Cite this article: Aliyu, S. S., 2026. “Boko Haram and Its Historical Foundations: Contexts, Local Roots and Global Resonances”. Sokoto Journal of History Vol. 14, Iss. 01. Pp. 85-94. www.doi.org/10.36349/sokotojh.2026.v14i01.008
By
Shuaibu
Shehu Aliyu
Arewa
House Center for Historical Research and Documentation, Kaduna
Abstract: This paper
interrogates the historical foundations, ideological orientations, and global
connections of Boko Haram, one of Nigeria’s most enduring insurgencies. It
traces the movement’s evolution from earlier sectarian groups and reformist
traditions in northern Nigeria to its transformation into Jamaʿatu Ahlis Sunnah
Liddaʿawati wal-Jihad. The study further situates the emergence of Boko Haram
within the broader socio-political and religious contexts, highlighting how
state failure, endemic corruption, youth alienation, and local grievances
converged with transnational jihadist ideologies and Middle Eastern influences
to sustain the insurgency. It argues that Boko Haram cannot be explained by a
singular framework; rather, it reflects the interplay of local dynamics,
doctrinal contestations, political patronage, and global currents. The paper
further assesses the role of conspiracy theories, sectarian rivalries, and
political entanglements in shaping Boko Haram’s trajectory. Ultimately, it
concludes that Boko Haram represents a complex historical process defying
reductionist explanations, while underscoring its enduring implications for
security, identity, and governance in contemporary Nigeria.
Introduction
The Boko Haram
insurgency remains one of the most enduring and complex security challenges in
Nigeria’s modern history. Since its violent eruption in the early 2000s, the
group has generated divergent interpretations from historians, political
scientists, sociologists, and security experts. At the center of these debates
lies the question of its origins, ideological foundations, and the structural
conditions that enabled its growth and sustenance. While the label “Boko
Haram”—a popular coinage by the media meaning “Western education is
forbidden”—has gained global currency, the group self-identifies as Jamaʿatu
Ahlis Sunnah Liddaʿawati wal-Jihad, framing its mission within the doctrinal
pursuit of establishing an Islamic polity. This tension between external
labeling and internal self-conception has further complicated scholarly and
policy-oriented discourses about the movement.
The
historiography of Boko Haram reveals multiple schools of thought. One strand
emphasizes structural explanations, pointing to the failures of state
institutions, endemic corruption, social inequalities, and youth alienation as
the enabling conditions for radicalization. Another perspective highlights
ideological and religious roots, situating Boko Haram within longer
trajectories of Islamic reformist, Salafi, and sectarian movements in northern
Nigeria. A third dimension focuses on global and transnational linkages,
especially the impact of Middle Eastern upheavals, the influence of Al-Qaida,
and the possible roles of external conspiracies in shaping the insurgency.
These competing perspectives underscore the difficulty of constructing a
singular narrative about Boko Haram’s historical foundations.
This paper
critically interrogates these diverse interpretations with the aim of situating
Boko Haram within broader historical and socio-political contexts. By examining
both internal dynamics, such as local religious movements, socio-economic
discontent, and political patronage networks, and external influences,
including Middle Eastern connections and global jihadist ideologies, the study
seeks to unravel the layered processes that shaped Boko Haram’s emergence and
persistence. It argues that Boko Haram cannot be reduced to a single
explanatory framework; rather, it reflects a complex historical process shaped
by the interplay of local grievances, doctrinal contestations, and
transnational currents. In doing so, the paper contributes to the ongoing debate
by reassessing the historiographical foundations of Boko Haram and offering
fresh perspectives on the intersection of history, ideology, and insurgency in
contemporary Nigeria.
The Ideological
Foundation
The ideological
and doctrinal basis of Boko Haram insurgency has received diverse
interpretations and theorizations from historians, sociologists, and political
scientists. This has led to the rise of different schools of thoughts each
attempting to situate and explicate Boko Haram within wider historical
perspectives. Boko Haram (western education and system is forbidden) is an etymology ascribed to a group that
described themselves as Jama’atu Ahlis Sunnah Liddawa’ati Wal-Jihad (people
committed to the revival of the teachings of the prophet and self-exertion), while
others designate them as ‘’Ahl Sunnah wal-Jammaa ala Minhaj Salaf’’ (people of
the way of the prophet SAW and the community of the Muslims in line with the
teachings of the earliest scholars or first generation of Muslims). Presumably,
the press in their attempts to report the activities of the fringe sects,
referred to them as Boko Haram. Since then, the coinage has received increasing
publicity especially within the academic discourse as well as in the national
and international media platforms. The
Northern Nigeria region had experienced proliferations of deviant religious
groups, which were oftentimes considered to be fanatical or extremist. The most
commonly known in recent history include the Maitatsine, Yan Kala Kato, Yan
Hakika, Darul Islam, Yan Shia, and the Taliban who are regarded as the
precursor of Boko Haram. The common thing about these Islamist splinter groups
is that they drew their recruits from the same sources, which include youth
groups and Qur’anic school pupils, especially mature students (Gardawa). During
the colonial period, the Tijjaniya Sufi orders and Mahdism were regarded as
extremist, fanatical and anti-British in their utterances and activities. These
groups therefore suffered persecution in the hands of the British. Many emirs
who were sympathetic to these groups were deposed and exiled. Unlike the others, the Qadirriya Sufi order
was considered to be liberal and accommodating to the British colonial system.
Nigeria is mostly regarded as the demographic and ideological Centre of Gravity
of West and Central Africa. Equally northern Nigeria became and still enjoys
the status of being the source of novel
ideas and knowledge that nurtures Islamic revolutionary ideologies across its
present borders.
Many factors
have been credited with the evolution of Boko Haram. The group, which became
the first to take up arms in an unprecedented scale against the Nigerian State.
The dominant perspectives in the academic cycles holds that the failure of
state institutions to address key socio-economic and political issues and challenges
played a pivotal role on the evolution of Boko Haram. On the other hand,
conspiracy theories have also been advanced on the academic discourse and
polemical debates on the origin of Boko Haram. Some perspectives posit that the
emergence of the extremist group was doctored by the western world in an
attempt to destabilize the Nigerian state. This school of thought argues that
as the Nigeria, being the largest emerging economy in the African continent,
was a threat to the western and American economic interest in Africa. The paper
contributes to the discussion of the historical development of Boko Haram. The paper critically examines the various
perspectives put forward to reinterpret some perceptions within the context of
the internal dynamics that are connected to the growth of Boko Haram insurgency
in Nigeria.
In addition to
the aforementioned, the paper discusses the material conditions that impelled
the insurgency of Boko Haram to subsist for over a decade. It also looks at
other issues, and local conditions, which are largely being ignored in the
literatures on the origin and fruition of Boko Haram. The issue of conviction
and martyrdom is critical in burgeoning the population of the group. The
factors that prompted the internalization of Boko Haram, which links the group
with ISIS and ISIL, which likely confirms the assertion of external conspiracy
on Boko Haram? Though, history do not support conspiracy in shaping society or
human phenomenon, because there must be internal dynamics that created enabling
conditions for conspiracy to thrives. Certainly, emotions and sentiments had
beclouded some of the literatures that reduced the significance of the
historical process of the insurgency to the rupture and extremist
interpretations of Islam by the scholars of the Ahl Sunna wal jamaa (Wahabi-salafi),
who often regarded themselves as the orthodox followers of the footstep of the
Prophet SAW. In Nigeria the Da’awah against Sufism interpretations of Islam was
championed and pioneered by late Sheikh Gumi, who inspired the formation of
Izalatul Bidi’a Wa’iqamatul Suunah, a splinter group considered as the
forerunner to Boko Haram. However, the paper concludes with the assertion that
Izala-Salafi movements were not spared by the Boko Haram insurgents. The
resounding questions still remain; who are really the Boko Haram members and
what do they stand? What do they want to achieve in a pluralistic society? Who
are their sponsors? Has the movement been hijacked by others as is being
proclaimed? The paper concludes that
Boko Haram is a complicated historical process that defies theorization, compartmentalization
and conceptualization because of the diverse interests involved in its
evolution, nurture and development.
Impact of the
Middle East on Sectarian Movements in Nigeria
The Middle
East, the root of Islamic religion has a strong impact on Islamic development
in the West African states including Nigeria. The fraternity that connects West
Africa and the Middle East dates back to the period of Trans-Saharan trade,
which led to the spread of Islam. The Middle East is regarded as the heart of
the religion. Thus, all socio-political developments, which affected the region
were largely classified as either Islamic or anti-Islamic. In this regard
religious movements continued to play insightful effects on the religious
activities and political reengineering in West Africa. The evolution of
sectarian movements, particularly the Sufi orders, the orthodox and
neo-Salafism were byproducts of these historical processes. There are missing links in the literature
relating to the interpretations of the effects of the Middle East towards
fostering sectarian movements not only in Nigeria, but in the West African
sub-region, the homes of Nigerian Boko Haram and Sahelian insurgency in Mali,
Burkina Faso and Niger.
Islam fostered
robust intellectual, socio-political and economic linkages for many centuries.
Consequently, developments in social and political engineering in the Middle
East had profound effects on West Africa and particularly among Nigerian
Muslims. In recent times, Nigerian Muslims are becoming increasingly exposed to
external influences and ideas, which have evoked dissenting feelings. The
continued upsurge in sectarian groups in the Nigerian socio-religious and
political scenes are almost all traceable to similar events or literatures
emanating from the Middle Eastern region. The Islamic sects could only be
understood by studying their historical linkages within the World of Islam. The
Middle East cannot be ignored in an attempt to discern clearly the upsurge of
sectarian and insurgency especially towards shaping and engendering insurgency
in northern Nigeria and Nigeria as a whole. These insurgencies have further
deepened the fragmentation and social disorder in the development of
contemporary Nigeria. They have also fostered internal politics and rivalries
between rival networks of sectarian groups. These splinter groups particularly
the Sufi orders and the Hijaz revivalist movements such as the Salafi-
Wahabiyya and neo-Salafism had significant effects in entrenching dissection
amongst the majority of Nigerian Muslims.
The series of
intra religious conflicts that dominated the landscape of the Islamic movements
in Nigeria were to a large extent viewed within the context of receiving moral
and financial backing from the Middle East. A typical case in point was the
Maitatsine disturbances of the 1980s that occurred in Kano and later spread to
other parts of northern Nigeria. The Sufis accused Saudi Arabian government of
sponsoring the crisis. On the other hand, the Izala suspected the former Libyan
leader, Muhammad Gaddafi of financing the Maitatsine cataclysm, which began
from Kano and gradually spread to other part of northern Nigeria.
The Islamic
brotherhood uprising in Egypt in the 1960s, which provoked mass exodus of
members of the Muslim brotherhood to Nigeria also had its repercussion on the
Nigerian Muslim socio-religious and political platform. The Iranian revolution of 1979 succeeded in
making Nigeria the Shiism stronghold in West Africa through the evolution of
Islamic Movement of Nigeria under the banner of Sheikh Ibrahim El-Zakzaky. The
first major upsurge of Boko Haram phenomenon occurred in the 1980s, which was a
byproduct of the Iranian revolution. However, it has been largely ignored in
the literature of the present dimension of Boko Haram, the harbinger of present
Boko Haram. Again, critical assessment of historical events, such as the
American attacks on Libya in the 1980s; the invasion of Iraq and Afghanistan in
the 1990s and 2003 following the devastating attack on American twin-tower,
popularly known as of 9/11 were all conceived as anti-Islam. These developments
invoked ill feelings and anti-America sentiments, which led to the naming of
Nigerian Muslim children as either Gaddafi or Sadam respectively.
Another
critical dimension, rarely discussed was the split of Izala-Salafi into two
camps: the pro-Sadam (Sadamawa) and pro-Bush (Bushawa) in the Iraq-Saudi
Arabia-Kuwait debacle. The Arab springs which led to the end of Mubarak and
subsequent emergence of Islamic Brotherhood government, the subsequent toppling
of the Islamic Brotherhood government in Egypt as well as the Libyan and Syrian
crises further deepened the radicalization of Nigerian Muslims against the West
and America. Undoubtedly, Nigeria has
had long cultural and fraternal connection with Egypt, Libya and more
importantly Hijaz. In this regard, Muslims in Nigeria perceive developments in
the Middle East as touching them directly. These fraternizations have resulted
in the emergence of sectarian groups with different postures and dimensions
leading to the superfluity of clashes between the Islamic Movements, the
Nigerian Taliban, Boko Haram insurgents and forces of the Nigerian State. The
presumed connection of Muhammad Ali with the Osama ibn Ladan, who was the
founder of Taliban that later metamorphosed into Boko Haram, is very pertinent
in the proper conception of the historical process of the Nigerian insurgency.
Thus, it will be difficult to fathom the continued emergence of varied Islamic
splinter groups, without examining the impact of Islamic development in the
Middle East had on Nigerian Muslims.
Muhammad Ali:
The Nigerian Taliban at Kanamma
There are many
discourses and polemical debates on the origin and the real founders of Boko
Haram. It has generated heated debates amongst scholars and government
officials. This has led to the productions of many literatures, which purported
that Boko Haram members and ideology emanated from the Izala-Salafi and Wahhabism
interpretation of Islam, which challenged the dominant perspectives enshrined
in the Sufis understanding of Islam. While others argued that Boko Haram is an
extension of the Islamic Brotherhood movement enunciated by Sheikh Ibrahim
El-Zakzaky, until his followers fall out with him in the early 1990s, when they
realized that he concealed Shiite doctrine (Taqiyyah) for long time.
Yet, the
evolution of Boko Haram could be analyzed from different historical phases. The
formative stage; the proselytization stage; the development of organizational
structure; and finally, the militant and confrontation with the security
agencies, which climax to detonating of explosive and suicidal bombings. Others
examine the historical process of Boko Haram within the context of religious
indoctrinations; raging poverty and the ravaging economic inequalities;
prolonged period of military and return to civilian rule in 1999; youth
militancy and restiveness. Another school of thought, pigeonholed the phases of
Boko Haram from the Kanamma-Taliban incidence of 2003-2004; then the
re-grouping and rebuilding, which was marked by Da’awa, which culminated in the
radicalization of the group from 2005-2009. The insurrection and confrontation,
which occasioned the death of the leader of the movement, Muhammad Yusuf in
2009.
The extremist
interpretation of Islam, which served as the root cause of Boko Haram ideology
was introduced into Nigeria by a handful of youths, many of who studied abroad.
They are mostly children of the top echelon of the society. They propagated and
advocated the burning desire to change and transform the society from decadence
and oppression. The ring leader of the group was Muhammad Ali who studied in
the Sudan and presumably was indoctrinated by Usama bin Ladan, the founder of
al-Qaida. Muhammad Ali was probably a Chadian who travelled extensively and
participated in many struggles. This had exposed him to the outside world.
Between 2000 and 2002 Osama bin Laden issued two audio messages calling on
Nigerian Muslims to wage jihad and establish an Islamic state. Osama met
Mohammed Ali, who was then studying at the International Islamic University of
Africa, Khartoum. He became a disciple of Osama and thus, facilitated Muhammad
Ali to travel to Afghanistan and received training alongside with Mujahideen.
He became the front runner of the decades of Nigerian insurgency. It was
alleged that, while at Sudan, Bin Laden provided Muhammad Ali with huge
financial support to carry out Islamic programs of Daawah and mobilize youth
for Jihad. Approximately $3 million was
released by Osama, by then equivalent to 300-million-naira. Subsequently,
Muhammad Ali returned to Nigeria in 2002 and engaged in robust religious
activities under many guises. While in Sudan, Muhammad Ali had recruited
prominent individuals who began the Movement before he returned. These include
Babagana, Abubakar Shekau and Muhammad
who become his close lieutenants. However, the missing links in the narratives
is when and how Muhammad Ali met Muhammad Yusuf.
Immediately, he
returned from Sudan, Muhammad Ali began internecine preaching in 2002 by
mobilizing disenchanted youths at the famous Alhaji Muhammad Indimi mosque in
Maiduguri, which began as taalim reading cycles. He gradually appealed to the
yearnings of young school leavers and University graduates. Within short period
he built formidable followers who shared similar thoughts and aspirations of
changing the decadent society replete with evils. Muhammad Ali and his
followers deepened their knowledge with the reading of literature written by
Sheikh AbdulMun’in Mustafa Halima popularly known as Abul-basir At-tartusiy .As
the movement gained momentum, Muhammad Ali embarked on a hijra (migration) in
conformity with the Prophet SAW migration from Mecca to Madina and Sheikh
‘Uthman Danfodio hijra from Gudu to Degel. The group referred themselves and
also called by the local population as Taliban or ‘’Nigerian Taliban’’, and
intend to conduct their lives in conformity with the lives of Afghanistan
Taliban. Coincidentally, a prominent business man, Alhaji Bello Damagum was
suspected of sponsoring the group or heralding the emergence of the Taliban. Indeed,
information from Damagum portrayed that Bello Damagum facilitated the Tafsir
session of Muhammad Yusuf at Damagum. And to stimulate the literacy level of
the people of Damagum, he collaborated with the Mauritanian network and sent
few children to Mauritania to advance their Islamic knowledge. This effort was
later translated of participating and masterminding the emergence of the
Taliban group. The charges had been dismissed long ago by a competent court.
Consequently,
Muhammad Ali and his followers embarked on a hijrah from Maiduguri to Geidam
and finally to Kanamma in Yobe State, since the earth is filled with unbelief. The
leadership of the Taliban group was under Muhammad Ali and Muhammad Kamar. One
in charge of military training and the other in charge of Daawah. The dominant
ideology of the Taliban was withdrawing from secular system and values.
Contrary to Muhammad Yusuf’s ideology of Boko. It was alluded that from Kanamma
the two had disagreement on philosophy of the movement. Kanamma is situated at
the fringes of a border with Niger Republic. While at Kanamma people flocked
and thronged from different directions and paid their allegiance. The group
were highly committed to reviving the teaching of Islam and establishing an
Islamic polity and government. The leaders of the Taliban avowed that the
implementation of Shariah legal system by some northern governors was a
‘’Political Shariah’’, hence they were agitating a full-scale Shariah. The Taliban group had misunderstanding with
the community of Kanamma, and they refused to sell them food, which led to
confrontation. The incidence happened at the last quarter of 2003. Consequently, the Kanamma community sought
the intervention of the Nigerian police. Unfortunately, the militant faction of
the Taliban seized the rifles of the Nigerian police. The police mobilized
reinforcements and in aggressive encountered most members of the Taliban were
decimated. At that time the ring leader of the group also lost his life. In the
course of the fracas Muhammad Ali prophesized that the group will bounce back
and ultimately become a scourge (bone stuck in the throat) for the Nigerian
State .
Muhammad Yusuf:
Groundbreaking the Boko Haram 2004-2009
Muhammad Yusuf
was until hitherto unknown in Maiduguri, he hailed from Jakusko village
situated around Yunusari in the Gashua region in the present day Yobe State. He
was initially an ardent follower of Nigerian Muslim Brotherhood under the
auspices of Sheikh Ibrahim El-Zakzaky. However, in the early 1990s the
Zakzaky’s followers fall out, following the appalling discovery that El-Zakzaky
was behind Iran version of Islam (Shiism), It was only after El- Zakzaky’s
conversion to the Shi’i school of thought.
At this points Muhammad was the Ameer (president) of Muslim Brotherhood
in Maiduguri. Subsequently, as a
disciple of El-Zakzaky reinforces his conviction of Boko Haram. Because
El-Zakzaky was the first Boko Haram in Nigeria.’’ The Islam Only Movement was
very much opposed to Boko and through El-Zakzaky’s sermons and preaching tours
in the 1980s, many secondary and University students dropped out of school, to
dedicate themselves wholly and partly to the movement’’. During this period, all systems were regarded
as Taaghut (infidel). In spite of the raging controversies of whether Muhammad
Ali or Muhammad pioneered the movement, which led to Kanamma incidence.
Certainly, Muhammad Yusuf was at large before or immediately after the Kanamma
episode. He travelled to Saudi Arabia and stayed as asylum until normalcy
returned and promised not to return back on his erstwhile preaching’s. it was posited that Muhammad Ali, was
instrumental for initiating Muhammad Yusuf into militant jihadi ideology.
Following the
decimation of the group by the Nigerian security agencies, the survivors
relocated to Maiduguri. They eventually congregated around Muhammad Yusuf who
provided leadership and rebuilt the group. At this period the ideological
inclination of this group has not been clearly delineated. Muhammad Yusuf was
very eloquent, diplomatic and strategic in approach than Muhammad Abu Ali. However, Muhammad Yusuf, transferred the
headquarters of the group from Indimi mosque to Gwange situated railway
quarters in the metropolis. He built a
mosque and called it Ibn Taimiyya Masjid. And named the group Yusufiyyah
Islamic Movements. However, in a day,
Muhammad Yusuf transformed the name of the group from Yusufiyya Islamic
Movement to Jama’atu Ahlus-Sunna Lidda’Awati Wal Jihad. Till date the followers
of the group continue to ascribe the name to themselves. He authored a book, largely considered as a
proclamation, titled: Hadhihee aqidatuna
wa manhaji da’awatina (This is our Belief and Method of Call). In the preface
of the book, he denounced and debunked the names ascribed to the group by
others, – such as al-Khawarij, Shi’ite, Qur’aniyun or some secret group.
Within a short
period, the group metamorphosed into large movements, drawing followers from
all classes of people. These include, the educated, uneducated and even civil
servants. These classes of people were mostly alienated in the society. The
majority of them acquired University degrees and its equivalents, but tore
their certificates. They regard as anathema to attend secular-oriented schools
of any kind. Others believed that some members were initiated to follow the
group through charm and mysteries (Asiri). Despite the sagacity of Muhammad
Yusuf to convince his followers about the ills of western education. The plain
of Kanem Borno (successor to Safewa dynasty Intellectual tradition,), which
comprised present day Yobe and Borno since the onset of colonial rule shunned
western type schools, especially the rural areas, authorities had to make
vigorous efforts to recruit pupils for the rural communities to enroll their
children to school. Thus, it was not surprising that Muhammad was able to
inspire them to join the Boko Haram movements. Indeed, this factor is more
paramount that served as basis for recruitment than other consideration. It
served as the internal dynamics of the state and society of the former Kanem
Borno empire that created the enabling environment for ideology of Boko Haram
to subsists. In the midst of this realities, Muhammad Yusuf becomes a
phenomenon articulating the aspiration of section of the society not only in
Borno, but the entire northern Nigeria. By 2006 Muhammad Yusuf has begun
propagating the principles and ideology of Boko Haram. He then gradually
engaged into polemical debate with different Islamic scholars and delivering
sermons in many places. Through his numerous lectures, Muhammad Yusuf drew the
attention of his audience on the importance of why Muslims should reject the
Nigerian Government and its institutions, because it was a bastion of kufr
(Disbelief) .
In addition to
the above, as rightly pointed out, Muhammad Yusuf exploited the failure of
leadership coupled with endemic corruption at all levels, and gives hope for
better future and eternal bliss awaiting them in this world and in the
hereafter with the establishment of Islamic state. There were many instances of
civil servants, including uniformed personnel who retires from services and
joined Muhammad Yusuf. Indeed, these classes of people constitutes parts of the
sources financing the activities. There is other window of funding, which are
still obscure or not known. This may had led to his execution. Other popular
assertion indicated that Muhammad Yusuf derived funding from foreign countries.
However, the real sources of funds for Muhammad Yusuf are still shrouded in
mysteries and becomes an intense subject of debates among researchers of Boko
Haram. There is still speculations’ that international donor agencies provided
funding under cover up of providing relief materials to the victims and de-radicalization
of the group. The general perception and speculation within academics and
public analyst are that Muhammad Yusuf received funding from the Middle East.
The countries mostly cited are Saudi Arabia, Algeria, America and France
through clandestine activities in Nigeria. But there was absence of concrete
evidence to support the assertion. At
certain extent unsubstantiated allegation is labeled against Christian
Association of Nigeria (CAN), as providing funding and reinforcements for the
group. The arrests of the private jet of
the president of CAN in South Africa engaging in arms deal has added impetus
and credence to the accusation. The huge sums of money found in the account of Muhammad
Yusuf, domiciled in many banks after his demise gave rise to many questions
that are still begging for answers. This unanswered question has added to the
complexity of Boko Haram and its conspiracy theories. While some sources
indicated initial funding from Osama bin Laden through Muhammad Ali, there is
very little to point to whether or not Muhammad Yusuf inherited funds left
behind by Muhammad Ali?
Muhammad Yusuf
was able to appeal to the bulk of his followers, especially those who had
acquired western education that the earth is flat and not round; he challenged
the Darwin’s theory of evolution as blatant lie; disagreed with the theory,
which states that rainfall is caused by evaporation; there is only seven
planets not nine as proclaimed by western scientist; co-education should also
be prohibited, and hence, ban in all schools. These constitutes the crux of his
ideological leanings and the hallmark of the popular slogan called Boko Haram.
This coinage has become a household name throughout the life history of the
group. In his book, Muhammad Yusuf states as follows:
“Any who claims
that the new technological inventions as a creator and an initiator other than
Allah, the Highest, becomes the type of philosophers who believe not in Allah.
and disputed his existence. Allah is far from their wrong belief. Whoever also
differentiates between the creation of animals, inanimate objects, people,
jinns, crawling animals, sun, moon stars, trees, mountains, heaven and earth
and modern technological inventions in terms of invention, creation and
founding, such a person belongs to the people of whim”.
As a master
strategist, Muhammad Yusuf emulated the methodology of Daawah and mobilization
strategies of Sheikh Ibrahim Al-Zakzaky, which centered on economic
empowerment. He instituted micro credits
scheme to small income earners of the group.
The scheme succeeded in maintaining and sustaining the burgeoning
followers. The benefiting communities include rural communities and small-scale
traders and hawkers.
However, the
group had two factions. The militant faction and non-militant faction. The
militants were represented by the remaining rebellious elements and disciples
of Muhammad Ali, under the banner of Abubakar Shekau, the non-militant elements
were represented by Muhammad Yusuf. The perception of the people of Maiduguri
on Muhammad Yusuf, was a person who like to attain fame and popularity cheaply.
And undeniably, through the social system he initiated Muhammad Yusuf within
short time had grown wings and collected large following. Accordingly, his
growing influence deluded him to believe that he has become a force to be
reckoned in the political development of Borno. This has prompted, some
political thought to begin predicting the end of his prominence. Ultimately, he
had reached the pinnacle of his fame, which deceived to presumed time was ripe
to arms against the Nigerian State. Indeed, he fooled himself and embarked on a
mission that led him to total destruction.
On the other hands, among his followers who were hardliners, pressurized
him to start on the long-awaited jihad they were yearning, which will culminate
to the establishment of an Islamic government where Islamic law and principles
will take precedence over manmade laws.
Coincidentally,
Muhammad Yusuf travelled outside Maiduguri, and on way back, he was received by
a mammoth crowd of followers. The burgeoning followers misled Mohammed Yusuf
into thinking that he was now ready to pick up arms against the Nigerian state,
unfortunately, he had underrated the capacity of the Nigerian state. The crowd
that received Muhammad signaled the time bomb awaiting explosion. Therefore, the government enforced the use of
helmet for all motorcycles in Maiduguri. The members of the group defied the
order, which in turn led to open confrontation with the police. This marked the onset of the Boko Haram
crises and fracas that have lasted for over a decade. It led to colossal loss
of lives and property and consumed huge state resources to contain it, but to
no avail. The crises have defied solutions and assumed diverse interpretations
and conspiracy theories. Despite numerous security reports on the danger the
group portend to peace and stability in Maiduguri, authorities became adamant
and recalcitrant to take any action to curtail their utterances, until the
situation degenerated to unprecedented proportion. Behind the scene, Muhammad
Yusuf enjoyed supports from different classes of the society at the initial
stage. This support emboldened the growth of the movements to monumental scale.
Another
interesting aspect of the group, which served as a catalyst for the growth and
development of the group was its romance with the political class of Borno.
This allegation has received currency in some literatures of Boko Haram. The
dominant perspectives, indicated strong connection with the then Governor of
Borno state, Ali Modu Sherrif who utilized the organizational structure of the
group to advance his own political course. Having achieved his objective, Modu
Sherif severed relations with the group. The extra-judicial killings of
Muhammad Yusuf and former commissioner of religious affairs who had served as
the link man, were hurriedly eliminated probably in order to conceal
information on the connection of the group with government that be.
The episode of
June 2009 is very significant in the life-history of the evolution of the
group. It marked the onset of open confrontation and deadly phase of the group.
Their retaliation a month after, in July 2009 marked the beginning of over a
decade of the Boko Haram insurgency in Nigeria. JASLIWAJ was seen as a state
within a state that planned and schemed to wrestle power. An impression, which could not be taken
lightly by the authorities. Before that date, little is known about the
nefarious activities of the group outside Maiduguri. The general assumptions
about the group by security agencies, they do not constitute threat to
government. Hence, their activities will be contained and confined within the
borders of Borno, at most Yobe State. And Muhammad Yusuf was a mere charlatan
seeking for fame. Unfortunately, the security underestimated preparedness of
the group to confront government. This
beclouds the thinking of taken decisive actions against them at early times.
They were likened with similar splinter group that emerged and died within the
confines of the region or state they emerged. Regrettably, with the killing of
the ring leader and other principal founders. The remaining went underground,
re-organized and resurfaced stronger and become more deadly than before. Since
then, they assumed different approach of mass killing with explosive devises,
under the leadership of Abubakar Shekau. Accordingly, many stereotype has been pervaded
with regards to wanton killings, lootings, organized arson, kidnappings,
bombings of innocent lives and destruction of properties within and outside
Maiduguri. Indeed, within 5-6 years, Boko Haram had instilled psychological
trauma not only in the minds of the people of Maiduguri, but throughout
northern and Nigeria as a whole. It had made travelling from one place to
another more difficult, because of the multitudes of security checkpoints
mounted across the major highways of the country.
Conclusion
The story of
Boko Haram is not merely a narrative of religious extremism, but one that
underscores the profound entanglement of history, ideology, and politics in
northern Nigeria and beyond. Its emergence cannot be explained by singular
variables such as poverty, unemployment, or even foreign conspiracies; rather,
it reflects a layered process in which internal grievances converged with
external ideological currents to produce one of the most formidable
insurgencies in Africa. From the Kanamma episode under Muhammad Ali to the
meteoric rise of Muhammad Yusuf, the group’s trajectory has been shaped by the
interplay of local religious movements, socio-economic marginalization,
fractured governance, and global jihadist networks. Boko Haram thrives within
spaces where the failures of the Nigerian state intersect with long-standing
cultural and religious contestations. At the same time, its resonance with
Middle Eastern upheavals and global Islamic reformist currents illustrates how
transnational linkages reinforce local insurgencies. Importantly, the sect’s
history also exposes the ambiguities of political patronage, the volatility of
religious reform, and the persistence of unresolved questions about identity,
legitimacy, and power in Nigeria’s plural society.
Ultimately, Boko Haram should not be understood as a
static or isolated phenomenon, but as a dynamic historical process that
continues to evolve in response to shifting local and global contexts. Its
trajectory challenges scholars and policymakers to move beyond reductionist
explanations and to recognize the insurgency as both a product of Nigeria’s
internal contradictions and a reflection of wider geopolitical transformations.
Any attempt at resolution must therefore grapple not only with the immediate
security dimensions of the crisis, but also with its deeper historical roots,
intellectual genealogies, and the structural conditions that sustain
discontent. In this sense, Boko Haram is less an aberration of history than a
mirror held up to the unresolved tensions of Nigerian statehood and the
enduring legacies of global Islamic politics.
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