Nigeria and the Quest for Regional Hegemony in West African Sub-Region: An Assessment, 1960-2025

Cite this article: Maiwada, B. Ahmad, R. M. & Dantsoho, M. 2026. “Nigeria and the Quest for Regional Hegemony in West African Sub-Region: An Assessment, 1960-2025”. Sokoto Journal of History Vol. 14, Iss. 01. Pp. 95-105. www.doi.org/10.36349/sokotojh.2026.v14i01.009

NIGERIA AND THE QUEST FOR REGIONAL HEGEMONY IN WEST AFRICAN SUB-REGION: AN ASSESSMENT, 1960-2025

By

Bashir Maiwada

Rabiu Muhammad Ahmad

Mahmoud Dantsoho

Department of History and Strategic Studies, Kaduna State University, Kaduna

Abstract: This paper examines the historical, political, and economic dynamics underpinning France's relationship with its African colonies. Rooted in the legacy of colonialism, France-Africa relations have been characterized by a blend of centralized control over defense, foreign affairs, and economic policies, while granting limited internal self-governance to the colonies. The persistence of patrimonial ties between French and African elites further solidified this relationship, with a formal structure that included institutions like the Presidency, the Ministry of Cooperation, and the French Monetary Zone (CFA). Over time, however, France's African policy has undergone significant shifts, marked by phases of disengagement and strategic redeployment. This paper underscores the duality of historical entrenchment and contemporary transformation in France's African engagements while reflecting on the broader implications for post-colonial power dynamics.

Keywords: France-Africa relations, Post-colonialism, French Monetary Zone (CFA), Colonial legacy, Political and economic dependency

Introduction

The post-World War II period witnessed various events and developments in international affairs, but none was more pronounced and articulated than the decolonisation process, which was used more vigorously by Pan-Africanism and the United Nations General Assembly through resolution 1514 of December 14, 1960.^[1] The decolonisation process received legal backing and led to the emergence of new nation-states in the international affairs.^[2] Interestingly, no continent of the world benefitted from the United Nations and other International bodies’ magnanimity of spirit as much as did Africa. For example, in 1960 alone, seventeen African countries became independent and joined the United Nations as members.^[3] The majority of them were from the West African sub-region. Among the new “entrants” into the world politics is Nigeria, which by virtue of its size, people and natural endowments, as well as its peers in the West African sub-region, possessed the quality to lead and direct affairs in the region. Thus, given these existential realities, the ruling elites upon whom the leadership of the country was bestowed at independence, not only considered and articulated the ideas for a regional hegemonic role for the country but also outlined manifestos for its hegemony in the West African region in the foreseeable future.^[4]

Nigeria appears a giant nation south of the Sahara Africa which would lead Africa and the entire black race in their march to world supremacy in international affairs^[5] due largely to the enormous wealth at its disposal. After sixty years of Nigeria’s diplomatic engagements in the region, through the formation of ECOWAS in 1975, and the realities on ground in the last few years, Nigeria’s ambition slip-up and gaffe here and there, which indicated that its much conceivable and well publicised dreams may appears not to have matched the hegemonic role associated to it at the time the country got her independence in 1960. In fact, the giant of Africa was in the danger of becoming the midget of the world.^[6]

 However, in the 1980s, early 1990s and specifically in 2017, Nigeria had displayed great statesmanship as a regional power. It was due to Nigeria's interventions in the Liberia, Sierra Leone, and the Gambia crises that relative peace was restored in those countries. Also, attempts were made by the Nigerian government to ensure civilian governments reigned in the region, which forced three Sahel countries, namely Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso Republics, to secede from the Economic Community of West African States in 2025 (ECOWAS).This development adds the number of countries that withdrew their membership from the regional body to four: Mauritania, Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso.

 Therefore, the thrusts of the study is to examine and elucidate on some of the dynamics behind the Nigeria’s failure in the twenty first century to realise and translate its dreams of its founding fathers of becoming a regional power in West African sub-region, despite having the immense material power potentials, which is the basis upon which hegemonic role was conceived for it at independence into hegemony in the West Africa sub-region after over six decades of independence.

Dynamics impede Nigeria's hegemonic ambitions

 Many factors were advanced by scholars, writers, and analysts of international affairs for why Nigeria was unable to achieve its ambition of becoming a regional power in the south of Saharan African sub-region. Some of the factors positioned by scholars include the problematic-bad stewardship by Nigeria government, colonial legacy in the region, geopolitics, lack of political stability and will power, the heterogeneous nature of the regions, ideological differences and many other reasons but the French factor-la Francophonie-appears to have been the most dominant view among scholars, writers and diplomats.^[7]

 The common views in these scholarly works on Franco-Nigerian relations are that la Francophonie is seen as the strong kinships of Francophone states in West Africa towards France, which is the main obstacle to Nigeria’s hegemonic quest in the West African sub-region, despite Nigeria's leading role in the ECOWAS.

Other scholars express different views, such as the inability of Nigeria to build its hegemony from the domestic society. Therefore, each of the two schools of thought or views is examined in considerable detail.

Since Nigeria’s independence in 1960, its relations with France have been indecisive between hostility and mistrust until recently, when President Tinubu came into power in 2023, tilting his foreign relations toward France as a strong ally in West African regionalism. But, international relations between Nigeria and France have been characterised since the outset by distrust, hostility and conflict.^[8]

 Perhaps, this may be because the two countries, France and Nigeria consider West Africa as a strategic region in their quest for hegemony in their respective regions. Put differently, the two countries, France and Nigeria, consider West Africa as the epicentre of their strategic calculations to be regional powers. In fact, Nigeria sees West Africa region in particular and Africa in general as the central zone of her policy.^[9]

 French also looks at the West African region as her foreign policy instrument.^[10]In fact, without French possession in the West African region, the position or status and prestige of France in Europe as a power would be a mirage. France depends so much on its Francophone West African states for promoting its political and economic activities not only in Europe but in the world in general. It is in this context that the region becomes the object for which both are competing for supremacy.

Apart from France, there are other foreign powers, whose presence and influence in the region are bringing setbacks as well as obstacles to Nigeria’s ambition of becoming a regional hegemon in the West African sub-region. Foreign powers such as Russia, China and the United States of America. The West Africa region is considered to be of strategic importance to France and other powers because of the mineral resources that are in the region.

It is worth mentioning that Francafrique is the soul of France's interaction with Africa, and has been conditioned by certain environmental and historical forces in France and West Africa. Historically, the forces of colonialism played an important part in encouraging Francafrique. Francafrique is not just a post-World War II development but is deeply rooted in earlier events. Before the latter part of the 19th century, France was the torchbearer of European civilisation. For example, she was the first republican state in Europe.

 Again, she was the most populous nation in Europe and this naturally conferred leadership on her. More importantly, France, along with England, the Netherlands, the Ottoman Empire and Austria, were the only great powers in the global system of the 17th century.^[11] Russia and Prussia joined the great power league in the 18th century. Precisely in 1871, the greatness of France, following the defeat by Prussia, not only began to diminish but also became debatable in International politics.^[12]

 The defeat by Prussia and the emergence of Germany as a major power in the first decade of the 20th century further eroded the prestige, position and glory once enjoyed by France in Europe. Therefore, France has to look for somewhere else to redeem its glory, which was Africa. Due to this, France was among the front-runners in supporting the outcome of the Berlin conference of 1885. Furthermore, the First and Second World Wars also weakened France as it suffered greatly both in terms of human and material resources. Her statue or position in Europe was totally smeared.

 However, it is informative to note that following the end of World War II, France managed to be among the “Big Four” after the USA, Soviet Union and Britain, as the new custodian of the international system. At major conferences held, leading to the formation of the United Nations, France, with the other members of the “Big Four” club, played a major part in the establishment of the UN body.^[13]

 In another way, the period of French history between 1945 and 1958 had three particular features, first, the material, demographic and economic recovery of the nation; second, the colonial wars from Vietnam to Algeria, leading to what is called either the loss of the empire or the emancipation of the Asian and African people; third the permanent political crisis of the republic, symbolized in the eyes of foreign observers by the instability of its successive governments.^[14] In fact, it was not long, when France lost out in the power game to determine the leadership of the Western bloc, following the Soviet Union threat.^[15] These external challenges, coupled with domestic instability, particularly during the fourth republic, put France as a weak entity, when compared to other Western powers of the period.

 In the midst of these challenges, French policymakers, led by Charles de Gaulle, were convinced that no foreign national would be prepared to do for France what the French people could not do for themselves and therefore, they introduced the policy of grandeur la France in the face of French demoralization and weakness, at home and abroad.

In fact, it has even reached a stage where France could not maintain its overseas possessions- colonies in Africa. France depended solely on the resources and contributions of its colonies in Africa. Therefore, the policy’s objective of grandeur la France was to find ways and means of enabling France to rise to the challenge of a great power and be on par with other European powers.^[16] It was these internal and external troubles that compelled the French leaders to see Africa as an indispensible region towards realising its lost glory.^[17] In light of these, even in the face of intense decolonisation struggles across the continent, Paris holds on to its colonies in West Africa.

 The return of President Charles de Gaulle to power in 1958, after due consideration, started a new chapter in the process of granting independence to French colonies in Africa. Put it in another perspective, just like Britain, when it was under pressure from the USA, to hand over power to her colonies in Africa. But in the case of France, under de Gaulle, it was planning to link its colonies in some form of association (community) with France. Put differently, President Charles de Gaulle did not intend to give complete independence to the French erstwhile colonies. Rather, he wanted to create an order that granted internal government to the African colonies while Paris retained control over defence, foreign affairs and the economy of its colonies.^[18]

Even after granting independence to the Francophone West African colonies, France instituted a patronage system that spurred an unequal relationship between France and its former colonies. In ensuring the system works well in the former colonies, the French government, acting as the patron of the colonies, gave political, military and economic favours to the clientele-states (the former colonies). In return, the clientele-states in Africa were expected to give political loyalty and support to Paris. In place of French controlled administration, the new states were not run by elite groups long accustomed to collaborating with the French and well accustomed to the French system of management and culture.^[19]

Nevertheless, the whole system was put into nomenclature as la Francophonie. Through this framework, Paris was able to control the policies of these states.^[20]Sadly to note, France-African relations are rooted and have been strengthened by strong interpersonal relations between French and African elites. In fact, for decades, this patrimonial relationship was sustained through a highly differentiated formal structure: the Presidency, the Ministry of Co-operation, Technical Assistance and Co-operation, the French Monetary Zone (CFA) and later the Franco-African summits.

In essence, African policy for decades was run by the triumvirates of the President, the cellule African de l’Elysee (ministry of co-operation) and Caisse Francaise de Development.

Through these formal and informal structures, France was able to control both the internal and external affairs of the Francophone West African states to the consternation of Nigeria and other Anglophone countries.^[21]Also, the authorities in Paris have always considered their intervention in these countries as the continuation of the Gaullist agenda. For example, when France intervened militarily in Shaba in the spring of 1977, President Giscard d’Estaing justified the action, among other reasons, as a gesture of European solidarity with Africa.^[22]

Paris had succeeded in shaping the policy directions of the Francophone countries and, by extension, to a reasonable extent, in shaping development thinking and policy in West Africa.^[23]

This situation can be seen with the politics behind the formation of the Union économique monétaire de l’Ouest de l’Afrique (UEMOA), and its precursor, Communauté économique de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (CEAO). At the behest of France, the two bodies were floated to support France’s puppet regimes in the sub-region to weaken the broader regional grouping of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), promoted by Nigeria. This not only raised the issues of primary allegiance and conflicting loyalties, but also extra financial and human costs, putting the rivalry between UEMOA and ECOWAS.^[24]

So successful has Union économique monétaire de l’Ouest de l’Afrique ( UEMOA) check-mated and undermined ECOWAS that all that the latter now spends a great deal of its time doing is to harmonise, trade, common currency, free movement of people and services, as well as a regional force.

It is deductively clear from the foregoing that West Africa, from the perspective of France, is a strategic region vital to its global quest for hegemony. And it is an instrument for Paris in her search for a great power status, a source of raw materials and outlet for French finished goods, an ally in the anti-hegemonic struggle with other European rivals and the platform for the making of a new France.

It is also clear from the foregoing that France’s policy in West Africa has always been to establish hegemony in Africa. Other foreign powers like the USA, Russia and China have the same ambitions of exploiting the resources and markets of West African States. Indeed, perhaps the three newcomers- foreign powers into the affairs of West African States are sowing the seed of discontentment in the region and even in the Economic Community of West African States, which Nigeria cherishes in using the platform to secure regional hegemony in the sub-region.

On the other hand, Nigeria is potentially the greatest power in Africa from the standpoint of elements of national power with impressive credentials at the inception of her full entry into the comity of nations; she saw the West African sub-region as her natural sphere of influence and the hub of her hegemonic quest.^[25]

To this end, the country’s foreign policy principles and objectives were framed around promoting the African leadership project and defending African interests. One of such objectives, as enunciated by Prime Minister Balewa, was to reduce, if not to prevent, the preponderance of imperialists’ presence in Africa, particularly, in Nigeria’s immediate neighbourhood, that is, the West African States. The reasons why Nigeria adopted this foreign policy objective have been the subject of discussion by scholars and are outside the scope of this study.^[26]

However, what would seem to have informed the decisions of the founding fathers to put the objective of decolonising West Africa, Africa, and the Black world was the imperative of promoting the country’s national interest. As realist scholars have pointed out, all countries in the revolutionary international system seek to promote national interests.

Flowing from this, Nigeria, on the one hand, had always seen the West African sub-region as being critical to realising its national interests, and on the other hand, France and other foreign powers' overbearing influence as an obstacle to attaining its ambition. Perhaps, it is Nigeria’s quest for hegemony in West Africa, in line with the hegemonic role conceived for her at independence, which often brings her into conflict with France.^[27]

To this end, the Nigerian policy makers have always entertained the fear of probable France’s re-colonisation of West Africa. However, recent misunderstandings between France and some Francophone West African States had wiped out the fear the Nigerian government is entertaining. Three Francophone countries in the West African region have disowned France as a mother. On the other hand, Paris has also perceived Nigeria as a hegemon which must not be allowed to dominate its immediate environment, although the good relationship that exists between the government of President Tinubu of Nigeria and that of President Macron of France may prove otherwise, but only posterity would tell. ^[28]

 Interestingly, aside from hostility predicated on fear of neocolonialism on the part of Nigeria as well as fear of regional domination on the part of France, there have been some other forces that have continued to heighten the level of mistrust between the two countries.^[29] This has to do with the strong affinity between Nigeria’s Francophone neighbours and France to the extent that the former’s major foreign policies are often shaped by the preferences of the latter. Although for the past decade, the relationship between Nigeria’s Francophone neighbours and their coloniser (France) was not favourable.

It has even gone to the extent of expelling the Frenchmen out of their countries in return, inviting Russia and China to come to their aid. The Nigerian government was now in serious romantic relations with France. This state of affairs is often perceived by observers and analysts in Abuja to be harmful not only to Nigeria’s interests but also to African Unity. The change or tilt of Nigeria toward France is now trying to rip apart the cohesion of the region, especially the Economic Community of West African States. For instance, already three member States of ECOWAS had broken away from the Community over their relations with France. The three Francophone states accused the Nigerian government under President Tinubu of conspiring with France to sabotage their countries.

 Despite all these, some Nigerians and other Anglophone states in the region allege the hands of other foreign powers, such as the USA, Russia and China, in encouraging misunderstandings, conflicts and crises in the region to have a field day in exploiting the mineral resources of the region. While the crisis in which Nigeria, in fulfilling its role as a leader of the Black World, severed diplomatic relations with some Francophone states by ally her herself with France was not only perceived as a threat to Nigeria's future ambition at the level of Nigerian relations with West African States but also held responsible for African disunity and setback.

 From the foregoing, it is clear that France’s tremendous influence on the Francophone countries in the West African sub-region, encapsulated as la Francophonie, is a major challenge to Nigeria’s quest for hegemony in West Africa.

Furthermore, for any country to be strong internationally, it must have the capacity and capability to infiltrate its society, control its relationships, as well as to be able to use the resources it needs from the country and to use these resources in determined ways.^[30] Similarly, a country is considered to be legitimate, when it has evolved production to local social institutions of power and authority or when, having originally been imported, it is then absorbed by such preexisting endogenous institutions”.^[31]

 What is being posited here, based on the positions of some scholars is that a state’s capacity to project its hegemony and influence beyond its border, is not solely determined by the arsenal of hard power capabilities, though essential when the integrity of the state is threatened, but most importantly, by its ability to make the citizens accept its worldviews and agenda.^[32] Put differently, a state primarily builds its hegemony from the legitimacy of the society that it superintends itself over.

It implies that a state that is disconnected from society may find it problematic to project its hegemony outside its borders. Since attaining independence in 1960, the post-colonial Nigerian state, like its precursor, has not really penetrated the society in a manner that would have justified it being invested with legitimacy. Indeed, a daily observation of the actions and attitudes of individuals and various ethnological groups, as well as those of state officials, would clearly suggest that the post-colonial Nigerian state is structurally connected to society. In fact, the relationship between the state and society in Nigeria has really been characterised more by disharmony, contradictions and lack of recognition of the need for interdependence.

 In short, the crises of the post-independent state in Nigeria, arising from its illegitimate character and disconnection from society, created the crises of nation-building. Nigeria’s fractured nationhood has not only fed into the country’s foreign policy processes but also the failed Pax Nigeriana project in Africa. Similarly, a state that is detached from its society and unable to navigate a successful nation-building project is unlikely to be able to project its hegemony beyond its borders.

Beyond being unable to build a nation of equal citizenship as the case of the US and great powers of the world clearly shows, a socially delinked and illegitimate post-colonial state may also be unable to create values that attract deference from other states. Perhaps such a country, especially if it derives revenue exclusively from natural resources such as oil, culture, corruption, rigging of elections and other problems which may undermine its moral credentials externally.^[33] In fact, being a regional hegemon goes beyond a country’s possession of material power as perceived by the Nigerian government but its ability to project some value that could be attractive to other countries.

 A nation must be a pacesetter for other countries to become socialised into such values. The regional hegemon is the ability for a country to set the agenda and direction for other countries to follow. Nigeria has no moral justification to threaten or invade the Republic of Niger for refusing to return to democratic civilian rule. The Niger Republic regarded the process Tinubu followed to become Nigeria's President as illegitimate, and that was why they challenged his directive. Therefore, Nigeria does not have the qualities of becoming a regional leader.

Nigeria, aside from its hostility to society, over the years, as observed earlier, has experienced multitudes of governance crises that have created perception and image crises for it in West Africa, Africa and beyond. For example, corruption from top to bottom has become the bane of governance in Nigeria, apart from contributing to the further delegitimisation of the Nigerian nation-state, through debasement of moral values and pervasive corruption, which has further compounded the country’s legitimacy crisis and put a question mark to her claim to regional leadership.

Furthermore, electoral malpractices, sentiments, tribalism, religious crisis, and militant activities and insurgency have become the order of the day, all these are influencing against the national interest of Nigeria to be a regional hegemony in the West African sub-region, despite the amount of huge resources the country is spending to meet its ambition in the region.

Conclusion

The study attempted to examine and elucidate some of the dynamics that were militating against Nigeria’s ambition of becoming a regional hegemon in West Africa since 1960.Some of these factors include the famous Franco-Nigerian relations, which tend to be la Francophonie as the major impediment to Nigeria’s quest for hegemony in West Africa. The presence of some foreign powers in the region for the past two decades has also hampered Nigeria’s quest to become a regional power in the southern part of Africa. Foreign powers such as the USA, Russia and China are penetrating and influencing the activities of some West African States, especially some Sahel states. The study found that hegemony, it was found, is not based on a state’s possession of a multitude of material power but rather on its capacity to build its hegemony from legitimacy and values derived from the domestic society. For that, the study identified that there were wide gaps between Nigerian leadership and its people. Also, the Nigerian government's failure to make a bridge that would connect its society and government. It also found out that beyond the French factor, Nigeria’s failure to project its hegemony in West Africa lay in its incapacity to build its hegemony from the domestic society. It submits that as long as Nigeria continues to be stuck in the crisis of nationhood, governance and values, arising from the disconnection between the state and the society, its capacity to project its influence beyond its borders may continue to be a mirage.

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[1] Ajala, A., (1998) “Decolonization and Liberation in Africa” in G. A. Obiozor and A. Ajala (eds) Africa and the UN system: The First Fifty Years, Lagos: NIIA.p.

[2] Spruyt, H. (2005) Ending Empire: Contested Sovereignty and Territorial Partition, New York: Cornell University Press.p.10.

[3] Aluko, O., (1981) Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy, London: Allen and Unwin, p.1.

[4] FRN (1964) Mr. Prime Minister-A Selection of Speeches made by Alhaji the Right Honourable Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, K.B.E, M.P, Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (Lagos: Federal Ministry of Information, 1964, p.97.

[5] Time (1960) Nigeria: the black rock, December 5.

[6]Meredith, M. (2006) The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence (London: The Free Press,p.154.,and Mazrui, A. 2006, A Tale of Two Africas: Nigeria and South Africa as Contrasting Visions, London: Adonis and Abbey Publishers

[7] Ate, B. (1983) ‘The Presence of France in West Central Africa as Fundamental Problem to Nigeria’. Millennium Journal of International Studies, 12 (2), 110-126; Akinterinwa, B., (1999) Nigeria and France, 1960 – 1995: The Dilemma of Thirty Years of Relationships, Ibadan: Vantage Publishers; Akinterinwa, B., (1999) Nigeria and France, 1960 – 1995: The Dilemma of Thirty Years of Relationships, Ibadan: Vantage Publishers; Akinyemi, B., (1974) Foreign Policy and Federalism: The Nigerian Experience, Ibadan, Ibadan University Press; Medard, J. F, (2008), “Crisis, Change and Continuity in Franco – Nigeria Relations” in Adebajo, A. and Mustapha, A.R (eds) Gulliver’s Trouble: Nigeria Foreign Policy after the Cold War, Natal: University of Kwzulu-Natal Press, and Otubanjo, F and Davies, S. (1985) “Nigeria and France: The struggle for Regional Hegemony” in A. B. Akinyemi et al (eds) Nigeria since independence: The First Twenty five Years, Ibadan: Heinemann.

[8] Medard, J. F, (2008), “Crisis, Change and…,”p.314.

[9] Akinterinwa, B. (2012) ‘Overview of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy, 1960-2010: Challenges and Recommendations’ in Anyaoku, E. (ed.) Review of Nigeria’s Foreign Policy: Issues and Perspectives (Lagos: NIIA)

[10] Akinterinwa, B. (1995) “France’s Foreign Policy towards Nigeria: The Changes in Continuity”, Nigeria Forum, 15,pp.11- 12

[11] Deporte, A. W (1987). The Challenges of Renewal , New York: Foreign Policy Association

[12] Akinterinwa, B., (1999) Nigeria and France, 1960 – 1995: The Dilemma of Thirty Years of Relationships, Ibadan: Vantage Publishers

[13] Lieber, R. (2001), No Common Power: Understanding International Relations, New Jersey: Printice Hall.

[14]Reymond Aron, “France Has a Glorious Future,If.. , New York: Times Magazine,October,9, 1960.p.27.

[15]Gaddis, J. L. (1987) “The Long Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold war, New York, Oxford, University Press

[16] Akinterinwa, {1999). Nigeria and France…,p.12

[17] See Kulski, W. W., (1966) De Gaulle and the World: The Foreign Policy of the Fifth French Republic, New York: Syracuse University Press.

[18] Martin, G. (1985) “The Historical, Economic and Political Bases of France’s African Policy” Journal of Modern African Studies, 23, 2

[19] Meredith, M. (2006) The State of Africa: A History of Fifty Years of Independence (London: The Free Press.p.70.

[20]Basiru, A. S (2016) “Hegemony and Nation-building: Nigeria and United States Foreign Policies in Historical and Comparative Perspectives”, Unilag Journal of Politics, No 1&2, pp.174-207

[21]Basiru, A. S (2016) “Extra-African powers and the crisis of regionalism in Africa: background to and reflections on France’s engagement with Africa”, Africa Review, Vol. 8, No. 2, p.103.

[22]Ate, B. (1983) ‘The Presence of France in West Central Africa as Fundamental Problem to Nigeria’. Millennium Journal of International Studies, 12 (2), pp. 115-126.

[23]Martin, G. (1985) “The Historical, Economic and Political Bases of France’s African Policy” Journal of Modern African Studies, pp. 23-. 25

[24]Asante, S.K.B (2004), “The Travails of Integration” in Adekeye, A. and Ismail, R. (eds), West African Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region, London: Lynne Reiner. P56., and Adedeji, A. (2004) “ECOWAS: A Retrospective Journey” in Adebajo, A. and Rashid, I. (eds) West African Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region, London: Lynne Reiner Publishers. P.18.

[25]Akindele R. (1986) “External structure and Nigeria’s Foreign Policy: Perspectives for the Future” Nigeria Journal of International Affairs,pp. 1- 2 ,and Philllips, C. (1964) The Development of Nigerian Foreign Policy 1960 – 1966, Ibadan: Ibadan University Press. P. iv.

[26] Akinyemi, B., (1974) Foreign Policy and Federalism: The Nigerian Experience, Ibadan, Ibadan University Press; Aluko, O., (1981) Essays on Nigerian Foreign Policy, London: Allen and Unwin; Idang, G., (1973) Nigeria: Internal Politics and Foreign Policy, Ibadan, Ibadan University Press; Agbu, O. (1999) Alternative Projections for Nigerian’s Foreign Policy in Saliu, H. (ed) Selected Themes in Nigeria Foreign Policy (Ilorin: Sally and Associates; Ogunsanwo, A (1986) Our Friends, Their Friend: Nigeria’s External Relations, 1960-1985, Lagos: Alfa communications, and Ogwu, J.U (1985) Nigerian Foreign Policy: Alternative Futures, Lagos Macmillan Nigeria Publishers.

[27] Akinterinwa, B., (1999) Nigeria and France, 1960 – 1995: The Dilemma of Thirty Years of Relationships, Ibadan: Vantage Publishers, p.4o.

[28] Ibid., p.45.

[29]Akinterinwa, B., (1999), Akinterinwa, B. (1995) “France’s Foreign Policy…, pp. 11-12.

[30] Midgal, Joel (2001) State in society and societies transform and constitute one another, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press)

[31] Englebert, P. 2000, State Legitimacy and Development in Africa. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.p.72.,and Jackson, R.H. and Rosberg, C. G. (1982) ‘Why Africa’s Weak States Persist: The Empirical and the Juridical in Statehood’, World Politics, 35 (1)

[32] Midgal, Joel (2001) State in society and societies transform and constitute one another, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press)p.69,and Englebert, P. 2000, State Legitimacy and Development in Africa. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

[33] Prys, M. (2008) Developing a Contextually Relevant Concept of Regional Hegemony: The Case of South Africa, Zimbabwe and Quiet Diplomacy (Hamburg: German Institute of Global and Area Studies) Working paper no.77.