Article Citation: Isa Muhammad Maishanu (2018). A Reflection on Some Models of the Comparative Method Employed in the Study of Religion. DEGEL: The Journal of the Faculty of Arts and Islamic Studies, Vol. 16. ISSN 0794-9316
A REFLECTION ON SOME MODELS OF THE COMPARATIVE METHOD EMPLOYED IN THE
STUDY OF RELIGION
By
Prof. Isa
Muhammad Maishanu
Department of
Islamic Studies
Usmanu Ɗanfodiyo
University, Sokoto
maishanu@gmail.com
Abstract
The modern scientific study of
religion is nearly one and half century old today, since its inception. The
Comparative Method by which the discipline took its name has been applied
differently in line with the two main understanding of the students of religion
of this nascent field. The historical and the systematic comparative approaches
have been the dominant ways of employing it, in analyzing religious data from
the religious world. This paper is a review of the various approaches to the
method, with the intention of giving the reader an idea of the method and its
conception and application by some of leading experts in the field. It is,
however, not meant to be exhaustive. Merits of the method, as well as its
critique were also discussed at the end.
Introduction
The comparative method due to which the modern Western scientific study of
religion took its name, was seen at the inception of the discipline, as the one
adequate, and at the same time appropriate method. It is, by means of which the diverse religions of mankind are studied,
in order to discover the possible origin , as well as ‘the purpose that runs
through the religions of mankind’.[1] Defined as an approach that draws on
historical data in comparing religions, the comparative method aims to show not
only the interplay of the general and the particular elements of religion, but also the interplay of influences
between religious phenomena and the secular factors in human culture (The
Encyclopedia of Religion, 1987). It is
an approach that seeks to demonstrate historical connections of, and independent occurrences of similar
phenomena. Smart (1987) notes that the
comparative – historical method aims to be as objective as possible about the
nature and power of religion; it is not
concerned with whether a particular faith is true. There are two main kinds of comparative
method. The comparative – evolutionary
one, which has almost been completely abandoned now, due to its value
judgements and positivistic temper inherited from Comte, who believes,
according to his ‘Law of Three Stages’, ‘that evolution must mean an evolution
out of religion into science’. The other
kind of comparative method even though it took another name, evolved gradually
and as a reaction to the misgivings of the first method. It is the
Phenomenological Approach.
We begin our
discussion by presenting some models of the application of the comparative
method in the modern Western scholarship. It focuses on the models developed by
Joachim Wach (1898-1955) and Mircea Eliade (1907-1986), both of the Chicago
tradition of the History of Religions. After presenting merits of these approaches, we critique the models discussed. The
paper concludes by positing that notwithstanding the criticism, the comparative
models of the study of religion can be employed to help in bringing the world
community closer, and also minimise tension between different contending
religious groups.
Phenomenology of Religion as a Model of Application of the Comparative
Method
This method of the study of religion even though it is
basically comparative, it came to be
known with the name ‘Phenomenology of Religion’, i.e. especially as conceived
by the earlier phenomenologists. On
explaining this kind of comparison, which is completely different from the
first and better characterized by the
name ‘Phenomenology’. Kristensen [2] says:
Phenomenology…… takes out of their
historical setting the similar facts and phenomena which it encounters in
different religions, brings them together, and studies them in groups. The corresponding data, which are nearly
identical, bring us almost automatically to comparative study. The purpose of such study is to become
acquainted with the religions, idea or need which underlies the group of
corresponding data. The comparative consideration of corresponding data
often gives a deeper and more accurate insight than the consideration of each
datum by itself…[3]
This same idea of a
second kind of ‘Comparative’ method known as phenomenology of religion, was explained by Sharpe in his history
of the discipline, even though he qualified it with the phrase, ‘in its
earliest form’. He says:
...the phenomenology of religion’
was meant to be no more than a systematic counterpart to the history of
religion, an elementary method of
cross-cultural comparison of the constituent elements of religious belief and
practice as opposed to their treatment in cultural isolation and chronological
sequence.[4]
The same division of the two main methods by which
religious phenomena are studied was given
by Wach, when he saw that these phenomena
would be studied lengthwise in time
(diachronically) and in cross-sections –
or comparatively (synchronically).[5]
It is pertinent
in our view to mention here, that the comparative - evolutionary method seen
earlier, despite its being attacked and
challenged, continued to be employed till as recent as the 1940s. However, it was from the years between the two
World Wars that new need was seriously felt
for another approach to the study of religion.
Sharpe saw the turn of the tide as coming
due to a number of factors, including, the general feeling of living in an
insecure world, especially after the Ist World War; the challenge from the New
World with its peculiar experience; the ideas of the Psychologists of Religion,
like William James and others; and the new wave of writings on the spiritual
life by Wundt, Otto and others.[6] Of great importance in this regard is Otto’s
work ‘The Idea of the Holy’ (1917), showing the complexity of the
religious realm and the irrational side of religion, thus calling for a deeper
understanding of religion. Whitehead’s Adventures Of Ideas (1955)
attempts to show that, religion: “…cuts into every aspect of human existence.
So far as concerns religious problems, simple solutions are bogus solutions”.[7]
The
phenomenology of religion is seen by many as occupying a similar position as
the expression ‘Comparative Religion’, and as Sharpe believes this similarity
is both ‘in potential scope and undeniable ambiguity.’[8] ‘Comparative
Religion’ as a term is not commonly used in America, as is well known, preferring instead the name ‘History of
Religions’, and so we see Wach, explaining that ‘Religionswissenschaft’
is the same as the phenomenology of religion or the systematic study of
religion as explained by Max Scheler, in his notion of ‘concrete phenomenology
of religious objects and acts’, as distinguished to ‘Religionsgeschichte’
i.e. the historical study of religion.[9] The two form the general history of religion
or the science of religion in the broader sense..
The
phenomenological method, which some scholars saw as essentially historical, and
comparative, intends a sympathetic study
of the religion of the other. In fact, it
means many things to many people.
Douglas Allen in his article on this method in The Encyclopedia of
Religion has given four different uses of the term by scholars.[10] In the Dutch tradition of the study of
religion alone, five different definitions can be
discerned for the phenomenological method.[11] The major
aspects of that method have been expounded by scholars. They include:
a.
Empathy – or the power of entering into another’s personality and
imaginatively experiencing his experiences. On this Kristensen says:
By means of empathy he tries to relive in his own experience that
which is ‘alien’ and that, too, he can only approximate. This imaginative re-experiencing of a
situation strange to us, is a form of
representation…[12]
b.
The belief in the absolute character of all faiths and the limited
validity of historical research, and due to that, the believer should be
allowed to speak for himself, so that the
researcher’s ideas and values are not imposed
on the data studied. Kristensen says on
this issue:
If the historian tries to understand the religious data from a different
viewpoint than that of the believers, he negates the religious reality, for
there is no religious reality other than
the faith of the believers.[13]
Other aspects of this approach include:
c.
Descriptive nature – This approach to the study of religion aims at a
rigorous description of the
phenomena as they appear. Hence the word
‘phenomenon’ is a total description of
the phenomena in its diversity,
complexity and richness.[14]
d.
This approach is also opposed to all kinds of reduction – which
Means ‘freeing us from uncritical preconceptions that prevent us from
becoming aware of the specificity and diversity of phenomena’.[15] This reduction of religious phenomena can be
in the form of psychologism or the ‘over-simplications of traditional empiricism’ etc.[16]
e.
Intentionality – as all acts of conscious beings are aimed at, and
directed toward something, trying to know this will help in the description, as
intentionality is part of the phenomena described.[17]
f.
‘Epoche’ –which derives from Greek, it means ‘stoppage’ and suspension of
judgement, the exclusion from one’s mind of every possible presupposition’[18]
This is also known
as bracketing, in explaining this term Wach says:
Historians of religions have studied and described very different
religions,...and they have still avoided
discussing the claims to truth that these religions naturally make. This
does not mean, of course, that they deny the truth of a given religion.[19]
Another aspect has also been mentioned by Sharpe,
which is the task of clarifying and comprehending or understanding the
religious phenomena, which will take us to the areas of ‘hermeneutics’ - ‘the intellectual
discipline concerned with the nature and presuppositions of the
interpretation of human expressions.”[20] In this connection, Wach explains that, as ‘… there
is always a possibility of a misunderstanding, there has arisen a
concern, to guarantee that understanding is adequate.’[21] He later added:
The history of religions, for example, seeks to understand foreign
religions….Its ultimate goal is to
comprehend the spirit that is active in the totality of religions’
manifestations….The hermeneutics of
religious documents, should make such
understanding possible.”
|
Comparative Aspect of the
Phenomenology of Religion |
As mentioned above, many scholars have pointed to the
importance of the comparative approach under the phenomenology of religion, and
yet others have seen the comparative
aspect as essential in that approach to the religious data.
Starting with
Kristensen, whom we have quoted above, in his only book published in English –
‘The Meaning of Religion’, with a sub-title:
‘Lectures in the Phenomenology of Religion’, he tried to explain the essential
need for comparison, if one wants to employ the phenomenological method with
illustrations. For instance, on
discussing the religious significance of ‘ritual purification’, which he says
occurs in most religions, he opined that,
it is:
...only on the basis of comparative study of corresponding data is it
possible to ascertain whether the purification has the positive effect of
strengthening the one purified, or whether it has the negative aim of washing
off spiritual stains.’[22]
Any similar inquiry, taking religion as a whole or an
aspect of it, will undoubtedly necessitate comparison. It is clear that this
kind of comparison does not involve value judgements. Through such comparative analysis, we are
able, according to Kristensen:
…to penetrate to the thoughts which lie deeper,
and more or less, be able exactly, to
determine the religious (not that of a particular religion) significance or
value of each separate form of worship.’[23]
He further explains the helpful relationship between phenomenology and comparison in
another chapter, saying:
Phenomenology does not aim to give a comparative evaluation; it uses comparative observation or study only as means
towards better understanding of the
distinctive nature and value of the various religions.[24]
This means that, comparative study of religious data under
phenomenology is so as to facilitate
understanding of the phenomenon in question, as it is taken from different religions and then compared, to discover
any hidden facts. Kristensen, like many scholars, has his own reservations and words of caution, as
regards the use of the comparative method. He said in the ‘General Introduction’ to his
work:
Comparative Study is in numerous instances a quite necessary aid to the understanding of alien religious
ideas, but it is certainly not an ideal
means. Every religion ought to be understood from its own standpoint…. The result
of comparative research, and every kind
of historical research is likewise less than ideal; only approximate knowledge
is possible.[25]
He also maintained that, as every believer looks upon
his religion as unique and incomparable, so also individual beliefs or rites
are also claimed
to be so. It is very
evident then, from points raised above, that anyone who wants to employ the
phenomenological method in studying particular phenomena from the different
religions, will have to use the comparative approach so as to arrive at general insights as regards prayer, sacrifice,
religious festivals, for example, in the religions of the world.
The second
scholar whose views as regards the position of comparison in systematic (as he
prefers to call it) study of religion is Joachim Wach (1898-1955). In his work edited by Kitagawa and others – ‘Introduction
to the History of Religions’ – being Wach’s habilitation thesis in 1924, he
pointed to the kind of comparison that is
accepted in the systematic (phenomenological) study of religious
phenomena, after having delineated some of the dangers associated with comparison in his views. He seems to start from where Kristensen has
stopped. He says:
To be useful, a comparison must work within its own limits.
One must remember that for a comparison to be successful, certain points must be established as the “bearers of the comparison….What is
peripheral in one instance may be of decisive significance in another.[26]
In a somewhat
similar statement to that of Kristensen, he continues:
The integrity of an individual phenomenon unique in itself, whose
elements cannot be eliminated or regrouped arbitrarily, is of utmost
importance.70
Wach believes
in the use of comparison as a tool in the discipline, but that has to be guided
by an important principle of ‘careful
criticism’: as similarity of form does
not always imply similarity of meaning.
It should be of help to see not only what is common but also what is distinct and
that no evaluation should follow, otherwise
one may fall into apologetics.[27] As for his criticisms, we will mention them
together with other criticisms against the method at the end of this part.
It has been stated in the only article the researcher
was able to lay his hands on, speaking specifically on the comparative method,
and that also in French, by Geo Widengren, that the phenomenology of religion
has its basis in philology and the comparative method’[28] Thus buttressing what we have been trying to
establish on the comparative nature of the phenomenological method. We see another indication of the use of
comparative approach in the phenomenology of religion in The Encyclopedia of
Religion. In the second usage of the
term phenomenology of religion, Allen says that it ‘indicates the comparative
study and the classification of different types of religious phenomena’. This is
the concept of P.D. Chantepie de la Saussaye, and to some extent Kristensen,
whose many statements in this connection we have seen, so also that of
contemporary Scandinavian scholars of religion like Geo Widengren and Ake
Hultkrantz.[29] This very idea of the comparative nature of
phenomenology of religion was further elucidated by Allen, when he declares that there is ‘a widespread agreement that
his discipline (phenomenology of religion) uses a comparative approach’.[30] Not only this, but various phenomenologists
have defined their phenomenology of religion as equivalent to comparative
religion, as we have shown above. Allen
believes that even those who rejected such simple
equation, have admitted the fact that they can ‘gain insight into essential
structures and meaning only after comparing a large number of (religious)
documents.’74 Another
modern scholar of religion, M. Pye opines that the comparative method
phenomenologically conceived is ‘the’ method of studying religions.[31]
So, from all
that has preceded, we will not be exaggerating when we say that the present
‘phenomenology of religion’ may be a refined form of the earlier comparative
method conceived at the inception of the discipline as the main, or almost the main method by which to
study religious data scientifically. It
is only that it is no more being
labeled ‘Comparative’ but phenomenological. The comparative has
therefore metamorphosed to the phenomenological method.
Another modern scholar of religion, in explaining the dialectic between
phenomenological, historical and comparative aspects of the science of religion
and in attempting to find an adequate, and comprehensive method, mentions an
approach called ‘historical phenomenology’ used earlier by Bianchi, Smart and
others, and shows his satisfaction with it, and its meaning, as the most
appropriate method by which to study religion. This is a sort of an integral
approach to the study, which scholars have been searching for, for some time
and by means of which religion is studied in all its complexity. It ‘is perhaps
the most appropriate to describe a strong historically grounded, but
systematically and comparatively oriented study of religious phenomena’.[32] The reason of
its appropriateness is its combining the historical and the phenomenological
approaches together with a comparative
study of the religious material. It emphasizes
on empirical and non-normative research, which makes it come closer to the
earlier positivistic meaning of the comparative study of religions. This will
also appear as a combination of the two kinds of study in this discipline – the
historical and the systematic or the diachronic and the synchronic.[33] The systematic or the synchronic approach
always involves comparison, grouping and typologies, so as to reach the essence and structure of religious phenomena,
out of the vast data in the religious
world. In concluding his article, King says:
To some extent there will always exist a dialectical
tension between historical and systematic approaches to the study of religions….The study of religion will of necessity be
comparative, for it is not only concerned with research into one religious
tradition but examines phenomena across traditions and cultures, using
cross-cultural data.[34]
Smart, in his
survey of the methods of the scientific study of religion in its plurality summarised those methods in the
following words:
Thus the study of religion contains among other things the histories of
various traditions…… but it also contains
attempts at comparative treatment, which
is necessarily cross – cultural…
Earlier he has
said that the comparative study comes in and out of vogue, adding that:
… yet
in vogue in so far as we wish the study of religions to make use of the
opportunities for comparison and contrast, opportunities which are useful in
testing various hypotheses about religion…[35]
This further
strengthens our thesis above that the comparative method has not been completely abandoned, but continued to be
employed in the study of religion as in
other fields, though differently. What
distinguishes one kind of comparison from another, or makes it being declared as unscientific or abandoned,
are the presuppositions and values that are
associated with the application of that kind of comparison.
|
The Comparative Method in the Study
of Religion in the 1980’s and Beyond |
As some people may surmise that the
comparative method or approach is no more used in the modern scientific study
of religion in the West, and that it has been completely abandoned, we would
like to mention some few Western scholars of religion, known for their standing
in the field, and their views on the issue in the recent past. In a conference on the history of religions, with the
theme: “The History of Religions, Past, Present and Future” held in the
University of Chicago – known for its old and sustained interest in the study
of religion – in May 1983, Ugo Bianchi presented a paper titled ‘Current
Methodological Issues in the History of Religions’, [36] in which he clearly emphasises on the
issue of comparison but within historical contexts. In that paper he saw two issues ‘as standing out, the
problem of definition and the problem of historical comparison’[37] Bianchi, true to his Italian tradition of
the study of religion, leans strongly towards the historical
comparative-method. He even agreed with some scholars, who expressed the
commitment of the History of Religions to its being comparative, using terms
like ‘systematic’ or ‘nomothetic’, but he added that, that should not be
thought to be non-historical. He expressed his belief in the discipline’s
essential requirement to be comparative and historical.[38] Having started as a historical study of religion, which
appropriated historical methods of research, the discipline will always have a
historical aspect, side by side with the comparative. This
being the contention of Bianchi, we see that perhaps as a result of that, many
scholars today accept the dual aspects of the History of Religions or
Comparative Religion, i.e., the two trends taken to be the historical, and the
systematic or comparative studies of religious data.[39] The article in The
Encyclopedia of Religion, on one of the main method in the field of science
of religion proper, took the title ‘Comparative – Historical Method’. This method presupposes ‘pure history’ which
‘supplies the facts upon which comparisons depend.’[40] As for the rationale
for this method and its application by students of religion, Smart (1986)
believes that to be partly, due to religion being considered (especially in the
West) as an aspect of human culture, which need to be interpreted and explained.
He saw the importance of this method in its giving eminence to the
exploration of the ‘recurrent patterns of religious thought, symbolism, ritual,
and experience’.[41] Rudolph, quoted above was cited by Bianchi in connection with, the
former’s belief that the proper method for ‘the comparative science of religion
is the comparative historical method.’[42] Bianchi stated his position clearly, as regards what he
believes is the right or most appropriate method by means of which to study
religious data. He states:
Only historical
comparison, a comparison not limited to ‘facts’ arbitrarily isolated from the
historical contexts and processes that give them meaning and life, will avoid
killing those ‘facts‘, that is, will avoid transforming them into ‘phenomena’,
fascinating and repelling phantasms in a lodge of disincarnate ghosts …
only a comparison that is historical and
holistic, will be creative and scientifically sound.[43]
This shows clearly that comparison is taken as an undisputed
method in this discipline. The bone of
contention is which comparison. It is
worth mentioning here, that Bianchi believes, comparison can be creative and
scientific, as long as it is also historical. In his own paper at the same
conference in Chicago (1983), titled ‘The Foundations of the History of
Religions and its Future Task’, even though he could not attend, Rudolph
articulates his view on the nature of this discipline and what he anticipates
in its future. In summarizing his view
of the method(s) of this academic field he says:
The special character
of the History of Religions, however, lies in its combination of philology,
history and comparison. Being
synchronic, the comparative or systematic method supplements the diachronic
(historical) method.[44]
He believes it is their interdependence that determines the
relative autonomy and integrity of this field.
Both methods also make their specific contributions to the discipline’s
hermeneutics. Rudolph also considered ‘comparison’ as one of the unique
contributions of the History of Religions as a field.[45] Even in the future,
he saw a special role for comparison or the comparative method in this
discipline. He foresees the continuation
of the use of religio – historical methods which bracket the religious claim to
truth, by ‘recourse to philological – historical and comparative procedures.’[46]
|
Merits of the Comparative Method as
Employed in the Study of Religion |
After what we have seen above, on the importance given to
comparison, most especially the historical comparison, we will now see some of
the general benefits discovered by Western scholars in their application of
this method. After that, we will also
mention the general criticisms of these scholars of the Comparative Method.
One of the modern scholars of religion has expressed the
position of the act of comparison viz-a-viz, man and his sciences in these
words:
Man cannot desist
from making comparisons. To compare is
one of the elementary processes of the human mind, and it is an essential
procedure of all sciences of the human mind, it must have some benefit and use
for man.
And as knowledge is gained partly by means of the various
processes of the mind, comparison being one of them – we will definitely gain
some knowledge by means of this process.
But what are the different merits and benefits of this method? The
pioneers of this discipline established it on the basis of the usefulness of
the comparative method as discovered in science with its different
branches. From Max Muller’s emphasis on
its fruitfulness in the comparative philology and in other sciences, in fact in
his times and in all ages, we can see why they decided to depend on comparative
method. He said:
… The comparative spirit is the truly
scientific spirit of our age, nay of all ages.
An empirical acquaintance with single fact does not constitute knowledge
in the true sense of the word…[47]
Jordan explains extensively the usefulness of this method in
almost all the branches of human intellectual endeavour. [48] He mentions that
some scholars do believe that the real significance of any religion is never
firmly grasped unless it is compared with others![49] Kristensen in his
phenomenological lectures also alluded to the benefits of comparison, when he
opined that the comparative consideration of corresponding data (say, in an act
of worship from different religions) often gives a deeper and more accurate
insight than the consideration of each datum by itself.[50] The writer of the
article on ‘Religion’ in Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, writing in
the 1920s, has seen the comparative method as the brain behind the present
globalisation we are witnessing now in all fields, like political, economic,
cultural, communicational, religious and ideological.[51] He also shows that
comparison does not only reveals similarities, but also subtle
differences. The comparative method also
emphasized the necessity of constructing conceptions of religion upon a wide
basis of data.”113 The use of this method can lead to
typology, which as a classification, tells more of the differences than the
similarities. The methodological
functions and significance of typology are important, especially in the social
sciences, codification and prediction.[52] It ‘creates order
out of the potential chaos of discreet, discontinuous, or heterogeneous
observations’114 In phenomenology of religion also, typology
is used after the necessary comparison, with the intention of better
understanding of the vast material in the religious realm.[53] Comparative study can be helpful also in the study of a
literary or historical problem, when it is compared with analogous data or
situations. It can also be employed to
prove or disprove ‘absolutist pretensions’ of one religion, when compared with
others.[54] On another plane, the impartial and sympathetic comparative
study of world religions had led to the general appreciation of the religion of
the ‘other’, thus facilitating interreligious dialogue, or at least minimizing
acrimony between different religions.
These are some of the general benefits found in employing
the comparative method, which seem to speak against its total abandonment.
Criticism of the
Comparative method
The comparative method in the study of religion has got its
own share of criticisms from many quarters, with some people disliking even the
word – ‘comparative’. Is it due to
increase in knowledge or change in presuppositions or something else that led
to this complete turn as regards the usefulness of this method in today’s
scholarship, after having been seen as
the main scientific method in almost all fields, including religious studies?[55] It might not be unlikely that the misuse of this method by
some scholars, theologians and so on, coupled with the abandonment of the
evolutionary categories, and also the ardent calls by some historians of
religion, reminding others that their discipline has to stick to the historical
approach to research, it may not be unlikely that all these led to that change
of attitude in connection with the comparative method. We have seen Sharpe’s and Kristensen’s statements
showing that the method was considered as unscientific, and this, we supposed
was due to some sort of self-criticisms on the part of students of religions,
most particularly on the issue of objectivity and value judgements. When some of them thought it right to come
out of the slough of Euro-centrism, especially after the Second World War, they
questioned their numerous explicit and implicit presuppositions when it comes
to the study of other people’s religion or culture. The researcher sees sometimes very
clear statements on this issue like the statement of Widengren in a foreword
to Bianchi’s work of 1966:
As a feeling and
reflecting individual, I may approve of
some religious phenomena and disapprove most strongly of others, but as a
historian of religion it is impossible for me
to provide an objective motivation for my sympathies and antipathies, and therefore, I have no right as a scholar to make my private opinions public.[56]
These rules of objectivity will automatically disqualify
many derogatory descriptions or valuations of some religions as we see in many
Western writings. Some of the earlier criticisms of this method came as early
as the beginning of 1920s. We saw Wach, for instance, objecting to the
field being called ‘comparative religion’, as by that, scholars are
unjustifiably emphasizing a single method which is also shared with other
disciplines, as if the very aim of the field is only to compare, adding that
‘methods can only be means never end in themselves’.[57] He also pointed to
the dangers that threaten any comparison like errors, premature conclusions and
mistaken theories, so also exaggeration, and lack of caution on the part
of some scholars.[58]
The evolutionary – comparative method, as we have shown was
proved to be unscientific, due to its value judgement and other flaws as a
result of its application by different sets of scholars in the general study of
religion, from reductionism to evolutionism, to theological
value judgements etc.
One general objection being raised by many scholars in this regard, is the fact that religion resembles an
organism, with different parts, and that ‘the meaning of each of the particular
elements woven together into a whole, is affected by the meanings of all the
other elements in the whole. This tends to give each religion or an aspect
of religion uniqueness of its own. To
compare that element with other ‘similar’ elements will be to neglect the
uniqueness of each element. Likewise is
the case of the different historical contexts and backgrounds.[59] In our view, this is
not to invalidate all comparisons in religion, as we still can see similar
elements or phenomena from different religions e.g.
prayer, the difference is only in some details which will not make it a
completely different thing like, say, sacrifice. The comparison here is always associated with contrast, which must be explained. Comparisons are also considered
to be odious especially in matters of religion. Those carried out by some
scholars could be ‘redolent of whiffs of Western imperialism’ and Christian
superiority.[60] We also see that in
many cases of comparison, evaluative principles are
built into the very act of description.[61] There has to be caution in the comparative process, lest one jumps to ‘concocting facile
similarities and analogies’ or completely neglect the differences.[62] Another problem with
some comparisons is that they are done on
a large scale, which tends to result ‘in catalogues and collections of mere
heuristic interests’.[63] The other points raised include the claim that,
even if the method supports or suggests some theories, it does not prove that
others are excluded. So, also the suggestion that confusion can
result due ‘to naïve comparison and rash inferences’, which will have to be
tested by means of other methods, is also
likely.[64]
Another subtle criticism of the application of the
comparative method made by Wiebe, is his
accusing scholars of usually or (all too often) (making) ‘evaluative
comparisons between the ideal conception of one religion and the (distorted or
corrupted) empirical embodiment of another.’[65]
As for the criticisms of some kind, of comparative
approaches, like phenomenological typology of Eliade for instance, it has been
seen as being concerned with typology and not with historical contexts. This
kind of approach also tends to select material from say, primal religions, with
minimal reference to contemporary living religions. This approach also
minimises the importance of the religious apprehensions of particular persons
or specific traditions, as the emphasis is only on the phenomenon and the structure.
So also the point that, this kind of
comparison depends not so much on objective empirical criteria, but rather upon
the researcher’s own underlying
presuppositions’, as has the phenomenological method been generally criticised
of subjectivism. [66]
The other kind of comparison seen above – the thematic
comparison is seen to have presuppositions that are not necessarily
self-evident, like the selection of themes, the de-contextualisation of
material, and so on. It is also being argued
that no one can master in a specialist sense all religions, so it seems to be a
second-order activity that depends on
primary researches. There is also the
problem of language particularities.[67]
Conclusion
In this paper, we have attempted to show
that the comparative
method can be very useful in the study of
religion in plurality. The method was conceived as the method of studying
religions of the world and comparing them. With time many models of it evolved
to enrich the scientific dispassionate study of the ubiquitous phenomenon of
religion. The merits and critique of the method were also analysed and brought
forth for further researches.
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[1] Muller, F. Max, Chips from a German
Workshop, in Sharpe, Comparative Religion, op., cit., p. 31.
[2] Kristensen’s The
Meaning of Religion’s appearance and another work by van der Leeuw, were
seen by Whaling as heralding the first appearance of phenomenology of religion
in continental Europe, which means he is among the chief exponents of that
method.
[3] Kristensen, The
Meaning of Religion, op., cit., pp. 2-6, where a lot of emphasis has been
laid on the necessity of comparison in this kind of study, cp. Allen, D. (art) ‘Phenomenology of
Religion’ in The Encyclopedia of Religion, op., cit., Vol. II, p. 280.
[4] Sharpe, Comparative
Religion, op., cit., p. 223.
[5] Wach, J.
Introduction to the History or Religions, (ed.) Kitagawa, et. al., op., cit., p. 19. cp.
Rudolph, K. ‘The Foundations of the
History of Religions….’ The History of Religions,
Restrospect and Prospect, op., cit., p.
105 and 113, where he saw the interdependence’ of the
two methods as recent as 1985. º cp. also Smart, N., (art)
‘Scientific Phenomenology and
Wilfred Cantwell Smith’s misgiving, in
Whaling, F. (ed.) The World’s Religious Traditions,
Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1984, p. 257.
[6] Sharpe, (art) ‘
Some Problems of Method…’ op., cit., pp. 6-11, cp. his Comparative
Religion, op., cit., pp.
97-188 and pp. 195-219.
[7] Whitehead, Adventures
of ideas, (1955), p. 165 as in Sharpe, (art) Some Problems of
Method……’ op., cit., pp. 7-8.
[8] ibid., p. 11,
cp. Kristensen, The Meaning of Religion, op., cit., p. 1, Allen, D.,
‘Phenomenology of Religion’ in The
Encyclopedia of Religion, op., cit., Vol. 11, p. 276,
Smart even said that the difference between the two methods ‘cannot be
put always so
clearly’. See Smart, N. (art) ‘Comparative
– Historical Method’. The Encyclopedia of
Religion, op., cit., Vol. 3, p. 571.
[9] Wach,
Introduction to the History of Religions, op., cit., pp. 92-96 and pp.
128-132.
[10] Allen, D. (art) ‘Phenomenology of
Religion’ The Encyclopedia of Religion, op., cit.,
Vol. 11, p.73.
[12] Kristensen, The Meaning of
Religion, op. cit., p. 7.
[13] ibid., p. 13.
[14] Allen, D. (art) ‘Phenomenology of
Religion’ op., cit., Vol. 11, p. 274.
[15] ibid.
[16] ibid., pp. 274-275.
[17] ibid., p. 275.
[18] ibid., p. 224.
[19] Wach, Introduction to the History
of Religions, op., cit., pp. 22-23.
[20] Harvey, V.A., (art) ‘Hermeneutics’ The
Encyclopedia of Religion, op., cit., Vol. 6,
p. 279.
[21] Wach, Introduction to the History
of Religions, op., cit., pp. 156-157.
[22] Kristensen, The Meaning of
Religion, op., cit., p. 4.
[23] ibid., p. 6.
[24] ibid., p. 268.
[25] ibid., p. 6.
[26] Wach, J., Introduction to the
History of Religions, op., cit., p. 136.
[27] ibid., pp. 162-163.
[28] See Pummer, R. (art) ‘Recent
Publications on the Methodology of the Science of
Religion’ in
Numen, Vol. 22, Fasc. 3, p. 171.
[29] Allen, D. (art) ‘Phenomenology of
Religion’ in The Encyclopedia of Religion, op.,
cit., Vol. 11, p. 273.
[30] ibid., p. 280.
[31] See Whaling (art) ‘Comparative
Approaches’, op., cit., vol., 1, p.269.
[32] King, U. (art) Historical and
Phenomenological Approaches to the Study of Religion
in Whaling (ed.) Contemporary Approaches to
the Study of Religion, op., cit., Vol.
1, p. 88.
[33] ibid., p. 39, cp. Wach,
Introduction to the History of Religions, op., cit., pp. 161-162.
[34] King, (art) ‘Historical and
Phenomenological Approaches…’, op., cit., p. 149.
[35] Smart, N. (art) ‘The Scientific
Study of Religion in its Plurality’ in Whaling (ed.)
Contemporary
Approaches, op., cit., Vol. I, p. 371.
[36] Bianchi, U. (art) ‘Current
methodological Issues in the History of Religions’ in
Kitagawa, J. M., (ed.) The
History of Religions, Retrospect and Prospect. New York:
Macmillan, 1985, pp. 53-72.
[37] ibid., p. 156.
[38] ibid., p. 56.
[39] See above, cp. Rudolph, K., (art),
“The Foundations of the History of Religions and
Its Future
Task”, in Kitagawa, The
History of Religions, op., cit., p. 105.
[40] Smart, N. (art) ‘Comparative –
Historical Method’ in The Encyclopedia of Religion,
op., cit., Vol. 3, p. 571.
[41] ibid., p. 572.
[42] Bianchi, (art) ‘Current
Methodological Issues, op., cit., pp. 60-61.
[43] ibid., p. 62
[44] ibid., p. 105.
[45] ibid., p. 111.
[46] ibid., p. 113.
[47] See Arapura, J. G., Religion as
Anxiety and Tranquility (The Hague: Mouton, 1972)
p. 29, cp. Muller’s statements
in the Introduction to the Science of Religion in
Waardenburg, Classical
Approaches to the Study of Religion, op., cit., p. 94.
[48] See Jordan, L. H., Comparative
Religion, op., cit., pp. 30-51.
[49] ibid., p. 59.
[50] Kristensen, The Meaning of
Religion, op., cit., p. 2.
[51] Cook, S. A. (art) ‘Religion’
Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, (ed.) Hastings, J.
(Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark,
1956) 4th Impr., Vol. 10, p. 664.
[52] Tiryakian, E. A., (art) ‘Typologies’
International Encyclopedia of the Social
Sciences (ed.) Sills,
D. L., (New York: Macmillan, 1972) Reprint Ed. Vol. 16, p. 178.
[53] Wach, J. The Comparative Study of
Religion, (ed.) Kitagawa (ed.), New York:
Columbia University, 1958), p.
25.
[54] See Waardenburg, Classical
Approaches to the Study of Religion, op., cit., p. 52.
[55] See Pummer, R. (art) ‘Recent
Publications on the Methodology of the Science of
Religion’ in Numen, Vol.
xxii, Fasc. 3 (Dec. 1975), p. 170, stating that, it is almost
generally assumed that the
Science of Religion is essentially a comparative
discipline, citing many recent
works on that.
[56] Sharpe, (art) ‘Some Problems of
Method…’ op., cit., p. 8.
[57] Wach, J. Introduction to the
History of Religions, op., cit., p. 134.
[58] ibid., pp. 134-135.
[59] See Kristensen, The Meaning of Religion, op., cit., p.
6 cp. Smart, N. (art)
‘Comparative-Historical Method’, The
Encyclopedia of Religion, op. cit., Vol. 3, p.
573. cp. Sharpe, (art) ‘The Comparative Study
of Religion in Historical Perspective’
in Foy, W. (ed.) Man’s
Religious Quest, A Reader .London:
Croom Helm, p. 14.
[60] Whaling, F. (art) ‘Comparative
Approaches’ in Contemporary Approaches….’, op.,
cit., Vol. 1, p. 166.
[61] Allen, D., Structure and
Creativity in Religion (The Hague: Mouton, 1978), p. 27.
[62] Wach, Introduction to the History
of Religions, op., cit., p. xx-xxi (Introduction).
[63] Bianchi, U., The History of
Religions, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975), p. 10.
[64] See Cook, (art) ‘Religion’ Encyclopedia
of Religion and Ethics, op., cit., Vol. 10, p.
664.
[65] Wiebe, D., Religion and Truth
(The Hague: Mouton, 1981), p. 26. cp. Brockington,
J., Hinduism and Christianity,
(Hampshire: Macmillan, 1992), p. 1.
[66] See Whaling, ‘Comparative
Approaches’, op., cit., Vol. 1, pp. 217-219.
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