newly formed political parties were regional and ethnic-based. While the AG was birthed from the Egbe Omo Oduduwa, the NPC was formed from the Jamiyar Mutanem Arewa, both former and latter ethno-cultural organisations (Ikime, 1985: 19). In the 1951 elections, each of the three political parties won in their respective regions – the NPC (North), the AG (West). And the NCNC (East). Following this was the elections into the Federal House by the Yoruba-dominated legislature. Consequently, Azikiwe went to the East and displaced Eyo Ita, an Efik leader of the Eastern House of Assembly. Eyo Ita and his supporters were dismissed (Ikime, 1985: 21). This development soured the relationship between the Igbo and the Efik, and led to the formation of the United Nations Independence Party (UNIP) by the latter. The party characteristically became anti-NCNC, anti-Igbo, and heightened ethnic tensions. Ikime opines that:

Since the Zik episode, few Nigerian politicians have dared contest elections outside their region, their state, their local government area. Even when a man has lived his entire life outside his local government area, it is to that local government area he goes when he decides to run election (Ikime, 1985: 23).

Another aspect of the ethnic and regional politics was the politics of zero-sum game, which imposed virtual anarchy until the opposition had been completely dislodged. This had been the case with Nigerian politics that political parties jettisoned national political spread and loyalty, but sought regional patronage. This pattern necessitated the NPC, AG, and NCNC domination in the North, West, and East, respectively, which subsequently culminated in the making of the First Republic. The politics of the Second Republic followed suit; the National Party of Nigeria (NPN) in the North, the Unity Party of Nigeria (UPN) in the West and the Nigeria Peoples’ Party (NPP) in the East, beside these new change of nomenclatures. From the above, the implications of ethnic politics on the country’s corporate entity is not be far-fetched. Since political parties lacked national outlook, the consequence was that it snowballed into intra-ethnic distrust, acrimonies and sheer hatred and the oppression of the minority groups. Until attempts are made at establishing national-oriented political parties, the unity of the country would remain in limbo.

The issue of North-South dichotomy was also evident prior to independence, and manifested itself in the constitutional configuration of Nigeria, and largely remained unaddressed. The North-South dichotomy is the ideological division between the Northern part of Nigeria comprising the Hausa, Fulani and the Middle-Belt minorities; and the Southern part comprising the Yoruba, Igbo, Ijaw and many other minority groups. The colonial-North provided the model for the British colonial policy of Indirect Rule. On the other hand, in the colonial South, there was a diffusion of political and economic practices. Under the colonial policy of Indirect Rule, traditional rulers, then referred to as Warrant Chiefs, were imposed on these decentralised societies. In 1906, the Colony of Lagos and the Protectorate of Southern Nigeria (which included the former Niger Coast Protectorate) were merged together to become the Colony and Protectorate of Southern Nigeria. In 1914, the Northern and Southern Protectorates were amalgamated to become the Colony and Protectorates of Nigeria. From 1914 to 1960, Nigeria had four major constitutions and in each of these, the divisions between the North and South became apparent.

Taken as one region, the British created an imbalance by keeping the Christian missionaries out of the Muslim North for respect of the Muslim faith as well as out of the British ulterior motives. Having kept out the missionaries who were the pioneers of Western education, the British took no steps to develop Western education in the Sokoto Caliphate. Indeed, the impression was created that Islam and Western education were incompatible. The much-touted educational imbalance between the North and the South was owed to this aspect of the British colonial policy. That imbalance has been at the centre of the North-South dichotomy in the Nigerian politics since the period of decolonization (Ikime, 1985: 16). We still talk about the less educationally developed areas (North) and educationally developed areas (South), in the contemporary Nigeria. This, even, has the negative effect of competition for offices between the various ethnic groups in the country. The North has since independence feared Southern domination. This is borne out of the fact that, in terms of educationally trained man-power, the North is far behind the South, and this could be credited to their backwardness in terms of European western education.

Another area where the British created a gap between the North and the South was the failure by Lord Lugard to break the country into smaller and more equal units during the 1914 Amalgamation, thereby creating a country that was geographically lopsided, ethnically incongruous, and administratively absurd (Uzoigwe, 1996: 13). In 1939, Governor Bourdillon divided Southern Nigeria which was smaller in size than the North into two on the grounds that the South was too heterogeneous to remain one unit and that there were communication problems between Enugu, the Headquarters of the southern provinces and its component parts. By contrast, the same Bourdillon argued that the North was culturally heterogeneous and that the centrality of Kaduna, the capital, reduced communication difficulties to the minimum. This claim is, however, faulted on the grounds that, there existed myriads of peoples and cultures in the Middle-Belt. This arrangement of leaving the North untouched, ensured that the region developed into a meaningful political entity dominated by the Hausa-Fulani; the South by contrast, has never developed into this meaningful political entity.

The mode of administering the two protectorates even after Amalgamation was another area where the British further divided the North and the South. The Clifford Constitution of 1922 established a new Legislative Council, whose jurisdiction covered the whole of southern Nigerian protectorate while the North, on the other hand, was governed by proclamations from the governor. Clifford justified this separate mode of governance, when he opined that he had to limit the Legislative Council to the South because he was faced with the practical problems posed by the sheer size of the country, poor communication facilities, ethnic diversity, and to a certain extent the theoretical distinction between a colony and a protectorate. He further posited that he did not consider that a Council sitting in Lagos could be properly entrusted with the responsibility of legislating for the Islamic emirates which were self-contained Native states, “the de-facto governments of which were their respective Native Administration” (CO 8583/100 Clifford to Churchill, March 1921d: 518).

Olusanya has faulted Clifford’s arguments as convincing. First, he opines that “though the country was very large and facilities for communication poor, these were not insurmountable difficulties” (CO 8583/100 Clifford to Churchill, March 1921d: 518). Also, the argument about ethnic diversity has been regarded as baseless since the North, itself, had the largest ethnic groups in the country. On the issue of theoretical distinction between a colony and a protectorate, the argument is not valid since it was only Lagos that was colony, and all the other areas were protected areas like Northern Nigeria. Further, his position that the Muslim emirates were self-contained states, the de-facto government of which they were their respective Native Administration also applied to indigenous states in the South such as Benin and the Yoruba states (CO 8583/100 Clifford to Churchill, March 1921d: 520). Lastly, the postulation that the emirs would resent even nominal representation was not convincing, since if they were shown the value of it would not resent it, and certainly, it was the duty of the British administration to demonstrate the need if they believed in it. The failure to provide a common legislature for the North and the South meant that it was not until the Richard Constitution came into effect in 1947, that the leaders of both area had the opportunity of working together (Olusanya, 1980: 519).

It was during the 1951 General Conference during Sir Macpherson’s era that the North-South division was most glaring. During this conference, representatives of the three regions brought recommendations that were to affect the political future of the country. The three regions agreed to a federal system of administration. The Northern region, in addition to this, demanded for fifty per cent regional representation at the centre. This claim was clearly entrenched when the Emirs of Zaria and Katsina announced to the conference that unless the Northern region was allocated fifty per cent of the seats in the central legislature, it would ask for separation from the rest of Nigeria and revert back to the pre-1914 political arrangement. The conference concluded by carrying proposal to increase the representation at the centre to forty-five for the Northern region; and thirty-three each for the Western and Eastern regions (Olusanya, 1980: 523). The usual explanation for that arrangement is that the seats were distributed in accordance with population.

However, Ikime has opined that if indeed population was the guiding principle, he would not see any reason why the East and West were granted equal representation, since they were not of equal population. It is difficult not to reach the conclusion that the British who were the umpire at the constitutional conferences had some stake in ensuring that the then more conservative North dominated the central legislature. Yet, it is obvious that a situation in which the constitution itself guaranteed the dominance of central government by a particular region could only be product of strife. This very political arrangement, since independence, has engendered a superiority-inferiority political culture in which a particular group considers that control of Nigeria’s central government is its birthright, and thus inhibits a true search for unity (Ikime, 1985: 21).

A further act by the colonialist, which accelerated the North-South division, was the Northernisation Policy proclaimed by the Public Service Commission of the region in 1951. In 1948, Foot Commission of Enquiry was commissioned to study and make recommendations about the recruitment and training of Nigerians for senior posts in the nation’s service, and recommended, among other things, that no non-Nigerian should be recruited for any government post except where no suitable and qualified Nigerian is available (Report of the Commission Appointed to make Recommendations on the Recruitment and Training of Nigerians, 1948). But, the Northernisation Policy of 1951 provided that, should a qualified Northerner be available, an expatriate should be recruited or a non-Northerner on contract term (Report of the Northern Public Service Commission, 1954-1957: 87). In 1954, Lyttleton Constitution, one of the provisions was the regionalisation of the Civil Service. What the NPC government did was to seize the opportunity to embark on the Northernisation policy aimed at replacing Southern civil servants in the North with Northerners irrespective of the differences in qualification and experience. By 1959, the staff list of the administrative class of the Northern civil service eloquently expressed the effectiveness the Northernisation policy. It included 161 expatriates, 59 Northern Nigerians, and one Southern Nigerian (Sklar and Whitaker Jr, 1966: 99).

From the political standpoint, there were tensions between the North and South when after 1948, the Northern peoples were shocked into a terrifying awareness of the great divide that separated them from the South. They saw a political advance leading rapidly to a self-governing Nigeria at a date that they never imagined. In 1953, Chief Anthony Enahoro, the AG member of the House of Representatives, moved a motion that the House should work towards the attainment of Self-Government in 1956. Consequently, Sir Ahmadu Bello suggested the phrase “as soon as practicable’ to substitute that of 1956 (Olusanya, 1980: 535). This disagreement led to a sharp division in the House, further deepening the North-South dichotomy. The North was afraid of the domination of their region by the South, the latter being more educationally and economically advanced. The AG leaders’ tour of the North in 1953 to canvass for support for the call for self-government in 1956 led to the 15-17 May, 1953 Kano Riots in which many people were wounded and killed.

Culturally, the British also adopted the Hausa language as the language of Native Administration. This aided the spread of the Hausa language through the length and breadth of the old North. The end result was a greater degree of cultural homogeneity in the North. However, in the South, no language was given due recognition as such. In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the North-South dichotomy that exists in Nigeria politics had gradually evolved from their differences in political and sociocultural spheres. The British colonialists who favoured the North over the South complicated this (Odumuh, 1994: 9). The consequence of this is the struggle for power between the two divisions with utter distrust and suspicion. The implication this has on Nigeria’s corporate existence is the fact that, as one country, unity within this dichotomisation seems illusive.

The maginalisation of the minority nationalities is occasioned by the inability of the Nigerian federal structure to carry its minority nationalities along. The minority issue could be situated within the precincts of the colonial setting when southern Nigeria was divided into Eastern, Western and Northern regions. These divisions jump-started the balkanisation of the territorially contagious and culturally homogenous people into political and administrative units much to their disadvantages (Olusanya, 1980: 518). It is apposite to mention that a federal political structure was foisted on Nigeria in 1954 with a view to balancing the varying interests of the major ethnic nationalities that superintended the then three regions that structurally made up pre-Independence Nigeria.

According to Tyoden, the colonial administrator could not have feigned ignorance of the existence of multiplicity of the minority nationalities, especially as these had served as spring-boards for British occupation of what later became Nigeria (Tyoden, 1996: 247-259). For example, Lokoja was the Headquarters of the Royal Niger Company whose territory later constituted much of the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria, while Calabar was the capital of the Oil Rivers Protectorate. Ironically, Calabar waited till 1967 and Lokoja till 1991 before they both emerged as capitals (of Cross Rivers and Kogi states, respectively) in the continuous restructuring process of Nigeria’s federation (Tyoden, 1996: 248).

Indeed, the constitution-making process between 1946 and 1953 was to work out a stable federal balance among the three ethnic groups. However, the wrong beginning accentuated two far-reaching developments. First, the minority’s perception that they were being marginalised in the political scheme of things in the country. Second, the mobilisation by the minority ethnic groups for regional autonomy and the resultant conflicts it generated between them and the major ethnic groups punctured the essence of the myth of homogeneity that the colonial overlords engendered. These developments necessitated the constitution of the Henry Willink Commission of Inquiry into Fears of Minorities and Means of Allaying Them, in 1957. The Commission, instead, of allaying the fears of the minorities, and despite its findings, particularly refused to recommend the creation of more regions for the minorities. The Commission, in the stead of the above, recommended a “Bill of Human Rights” which could not be enforced and in rhetorical subjects for good governance which no one took seriously (Ajayi, 1990: 7). Therefore, the view, that the Report of the Commission was an exercise in hypocrisy, cannot be over-exaggerated (Afigbo, 1989: 14). Nevertheless, two major factors accounted for the missed opportunity at creating more states; the majority ethnic groups were anxious to tenaciously guard, defend and preserve their regions and, the British overlords were committed to upholding the triangular structure they had created (Coleman, 1958: 390). The above has continued to impact on the problem of political exclusion of the Northern and Southern minorities in their membership of Nigeria’s federal structure.

However, in the subsequent reconfiguration of Nigerian politics, states were created for these minority ethnic groups in 1967; the Benue-Plateau and Kwara states were created in the North, and the south-(Eastern) part, Rivers state was created. In 1975, a 19-state structure emerged with the Northern minorities having Benue and Plateau states separately, Gongola, Kwara, and Niger states, and for the Mid-West, Bendel state was created; in the South, Cross-Rivers state was added to Rivers state. This exercise continued in the subsequent regimes/administrations (Usman, 2002: 4). Out of 36 state-composition in Nigeria, the southern minorities have six states namely: Bayelsa, Rivers, Akwa-Ibom, Cross-Rivers, Edo, and Delta. In the North, the minorities comprise Adamawa, Taraba, Niger, Nassarawa, Benue, Plateau, Kwara and Kogi. Nonetheless, it is important to note that the creation of states has not solved the problems of the minorities. For example, in the North, there has been the struggle for self-determination and cultural identity by non-Hausa-Fulani communities. This has resulted in various conflicts such as the Kasuwar Magani conflict in Kaduna state (1980), the conflicts in Kafanchan, Zaria, Kaduna in March (1987), the conflict in Zango-Kataf and other parts of Kaduna state in February and May, 1992 (Usman, 2002: 9).

In the South, the story is not different, however, this is more complex because the states have not only been marginalised politically, but also stripped of their economic resources by the federal government. Instead of states controlling their resources, the federal government appropriates them to itself, despite the fact that the minorities are producers of the national wealth, basically the crude oil that is in their domain (Osaghae, 2001: 221). The economic deprivation of the people can be evaluated from different perspectives. First, it emanates from the repressive state legislations promulgated by the Federal Government over the years since independence. This has manifested in many forms which included the Petroleum Decree Act No. 5, 1969 (Nigeria 1969 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria: 15-26), the Land Use Decree, 1978 (Nigeria 1978 Federal Republic of Nigeria: 14), the Land Title Vesting Decree No. 52, 1993 (Etikerentse, 1998:11-19), and the National Inland Waterways Authority Decree No. 13, 1997 (Etikerentse, 11). In addition to these Decrees is the Revenue Allocation formula adopted by the Federal Government over the years (since 1946), and which has further led to the economic impoverishment of the people. The impoverishment revolves around four inter-related issues: (Tyoden, 1996: 254).

i. The de-emphasis on derivation as a principle for revenue allocation in the country, which has consequently reduced the amount of national resources going to the oil-producing areas as of right;

ii. The lack of infrastructural development in the oil-producing states;

iii. The absence of social amenities and the consequent poor standards of living of the people in the oil-producing states, as a result of corruption, politicisation and securitisation of development; and,

iv. The systematic destruction of the environment and ecosystem in the oil-producing areas resulting from oil exploration activities.

The above notwithstanding, the minorities have also learnt to contend with the language policy. Government’s policy has been to impose the language of the three dominant ethnic groups – Hausa, Yoruba, and Igbo – as the national languages for the country. The National Policy on Education of 1977 mandated each child in the country to learn one of the three major languages other than his own mother tongue (Odumuh, 1994: 13). Politically, the 1979 and 1989 constitutions provided that the business of the National Assembly should be conducted in English, Hausa, Igbo and Yoruba languages when adequate arrangement had been made (Constitutions of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979 and 1989). Furthermore, vernacular translators of Federal Government’s documents where the need arises are only officially limited to the three indigenous languages. Culturally, these major languages, too, are officially recognised indigenous mode of communication on the federal mass media. It is being generally deciphered that the government’s major policy at fostering the majority ethnic languages is aimed at suppressing the minority ethnic languages with the implication of impacting negatively on the corporate existence of Nigeria, as there would be continuous violent agitation by these disgruntled minority groups (Odumuh, 1994: 15-18).

Every attempts having been seemingly exhausted, the minority ethnic groups resolved at tabling matters at a National Conference where they would deliberate upon the terms and conditions on which they would continue to live together (as a corporate entity) (Usman, 2002: 11). A National Political Reform Conference (NPRC) was inaugurated on 21 February, 2005, where major political stakeholders were represented. Nothing came out of the conference because, it could not draw a new constitution whereby all minority ethnic groups would have a fair treatment and reparations paid to them for their neglect over the years. Not even the Sovereign National Conference constituted by the Goodluck Jonathan’s presidency in 2014 could serve as a panacea to the pending constitutional conundrum.

The asymmetric Federal-Regional/State relations or lopsided federal political structure is another important factor since the nation’s adoption of federalism. At the end of the first National Conference in 1950 held by the representatives of the three regions in Nigeria, the delegates unanimously opted for federalism. The reason is illustrated by the multiplicity of ethnic groups in the country. Federalism, according to A. V. Dicey, “is a political invention which is intended to reconcile national unity and power with the maintenance of the rights of the separate member-states” (Dicey, 1924: 19-34) Furthermore, federalism is an arrangement whereby powers within a multinational country are shared between a federal/central authority and a number of regionalised governments in such a way that each unit, including the central authority, exists as a government separately and independently from the others, operating directly on persons and property with its territorial area, with a will or its own and its own apparatus for the conduct of affairs, and with an authority in some matters exclusive of others. In a federation, each unit enjoys autonomy, a separate existence and independence of the control of any other government.

The connotation of the above is that whatever concerns the whole should be placed under the control of the national government and all matters which are not primarily of common interest should remain in the hands of the respective constituent states. Each government exists not as an appendage of another government, but as an autonomous entity in the sense of being able to exercise its own will on the conduct of its affairs free from direction by any government. Thus the central government on one hand and the state governments on the other hand are autonomous in their respective spheres (Elaigwu, 1996: 166). Thus the fundamental and distinguishing characteristics of a federal system is that neither the central nor the regional government are subordinate to each other, but rather, the two are coordinate and independent. Succinctly put, in a federal system, all governments have a horizontal relationship with one another. It is apposite, also, to add that the power-sharing arrangement should not place preponderance of power in the hands of either the national or regional government to make it so powerful that it is able to bend the will of others to its own (Federalism, 2019). Therefore, federalism presupposes that the national and regional governments should stand to each other in a relation of meaningful independence resting upon a balanced division of powers and resources. Each should have powers and resources sufficient to support the structure of a functioning government able to stand on its own.

In view of the above, the 1960 Constitution represented a true federal structure in which extensive powers were granted the regions making them effectively autonomous entities, and the revenue arrangements which ensured that the regions had the resources to carry out their immense responsibilities. The following features emphasised the existence of true federal system composed of powerful and autonomous regions and a centre with limited powers: each region had its own separate constitution; each region had its own separate Coat of Arms and Motto; each region established its own separate semi-independent mission in the United Kingdom headed by Agents-General. The regional governments had residual power, that is, where any matter was not allocated to the regions or the federal government, it automatically essentially became a matter for regional jurisdiction. Thus apart from items like Aviation, External Borrowings, External Affairs, Immigration, Maritime, Defense, and Posts and Telegraphs (which were all in the Exclusive List), all other important items were in the Concurrent List, that is, under the control of the regions, thus permitting the regions equal rights to legislate and operate in those areas (Federalism, 2019). The most significant included arms and ammunition, census, commercial and industrial monopolies, higher education, industrial development, statistics, registration of business names and regulation of professions, public order and public safety maintenance (Federalism, 2019).

Given the initial thrust at independence, a deviation occurred with the federal government becoming more powerful than the regions, thus making the federal-state relationship to be unnecessarily asymmetric rather than symmetrical one. Nigeria, supposedly as a federal state, has departed from all the fundamentals of federalism. As a multi-ethnic state, it has not succeeded in integrating the constituent units, hence the marginalisation of the minority ethnic groups. Besides, the 1960 constitution described each region as self-governing. This was clearly demonstrated in the allocation of revenue which was strictly derivative and guaranteed financial/economic autonomy of the respective regions (Mancilla, 2019). The federal government, covertly and overtly, hijacked this arrangement.

While federalism was adopted, the question became its imperfection. The federating units have not been representative of the ethnic nationalities, thereby resulting into an assertion to the right to self-determination by ethnic groups without their own. The major ethnic groups which controlled the former regions continue to have ethnic states and have been the only fortunate ethnic groups in this respect. They were the major factor in the process of constitution-making bargains of the 1950s that produced the original federal constitution that was based on the principle of regional autonomy and have had pride of place in all subsequent phases of federalism. Although national integration and cohesion had hardly been achieved with the federal system that was foisted on the nation at the behest of first military incursion into the nation’s politics. This no doubt compounded the process of constitution-making and created deep-seated fears and suspicions among the diverse ethnic nationalities in the country (Mancilla, 2019). The minorities have been repressed and suppressed. While their struggle is a continuum, restructuring of the country remains no less an arduous task. The long and tortuous interregna of the military rule in Nigeria aggravated the federal structural arrangement in that, it unscrupulously heightened the centripetality of the federal-state relations. Virtually all ramifications of governments’ businesses were over-centralised.

The word, citizenship refers to the status of being an inhabitant of a city or town; a member of a country, native or naturalized, having rights and owing allegiance. Gaventa conceptualises citizenship along three major trends namely liberal, communication and civic republican. The liberal theories define citizenship as a status which entitles individuals to a specific set of universal rights granted by the state. The civil republican approach addresses the rights and obligation of the citizens to participate in political affairs; while the communitarian theories centre on the notion of the socially embedded citizen and community belonging. They argue that the individual’s realization of interests and identity can only be defined in relation to the community he/she belongs (Osaghae, 2001: 231). The question of citizenship is another prominent issue that is still begging for answer since the nation’s independence. Citizenship and the issues associated with it are at the core of any nation. It is citizenship rights that determines an individual’s rights vis-à-vis his/her respective state. This is, especially, significant in respect of an individual’s acquisition of opportunities, majorly in terms of his/her political and educational rights, job opportunities in a state other than his/hers.

The current debate on citizenship in Nigeria has paid little attention to the above concepts and rather emphasises indigeneity. The word indigene, which is a Nigerian coinage, is used to define a native of a particular place as against other citizens of Nigeria found in that locality. It is not mentioned in the constitution, but it has assumed political connotation in virtually all Nigeria’s sociocultural, economic and political spheres of life, even as various communities and political units seek to jealously guard themselves against perceived interlopers. It is largely a product of Nigeria’s multi-ethnic and heterogeneous states. It is used to confer special privileges on the natives that are beyond the reach of supposedly non-natives. At independence, all the former regions sought to use it to offer their peoples special privileges and opportunities. Given the ethnic and regional politics of the country, the regions were suspicious of each other. This could be recalled in Azikiwe’s bid to contest for elections in Lagos, but through ethnic chauvism was checked out. No wonder it is being contended that Nigeria lacks state citizenship, rather national citizenship is the only provision (Mancilla, 2019).

Indigeneity has become a key issue in the citizenship debate. If a person has lived in a certain place other than his native place for most of his/her life, worked, married and had children there, he/she is still supposedly considered a non-indigene or a settler. That person has to refer to his/her state of origin to claim citizenship rights. This definition of citizenship does not permit the exercise of universal rights and entitlements since they have been restricted by a code (Osaghae, 2001: 281). Individuals who are not indigenes experience discriminations in terms of placing their children in school, within the realm of catchment areas, such as less educationally developed areas and educationally developed areas, employment opportunities and access to resources such as political and other socioeconomic rights.

Therefore, there is a consensus that this way of defining citizenship in Nigeria has led to the emergence of a dysfunctional citizenship, even in the absence of a primary identification at the national-state level. Nevertheless, the role which religion plays in the nation’s scheme of things has made the issue of citizenship more difficult. Given the domination of Moslems in the North and Christians in the South, identity and citizenship have been veritable determinants of people’s access to existential resources. The situation has posed a great challenge to Nigeria’s corporate existence, plunging the country into a vortex of communal disputes. In the current circumstances, it is important that the issue of citizenship be addressed in the constitution, thereby making provisions that would be constitutionally viable and sustainable so that the status of any citizen would not be determined by his place of birth or religion (Osaghae, 2001: 287).

The emergence of a dual legal system in Nigeria based on the existence of two key religions is another issue that has generated tensions in the country since independence. In her pre-independence era, Nigeria was a non-political entity consisting of tribes and ethnic groups with varying religious beliefs and systems of government. When the British colonialists took over Northern Nigeria in 1903, they created Sharia courts for the Muslim ethnic groups and customary courts for the minority ethnic groups. These courts were to administer Native Law and customs prevailing in the area of jurisdiction and might award any type of punishment recognized, except mutilation, torture, or any other which is repugnant to natural justice and humanity (Ikime, 1985: 30). By 1914, Nigeria, as a political entity was created through the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern parts of the country. The bringing together of these nationalities created problems because of differences in systems of government and religious beliefs, so the British adopted different processes for the administration of justice.

In the Northern part of the country, indirect rule was introduced where the British ruled through the traditional rulers of the area, Muslim rulers from the Hausa-Fulani ethnic groups were given some responsibilities to administer their people. However, this posed a problem when the colonial administrators in Northern Nigeria forcefully subjugated minority ethnic groups to the rule of these Hausa-Fulani Muslim rulers. Before colonisation in Nigeria, these Northern Nigerian ethnic minorities had existed as independent nations and embraced Christianity and traditional religions, while the Hausa, Fulani, and Kanuri embraced Islam. The subjugation of these Northern minority ethnic groups to the leadership of Muslim leaders with differences in religious beliefs, customs and traditions, was to become a seemingly uncontrollable political issue that has eaten deep in Nigeria’s political fabric at, and since independence (The Proclamation of the Colonial Native Courts in 1900).

By Nigeria’s independence in 1960, the British colonialists had already created a de facto ruling class out of the Hausa-Fulani Muslim ethnic groups. These carried out judicial reforms to entrench more Islamic values even amidst Northern Nigerian communities. The judicial reforms birthed a legal system that combined Islamic Law with some aspects of the English Common Law. The former provided for the administration of justice on issue of personal matter, such as marriage, divorce, paternity, guardianship, gifts, wills and succession (Ikime, 1985: 23). However, all criminal cases were still vested in the hands of the state. The result of the Sharia implementation has been disastrous. Between the last four and five decades, scores of major religious conflicts have been recorded between Christian and Moslems were killed, and hundreds of Church buildings destroyed. This penal code of criminal procedure was in operation until 1999, when Moslem political elite moved to implement Islamic law over both civil and criminal aspects of daily life of the peoples.

Nonetheless, the declaration of Sharia law in several Northern Nigerian states have increased Muslim-Christian relations and tensions. Christian leaders in Northern Nigeria have consistently warned that adopting and implementing Sharia is tantamount to marginalizing Christians politically and religiously. In spite of the provisions establishing Sharia courts in the Nigeria’s constitution, there is no ground that permits a state government to adopt Sharia as a law, neither should any government adopt any religion as a state religion (Mancilla, 2019). However, this extant constitution provides for the establishment of Sharia courts by a state, giving opportunity for the Northern leaders to adopt Islam as state religion. The Nigerian government, unfortunately, appears to be helpless in addressing the issue, thus heightening the tempo of religious conflicts in the country. Although, Sharia courts are domiciled only in the North, conflicts still arise because of the Christians living there. For Moslems, Sharia is a right and not a privilege. For Christians, it is a deliberate disobedience to the constitution. Therefore, the only way this issue could be resolved is to make provision within the constitution that Sharia should be purely restricted to Moslems and where Christians are affected, they ought to be constitutionally/legally insulated and protected.

Conclusion

This paper has interrogated some constitutional and political issues that are still negatively impacting on the prospects of Nigeria’s corporate existence. The amalgamation of 1914 changed the destiny of these entities as the British government imposed what they felt was the most ideal system of government. The development of constitution-making in Nigeria culminated in controversial issues, because of differences between the two Protectorates. However, the common enemy that the pre-colonial Nigeria had was the British colonisation, and so blind-folded its senses of judgement at different fora of constitution-making, while issues revolving around national cohesion and integration were overlooked. When the euphoria of independence was over, those issues such as North-South dichotomy and majority-minority ethnic groups/relations, among others, began to re-generate, not in the form of dialogue or debate but as conflict and distrust among diverse ethnic nationalities in the country. The resultant constitutional and political problems that all these have posed seem insoluble. The panacea to all these logjams cannot be a mirage as the government has catalogues of policy recommendations on shelves that could be put to use. It is the strong political will that matters most on the part of the government. The constitution should not only be framed to address extant legal and political issues, but appreciate the forseeable and seemingly improbable or insoluble human’s endeavours. There is a general consensus that there cannot be a perfect constitution, but that should, and cannot be sufficient justification for disallowing a thoroughly robust discussion on how the people wish to be governed.

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