Cite this article as: Oumarou S.B. (2025). The Environmental / Climatic Refugees, Insurgencies and Immigration Policies in the Lake Chad Basin. Zamfara International Journal of Humanities,3(3), 157-168.www.doi.org/10.36349/zamijoh.2025.v03i03.017
THE ENVIRONMENTAL
/ CLIMATIC REFUGEES, INSURGENCIES AND IMMIGRATION POLICIES IN THE LAKE CHAD
BASIN
By
Soureya Bobbo
Oumarou
PhD Student in
Historical, Archaeological, and Heritage Sciences
University of
Maroua / Cameroon
Abstract: Since the beginning of the 1980s,
following the great Sahelian drought of 1971-1972, the Lake Chad Basin has been
the victim of climate change with numerous effects. Countries including
Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Nigeria are experiencing serious upheaval as a
result. One of the consequences of this climatic violence concerns climate
refugees, i.e. populations that flee their usual living territories because of
environmental and climatic complications. The objective of this article is to
study the configuration of the phenomenon of climate refugees in the Lake Chad
Basin, as well as its impacts on the new migratory movements that have emerged.
Therefore, how does the phenomenon of climate refugees operate in the Lake Chad
Basin and how are the new migratory movements that result from it evolution?
The methodology was based on the collection and analysis of documents to
understand this phenomenon. The exploitation of oral sources allowed us to
empirically collect the perceptions of the populations concerned. The
theoretical framework of the study is based on the theory of ecological
instability of Sherlip Bozip, which explains climate change and its effects on
human life. The results show the phenomenon that of climate refugee’s result in
the Lake Chad Basin, from human nature to the search for a better environment.
Climate refugees are in this space, populations that move in search of a better
environment. This gives rise to new migratory movements, but also to new
conflicts.
Keywords: Environment, Climate Change,
Climatic Refugees, Migrations, Lac Chad Basin.
Introduction
It
is appropriate, following the Sahelian drought of the 1970-1980s and its impact
on the acceleration of climate change in the Lake Chad Basin, to look at the
effects that these drastic changes in climate have had on the movement of
people in the basin. In fact, if the complications of climate change have been
of concern to the international community at the global level for about four
decades, and particularly at the level of the Lake Chad Basin, it is because of
their effects on the challenges that they increasingly pose to the daily lives
of the populations that are victims of them (Barbault, 2000: 57). The element
at the center of these challenges is the environment. This is a very difficult
equation to solve. In some areas such as the Lake Chad Basin, it is difficult
to reconcile the preservation of the environment with the dynamics of improving
the living conditions of their populations. Several concrete testimonies show
that man is both a victim and an executioner of climate change (Fofack, 2019:27).
Following
this evolution, this situation has led to what should now be called
"environmental or climatic refugees" in the Lake Chad Basin. Several
populations have indeed been pushed out of their usual sites of occupation, due
to the complications that the environment imposes on them. Worse still, these
difficult environmental situations are at the origin of famine, which creates a
situation of predation between humans and between humans and the environment
(Mémorandum d’entente, 2013:79). This leads to other collateral situations,
such as insurrections, violence of all kinds, which then drive new migration
dynamics in the Lake Chad Basin. This stressful situation has been very visible
since the beginning of the decade 2010, in the localities of Bol, Bongor and
Baga Sola in Chad, Kousséri, Kolofata and Yagoua in Cameroon, Baga and Gwaza in
Nigeria. It is in fact a crisis that has many repercussions on the national and
international policies of the Lake Chad Basin countries. It is interesting to
note that in this movement, other implications concern insurgencies, as well as
cross-border movements, which require the States of this Basin to adopt new
security policies, migration control as well as measures that can contain or
regulate the movements of populations to areas suitable for human life (Atakou,
2019).
We
can also observe that in terms of the analysis of this phenomenon, the
emergence of the paradigm of environmental refugees enriches the lexical field
of migrations. In the context of this new paradigm, the pressure of a hostile
environment imposes new migratory movements on human populations, pushing them
towards each other and generating major conflicts. Thus, we are faced with new
challenges that climate change requires humans to resolve, if they want to
effectively ensure the development of current generations, by preserving and
transmitting an environment that will be conducive to the development
activities of future generations (Nana Sinkam, 1999: 146).
The
objective of this article is to analyze the reality of environmental or
climatic refugees in the Lake Chad Basin, in relation to the climatic changes
that affect this locality, and then to appreciate the insurgencies linked to
the challenges imposed by these difficult environmental conditions. It then
addresses the new migration policies and dynamics that have resulted.
The
main question that this paper attempts to address is: How is the phenomenon of
environmental or climatic refugees in the Lake Chad Basin configured in the
context of climatic stress, and what are the new migration movements from a
cross-border and internal perspective that result from this? Specifically, it
is question to know: what is climatic refugees in the context of Lake Chad
Basin? What are its main consequences? How does it impact new migrations in
that zone? The methodology used draws heavily on documentary collection and
analysis, as well as on oral sources to capture the perceptions of the
populations concerned. The structure of the article begins with a
contextualization of the phenomenon of environmental refugees in the Lake Chad
Basin, the implications for the new realities of life imposed on the
populations affected, and finally, the configuration of new migrations movement
that this phenomenon has fostered.
1. The Phenomenon of Climate Refugees
in the Lake Chad Basin: A Substantial View its Establishment
The
phenomenon of climate refugees is a reality in the Lake Chad Basin. Its
establishment has been encouraged by a certain number of natural and
anthropogenic phenomena. The dynamics of its evolution are also based on
socio-economic, cultural and political facts that are faced by the governance
displays in the Lake Chad Basin.
1.1. The advent of
the phenomenon of climate refugees in the Lake Chad Basin in a context of
climate stress
The
phenomenon of the climate refugee is nowadays at the center of several
international meetings, whose purpose is to think about the condition of
millions of individuals who are forced to leave their usual comfort zones
because of a disruption of the environment. In general terms, ecological
refugees are people forced to leave their homes because of a breakdown in
environmental conditions. It is in this sense that Delisle and Devéret
(2005:72) argue that climate or ecological refugees or eco-refugees, are a
category of environmental refugees. For these authors, they are people or
groups who are forced to leave their place of living temporarily or
permanently, because of an environmental disruption (of natural or human
origin) that has jeopardized their existence or seriously affected their living
conditions. In most cases, climate refugees are farmers, but sometimes also
hunter-gatherers, fishermen or herders.
This notional approach makes it possible to realize that farmers are the popular class most concerned by the phenomenon of climate refugees. Since the beginning of the decade 2000, this phenomenon has affected nearly 1.54 billion people worldwide, with a high concentration in the Sahel (Atakou, 2019:45). The environmental disruption that is at the origin of the climate refugee phenomenon is the result of a combination of interconnected factors. In the Lake Chad Basin, the disruption created by the disruption of the natural climate and other factors, explain more that process. The following model presents the configuration of the climate refugee phenomenon in its implementation process as far as the Lake Chad Basin is concerned.
Model 1. Process of the establishment of the climate refugee phenomenon
|
Source: Made by Soureya Bobbo, Maroua on 7 June 2023. |
Indeed, looking at the explanatory model we presented above,
one realizes that the phenomenon of climate refugees is remote in the Lake Chad
Basin. In the Memorandum of Understanding (2013:45) that was drawn up by the
leaders of the Central and West African sub-regions on security, it was noted
that before the advent of Boko Haram in the early 2010s, the Lake Chad Basin
was already subject to major migratory movements. Through these movements,
populations of many localities in the Basin close to the Sahel, were
progressively fleeing from the complications of climate in their environment.
Moreover, industrial activities are also one of the major causes of
environmental degradation in the Lake Chad Basin. The race for development is
indeed a major cause of environmental degradation in the Lake Chad Basin. Due
to its economic advances over the past two decades, Nigeria has achieved
significant economic growth.
The extension of these economic successes to its States in
the Lake Chad Basin like Borno State, has accelerated the degradation of the
atmosphere in that locality.[1]
On this basis, if we decide to situate the benchmark at the
beginning of the 1970s with the great Sahelian drought of 1971-1973, and the
effects it had in complicating the climate in the Lake Chad Basin and pushing
its populations to new migrations, we could say that the phenomenon of climatic
refugees goes back to the beginning of the 1970s in the Lake Chad Basin,
following the Sahel drought. In addition, the Lake Chad Basin Commission's
investigation report on night fishing activities in Lake Chad indicated that
nearly 3,000,000 people had pushed into Lake Chad around the borders of
Cameroon and Chad between 1997 and 2007, fleeing climatic complications in
their areas of departure[2].
The phenomenon of climate refugees has thus appeared since the beginning of the
1970's, as a multiple entry equation for the international community. Thus,
Essam El Hinnawi, working for the UN, used the expression "environmental
refugee" as early as 1985, in reference to populations displaced by
sub-Saharan droughts and the degradation of their territories (Atakou,
2019:89). Some authors such as Norman Myers, as early as the 1990s, spoke of
environmental exodus, in relation to the consequences of climate change (Sinkam
Nana, 1999:138). In the Lake Chad Basin, the evolution of this phenomenon has
shown different faces depending on the period.
1.2. The diversity
of actors implied in the phenomenon of climate refugees in the Lake Chad Basin
Three major entities are at the center of the climate
refugee phenomenon in the Lake Chad Basin. These three entities include: man,
climate and the environment. The interaction between these three entities
effectively allows us to observe the evolution of the phenomenon of climate
refugees in the Lake Chad Basin (Berkes, 1999: 91). In fact, man is constantly
searching for resources in the environment for his survival, and in doing so,
he cuts firewood, exploits fishery resources, uses bush fires, and so on, which
have the direct consequence of accelerating the climate.[3]
Once this climate becomes hot, the environment becomes hostile and human life
difficult. Faced with this situation, man is forced to move from place to place
in search of a more welcoming environment or by adopting behaviors of
adaptation to his new environment.
A contextualization of this phenomenon shows that the
populations of the Lake Chad Basin have experienced a disruption of their way
of life with the advent of climate change, which is becoming more complicated
in this locality, and which has created many challenges, including that of
adaptation. In the Lake Chad Basin, this phenomenon has forced international
partners and national actors to review the concept of migration. This is a
development that has been noted in several other regions of the world, where
populations are victims of climatic aggression. The UN and many other
international organizations have had to introduce this dimension of migration
into their general operating framework. This is notably the case of the
International Organization for Migration (IOM). The latter has also had to
adopt a definition of environmental migrants. The IOM states that:
"Environmental migrants are people who, mainly for reasons related to
sudden or progressive environmental change that negatively affects their lives
or living conditions, are forced to leave their homes or leave them on their
own initiative, temporarily or permanently, and who, as a result, move within
or out of their country" (Mboutou, 2016:75).
In the locality of Baga-Sola in Chad, on the shores of Lake Chad, the estimation of the current number of climate refugees was carried out in this study, through a field survey by questionnaire and observation. This helped to collect oral testimonies from generations of populations, who are forced to flee the remote areas of the lake and victims of the heat waves, in order to get closer to the shores of the lake. About twenty-four (24) families registered in the locality of Baga-Sola are in this process of climatic refugees, having abandoned for the most part, their ancestral villages. It is a reality to be taken with much prudence and whose generalization would be difficult to the whole of the countries of the Basin. Indeed, if certain populations move closer to the lake for fishing activities that their ancestors have practiced for centuries, other ethnic groups move closer to find pastures for grazing their animals. The latter case concerns more nomadic herders (Etoupi, 2021:47). In different situations, these climatic refugees run either from drought or floods as in the following picture. They travel with all their things.
Pictue1:
Populations in situation of climate
migration
Source: Pictured by Soureya Bobbo, Baga, October 21, 2021.
Populations that are victims of climatic pressures and that
see climatic conditions change drastically are often helpless as on this photo.
The ecological displacements they face are journeys with uncertain outcomes.
Indeed, their arrival in new areas causes conflicts due to the hostility of the
host populations. A survey by the Lake Chad Basin Commission shows that several
million people were displaced in the Basin between 2000 and 2020, due to
environmental complications (Cotillon, 2021:13). Many experts on the issue
agree that this number will increase as migration policies in the Basin are not
sufficiently well developed to give special attention to population movements
in the Basin. The following table shows the displacement statistics of
populations facing climatic migration in the Lake Chad Basin.
Table 1. Statistics of populations facing environmental migration in
some localities of the Basin between 2000 and 2020
|
N° |
Most affected areas |
Period |
||||
|
2000-2005 |
2005-2010 |
2010-2015 |
2010-2015 |
2015-2020 |
||
|
1 |
Baga-Sola |
207 |
451 |
784 |
1478 |
1941 |
|
2 |
Baga |
354 |
454 |
845 |
974 |
1748 |
|
3 |
Bongor |
457 |
721 |
857 |
1544 |
2147 |
|
4 |
Bol |
547 |
651 |
784 |
985 |
2415 |
|
5 |
Darack |
251 |
457 |
642 |
954 |
2147 |
|
6 |
Diffa |
324 |
358 |
784 |
785 |
1785 |
Source: Table made by us from the archives of the Lake Chad Basin
Commission.
This table shows a very alarming reality of the situation of
climate refugees in the Lake Chad Basin. The most affected localities are those
bordering the Lake. The populations there are constantly migrating. They are
victims of either floods or severe droughts, which destroy crops, houses, and
plantations, and force them to move to the outskirts of the Lake. It is
interesting to note through a look at this table, that the numbers have
constantly increased in all these localities. The next section examines the
operating mode of that phenomenon in the Lake Chad Basin.
2. The Phenomenon
of Climate Refugees and The Dynamics of New Conflicts in the Lake Chad Basin
The realities of the populations that occupy the Lake Chad
Basin have undergone numerous transformations due to the upheavals that climate
stress has brought. The maxim that sums up this reality is that "nothing
can ever be the same again in the Lake Chad Basin". The multiple movements
in which the populations have been forced to engage in this space sufficiently
explain the dynamics of new conflictuality in the Lake Chad Basin.
2.1. Basis for the
emergence of new conflicts in the Lake Chad Basin in the trajectory of climate
refugees
A combination of factors has contributed to making the
phenomenon of climate refugees in the Lake Chad Basin the basis for the
development of new forms of conflict. The Lake Chad Basin has the merit of
covering a very large area. This reality makes it an area with a multiform
configuration. Indeed, most of the countries in the Lake Chad Basin, or even
all of them in the areas including Baga-Sola, Bongor, Bol, Kousséri, Baga and
Kolofata, are affected by the phenomenon of climate refugees, with the conflicts
that it causes, particularly at their international borders. Some are so
because of the heat, others because of the risk of epidemics, some still
because of recurrent floods (Daawe, 2015:87). Their consequences are very
negative on social cohesion, whether national or transnational.
The situation of climate refugees has become worrisome in
the world since the beginning of the decade 2000, with an emphasis on the Lake
Chad Basin. In 2002, Julienne Betaille estimated that for the year 1998, more
than 25,000,000 people had left their homes, regions or countries to flee
ecological degradation (Adeyeri & al., 2017:56). These people thus
constituted, what is commonly referred to as climate or ecological refugees. In
2018, twenty years later, the United Nations, through the United Nations Environment
Program (UNEP), predicted 250,000,000 climate refugees in the world in 2050,
with more than 20,000,000 in the Lake Chad Basin (Awotwi & al., 2022:22). It then called for global
governance based on solidarity. The situation of climate refugees thus appears
to have continually preoccupied the international community, because of its
political, geopolitical, and even geostrategic importance in Africa.
The new conflicts in the Lake Chad Basin, particularly at
the cross-border level, which are the result of climate refugees, also emanate
for the most part from the conflicts at the top of the State that some
countries in this area have had with each other at a certain period in their
history. Fofack (2019: 58) notes in this regard that the border conflict
between Cameroon and Nigeria over the Bakassi peninsula in its time,
complicated the situation of collaboration between the Cameroon-Nigerian
cross-border populations over climate displacement. The tensions at the top of
their two States were taken up by the local populations. Clashes were noted in
2006 at the Cameroonian border of Kolofata and the Nigerian border over a wave
of Nigerian populations fleeing the heat waves to settle on the Cameroonian
side (Kafour, 2016:45). In their migratory movements against climatic
complications, these populations adopt various behaviors.
With such a development, it is fair to say that the
challenge of climate refugees has become one of the contemporary challenges of
our era, along with the issue of terrorism. Indeed, in some parts of the world,
the two issues (climate refugees and terrorism) are inseparable and
intertwined. This is the case in the Lake Chad Basin where, since the emergence
of the terrorist sect Boko Haram, the issue of climate refugees has taken a new
turn. With terrorism, the populations of towns in Chad such as Baga Sola, Bol,
Bongor, Yagoua and Kolofata in Cameroon, but also Baga and Gwaza in Nigeria,
Diffa and Zinder in Niger, are undertaking climatic movements that obey both
the conditions of security against terrorism and of environmental security[4].
Inter-group violence has thus gained in magnitude in the
Lake Chad Basin, with the climatic displacements in which populations are
forced to engage following the disasters that the changing climate imposes on
them in their usual localities. In 1993, just after the first Earth Summit, the
Englishman Norman Myers argued that two factors alone, namely the rise in sea
level, particularly with the flooding of habitable and productive lands, deltas
and islands, combined with the effects of global warming on food production,
warming as predicted by the IPCC at the time, would cause the migration of
nearly 150,000,000 people between 1993 and 2050 (Cheng, He & Cheng,
2016:87).
By comparing this projection to the Lake Chad Basin, we can
directly prove this author right. Indeed, the problem of access to land and
food resources is another spur that ignites the conflicts related to climate
refugees in the Lake Chad Basin. Indeed, following their migrations, these
populations, victims of climatic violence, seeking food, enter into conflict
with the populations settled in the host sites. The resulting violence is
incalculable. It has been noted that there was an increase of about 75% in
land-related conflicts in the localities of Baga Sola in Chad, Diffa, Bongor
and Baga in the Lake Chad Basin between 2000 and 2020 (Cotillon, 2021:3). As
far as security is concerned, one could analyze the relationship between the
advent of the danger of conflict in the Lake Chad Basin, and the increase in
the scale of the phenomenon of climate refugees in the Lake Chad Basin.
2.2. Climate
refugees and the prolonged spectrum of conflicts in the Lake Chad Basin
Based on the 2050 horizon, Christian Aid estimated in 2018,
that at least one billion people would have to migrate around the world, more
than half of them to adapt to global warming or to flee certain consequences
(Morel, 2019: 82). According to this analyst, the following statistics have
been noted: 654,000,000 people who would migrate for energy reasons; 50,000,000
people because of conflicts and human rights abuses (which may be exacerbated
by deforestation, lack of water and the continued loss of arable land); 250.
000,000 people would migrate because of phenomena directly induced by climate
disruption (floods, droughts, water and food shortages, emerging diseases and
other epidemics (Morel, 2019:47). One might think that this analyst had the
Lake Chad Basin as an observation point for these estimates. Indeed, it is
possible today to observe populations migrating in the Lake Chad Basin for all
these reasons.
In terms of energy, there is a real challenge of access to
energy in the Lake Chad Basin. This situation has led to the development of
numerous energy trafficking circuits between Cameroon, Nigeria and Chad. Fossil
fuels are still the most widely used form of energy in the Basin, with oil as a
bonus. Projections are increasingly being made for the development of renewable
energies such as solar and wind power (Nana Sinkam, 1999: 78). The energy
challenge in the Lake Chad Basin nevertheless has some particularities.
Nigeria, thanks to its technological development, has set up solar energy
development projects in its territories located in the Lake Chad Basin,
particularly in Borno, Yobe, Adamawa, which enable it to overcome the energy
challenges (Morel, 2019:47). The results are certainly mixed, but deserve to be
encouraged. As for Cameroon, Niger and Chad, they are still behind and should
consider energy development projects in the coming years.
For the second point on migration due to conflicts and human
rights violations, the Lake Chad Basin also shows a black picture. Nigeria is
known in the Lake Chad Basin for its multiple coups d'Etat from the 1960s to
the early 1990s. These coups generated numerous conflicts in the country, with
migrations that the populations of Eastern Nigeria began towards the borders of
Cameroon and Niger. Also, these conflicts were reinforced with uprisings, the
formation of rebel groups and challenges to the regimes by opponents who
resented the confiscation of public wealth by dictatorial ruling castes in
several countries of the Lake Chad Basin, namely Nigeria and Chad, during the
decades from 1960 to 1990 and beyond (Ndong Atok, 2020:89).
In 1978, there was the capture of Faya-Largeau by rebels in
Chad. In 1979, there were riots and massacres in Central African Republic. In
1981, power was taken in CAR by André Kolinga. In 1990, Idris Déby became
President of Chad in a coup d'Etat and militarized the country against the
rebels who did not give up. Since 1960, the Lake Chad Basin has offered the
international community a distressing spectacle of conflicts of all kinds,
which threaten not only its security, but international security as a whole
(Mahdi Kante, 2019:97). It is worth noting that, in addition to these
conflicts, conflicts related to climate change have been added since 1970.
Inter-group clashes have thus gained a new source of conflict, linked to the
displacement of populations fleeing environmental complications[5].
Border conflicts were not left out, with the Bakassi war
between Cameroon and Nigeria, which lasted from 1981 to 2008, not without loss
of life, just like the Bakassi war (Fofack, 2019: 357). Moreover, Islamic
extremism, which Africa had been spared, has taken hold since the decade 2000,
with Africa now appearing as one of the poles of conflicts with a religious
background, with Islam as a bonus. The terrorist threat in Africa since the
middle of the decade 2000 is mainly the work of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
(AQIM) and the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) which
operate in North and West Africa; Boko Haram in Nigeria, Niger, Chad, and
Cameroon; Al-Shabaab in Somalia and Kenya in East Africa; the Lord's Resistance
Army (LRA) in Central Africa; and Ansar Al-Sharia in North Africa whose
casualties number in the thousands every year (Mady Kante, 2019).
In Nigeria, after the presidential elections of April 2011,
clashes between supporters of Goodluck Jonathan, the Christian incumbent, and
Muhammadu Buhari, the Muslim from the north, each claiming victory, were deadly
as the results were contested. Hundreds of deaths were reported. The toll was
heavy with hundreds of thousands dead and several thousand refugees,
complicating the pressures already caused by climate refugees (Bizima, 2016).
It is thus clear that migration movements in the Lake Chad Basin cannot be well
understood if one leaves aside the migration created by other socio-political
situations, including political crises and terrorism in this African space. It
is now appropriate to analyze the specific implications of the phenomenon of
climate refugees in the new migrations movements in the Lake Chad Basin.
3. Configuration
of new Migrations Movements Driven by the Phenomenon of Climate Refugees in the
Lake Chad Basin
The phenomenon of climate refugees is an issue that will
impose a new form of governance, as well as new challenges to be met in the
Lake Chad Basin. It is true that the issue is generally one of the orientations
imposed by climate change, but a particularity emerges with regard to all the
new issues that the climate displaced raise in this area. It can also be noted
that in general, the development of the phenomenon of climate refugees has
contributed to the readjustment of migration truth in the Lake Chad Basin.
3.1. The issue of
migration in the context of climate refugees in the Lake Chad Basin
Migration refers to all the movements by which groups of
populations move from one place to another (Nana Sinkam, 1999: 147). Migration
is one of the most worrying issues for the international community, but also
for individual States. Migration is of growing concern to the international
community. There are several reasons why people are moving from one country to
another today. Global governance dominated by national egoisms and struggles
for power, but also issues related to poverty and coups d'Etat, push several
million people each year, to leave their country for new States (Bdliya &
Bloxom, 2012:48).
Overall, and according to a nomenclature of the
International Organization for Migration (IOM), a distinction is made between
internal and external migration. Internal displacement refers to situations
where the population involved in the migration movement does not cross the
borders of the State of which it is a national. External or international
migration is when populations move beyond the borders of their State.[6]
In the same vein, the management of migration policies in areas such as the
Lake Chad Basin, takes into account several terminologies, such as emigration
and immigration. Emigration refers to the departure of populations involved in
migration from their country of departure. Immigration, on the other hand,
refers to the entry of populations involved in migration into a host country.
The international and especially transnational dimension is the most prominent
in the terminology of emigration and immigration (Nana Sinkam, 1999:75).
Whether it is emigration or immigration, the Lake Chad Basin is subject to it
in the face of climate change, which has led to the development of the
phenomenon of climate refugees.
On the other hand, it is difficult to state with certainty
that the Lake Chad Basin States have defined a new immigration policy within
the commission in the face of the pressures created by climate refugees. In
fact, the Basin States have not taken into account the impact of climate
refugees in the recompozition of migratory movements in the Basin. Indeed,
there is a certain selfishness on the part of the governments of Cameroon, Chad
and Niger in taking into account the specificity of environmental refugees from
other countries, especially in their territories.[7]
The central problem lies in the fact that these States neglect the weight of
environmental refugees in their capacity to have a lasting impact on governance
and, above all, on security in their States.
One fact is difficult to affirm by the member States of the
Lake Chad Basin Commission, but this reality is that Boko Haram fighters have
relied heavily on environmental refugees to create several harms through their
attacks in the Lake Chad Basin countries (Bdliya & Bloxom, 2012:56).
Indeed, many of the climatic migrated populations who were wandering in the
Basin because their homes had been destroyed by floods, or because drought had
destroyed their crops, were easily recruited by Boko Haram leaders, who
promised them better horizons after taking control over the Basin States (Youki
Mouhamar, 2019:74). Due to climatic complications, several populations of
Epouki village in the Gwoza Region of Nigeria have abandoned their quarters.
The migration policies implemented in the Lake Chad Basin since the 2000s aim
to stem the flow of irregular traffic through this area, but they have not been
very successful. For nothing can hold back a poor, starving population, chased
by drought, abandoned in some places by the political authorities and
confronted with intercommunity conflicts. These so-called "security"
policies from an international perspective are often perceived and experienced
as insecurity policies from a local perspective (Morel, 2019:76). On the one
hand, they have led to the clandestine entry of many actors of these
circulations, and on the other hand, to the flourishing of an
"industry" of management and control of mobilities, driven and
amplified by environmental refugees.
Following the meeting of the Heads of State and Government
of the Lake Chad Basin Commission on new policies for the management of
climatic immigrant populations in 2012, the final resolutions called for the
opening up of the circulation of climate refugees. Another aspect of these
resolutions called for the multiplication of refugee camps. Still on this
aspect, it was agreed that States should develop resettlement areas, including
neighborhoods, to settle the climate refugee populations. But it is to be regretted
that these measures have remained unimplemented. For apart from accommodating
them in refugee camps, most of the populations affected by climate change that
enter neighboring countries in the Lake Chad Basin are left to their own
devices. In this analytical vein, the triptych of climate refugees, migration
and security in the Lake Chad Basin should also be studied.
3.2. Climate
refugees, migration and security in the Lake Chad Basin
The
amplification of the environmental refugee phenomenon in the Lake Chad Basin
has many implications. At the end of the day, national and foreign views and
policies are obviously trying to understand the new game, but also the stakes
that the mobilizations of climate refugees have on life in the Lake Chad Basin
(Hodge, 2005: 85). On the other hand, they are trying to understand, in a
triple dimension of climate refugees, migration and security in the Basin,
whether climate refugees are the cause of the scale of insecurity in this area,
or whether they are victims of the growing insecurity in this space. This
question is of great relevance if the governments of the Lake Chad Basin wish
to find sustainable solutions to the challenges imposed by climate refugees in
the Lake Chad Basin. The crystallization of ideas around the issue of global
warming in the Lake Chad Basin is real. However, if we look at the background,
the member States tend to use this problem to obtain funds from international
partners such as the European Union (EU), the African Union, the International
Environment Fund (IEF) and the United Nations Environment Organization (UNEP).[8]
Thus,
the priority is not put on the climate displaced populations, because the
support received is diverted to serve private interests. In this movement,
there is a lack of multi-faceted care for climate displaced populations. They
engage in migration for this purpose, without being accompanied, supervised and
supported. Moreover, they are victims of numerous acts of violence by the
border guards of the countries of the Basin according to their areas of
departure and destination, despite the resolutions of the summit of Heads of
State in 2012 which recommended free movement of people who are victims of
climate disasters (Morel, 2019:65). This is the origin of a new source of
insecurity in which climate refugees, depending on the context, are both
victims and executioners in their migratory movements. These populations, as
illustrated in the following image, are then subjected to multiple social
pressures.
Picture
2: A view of the climate displaced in Baga
Source: Pictured by Soureya Bobbo, Baga, September 11, 2021
In most cases, these populations do not have a predefined
destination when they engage in migration following natural disasters. For most
of the countries in the Lake Chad Basin, cross-border migration with their
neighboring countries has been a constraint to be solved for about two decades
if they really want to move.
Until recently, in a country like Niger, international
migration was not considered a problem to be solved and was not the subject of
a specific policy. In 2015, while IOM Director General Antonio Vitorino claimed
that there are now as many migrant deaths in the Sahara as in the Lake Chad
Basin facing the war against Boko Haram (Morel, 2019:47), setting the stage for
rapid and extensive interventions, the AU put pressure on the governments of
the Lake Chad Basin Commission countries to address the situation of
environmental refugees in a comprehensive and specific manner (Adeyeri &
al., 2017:48). A few projects and programs have been implemented to achieve
this. This is particularly visible in the Agadez region in northern Niger,
which is more than ever considered by European experts as "the place where
most of the [irregular migrant] flows pass through, including climate migrants,
who go to Libya and then to Europe via the central Mediterranean road (Morel,
2019:68).
From this report, it is clear that climatic migrations also
challenges the European Union's ability to control migratory movements,
especially African immigration. We also note another element from this level.
The climatic situation in the Lake Chad Basin is at the origin of new migratory
movements in the world, whose impacts cross the community scale of the Basin,
the scale of the Sahel, to be felt as far away as the European space (Aradj
Slimane, 2018: 78). Indeed, faced with climatic constraints in the Lake Chad
Basin, populations sometimes engage in migratory movements either on a
community scale by forcing borders to neighboring countries. In other cases,
the more ambitious young people who say they have lost everything because of
the boldness of the climate, engage in more distant journeys, sometimes towards
Europe (Adeyeri & al., 2017:57).
Conclusion
In short, this study shows that the phenomenon of climate
change has contributed to the development of the practice of climate refugees
in the Lake Chad Basin and to new migratory movements. With the increase in
drought, flooding and seasonal irregularities, populations are fleeing their
villages and towns for new destinations, sometimes across the border with a
neighboring country. In this dynamic, new conflicts arise because these climate
refugees are not always welcomed by the communities of the destination
territories. In this chain, new migratory movements are therefore set up, which
are in fact forced migrations. This evolution shows that climate change is also
negatively transforming the lives of the populations of the Lake Chad Basin.
Indicatives
Bibliography
Oral Sources
|
N° |
Name and surname |
Position |
Age |
Place and date of interview |
|
1 |
Aroumtou
Jitoe |
Fish seller |
56 years old |
Bol, March 21, 2021 |
|
2 |
Efike Ojofi |
Former
driver |
64
years old |
Baga,
April 21, 2020 |
|
3 |
Mark Duncan |
UNO
expert for environment in the Lake Chad Bassin |
48
years old |
Maroua, April
30, 2020
|
|
4 |
Okide Oyobo
|
Farmer
|
65
years old |
Baga,
September 14, 2020 |
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[1] Interview with Efike
Ojofi, 64 years old, former driver, Baga, April 21, 2020.
[2] Archives of the Lake Chad Commission Basin,
FR7, Enquête sur la pêche nocturne dans le Lac Tchad, 2007.
[3] Interview
with Aroumtou Jitoe, 56 years old, fish seller in Bol Market, Bol March 21,
2021.
[4] Archives NGO Plan Cameroon, Projet de prise en
charge des réfugiés mineurs à Kousséri, Rapport Général, 2016.
[5] Interview with Okide
Oyobo, 65 years old, Farmer, Baga, September 14, 2020.
[6] Archives Médecins sans Frontières Maroua,
Campagne santé réfugiés filles-mères de la crise de Boko Haram, 2019.
[7] Interview with Mark
Duncan, UNO expert for environment in the Lake Chad Bassin, 48 years old,
Maroua, April 30, 2020.
[8] Interview with Mark
Duncan, UNO expert for environment in the Lake Chad Bassin, 48 years old,
Maroua, April 30, 2020.
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