Cite this article: Duymus, K. 2026. “Ottoman – Sokoto Relations during the 19th Century: An untold History”. Sokoto Journal of History Vol. 14, Iss. 01. Pp. 1-9. www.doi.org/10.36349/sokotojh.2026.v14i01.001
OTTOMAN –
SOKOTO RELATIONS DURING THE 19TH CENTURY: AN UNTOLD HISTORY
By
Kerem
Duymus
Institut
für Afrikastudien, Universität Leipzig
Abstract: Despite the
existing gap in the research literature concerning potential connections
between the Sokoto Caliphate and Istanbul during the 19th century, recent
findings from Ottoman archives in Turkey and Libya reveal a intricate interplay
between the Sokoto Caliphate and the Ottoman Empire. Accordingly, this
relationship was not only multifaceted but also crucially hinged on the
intersection of religious, political, and economic spheres. New evidence
indicates that both Sokoto and the Ottomans shared a common perspective on
caliphal legitimacy during the early 19th century, and this transformed into
political and economic relations in the late century.
Keywords: Sokoto Caliphate, Ottoman Empire,
Sahara, Bornu, Tripoli
Introduction
In the research
literature on the Sokoto Caliphate, relations of Sokoto with France or Britain
have been long over-researched by Anglo-European historians due to the
abundance of traveller accounts written by French and British agents.[1] The dominance of these
sources created an impression for the historians to assume no meaningful
relations between the Sokoto Caliphate and Islamic states such as Morocco and
the Ottoman Empire during the 19th century. This perception
solidified with the prevailing narrative that the 19th century was a period of
decline for non-European states, portraying African states as passive
recipients while European powers were the primary instigators. However, Arabic sources
have long challenged this view by illustrating the extensive global
interconnectedness of the Islamic world from Senegal to Indonesia during this
era and beyond.[2] A
subsequent wave of discoveries emerged with the Turkish sources in the Ottoman
Archives in Turkey and Libya,[3] this article contributes
to a larger research project examining Turkish sources concerning Africa in
Turkey and Libya, revealing that despite the apparent lack of interaction
highlighted by previous historiography, there existed a very intricate and active
relationship between the Sokoto Caliphate and the Ottoman Empire throughout the
entire 19th century.
Positioning the
Caliphate: Sokoto as Third Caliphate (1810s-1840s)
When the tajdid
movement of Uthman dan Fodio (d. 1817) turned into a jihad in 1804,[4] and evolved into an
expanding state following year, any debate regarding the position of this new
emerging state in the global Islamic world was still premature.[5] This issue gained urgency
only with the demise of Uthman dan Fodio in 1817, prompting Abdullahi dan Fodio
(d. 1829) and Muhammad Bello (d. 1837) to articulate their own founding
narrative to assert authority over the increasingly complex territories they
governed amidst multiple uprisings.[6]
At this juncture,
after 1817, both Abdullahi in Gwandu and Bello in Sokoto started to utilize the
title of "amir al-muminin," not merely denoting their status
as commanders of Muslim communities but also asserting caliphal authority, in
an effort to strengthen their power over vast areas.[7] However, this newly
established position was promptly challenged by Ahmad Lobbo (d. 1844) in
Hamdallahi, who refused to acknowledge the authority of either Gwandu or Sokoto
within his domain, compelling Bello to clarify his caliphal claims more
explicitly in light of global Islamic discourse. The core issue in this debate
was the legitimate nature of the caliphal authority. Lobbo argued that if
Sokoto declares itself as a caliphate under the presence of a caliph in
Istanbul, then he could also declare himself as a caliph, alongside Bello.[8] Bello rebutted Lobbo's
claim by asserting that during the initial phase of their jihad, Uthman dan
Fodio requested Bello to write a letter to Istanbul to declare their allegiance
to the Ottoman caliph residing there. However, Bello countered by suggesting
that it would be more appropriate to address Morocco instead, given that the
sultan of Morocco belongs to the Quraysh family, whereas the Ottoman sultan has
no such lineage. Nonetheless, Uthman persisted in his request, maintaining that
Sultan Sulaiman (d. 1566), who had conquered a significant portion of the
Islamic world, was recognized as the protector of Muslims and consequently
regarded as the legitimate caliph.[9] While Bello probably
contacted with the Ottoman governor Yusuf Pasha (d. 1838) in Tripoli, no letter
was sent to Istanbul.[10] Later, Bello maintained
there was no necessity for allegiance with Istanbul since directives from there
could not reach Sokoto, thereby Bello held right to be a caliph within his
domain. In this context, Bello contended that Ahmad Lobbo could not declare
himself as a caliph because instructions emanating from Sokoto were directly
applicable to them, considering they are in the same land (bilad Sudan).[11] This legal foundation of
the Sokoto Caliphate significantly influenced the relations between the Ottoman
Empire and the Sokoto Caliphate till the 1840s, creating a deliberate
diplomatic distance from Istanbul for Sokoto.[12]
Ottomans’
Perspective on another Caliphate (from 16th century to 1830s)
Interestingly, the
debate between Muhammad Bello and Uthman dan Fodio regarding the legitimacy of
the Ottoman caliphate was also a question for the Ottomans, as they
acknowledged their lack of lineage with the Quraysh family, contrasting from
the claims of previous dynasties like the Abbasid or Moroccan. Lütfi Pasha (d.
1563), whose arguments were documented in his text around 1554, provided an
official rationale for the Ottomans' caliphal title.[13] In his text, Lütfi Pasha
argues that given the existing sharif lineages from Qurayhs family (Abbasid and
Moroccan) were incapable of assuming the caliph title due to their weak power,
the Ottoman authority’s assumption of the title of caliphate should be viewed
as a justifiable exception. Thus, according to him, the Ottoman sultans is
recognized as the sole guardian of all Muslims worldwide, their rulership
should be validated as caliph.[14] Lütfi Pasha's
justification served as the foundational narrative for the Ottomans’ viewpoint
regarding the concept of caliphate. Consequently, within territories governed
by Ottoman rule, there could not be another caliph according to the established
principles. However, when Muhammad Bello asserted his caliphal authority in
Sokoto, a region distant from Ottoman control during the 1810s, it would have
been deemed acceptable for the Ottoman Empire. Yet, with the French colonial
invasion of Algeria in 1830—owing to the Ottomans' inability to prevent this
and their subsequent failure to reclaim Algeria—a widespread narrative emerged
across the Maghreb questioning the Ottoman Empire's status as the most powerful
authority within the Muslim world. This absence of power led many local
scholars in the Maghreb to question or openly challenge the legitimacy of the
Ottoman caliphate, effectively undermining the Ottomans’ claims based on their
historical and political statue.[15] In response to this
unexpected development, the Ottoman Empire significantly revised its stance on
the issue of caliphal legitimacy. Following the 1830s, they embarked on an
extensive endeavour to bolster their influence across the Islamic world, from Bahia
in Brazil to Jinan in China.[16] This expansion included
increasing interest and involvement in Hausaland as a means to strengthen their
initial political and caliphal authority within that region. As a result, by
the 1830s, the Ottomans were no longer inclined to acknowledge any further
caliphate claims within the Islamic world.
Kano and Katsina as
sphere of the Ottoman influence (1840s-1870s)
While Tripoli was
under Ottoman control since 1551, during the 18th century, it was governed by
the Qaramanli dynasty on behalf of Istanbul.[17] However, following a
civil war within this dynasty, direct Ottoman control was reasserted in 1835,
with governors subsequently appointed from Istanbul.[18] Around the 1840s, the
Ottoman Empire had solidified its hold over the entire region after series of
local rebellions.[19] Specifically, the
acquisition of Murzuq, the capital of the Fezzan region, marked an opening for
Istanbul into the Sahara.[20] Already in 1844, the
Ottomans dispatched their first envoy to Borno to seek Shehu Umar al-Kanemi's
(d. 1881) voluntary acceptance of Ottoman rule.[21] Notably, the rulers of
Ghat, Tibesti, and Kawar independently sought Ottoman control before even being
prompted by Ottoman demands.[22] As a result, in 1850, a
significant portion of the Sahara came under Ottoman control. In line with
their strategic objectives, the Ottomans resolved to bolster both their
diplomatic engagements and economic ties with southern territories. In 1853,
two Ottoman envoys from Murzuq were dispatched to Borno and Kano to negotiate a
trade agreement. Notably, Sayyid Ali, the Ottoman envoy who arrived at Kano in
the same year, signed a trade agreement with Emir Osumanu dan Dabo (d. 1855) of
Kano.[23] Following this pact,
Sayyid Ali was granted residency in Kano as the representative of Ottoman
merchants from the north, making the city a focal point for Ottoman interest in
the region. For instance, by the end of 1853, Sayyid Ali reported to the Ottomans
about rumours suggesting an impending invasion of Kano by Borno. In response,
Ottoman officers in Murzuq and Tripoli began planning to prevent such an
incursion, given Kano's significance as a trade hub for Ottoman merchants.[24] However, this alleged
invasion never materialized due to ongoing civil strife within Bornu in 1854.
Subsequent years
have seen a persistent evolution in economic interactions between the Ottomans
and Kano. Particularly, during the 1860s, Emir Abdullahi Maje Karofi's (d.
1883) active engagement in trans-Saharan trade further bolstered the Ottoman
presence within the city of Kano.[25] As these relations grew,
the Ottoman authorities sought not only to expand their sphere of influence but
also strengthen their direct control. The acceptance of Ottoman rule by Shehu
Umar al-Kanemi in Borno in 1869 marked a significant step,[26] as in 1873, the Ottoman
representative in Borno was tasked to conduct diplomatic relations with Katsina
and Kano with the aim of securing similar voluntary recognition from them.[27] It is noteworthy that
there had been no established direct communication channels with Sokoto at this
time. Furthermore, the Ottoman authorities were aware of the fact that both
Katsina and Kano were under the rule of Sokoto. Their strategic objective was
that if these cities could peacefully and voluntarily accept Ottoman rule, it
would not only lead to their inclusion within Ottoman authority but also
prevent conflicts with Sokoto. However, the emir of Katsina, Ibrahim dan Bello
(d. 1882) and Kano, Abdullahi Maje Karofi, expressed a desire for exclusively
good trade relations with the Ottomans without any further political engagement
or military assistance. After five years, in 1878, the new Ottoman governor of
Tripoli, Mehmed Sabri Pasha (d. 1879) once again personally addressed Abdullahi
Maje Karofi in Kano and Ibrahim dan Bello in Katsina, expressing a promise of
military support from the Ottoman Empire to deter plundering raids targeting
trade caravans between the northern and southern regions.[28] Both Emirs again favoured
maintaining solely trade relations with the Ottomans without seeking additional
political ties or military.
Failing Efforts to
bring the Sokoto Caliphate under the Ottoman rule (1880s-1899)
In the 1880s, the
Ottomans finally decided to engage Sokoto in direct diplomacy. In 1882, an Ottoman envoy from Murzuq was
dispatched to Sokoto to establish a direct diplomatic relationship and
negotiate a trade treaty. The envoy returned with favourable results, including
the caliph of Sokoto, Umaru bin Ali's (d.1891) signature on the agreement.[29] In 1885, Shehu Ashimi (d.
1893) of Borno contacted with Umaru bin Ali in Sokoto to convince him to accept
the Ottoman rule in Sokoto as he did in Borno. Consequently, in the same year,
Umaru bin Ali dispatched a commission from Sokoto to Istanbul seeking
negotiation for an Ottoman rule in Sokoto.[30] This commission received
with great ceremony at Ghat, the border city of the Ottoman Empire.
Nevertheless, while en route to Murzuq from Ghat, the commissioners were
assassinated by a small French-backed rebel faction in 1886.[31] This tragic incident had
a profound impact on the diplomatic ties between Sokoto and Istanbul. Given the
Ottoman Empire's perceived fragility, unable even to safeguard its own cities,
Sokoto halted all plans for an Ottoman rule.
In subsequent years,
the Ottomans found themselves increasingly concerned about the growing Mahdist
movement in Sudan encroaching into Wadai, which became an important sultanate
for the Ottomans due to the new trade route between Abeche and Benghazi in the
late 19th century. Still, around 1891, an Ottoman envoy was sent to the south
with the goal of communicating with the rulers including sultans of Baghirmi,
Mandara, Wadai, and Agadez as well as the caliph of Sokoto, regarding
recognition of Ottoman caliph and potential advantages of the Ottoman rule for
them. In his 4 years of mission in the bilad Sudan, the Ottoman envoy
initiated a new diplomatic relation with the caliph of Sokoto, Abdur Rahman
Atiku (d. 1902). Following the efforts of the envoy, Abdur Rahman Atiku showed
desire for new negotiations of a possible Ottoman rule in Sokoto, prompting the
envoy to directly write to the Ottoman sultan, Abdülhamit II (d. 1918) about
this news.[32]
However, the fall of Borno to Rabih's control in 1893 once again highlighted
the Ottomans' inability to defend their territories, creating a weak image in
Sokoto, thus once again leading to the cancel of the negotiations. Despite the
Ottoman plans for a new diplomatic campaign in 1896 aimed at establishing
Ottoman rule over the Sokoto Caliphate, escalating threats from an Italian
invasion in Tripoli compelled Istanbul to abandon this initiative and
concentrate more on safeguarding their coastal areas in Tirpoli.[33]
As colonial
expansion by France and Britain intensified in the Sudan region during
subsequent years, the Ottoman Empire endeavoured to safeguard the territories
it controlled, including Borno (which was under Rabih's occupation), Baghirmi,
and Wadai, through diplomatic means. In 1899, the Ottomans formally
communicated with France and Britain, declaring that these territories (Borno,
Baghirmi, and Wadai) are integral parts of the Ottoman rule, expressly
excluding any possibility of French or British invasions. Given the Ottoman
Empire's inability to establish its rule over the Sokoto Caliphate, Sokoto was
omitted from this diplomatic correspondence.[34] Consequently, after 1899,
the Ottoman Empire abandoned all plans aimed at extending governance over the
Sokoto Caliphate. Soon, Britain began their colonial invasion of the Sokoto
Caliphate.
Conclusion
During the 19th
century, the relations between the Ottomans and Sokoto were complexly
interwoven across religion, politics, and economy. Several key factors and
historical events significantly influenced the evolution of these ties. In the
early 19th century, both Sokoto and the Ottomans shared a similar perspective
on caliphal legitimacy, fostering a mutual indirect recognition that was
distant yet significant. However, the French invasion of Algeria in 1830
dramatically altered Ottoman stances, compelling them to seek deeper
connections with the Sokoto Caliphate. Between 1840s and 1880s, Emirs of Kano
and Katsina established close economic and diplomatic relations with the
Ottoman Empire, encouraging the Ottomans to think of a possible Ottoman rule in
the whole Sokoto Caliphate. From 1880 to 1899, the Ottoman Empire endeavored to
establish peaceful relations with Sokoto, aiming to convince them to accept
Ottoman rule voluntarily, as they always did in the whole Sahara and bilad
Sudan. These efforts were severely thwarted by various tragic incidents, such
as the assassination of a Sokoto commission at Ghat by French-backed rebels and
the fall of Bornu to Rabih's control. Ultimately, when colonial forces from
France and Britain started to encroach upon the Sokoto Caliphate in the late
19th century, the Ottomans had no further time to secure Sokoto under Ottoman
rule to avoid the impending colonial invasion, as they were already struggling
to counter a possible colonial invasion of Tripoli by Italian. As a result,
following 1899, the Ottoman Empire prioritized protecting Wadai and the Sahara
against French and British incursions, and Tripoli against Italian invasion,
thus losing contact with Sokoto.
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[1] A.A.
Boahen, Britain, the Sahara, and the western Sudan, 1788-1861 (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1964); A.S. Kanya-Forstner & P.E. Lovejoy, Pilgrims,
interpreters, and agents: French reconnaissance reports on the Sokoto Caliphate
and Borno, 1891-1895 (Madison, 1997); A.S. Kanya-Forstner & P.E.
Lovejoy, The Sokoto caliphate and the European powers, 1890-1907
(Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag, 1994).
[2] S.
U. Balogun, "Arabic intellectualism in West Africa: the role of the Sokoto
Caliphate", Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs Journal, 6(2)
(1985): 394-411; Y.Y. Ibrahim, ‘Arabic/Ajami manuscripts: resource for the
development of new knowledge’, in Nigeria: proceedings of the
National Conference on Exploring Nigeria's Arabic/Ajami Manuscripts (Kaduna:
Ahmadu Bello University, 2010).
[3] K.
Duymus, Afroglobal History of Siyasa in the Central Sudan during the 19th
century (PhD. Thesis, Univesität Leipzig, 2024).
[4] Prior
to 1804, Uthman did not have the intention of establishing a new state, but
reforming the society from the inside. However, these efforts ultimately
resulted in a military conflict with the Sarkin Gobir. M. Tahir, Salatin
Mayrunu Ḫulafa Al-Sheikh Uṯman Bin Fudi (Mayrunu, 2023), 37.
[5] Indeed,
Uthman dan Fodio had to first manage the ongoing jihad before thinking the
statue of the state that they can create. Furthermore, the great success of the
jihad towards 1810, expanding the control of the movement into an immense area
was an unprecedented phenomenon, rendered this newly established political
entity a prominent power in the whole bilad Sudan. M. Al-Hajj, ‘The
Meaning of the Sokoto Jihad’, in Studies in the History of the Sokoto
Caliphate: The Sokoto Seminar Papers, ed. Yusufu Bala Usman (Zaria: Ahmadu
Bello University Press, 1979), 17.
[6] Abdulkadir
Mustafa al-Turudi (dan Tafa), ‘Rawḍāt Al-Āfkār’, N.N.A., O/AR 1, 1. For
instance, in Kano, powerful local families rejected the appointments of new
emir by Bello around 1820. M.J. Abda, Tsarin Musulunica Kano (Kano:
Triumph Publishing Company, 2007), 25.
Around 1819, even one of the earlier commander of the jihad movement,
Abdulsalam from Adar, openly rebelled against Bello. Muhammadu Bello, ‘Sard
Al-Kalām’, N.N.A., O/AR 1, 8.
[7] For
Bello, since they are controlling a vast Muslim area, far beyond any other
caliphal power, he had right to be bare the title of caliph. Muhammadu Bello,
‘Ǧawāb Šāfin Li-l-Murīd’, N.N.A., O/AR, 12. For Abudllahi, dan Fodio family
comes from the very early companions of prophet Muhammed, who were his amir
al-muminin as being the commander of the armies. In this regard, dan Fodio
family has right to have the title of caliph in the sense that they are
successor (Ar. Caliph) of these earlier commanders. Abdullahi dan Fodio, ‘Kitāb
Al-Nasab’, N.U.A., Ghana/115/MSX.
[8] I.F.A.N.,
Fond Brevié, MS. 7.
[9] Muhammadu
Bello, ‘Ǧawāb Šāfin Li-l-Murīd’.
[10] A.
Bivar, 1959, “Arabic Documents of Northern Nigeria”, Bulletin of School of
Oriental and African Studies, 22(1) (1959): 324-349.
[11] ‘Compilation
of Atiqu’, Private Collection of Mamma Haidara [Bamako, Mali], 34023.
[12] See:
M.T.M. Minna, 2013, ‘“Non Alignment”:
Sokoto’s Foreign Policy under Sultan Muhammad Bello’, in Life and Ideas of
Sultan Muhammad Bello, ed. Centre of Islamic Studies Sokoto (Sokoto, Usmanu
Danfodio University Press, 2013)
[13] H.
Yavuz, Osmanlı Devleti ve İslamiyet, (İstanbul, İz Yayıncılık, 1991), 73-110.
[14] Lütfi
Pasha, ‘Halasu’l-Ümme fi Marifeti’l-Eimme’. Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Ayasofya
Bölümü, no. 2877.
[15] ‘Naǧāh
al-ummah fī tāʿtī al-āʾimma’,
Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Esad Efendi Koleksiyonu, no. 1856; ‘Al-Saʿyū
al-Maḥmūd fī niẓām al-ǧadīd’, Süleymaniye Kütüphanesi, Esad Efendi Koleksiyonu,
no. 2363.
[16] V.
Engin, II.Abdülhamid ve Dış Politika (İstanbul: Yeditepe Yayınevi, 2005)
[17] A.E.
Taş, “Garp Ocaklarında Birliğin Bozulması: 18. Yüzyılda
Cezayir-Tunus-Trablusgarp İlişkileri”,
İnsan ve Toplum
Bilimleri Araştırmaları Dergisi, 9(2) (2020): 1065–1091.
[18] Celal
Tevfik Karasapan “Libya, Trablusgarp, Bingazi ve Fizan”, (Ankara, 1960).
[19] M.S.
Meshal, Savratu Guma al-Mahmudi fi al-Cabali al-Garbi Libiya 1835-1838
(Cairo: Dar al-Nahdat al-Arabiyya, 1991), 5.
[20] A.
Kavas, (2018). Osmanlı’nın merkezi Afrika’ya açılan kapısı: Fizan sancağı
(İstanbul: Alelmas Yayıncılık, 2018).
[21] D.M.T.L,
uncategorized, dated as 1844.
[22] For
more details see: K. Duymus, “1850-1910 Arası Osmanlı'nın Sahra Politikaları”, Tarih
Araştırmaları Dergisi, 43(77) (2024): 363‑390.
[23] D.M.T.L.,
Tijarat, dated as 1853.
[24] D.M.T.L.,
uncategorized, dated as 1853.
[25] J.G.T.M.,
uncategorized, a letter dated as 1858.
[26] D.M.T.L.,
uncategorized, dated as 1869.
[27] D.M.T.L.,
uncategorized, dated as 1873.
[28] Sadık
El-Müeyyed, Afrika Sahra-Yı Kebiri’nde Seyahat (İstanbul: Çamlıca Basım
Yayın, 2010), 149.
[29] D.M.T.L.,
uncategorized, dated as 1882.
[30] B.O.A.
Yıldız Esas Evrakı, 122/121.
[31] J.G.T.M.,
uncategorized, dated as 1886.
[32] B.O.A.,
Yıldız Perakende Evrakı Arzuhal Jurnal, 13/56, 2-4.
[33] B.O.A.,
Sadaret Mektubî Kalemi Umum Vilayetler Evrakı, 35/88.
[34] B.O.A.,
Hariciye Nezareti Hukuk Müşavirliği İstişare Odası Evrakı, 520/249.
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