Article Citation: Usman Mohammed Musa (2019). The Abagana Debacle in the Nigerian Civil War: A Thematic Discourse. DEGEL: The Journal of the Faculty of Arts and Islamic Studies, Vol. 17, No. 2. ISSN 0794-9316
THE ABAGANA DEBACLE IN THE NIGERIAN
CIVIL WAR: A THEMATIC DISCOURSE
By
Usman Mohammed Musa
Abstract
This paper examines one of the major battles in the
Nigerian Civil War. It studies the tragic failed attempts by the Second
Division of the Nigerian Army to invade and capture Onitsha after three
unsuccessful attempts. Two at the river crossing of River Niger, and one, at
Abagana. Although, many scholars, military historians, political scientists, military
theorists and others had agreed in unison that, it was the failure of judgement
on the part of the General Officer Commanding the Division that led to the
tragedy both at the river crossing and at Abagana. This study explores the
dominant theme and situate it in the proper perspective of the events that took
place at the theather of the conflict. Using narrative and analytical method to
arrive at a balanced and sound position. However, the development turned Col.
Joe Achuze into a war hero on the Biafran side while Col. Murtala Muhammed was
quietly relieved of his command of the Federal Forces.
Introduction
Following the formation of the Second Division by the
Military authority after the secessionist declaration of the Eastern part of
Nigeria as Biafra from the Nigerian Federation by Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, the
Division was hurriedly formed. It comprises people with little or no military
training or experience. What brought them close to military was the intention
and planning of the federal government to work out a programme of three Rs
after the war. These were artisans that were meant to serve in the programme
but were now converted to a fighting force without much or any military
training and placed under the command of Colonel Murtala Mohammed.[1]
Mohammed had earlier on played one of the most pivotal
roles in the planning and execution of the second Coup that took place on 29
July, 1966. The coup was regarded as revenge Coup,[2] and
a reaction of a much earlier putch that took place in January of same year. The
two catastrophic events set the tune for the subsequent actions that were to
further shape the turn of events in the country and altered the course of its
history.
The Division’s main task was to
flush out Biafran forces from the mid-west, secure the route from Lagos to
Benin and to Asaba, and ultimately attack the heartland of Biafra from that
flank. This came about after the rude shock which the Nigerian Military high
command suffered when the Biafran forces under the command of Colonel Victor
Banjo advanced up to Ore. In fact, Banjo would have taken on Ibadan and Lagos[3], if he
had continued his advances without delay.4[4] Having
pushed the Biafrans forces out of the Mid West, the task that remains was how to
attack the Biafran heartland from that flank. The federal forces succeeded in
chasing the rebels out of the Mid-West but when they attempted to cross the
Niger bridge into Onitsha, the bridge was blown off. The second Division had to
resort to river crossing that also proved catastrophic and when they finally
detored through Idah a long journey though safer but it ended up a nightmare
and greatly altered the course of the war.
Composition of
the 2nd Division and the Biafran Forces
This Division was made up of three Bridges, namely: 6
Brigade, 7 Brigade and 8 Brigade. 6 Brigade was commanded by Major Alani
Akinrinade, 7 Brigade was commanded by Lt. Col. Godwin Ally and 8 Brigade was
commanded by Lt. Col. Francis Aisida. The rear of the Division was stationed at
Ibadan, it was also made a Garrison with Lt. Col. Olusegun Obasanjo as the
commander.[5] The
Divisions Headquarter was to be in Benin but because of the nature of the
operation it was made mobile. It also comprised of 63 Battalion headed by Capt.
Joradam. Major Ochefu group consisting of the 6,31,32 Battalions of the 3rd
Division also helped in clearing the riverine areas of the Mid West and some of
their officers like Major Jallo and Lt Yar’adua were later absorbed by the 2nd
Division.[6]
The men that formed the Division or rather the
soldiers were people who had no Infantry training. They had little military
experience. They were mostly artisans like tailors, nurses, mechanics, shoe
repairers, electricians others includes painters, vulcanizers, battery chargers,
etc, who joined the military. They were not a fighting force but were hurriedly
assembled and placed under the command of Lt. Col. Murtala Mohammed and were
charged with the task of not only defending and protecting the federal
territories but invading and conquering Biafra.
The Biafrans on the other side were initially under a
single Command structure, but, because of the exigency of the situation, the
Command was divided into two especially after the creation of the Republic of
Benin in the Mid West. The Mid West Army Division was created as part of
Biafran Army Division under the Command of Col. Ochei but later the command
went to Lt. Col. Joe Achuzia. The Mid West Division as the new commander
assessed were: 11th Battalion under Lt. Col. Agbogu; the 12th
Battalion under Lt. Col. Ivanso and the 18th under Lt. Col. Nsudo.[7]
The Battalion under Lt Col Chukwuka however, was a
component unit without the spirit of a fighting force. It was composed of
platoons sent from different Battalion from different part of Biafra many of
whom were not physically present on ground. The Battalion was disbanded based
on the strength of its weakness.
The troops of Mid West origin who were to be commanded
by Col. Ochei were also not a fighting force in terms of the physical
(strength) presence in their locations. It was a command still at the stage of
recruitment and training intended to defend the Mid-West in the event of its
invasion by Federal troops. Unfortunately this did not materialized as they
could not form themselves into a fighting force. They became a drain in the
resources and war effort of Biafran authority, the villagers and the local
chiefs.[8]
The Militia formed by Col. Ojukwu was meant to
compliment the Biafran forces which they did adequately was attached to each of
the Divisions being created. In the Mid-West, they were of full Battalion
strength of four companies despite the casualties they had suffered in Benin.[9] This was
the array of forces that were to confront the Federal troops, who were planning
to overrun Asaba and push forward to Onitsha while the Biafran forces were to
stop them in their tracks and defend the territory.
The Conquest of
Mid Western Nigeria
The 7th Brigade under Lt Col. G Ally and
the 6th Brigade under Maj. Alani Akinrinade were at the centre of
the onslaught. The 7th Brigade advanced from Benin to Abudu but because the
bridge (Ossiommo bridge) that serves as a link was blown off, their movement
was halted. The 6th Brigade softly made a southern detour via Eke and bursted
at Agbor where they attacked the location of the rebel soldiers guarding the
rear. The 7th Brigade made their movement by changing direction, arrived Agbor
and moved on to Umunade. However, it was not an easy maneuvering as both
Brigades were passing through Igbo speaking villages where both the villagers
and the rebelled forces were very hostile to the advancing Federal troops.[10]
The 6th Brigade moved along Ogwuashi – Ukwu
– Ibusa – Asaba, the 7th Brigade went along Isele – Ukwu – Asaba
while the 8th Brigade was reserved for the River Niger Crossing at
Asaba. Both brigade’s Movement were steady but with great difficulties as the 6th
Brigade met with stiff resistance at Ogwuashi – Ukwu and at Ibusa.[11] After
then, resistance to Federal Forces advances became minimal until they reached
Asaba where the rebel troops planned to fight to finish in the defence of their
territory. Both 6th and 7th Brigade fought hand in hand
in battle to rid St. Patrick School in Asaba of rebel soldiers. The defeat of
the rebel soldiers and the conquest of the School meant the capture of Asaba.
Meanwhile, the Divisional Headquarters still remained at Umunede, it was from
there the General Officer Commanding was directing the operations of war.[12] Meanwhile,
Biafran 12th Battalion was put on the defensive location.[13] to
counter this Federal Forces.
The River Niger
– Crossing the Bridge
When Asaba was invaded by Federal forces, it came
under a barrage of Artillery and Mortar bombs and within Ten hours it fell to
Federal troops. Thousands of civilians and Biafran Soldiers ran towards the
Bridge in order to cross over to Onitsha to avoid being killed. A mop up
operation[14]
was undertaken to flush out any Biafran soldier or sniper who must be lurking
around. The conquest of Asaba signaled the final push from the Mid-West and the
collapse of the Republic of Benin.[15]
The Nigerian troops in pursuit of the Biafran soldiers
also had to cross the Niger Bridge but, the Biafran troops after crossing,
sensed this danger blew off the bridge. This halted the Federal Forces from
crossing into Onitsha immediately.[16] Indeed,
invading Onitsha through the passage of the Niger Bridge became impossible as
the federal forces improvised to cross to Onitsha by means of river
transportation.
Crossing the River Niger: A Fatal
Calculation ora Failed Tactics
The take by the GOC was that, if the Federal troops
could get to Onitsha swiftly within one or two days, the possibility of ending
the war in record time with limited casualties was very possible. Against the
superior advice from the Supreme Army Headquarters which suggested an unopposed
crossing at Idah, Murtala Mohammad choose the Bravado side by launching through
the open river.[17]
It should however, be noted that, even in normal
circumstances and in an ideal situation with adequate and standard equipment,
optimum level of training, opposed river – crossing operation is a very
difficult task for soldiers. Given our level of development, poor training and
inadequate equipment, both the Army Headquarters and the Supreme Headquarters opposed
this operation.[18]
But the 2nd Division Commander went ahead with his plans,
collected ferries in use elsewhere in the country and assembled them at the
Asaba side of the river; gave the 8th Brigade some special training
at Ila for the River Niger Crossing Operation.
The first landing on Onitsha from Asaba by Federal
troops took place on 12 October 1967. The commander of the Division took part
in the operation and it was very successful. But the second attempt was a
failure due to a combination of factors, namely: A mechanical fault in the
second ferry and the opposition from the rebels. Hence, men and materials in
the second ferry could not reach those who had already landed.
The troops that had landed in the first instance also
became unruly and uncontrollable; they went into a looting spree and could not
hold the beach head which they had successfully captured. If they had
maintained their mission, a successful reinforcement would have been delivered
to them.[19]
The troops and their commander also misjudged the situation due to poor
intelligence gathering by assuming that because of the constant shelling and
artillery bombardment and air raid on Onitsha from Asaba by Federal troops, the
Biafran forces might have fled.
Instead, the Biafrans were in trenches and bunkers
along the river bank[20] aiming
their guns on the Federal troops who were being conveyed through the river in
river crafts and boats.[21] The
Federal troops became easy targets when the Biafran forces opened fire on them.
Some jumped into the river and got drowned while those (like Capt. Ejiga) who
could swim swarmed into safety. The causality figure of those who died in the
crossing was horrendous as corpses were littered all over the river while those
that had already landed became panicked and ran in different directons.[22] The
third attempt that was led by Lt Col Akinrinde almost ended in mutiny as
reported by General Obasanjo. Akinrinde was posted out of 2nd
Division and Murtala had to concede, change his plans and tactics by adjusting
his war strategies. This time his troops had to pass through Idah[23] to
Onitsha.
The Abagana Debacle
After the unsuccessful attempt to cross the River
Niger from Asaba to Onitsha first through the bridge and through the open
waters failed, Col. Murtala Mohammad the Commander of the 2nd
Division finally but reluctantly agreed to reach Onitsha by crossing the River
Niger through Idah to Adaro and to Nsukka.
Murtala’s 2nd Division had to battle their
way through the mazes of defences by the Biafaran 53 Brigade and 18 battalion
of 54 bridage.[24]
The Federal forces pushed themselves through Nsukka and pushed the 53 brigade
out of Oji River towards Ugwuoba. The aim of the 2nd Division was to
reach their destination which was Onitsha while at the same time conquer most
of the villages on their way; Awka was meant to be where they intended to site
their Divisional Headquarters.[25]
The Abagana debacle,was first a battle of attrition
between the Federal 2nd Division under Col. Murtala Mohammed and the
54 and 57 Brigade of the Biafran army under Brigadier Nwawo which was later
merged to form 1 Division of Biafran Army but later changed to 11 Division to
avoid confusion with the Nigeria 1st Division fighting at Enugu sector. These
fighting sectors had capable military officers that checkmated themselves, that
a distance of 25 miles from Abagana to Onitsha could not be covered in three
months. The Abagana battle had cost both sides especially the Federal side to
loose thousands of men and several millions of pounds worth of Military hard ware.[26]
The tragedy started when the Federal troops made last
ditch efforts towards moving to take Onitsha as they had taken Aforigwe after
heavy fighting. The Federal forces were armed to the teeth. As Brigadiers
Nwawo, Dr. Pious Okigbo, Col. Achuzia were discussing certain operational
issues, Col. Udeaja rushed in to inform them that the Federal troops were on
their way to Onitsha. Upon reconnaissance by a patrol team, the Biafrans
discovered that Federal troops consisted of several thousand infantry men, all
whom were fully kittled with over four hundred trailers, heavy Mercedes lorries
with several ferrets and saladins and some Olekons anti-aircraft guns.[27]
It should however, be understood that, at this time,
the Federal troops already positioned at Fegge in Onitsha and the ones at
Abagana had no any form of contact between them. The Biafran forces sold a
dummy in a form of bait which the Federal troops took by pursuing a patrol team
of Major Egwu who disappeared into the bushes at Obosi – Nkpo road junction.
The Federal side seeing that the road was quiet and empty, they felt no sense
of threat, thus, they began to try their movement. Meanwhile Col. Achuzia the
Biafran Officer who was in charge of the operation received an intelligence
information of the movement of the first landrover moving off toward Abagana
and thirty minutes later another second landrover travelling back to Onitsha
from Abagana.
The troops on the federal side appeared not to have
any intelligence about the Biafran side or perhaps because of lack of adequate
knowledge of the terrain they were operating on hence they couldn’t effectively
manage the operations. Whereas Col. Achuzia had received an intelligence report
about the activities of the federal troops staying at Abagana. The report ran
thus:
The federal troops were massing
vehicles loaded with equipment and supplies ready for a move to Onitsha. There
were thousands of troops massing on the side of the road almost stretching to
Igboukwu-Enugu-Ukwu. There were over four hundred trailers and Mercedes Benz
lorries loaded with artillery shells, Saladin shells, mortar bombs and boxes upon
boxes of bullets, grenades, including other military equipment.[28]
The report went further to furnish the commander (Col
Achuzia) with the description of the weapons to include anti-aircraft guns
towed by landrover, ferrets, etc, this also goes to confirmed the earlier
reports Col Achuzia had been receiving concerning the massing of troops and
ammunition meant to attack Onitsha and Awka respectively by the Federal Forces.
After feeling that the road to Onitsha was safe, the
Federal troops began their movement to Onitsha not knowing that the Biafran
forces had started attacking troops on both sides of the roads from trenches.
The lead vehicle was a ferret followed by three petrol tankers and a row of
trailers loaded with boxes upon boxes of arms and ammunitions. By the time the
lead vehicle passed the Ifieukpo junction others were still at Abagana.
By the time they came within range of mortar fire, the
first lead tanker was hit, the explosion and the vibration was so enormous that
locals within a radius of sixteen miles felt they were being attacked and were
running helter–skelter for their dear lives. Within a span of two minutes about
15 mortar incendiary bombs were fired at the convoy and they all hit their
target.[29]
Casualty and Destruction
The casualty figures cannot be mention with certainty,
but estimates shows that several military personnel from the federal side
perished in the inferno while many others lost their lives to the exploding
munitions that caught fire. Hundreds of military and civilian vehicles that
were to be use for the operation got burnt because of the explosion too. But,
however, many of the weapons were salvage by the Biafran forces like the Olikan
anti-aircraft gun, with some lorries and trailers, loaded with weapons,
ammunitions and anti-aircraft shells. It took two days for the fire and
explosion to stop.[30]
Tactics and Strategies
There were no definite tactics or strategies adopted
by both parties to this conflict. Both of them were responding to the
exigencies of the circumstances they found themselves in. The two divisions in
trying to take on each other adopted several tactics and strategies only to do
away with it because of the exigencies. But that is by no means apt to say that
there was no tactics adopted by the two sides to the conflict. At some point
the two sides took different tactics that can be described as the three pronged
attacking approach they always adopt or the horse shoe formation by the federal
side. While the Biafrans, were always in love with the double V formation in
their attack of the Federal forces.
Intelligence
There was less employment of the use of intelligence
gathering by both sides in the conflict. The two personalities in the Abagana
episode were Col Murtala Mohammed on the federal side and Col Joe Achuzia on
the Biafran side. Both officers were not in any way reported to have solid
intelligence information given to them nor to have acted based on intelligence.[31]
Achuzia has expressed an opinion when he said:
“Africans by their nature are not good in keeping secret nor are they good in
matters concerning intelligence gathering for this is their value system”.[32]
Therefore, the battles and the entire war itself was
fought with little intelligence information. Many a times the intelligence
information given was dismissed as mere gossips or even an information planted
deliberately by the other to deceived the adversary e.g the documents captured
in Awka after the 2nd Division troops were chased out gave a detail
war plans and objectives of the Division and even the party to hold after the
conquest of Onitsha but it was treated with levity.[33]
Mercenaries
Both sides were alleged to have engaged the services
of mercenary soldiers. The Biafran side had engaged the services of one Major
Steiner, a French national and an artillery officer with his two lieutenants,
and a number of Biafran soldiers under their command. While on Nigerian
side, the mercenaries were mostly Russian pilots flying Mig 17s that were
engaged in the bombings of Onitsha. Mercenaries from both sides played an
insignificant role in the battles to capture or defend Onitsha.[34]
Impact of Abagana Disaster
This disaster had single handedly altered the course
of the war itself by prolonging the period. The war that could have ended in
six months had the 2nd division succeeded in landing at Onitsha
safely without any incident. But as their armament had been destroyed and a
substantial quantity recovered by the Biafran forces, the whole structure of
the violence had changed and it enabled the Biafrans to sustain themselves and
drag the war for another two more years. The incident also made Col. Murtala
Mohammed to loose command and in his place, Colonel IBM Haruna was appointed to
take over.[35]
Sabotage
Sabotage in any military operation remains part of its
operational nightmare. Though not part of the conscious military planning but
always came about as a result of an operational fallout which some moles or
turn coat will divulge information to the enemy or engage on spying for the
enemy for pecuniary benefit. The civil war in Nigeria between 1967 and 1970 was
not free of such phenomenon especially on the Biafran side where several
officers such as Colonels Victor Banjo, Maj Ifeajuna, Maj. Sam Agbamuche and
Maj. Philip Alale were all executed for treanson,[36] after
been tried by a Court – martial and found to have committed the offence they
were charged for. The federal side also witnessed such a phenomenon when Prof.
Wole Soyinka crossed over to the Biafran side on a mission to convince Ojukwu
to recant his position and retrace his step back to Nigeria by calling off the
threat of war. But as the mission failed to achieve its objectives, Soyinka
conceived a third option which was the removal of both Gowon and Ojukwu from
power. This third force was led by Col. Victor Banjo.[37] while
Soyinka was arrested and detained, Banjo paid with his life. Therefore, this
issue of saboteurs had pervaded almost all the battle fronts and made Alexander
Madiebo to comment thus:
“The word” “Saboteurs” simply made
my heart skips a beat. I did not want a junior rank within the army to hear
that word “Sabotage” mentioned particularly by a senior officer, otherwise the
whole operation would collapse within a very short time giving way to a witch
hunting exercise against “Saboteurs”[38]
Although there was no obvious case of sabotage that
led to the Abagana incident both on the Federal and the Biafran side, the issue
of sabotage was part of the general nature of the Biafran operation where
everytime their forces were defeated they always attributed the defeat to the
activities of saboteurs like when Achuzia having failed to wrestle Port
Harcourt from the Nigerian Forces, blamed saboteurs from within the Biafran
Army of undermining him. That was how Col. Eze was accused of sabotage during
Nsukka and Onitsha battles.[39]
Propaganda
Machine
Propaganda is an integral part of any war effort. The
Biafrans had deployed into effective use their propaganda machine more
effectively than the federal side. At the beginning of the war, there was
paucity of arms and ammunitions (weapons) on the Biafran side. A plane load of
Arms had crashed near Ghana while the weapons left in their inventory consisted
largely of old fashioned riffles, 6 x 8mm and 6 x 3mm barrel guns. In the light
of this Col Ojukwu deployed his skillful propaganda machine into good use when
he said that. “He was in a position to line the bottom of the sea with the
debris of the Nigerian Military”[40] or that
“no power in black Africa could face Biafran Military strength”.[41] This
was meant to achieve multiple purposes, i.e, to manipulate the thinking of the
federal side to succumb to the threat and to bolster the morale of his troops
and people into believing on his invincibility.
However, the Abagana incident was devoid of propaganda
on both sides. Even if there was, it was the federal side that deployed
propaganda about the impending doom that awaited the Biafran forces should the
men and material under Col Murtala Muhammad successfully land in Onitsha. The
movement of such war arsenals was meant to psychologically scare the Biafaran
sides into submission and subtly demonstrate to the Biafrans the futility of
their resistance to federal might. While basking on the demonstrable strength
of his forces devoid of tactics and strategy Col. Mohammed exposed his under
belly by openly moving those materials in a twin convoy that stretched almost 2
kilometers in their advance to Onitsha[42] and in
the process by chance they were petrol bombed, the conflagration of which was
felt fifteen kilometers away from the theater.
Lastly, one can rightly argue that the Abagana debacle
took place not because of the propaganda unleashed during the war but because
there was no known propaganda deployed for the purpose of the Onitsha
operation. Nevertheless, the capture of Onitsha on 23 March 1968 was meant to
secure and consolidate the firm grip of the federal side on the Midwest.
Conclusion
The Abagana disaster was a tragedy that happened, it
had taught scholars, in military related field of studies, military thinkers
and students of peace the lessons about planning, tactics and intelligence in
Military operations. Here was a strong Military force arrayed against a weaker
enemy whose force were not well train nor equipped with adequate weapons to
prosecute their struggle. But out of share chance and luck on the Biafaran side
coupled with lack of tactics, strategy bothering on the over confidence on the
side of the domineering commander of the Federal Forces whose troops fell into
a trap set by the Biafran forces. The tragedy that occurred made the federal
side to loose enormous amounts of men and materials and made Nigeria to loose
valuable time and ultimately altered the fortunes of the war. The episode had
prolonged the war that could have ended in six months. The whole operation was
devoid of tactics and strategy and was not intelligence driven on both sides
especially the federal side that ultimately emerged victorious.
References
Achuzia, J.O.G.
Requiem Biafra: The true story of Nigeria’s civil war. Asaba: Steel
equip Nigeria Ltd, 1993.
Adejo, A.M. The
Nigerian Civil War Forty years after. What lesson. Makurdi. Aboki
publishers, 2008.
Adekunle, A. A.
The Nigeria – Biafra war letters. A Soldiers Story (Vol. 1) Brigadier
Benjamin Adekunle Aaka Black Scorpion. Atlana, Phoenix Publishing group. 2004.
Agbese, D. Ibrahim
Babangida. The Military, politics and power in Nigeria. London; Adonis and
Abbey Publishers Ltd, 2012.
Ardo, U. Murtala
Mohammed: The Architect of modern Nigeria. Princeton: Sungai group, 2002.
Lipede, A. A.
“Strategy and Military Technology during the Nigerian civil war”. Journal of
the Nigerian Defence Academy, Vol. 6 No. 1996.
Madiebo, A.A. The
Nigerian Revolution and the Biafra War. Enugu: Fourth Dimension publishers
1980.
Obasanjo, O. My
command: An account of the Nigerian civil war1967-1979. London: Heinemann,
1980.
Okpi, K. Biafara
Testament. London: Macmillan Education, 1982.
Orewa, O. G. We
are all guilty. The Nigerian Crisis. London: Spectrum Book Ltd, 1977.
Tamuno, T.N.
and Ukpabi S. C. (eds) Nigeria sinceindependence the first 25 years,
vol. vi. The civil war years. Ibadan. Heineman, 1989.
Udenwa, A. The
Nigeria/Biafra civil war. My experience. Ibadan: Spectrum books ltd, 2011.
Uweuhe, R. Reflection
on the Nigeria Civil war: Facing the future. New York: Africana Publishing
Corporation, 1971.
[1]
Udenwa. I. Nigeria/Biafra
civil war: My experience. Ibadan: Spectrum Books, 2011, p.81.
[2] D. Agbese, Ibrahim Babangida: The
Military, Politics and power in Nigeria. (London: Adonis & Abbey publishers
Ltd, 2012). p.84
[3] Udenwa. Nigeria/Biafra Civil War…
p.80.
[4] Ibid., p.80.
[5] O. Obasanjo, My Command: An Account of the Nigeria Civil War 1967 – 1970
(London: Heinemann, 1980). p.37.
[6] Ibid., pp 38 – 39.
[7] J. O.G Achuzia, Requiem Biafara. (Asaba: Steel Quip
Nigeria ltd, 1993) p. 44-47.
[8] Ibid., pp 47 – 48.
[9] Ibid., p.48.
[10] Obasanjo, My
command… p.39.
[11] Ibid p.39
[12] Ibid., p.39. see also Col Achuzia’s Requiem Biafara where he discusses it in
p.70.
[13] Achuzia,
Requiem Biafara… p.70.
[14] Obasanjo,
My command… p.39.
[15] Ibid
p.71
[16] Udenwa,
Nigeria/Biafra war… p.81.
[17] Obasanjo, My command… p.43.
[18] Ibid
40.
[19] Ibid 43
[20] Udenwa,
Nigeria/Biafara war… p.87.
[21] Ibid p. 87
[22] Ibid
[23] Obasanjo, My command… p.43.
[24] Achuzia. Requiem Biafara…
p.149
[25] Ibid p. 260
[26] Ibid p. 296
[27] Ibid 295-6
[28] Ibid p. 340-342
[29] Ibid 242-243
[30] Ibid; pp343 –
345. See also Achike Udenwa on Nigeria/Biafara
War from page 88 – 89 where he discussed the issue.
[31] Ibid p.22
[32] Ibid p22
[33] Ibid 330 -331
[34] Ibid p.331
[35] A. Y. Harbo, “The role of the
Nigerian Army in the Nigerian Civil War 1967 - 1970”, a paper presented at
History and International Studies Departmental Seminar, Nigerian Defence
Academy Kaduna, March, 2015, p.12
[36] T. N. Tamuno “Introduction: Men
and Measures in Nigeria crisis 1966 – 1970”. In Nigeria since independence, ed.
T. N. Tamuno and S. C. Ukpabi. (Ibadan: Heinemann, 1989). p.90
[37] M. A. Alexander. The Nigeria
Revolution and the Biafara war (Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1980. p.243
[38] M. A. Alexander. The Nigeria
Revolution and the Biafara war (Enugu: Fourth Dimension Publishers, 1980. p.243
[39] R. Unwechwe. Reflection on the
Nigeria Civil War: Facing the future. (New York: Africana Publishing
corporation, 1971). p.66.
[40] A.A . Lipede. “Strategy and Military Technology during the Nigerian
Civil War”. Journal of the Nigerian
Defence Academy. Vol. 6, No. 1 (July 1996) p.33.
[41] O. Obasanjo My command… p.43
[42] O. Obasanjo My command… p.43
The official website of the DEGEL Jounal is https://www.degeljournal.com
0 Comments