Cite this article: Aminu, A. D. & Raja, S. S. 2025. “Reflections on the Administrative Challenges of ECOWAS Formation: A Review of the Dispute between the Secretariat and the Fund, 1977 – 1979”. Sokoto Journal of History Vol. 13, Iss. 01. Pp. 131-144. www.doi.org/10.36349/sokotojh.2025.v13i01.012
REFLECTIONS ON THE
ADMINISTRATIVE CHALLENGES OF ECOWAS FORMATION: A REVIEW OF THE DISPUTE BETWEEN
THE SECRETARIAT AND THE FUND, 1977 – 1979
By
Ahmad Dahiru Aminu
Department of
History, University of Abuja, Nigeria
And
Sivachandralingam
Sundara Raja
Department of
History, University of Malaya, Malaysia
Abstract: The Executive
secretariat of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) formally
began to function in 1977. Immediately after, a debilitating dispute erupted
between the secretariat and the ECOWAS Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and
Development. The dispute started as a procedural disagreement involving the
community chief executive officers and later, snowballed into an administrative
and personality debacle that sapped the regions’ communal enthusiasms,
stagnated the secretariats’ functions and impeded its capacity to effectively
superintend the West African regional integration process. Using historical
techniques, this article perused available data, official reports and minutes
of meetings of the ECOWAS authority and council of Ministers to examine the
administrative and personality dimensions of the disputes, the efforts made in
resolving them and the impact they had on ECOWAS formation and the region’s
nascent integration process.
Keywords: ECOWAS Executive
Secretariat, ECOWAS Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development, ECOWAS
Executive Secretary, Managing Director of ECOWAS Fund, West African
integration.
Introduction
Founded on May
28th, 1975, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)
is a regional organization established by fifteen post-independent West African
countries[1]
to mine the advantages of the region’s economies of scale for the economic
development and integration of the constituting states.[2] The
ECOWAS establishment treaty and the protocols annexed to it provided for the
setting up of two key regional implementing institutions i.e. the Executive
secretariat and the ECOWAS Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development.
The Executive secretariat is charged with the general administration of the
community and the coordination of the integration programs of all its
institutions. On the other hand, the ECOWAS community Fund is created as the
special organ that will help the region manage the inherent imbalances that
trails economic regionalism.[3]
However, due to
myriads of factors, the initial integration euphoria that gripped West Africa
at the ECOWAS formation period begins to dissipate when the ECOWAS
institutional formation and the gamut of the integration process became
stagnant. For a start, the formation process became a subject of regional
political schisms which in turn delayed the negotiation of the key operating
protocols necessary for institutional formation and functioning of the ECOWAS.
Despite the successful signing and ratification of the 1975 establishment
treaty, the process was further compounded by a debilitating inter-state
rivalry particularly among key member states of the organization. Initially,
the issues at the Centre of the debacle were institutional hosting rights and the
selection of principal officers that will lead the integration process.
By November
1976, the hiatus stalling the ECOWAS institutional formation process began
loosening after Nigeria and Togo successfully negotiated the Lome compromise.
The terms of the compromise were subsequently adopted by the summit of the
ECOWAS authority. The Lome consensus provided that, Nigeria hosts the community
Headquarters/Secretariat, Togo was granted the hosting of the ECOWAS Fund.,
while, Cote d’Ivoire and Liberia were awarded the right to nominate persons for
the position of the Executives secretary and the Managing Director of the
ECOWAS Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and Development respectively.[4]
Subsequently,
the two duly nominated officers met with the Nigerian Head of State in Lagos,
on December 29th, 1976, wherein the Nigerian leader directed the
principal officers to collaboratively proceed with the task of putting in
place, the institutional mechanism for the realization of the objectives
contained in the ECOWAS treaty.[5]
However, as soon as the key institutions began the formation and functioning
process, they became enmeshed in a plethora of administrative and personality
crisis that disrupted the proper functioning of the community.
The saga began
as an inter-personal communication dispute between the principal officials, and
later, snowballed into an institutional crisis fueled by the combined effect of
the differing conceptual interpretation of the terms of the treaty and protocols
and other sundry disagreements.[6]
The main bone of contention was the limit and scope of the powers of the
Executive secretary of the community in relation to that of the Managing
director of the Fund. This article discusses the nature of the crisis, its
pattern of escalation and the effect it had on the development of the
institutions. It also offers a narrative of the resolution mechanisms employed
by the ECOWAS decision organs in resolving the crisis in their bid to
refocusing the community institutions towards the path to realizing the
regional objectives of economic development and the integration of the West
African region.
Administrative and Institutional Obstacles of ECOWAS
formation
The quality of
institutional coordination and harmony between institutions within
organizations is highly dependent on the important variables of rules,
structures, personalities and relationships. The relevance of the above
variables is better appreciated in organizations like ECOWAS where several
important institutions combine to pursue the same objectives. Although,
scholars like C. North, emphasizes the crucial role of structural frameworks in
building of institutions, the personality or human angle is equally critical.
Indeed, as contended by North, “both what organizations come into existence and
how they evolve are fundamentally influence by their institutional frameworks.”[7]
Nonetheless, it is a fact that frameworks alone cannot produce viable
institutions and or organizations. All successful organizations in human
history are products of the interplay of rules, structures, personalities,
relationships and even ideologies.
Often, the
personal rivalries and administrative conflicts that occur in institutions and
organizations present formidable challenges to their growth and development.
Particularly, because the decisions that are “made by agents entail conflicting
choices”[8]
that could instigate disagreements and conflicts even where there are rules.
And in most of such instances, rules alone cannot determine harmony in the
building of institutions without quality personal interaction between the
officials.
Curiously, the
framers of the ECOWAS model preferred to create an intergovernmental
organization fashioned along the OAU model. Thus, both the executive
secretariat (and its agencies) and the ECOWAS community Fund were only mandated
to carryout facilitating roles in the management of relations between ECOWAS
member states, its institutions and agencies and “the rest of the world.”[9]
As pointed out by General. Gowon, the ECOWAS leaders were quite aware that the
regional body might in the future assume political relevance but choose the
path of ‘pure economic regionalism’ as the appropriate first step in the
integration drive and designed the ECOWAS institutions accordingly.[10]
However, it is important to note here that, although deliberate, this choice
was forced on the region partly because of the dictates of cold war political
economy, neo-colonialism and the heighten fear of domination among the smaller
member states.
But, in a
regional union that composes of member states with unequal endowment of
economic resources, it is obvious that, the Fund will be the center of
attraction for the least developed countries (LDCs) in the region.[11]
Being the professional agency to handle issues of compensation, industrial
development and related matters the Fund attracted the most attention for the
LDC countries. Consequently, the ECOWAS organizational concept relies
excessively on sovereignty, paying little attention to issues of institutional
governance and harmony. Even the protocols focused mainly on “specialization,
economies of scale, augmentation of factor input, and those opportunities that
will enhance market structures.”[12]
Ab-initio the functions of the secretariat included
the task of ensuring diligent compliance by agencies and member states
regarding implementation of regional policies and programs, and the
facilitation of dialogue “between the regional community and the rest of the
globe.”[13]
The Fund on the other hand was envisaged to be the professional economic agency
designed to handle the tricky task of compensation and industrial development
of the member states. However, the establishment treaty only gave a sketchy
detail of the basic framework of the Fund’s purposes.
Curiously, both
the fund and secretariat which were expected to deliver on the ECOWAS
objectives were left with subordinate secretarial duties with no role in the
executive decision-making process. Even on the issue of payment of compensation
to states that suffer losses due to implementation of community policies, the
fund only does the technical work, but, decision on payment and other related
issues rest with the board of directors and or the council of ministers.[14]
Therefore, both the expected benefits of the secretariat functions and the
overall objectives of ECOWAS were held hostage by unnecessary administrative
dispute for almost two years. The treaty also failed to give the details of the
structured relation that should exist between the two key institutions. These
important details were left to be negotiated in the protocols annexed to the
treaty later. Nonetheless, the treaty was amply clear regarding the framework,
structure and functions of the ECOWAS Secretariat, and the extent of the powers
of the Executive secretary in the administration of all community
institutions.”[15]
Indeed, the
treaty’s clear mandate to the Executive Secretary relating to the exercise of
administrative oversight over all institutions of the community is clear, but
the contrasting powers issued to the managing Director in the promulgated
operating protocols of the Fund raises concerns and eyebrows. Curiously,
because both documents were silent on what operating rules should guide
relationship between the Fund and the secretariat, the gap was exploited by the
belligerent officials to bread a debilitating crisis for the community.
As if the
silence in the statues regarding relations between the institutions in the
governing rules and procedures was not enough injury, the crafters of the
protocol also promulgated series of contradictory clauses that embolden the
managing director in taking some important administrative decision without
recourse to the executive secretary. Some of these daring provisions included
the creation of a governing board and a ‘unique operating procedure for the
fund.[16]
Although, article 50 of the treaty which created the Fund did not offer any
restrictions to negotiators in working out the details of the Fund’s
constituting laws, it did not also envisaged that the Fund will be designed to
suggest autonomy or separate existence outside the broader administrative chain
of the secretariat.
However, when
one read the text of the protocol it is clearly suggestive of an autonomous
existence for the Fund. The treaty on the other hand did not intend any form of
autonomy as can be deduced from relevant sections of the 1975 treaty which
listed the four areas from which the Fund could sources its capital. Article 51
states that funding for the Fund shall be source from member states
contributions which shall be “determined only by the council of ministers.”[17]
In short, this section is clearly indicative of what the treaty envisages as
the key functions of the Fund i.e. the handling of compensation and other
matters of economic development in the community.
While the
protocols did injected live into the institutions, particularly the fund which
had its scope of purposes and functions expanded to include provision of grants
for financing national or Community research development, granting of loans for
feasibility studies and the promotion of “development projects in the less
developed Member States.”[18]
The lack of an effective arbiter and the disagreements that trails the
operationalisation of the statues strain relations between the key implementing
institutions of the community.
Although, the
task force set by the community to assist the chief executives in preparing job
profiles, organization charts, financial and staff regulations etc. has made
significant inroads and the Executive Secretary have already reported for
duties, the coming to effect of the protocols created additional task on the
Secretariat. Sadly, the gaps and contradictions in the treaty and protocols
coupled with the lack of rules and procedures to guide structural relations
between the Fund and the executive secretariat created a major impediment in
the institutional building process. First, the structural defects gave rise to
disagreement over procedures and communication channels between the principal
administrators of the institutions. Then the disagreement in turn precipitated
a rivalry between the chief executives causing crisis in relations between the
institutions and disrupting the state of harmony in the community.
Relations between the Secretariat and the Fund and the
Rationale of the ECOWAS Institutional Disputes
The defects in
organizational rules and the structure of relations between ECOWAS institutions
were the flaming ingredients that instigated the unfortunate crisis of
administration in the formative years of the West African regional community
institutions. The dispute started when on resumption for duties, the managing
director of the ECOWAS Fund appointed one of the three Liberian professionals
accompanying him to Lomé to represent the Fund as a liaison officer at the
community headquarters in Lagos. The officer was not well received at the
community headquarters and had to be withdrawn back to Lomé. The executive
secretary Dr. Ouattara justified the rejection on the grounds that at the very
early stage of the community building process, Dr. Horton should himself be
present in Lagos to help create the needed synergy between the institutions.
The Fund views
the rejection as a slight designed to subordinate its functions. Hence, the
Managing Director flatly rejected the justification referring to the protocol
establishing the Fund which asserts the ‘distinct legal entity status of the
Fund. He quoted article 13 of the protocol which he interprets to mean that the
Fund is under no obligation to subject its operations to the administrative
dictates of the executive secretary or the secretariat. He further contends
that, ‘the Funds operation is independent of any organ except in issues
relating to the payment of compensation or other form of assistance to a Member
State. Only such functions are to be “determined by the Council … in
accordance... with the principles listed under this article”[19].
Consequently,
the managing director effectively cut direct formal communication which further
deepen the differences of opinions and conceptual interpretations regarding the
scope and limit of the powers of the Executive secretary in relation to the
Fund widening the gap between the chief executives and inflaming the crisis. As
affirmed by General Yakubu Gowon, the stakeholders were obviously satisfied
with the provisions of the treaty regarding the scope of powers of the
executive secretary, thus, neither the framers of the treaty nor the protocols
envisaged a power tussle between the chief executives. “No one queries the division of functions
between the Secretariat and the Fund, or the wisdom of locating their headquarters
in different countries - however close to one another.”[20] All
leaders were in agreement that all administrative activities of the community
shall be coordinated by the Executive secretary in liaisons with other
community officials who shall be reporting directly to the authority via the
Council of Ministers. In essence the Fund was designed to operate as an
essential organ in the community building effort but with more limited and
specialized functions than the Secretariat.
Regrettably,
those entrusted with leadership of the ECOWAS institutions failed to display
the tact and statesmanship expected of them. They failed to maintain good
inter-personal relations and thus, were unable to rally the workforce of the
institutions around the patriotic goals of the organization. Worse still, the
crisis came at a time when ECOWAS has not evolved the internal mechanisms for
dispute settlement, and “the tribunal of the community”[21]
which by virtue of the treaty provisions is the formal mechanism of last resort
for resolving intra-states disputes and institutional crisis in ECOWAS hasn’t
been established yet.
Influence of Personality Traits and Leadership style
in the ECOWAS Formation Crisis
The pioneer
ECOWAS executive secretary Dr. Abubakar Diaby Quattara is an Ivorian born
economist and technocrat. He was educated in the Ivory Coast and later obtained
his higher education in the United States of America. Dr. Quattara is known for
his famous view that “multinational companies could play important and positive
roles in the economic development of the third world if only they were prepared
to abide by the rules of governments in the areas of their operation and were
ready to go into joint venture with local nationals.”[22] He
is considered amongst the vocal advocates of joint venture capitalism, and
among the most highly regarded Francophonie political economist in the region.
Dr. Quattara,
believed that, in building the ECOWAS institutional infrastructures, focus
should be directed towards result rather than what he called ‘reinventing the
wheel.’ He urged the ECOWAS political organs to leverage on the experience and
services of the existing West African regional organizations as guide, ‘rather
than try to build up a huge separate bureaucracy to tackle the task before
them.’
During the
transition period, he demonstrated his willingness to pair with established
organizations in the region to advance the economic integration objectives of
ECOWAS. A versatile technocrat, Dr. Quattara left no one in doubt about his
resolve to “work, … within the guidelines provided by the task force,”[23]
set up to facilitate the institutional takeoff of the ECOWAS, thus, endearing
himself to the officials of the host government in Nigeria. Except for the
slight hitch regarding the take off funding for the secretariat, Dr. Quattara
maintained cordial relations with his Nigerian host,”[24] and
in return was assured of the governments’ understanding and assistance
throughout the crisis that later ensued between him and Dr. R. A. Horton the
Managing Director of the ECOWAS Fund.
Dr. Romeo Alex
Horton on the other hand is a Liberian banker, businessman and an academic with
strong Pan-Africanist credentials. He was classmate and close friend of the
late American civil right activist the Reverend, Martin Luther King with whom
he studied for his master’s degree in business administration at the Morehouse
College.”[25]
A man of immense diplomatic prowess, Dr. Horton is an advocate of proactive
approach to African economic development.
According to
him ‘economic changes are based upon political choices and these combine into
different strategies for social development.’ Africa’s economic development he
said can only be achieved when the economic actors’ feels duty bound to remedy
the situation. He criticized the African economic elites’ attitude of regarding
economic development as a neutral or simply a technical matter. Dr. Hortons’
radical views regarding what he termed, the “unpardonable indictment against
ourselves to have a region so rich and a people so poor,” resonates with many
among African economic enthusiast, prompting General Gowon, the former Nigerian
leader to described him as ‘aggressive, but gracious in his manners, gregarious
but correct in his human relations.’[26]
Clearly these
two men hold divergent views regarding what approach best suite the task of
getting the ECOWAS community objectives and program implemented. Dr. Qattara
favored a bureaucratic approach in running the affairs of the community while
Dr. Horton ‘preferred to set his own goals, take his own decisions, create his
own support base, and make separate international arrangements for the funding
of his projects. These differing ideological concepts and approaches of the
chief executives also constitute an impediment in the tireless efforts by
stakeholders to amicably resolve the administrative crisis that later ensued
between the executives.
Unfortunately,
the inability of the officials to shift grounds led the community into a crisis
that lingers for two years. Thus, besides the contradictions in the enabling
laws the, contrasting personality of the principal officers of the community
was one of the major catalyzing factors that inflated the crisis. The chief
executives also used the split jurisdictions in the location of the
institutions to attempt forming alliances along their positions in the crisis
thus, polarizing the community. The executive secretary is seen to have the
backing of the council of ministers while the managing director also received
the backing of the Fund’s board of directors for a while.
The defects that Escalate the ECOWAS formation
Disputes
Indeed, the
ECOWAS treaty envisages crisis and conflict in the operations of the community,
hence it provided for the establishment of a community tribunal to arbitrate in
the possible crisis that may erupt between the organs of the community. But,
the parameters of the tribunal mandate were strictly delineated to issues of
ensuring observance of “law and justice in the interpretation of the provisions
of this treaty,” and the adjudication of matters of “disputes as may be
referred to it in accordance with article 56 of this treaty.[27]
And where such disputes so referred are determine by the tribunal, the ruling
shall remain binding on all parties.
The provisos in
article 56 restrained the tribunal from intervening in dispute unless those
concerning matters of “interpretation or application of this treaty, that
arisen among the Member States”[28].
Even in such disputes the tribunal can only entertain the matter if all
possible avenues for political settlement were exhausted and “the legal
litigant or (party) must either be a member state, a community institution and
or agencies with interest in the dispute. Only if the above conditions were met
and the tribunal delivered a ruling on the matter that the decision of the
tribunal shall be final”[29]
and binding on all the parties.
Sadly, the
ambiguities and contradictions in the ECOWAS treaty and protocols regarding the
scope of powers of the Executive secretary, and the managing director of the
Fund provided grounds for the escalation of what started as minor communication
incidence, into a full -blown crisis that crippled the development of ECOWAS
and its institutions. The dispute started when neither, the community tribunal
which is the institutional mechanisms for the settlement of disputes, nor, the
administrative hierarchy within the institutions were fully established and or
developed by ECOWAS.
Yet the treaty
clearly stated that the secretariat is to supervise all regional institutions
and agencies,[30]
and provide those essential bureaucratic services for which ‘ECOWAS could not
even begin to function effectively without.’ However, the successful operation
of ECOWAS is highly contingent on the level of confidence received by the
Executive secretary from the political decision organs. And the support and
collaboration of subordinate institutions, including the Fund which though
established as a separate agency but was not intended to be autonomous in all
intent and purposes.
As the dispute
escalates into the conceptual interpretation realm, the intransigence displayed
by the ECOWAS principal officers regarding the crisis stiffens and defied all
political and administrative resolution. The host governments (Nigeria and
Togo) did their best to intervene and resolve the dispute amicably but, have on
each occasion failed to reconcile the two antagonists. Dr. Horton vehemently
maintained that if properly interpreted, both the treaty and the protocol did
not give any preeminence to the Executive secretary over him or the secretariat
over the fund.
To make matters
worse, during the inaugural meeting of the Fund’s Board of directors in July
1977, some decisions that contradict earlier directives of the council of
ministers were taken. Because, the board members hold concurrent membership of
the council, the action emboldened the managing director to act in ways that
made a simple dispute of procedure in communication into an inter-personal
crisis and slowly into an administrative and constitutional crisis of immense
magnitude. Not-withstanding the vagaries and contradictions in the treaty and
protocols, had the principal officials of the community displayed the high
level of statesmanship expected of them the result would have been different.
Of-course, the
contradictions did undermine the chances of seamless interaction among ECOWAS
institutions. But as contended by Hurrell, “all regions are socially
constructed and hence politically contested.”[31] Had
the administrator accepted the many political interventions made to resolve the
issues ab-initio, the crisis won’t have escalated. Instead, they resorted to
self-interpretation and carried out actions that made it difficult for
political consensus to be reached.
While
interpretation by legal authority is the surest solution to issues of
constitutional disagreements, cooperation and consensus building are the best
guarantees for sustaining harmony in an intergovernmental regional arrangement.
Even the 1969 Vienna convention on the law of treaties developed to guide the
interpretations of international law recognizes that, in certain prevailing
legal regime some issues of interpretation are left to be decided upon by
appliers based on reasons other than international law. And in such situations,
the issue of how to put that freedom of action into practice is dependent on
the prevailing socio-economic and political milieu, i.e. the spirit and
objectives of the treaty,[32]
in question and the dispositions of the persons involved. In-fact, the articles
in the Vienna convention have codified the context and purpose within which
treaties and protocols can be interpreted by prescribing ‘international
guidelines and norms for interpretation,”[33]
noting that, the actual practice is relative to the milieu and situation in
question.
Thus, despite
the ECOWAS Fund’s relative autonomy to functions as prescribed by the protocols
detailing its functions, the concept was not intended to constitute the Fund
into a distinct independent community institution outside the administrative
tutelage of the secretariat. But because of the personality traits of the chief
executives and the absence of formal procedures for dispute settlement, the
crisis continues to assume more disturbing dimension especially, when other
issues including the disagreement regarding staff recruitment adds to the array
of conflict areas.
Political Intervention and Resolution of the ECOWAS
Institutional Crisis
Until the
decisive intervention of the ECOWAS Authority in May 1979, the ECOWAS
institutional crisis lingers unabated. All efforts aimed at resolving the
dispute were stalled by the combine effects of regional political schisms and
the intransigence of the managing director of the community Fund. Beginning
with the July 18th to 22nd, 1977 meeting of the council
of ministers in Lagos, the crisis dominated the agenda of both the Council of
minister’s meetings and the summits of the authority. At the July meeting, the
Ministers were briefed by the community institution host countries about the
damaging rivalry and administration dispute that had erupted between the chief
executives of the community. The host nations detailed the nature of the crisis
and the threat the situation is posing to regional harmony. They recommended a
set of measures that in their view will mitigate the rivalry if adopted by the
Council.
After
exhaustive deliberation on all the issues involved in the crisis, the ministers
decided that the council has a solemn duty to intervene to restore sanity and
mutual respect in the administration of the community. In a unanimous
declaration, the council stated that, the spirit and intent of the statues is
to have the Executive secretary as the principal administrator with
responsibility over all community institutions including the Fund. Therefore
in-spite of the contradictions in the contents in Articles 8 section 9 of the
1975 Treaty and Articles 28 sections 7 and 8 of the protocol relating to the
establishment of the Fund, the council holds that, the executive secretary has
power of administration over the Fund. "[34] The
council maintained that, Article 8 section 9 of the establishment Treaty
mandated the Executive secretary with the powers to oversee “the day-to-day
administration of the Community and all its institutions." Council
therefore recommended that, the Authority should order a review of some
relevant sections of the statues in the light of the glaring ambiguities in the
treaty and the protocols.
Mindful of the
damage that could be caused by further friction between the principal officers
which led them “to take divergent views of their roles and functions and even
contrary to the intentions of the founding fathers of ECOWAS,”[35]
the council particularly recommended a review of the sections relating to the
powers of the two chief executives. On their part, the ministers promulgated
additional rules and regulations to further guide the relationship between the
institutions. The rules also directed the principal officer to adhere to the
principles set in the decision taken by the council at its 18th – 22nd
July 1977 meeting that confirmed ECOWAS as one corporate body subsuming all its
institutions, including the Fund, and that the community is to be administered
in a hierarchical organization with the Executive Secretary at its head.[36]
These decisions did not require the approval of the Authority and could
therefore be implemented at once in accordance with Article 6 (2) and (3) of
the Treaty.
In addition,
the council issued directives that henceforth, “the meetings of the Board of
Directors for the Fund should always precede those of the Council of Ministers,
and that “no meeting of the Board of Directors should be held without
consultation with the Executive Secretary regarding the agenda and the time for
the meeting. Since the latter, judging from a general reading of the Treaty and
its Protocols is the greater authority of the two;” These arrangements will
ensure good working relations not only between the Board of Directors of the
Fund and the Council of Ministers but also between the Executive Secretary and
the Managing Director of the Fund.
The Council’s
recommendations were approved by the Authority at its Lagos summit in April
1978. Yet still, Dr. Horton went ahead to outlined aviation, i.e. (facilitating
regional air services), and the development of an ECOWAS integrated fishing,
iron ore, and steel industrial complexes as top priority areas for the fund in
defiance of the priority areas earlier identified by the council of ministers.
Thus, in view
of the above contraventions, on October 14th, 1977 the chairman of
the council of ministers wrote a letter instructing the Executive Secretary and
Managing Director to freeze staff employment until further directive from the
council of ministers. The Executive secretary swiftly notified the council
chairman that the secretariat has not made any permanent appointment and
expressed his readiness to abide by the instructions. Curiously, Dr. Horton’s
response was indignant, he declared that, the employments made at the Fund were
in keeping with the expectations of the Fund’s boards of directors and that,
the fund will continue to function as prescribed by the treaty, and the
protocol.[37]
In lieu of the response of the managing director, the council chairman
announced a follow up meeting of ministers to deliberate on the proceedings of
the regional meeting of experts charged with formulating solutions to the
organizational challenges facing the institutions.
The ministers
re-convened on the 18th and 19th of November 1977 in
Lagos. Top on the meetings’ agenda was appraising the executive secretary’s
memos earlier passed for expert advice and the set of accusations leveled
against the chief executives concerning staff employment which appears in the
media and corroborated by the host countries. At the end of the heated
deliberations, the council directed the termination of all appointments made by
the chief executives and the placed a notice of termination on all concern
persons. The council set a board for appointments and promotions mandated to
employ all senior cadre community staffs to curbed the alleged abuse of power
by the chief executives of the institutions.
The Council
approved the list of nominees presented by the designated member states for
statutory offices in both the Secretariat and the Fund. The permanent joint
advisory appointment, promotions and disciplinary committee to be set up was
charged with making the critical staff employment needed for the proper
functioning of the institutions in accordance with the proper established
procedures of conduct of staff recruitment exercises.”[38] The
Council also recommended to the authority to consider the setting up of a
permanent committee for studies and research with general mandate over all the
community institutions to address the contradiction contained in Article 13,
section h of the protocol establishing the ECOWAS Fund. The section gave the
managing director the duplicate powers to advertise and accept applications for
studies and research on behalf of the fund.”[39]
On the
correspondences between the Council chairman and the managing director, the
ministers frowned at the defiant response of the managing director and set up
of a ministerial committee comprising ministers from the Gambia, Sierra Leone,
Benin and Mali with the Gambian representative as Chairman.”[40]
The committee was given 30 days to investigate”[41] the
ambiguities in the treaty and the protocols that gave impetus to the conflicts
between the Executive Secretariat and the Fund; and, ascertaining the
“institutional contradictions and inconsistencies in the treaty, the protocol,
the rules of procedure and the regulations which are hampering the smooth
running of the ECOWAS system”[42]
among others.
The Cham led
ad-hoc committee presented its report to the Council of ministers at the April
1978 pre-summit meeting held in Lagos. All the committee’s recommendations were
approved and the report was recommendations for implementation by the Council.
Council also adopted the framework of functions and appointments, that
recommended enhance Council oversight powers over the institutions. The
recommendation that, ‘Council should direct the Financial Controller to keep
constant scrutiny of the financial administration of the institutions and
submit regular reports to the chairman of the Council and copy the chairman of
the board of directors of the fund”[43] was
also approved.
Sadly, these
measures did not abate the crisis, thus, the Council had to meet again in
November 1978 wherein, the chairman informed the meeting that, in the bid to
involving more stakeholders in finding lasting solutions to the community
debacles, he alongside the financial controller had attended the 2nd
committee of ECOWAS ambassadors meeting on Tuesday 31st October
1978. The chairman reported that, he relayed the council’s concerns on the
issues of the community institutions to the ambassadors and urged them to
convey the true perspectives to their respective states.
The ambassadors
were also briefed about the utility of the joint permanent committee for
appointments and promotions set up to deal with matters of appointment,
promotion and discipline of staff in the institutions. And, because, the
survival of the community is contingent on the adequate staffing of the
bureaucracies, the council Chairman informed the ambassadors that in an effort
to strengthened the regional consensus Council felt that those provisions in
the treaty and annexed protocols that empowered “the executive secretary, and
the Managing director of the fund …to appoint their staff, should not be
literally interpreted.”[44]
On the council directive freezing employment
and the termination of all permanent non-statutory staff appointments in the
secretariat and the fund. The Ministers observed that, the directive has left
the institutions with only statutory appointees and few secretarial staff thus,
were unable to superintend the process for the formulation and harmonization of
regional economic policies as envisage by community statues. Particularly, the
Council was concern that the harmonization of customs tariffs and the regional
policy for free movement of persons, labor and establishment which are the
necessary first steps in driving the ECOWAS regional economic integration
program have stagnated. Thus, the meeting considered the urgent need to engage
professional staffs to operate the bureaucracies and strived to reach a
consensus regarding the list submitted by the special recruitment committee
earlier set up by the council.
Sadly, the
Liberian delegation raised an objection on the matter and requested that the
issue be referred to the authority for a decision as prescribed by Article 6 of
the Treaty. The objection shattered the consensus reached on professional staff
recruitment and flung the community into further crisis and oblivion. All
entreaties to get Liberia to withdraw its objections were unsuccessful leaving
the council with two difficult scenarios, either to allow the institutions to
continue to operate minimally and refer the matter to the authority for a
decision, or, restore the withdrawn powers of the chief executives to employ
staffs and grant promotions.
In the end, the
Council decided to recommend that the Authority intervene to resolve the
rivalry between the chief executive officers of the community; address the
political issues surrounding the institutions employment saga, and resolve for
good the administration disputes in the community institutions.
The Authority
finally accepted to discuss the procedural, structural and other related
problems that were obstructing the smooth operation of the institutions and the
community. At the 1979 summit meeting in Dakar Senegal, the Heads of states and
governments deliberated on the recommendations from the council of ministers
regarding relations between the Executive secretary and the managing director
of the Fund and other matters. The summit also considers the report of the
Financial Controller and the External Auditor which highlighted the unhealthy
rivalry between the chief executives and the obstruction caused to the
effective and efficient functioning of the institutions, community programs and
policies and the economic integration of the region.
Conclusion
This article
has established that, while the 1975 ECOWAS treaty provided a framework of
functions for each organ of the community, the treaty did not define the actual
scope of the functions and powers of the executive secretary in relation to the
administration of the Fund, nor, the relations and mutuality that should exist
between the two main implementation institutions. Thus, when crisis erupted in
the administration of the institutions, ECOWAS was left to scavenge for a
solution. Efforts were embarked by the political organs of ECOWAS particularly
the council of ministers to midwife the crisis and restore rules and harmony in
the community. In four separate intervention meetings, the council of ministers
tried to define rules, issued directives and promulgated series of measures
aimed at ensuring the evolution of a well-nurtured administrative service that
can grow the institutions and serve the common will of the community. These
efforts lasted almost two years in between of which, the institutional life of
the secretariat, the fund and indeed ECOWAS in general were disrupted, and the
trajectory of progress that would have been attained by the community
truncated.
References
Bah, Essa. "An examination into
the quality of regional trade institutions: The economic community of West
African states (ECOWAS); a historical, theoretical and modelling
perspective." PhD diss., University of Bradford, 2017.
Barbara, E. Harrel-Bond, “ECOWAS: The
Economic Community of West African states,” American University Field staff,
Hanover, NH, BHB-1-79… 1979. /No6.
Gowon, Yakubu, "The Economic
Community of West African States: A Study in Political and Economic
Integration." PhD diss., University of Warwick, 1984.
Gutteridge, William, "The
organization of African Unity, 1963–1983." Journal of Contemporary
African Studies, Vol. 3,
No. 1-2, 1983.
Hurrell, Andrew, "Explaining the
Resurgence of Regionalism in World Politics." Review of
international Studies Vol. 21, No. 4, 1995.
Joy, U. Ugwu, and Warrisu O. Alli, (ed)
ECOWAS: Milestone in Regional
Integration, Nigerian institute of International Affairs, Lagos, 2009.
Kacowicz, Arie M.
"Regionalization, globalization, and nationalism: Convergent, divergent,
or overlapping?" Alternatives 24, no. 4 (1999): 527-556.
Maftei, Jana, and Varvara Lieuta Coman.
"Interpretation of Treaties." Acta U. Danubius Jur. (2012):
16.
Martin, Guy. "The Franc Zone,
Underdevelopment and Dependency in Francophone Africa." Third
World Quarterly VOL. 8, No. 1, 1986.
North, Douglass C. "Institutional
Change and Economic Growth." The Journal of Economic History Vol.
31, No. 1, 1971.
Rimmer, Douglas. "Growth and Anti‐growth
in West Africa", Journal of Contemporary African Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2, 1983.
Wayo, Ishobee. "Regional
integration in West Africa: the attitude of ECOWAS leaders." PhD diss.,
Kansas State University, 1982.
Official
Documents
ECOWAS, Treaty of the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), as amended 1975.
ECOWAS, Treaty of the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 14843, the United Nations Treaty
Series, New York: 1976.
ECOWAS, Decisions of the council of
Ministers on Relations between the secretariat and the Fund, C/DEC 5/7/77,
18-22 JULY 1977.
ECOWAS, Decisions of the council of
Ministers on “Framework of Functions and Appointments,” C/DEC 4/ 7/77, 18th
– 22nd July, 1977.
ECOWAS, Decisions of the Council of
Ministers on “Framework of functions and Appointments, C/DEC 4/ 7/77.
ECOWAS, Decisions of the council of
Ministers on “Staff Appointments,” C/DEC13/11/77, 18th – 19th
November 1978.
ECOWAS, Decisions of the council of
Ministers on “technical Assistance and Cooperation with International
Organizations,” C/DEC6/11/77, 18th – 19th November 1978.
ECOWAS, Decisions of the council of
Ministers on “Functioning of ECOWAS Institutions,” C/DIR7/11/77, 18th
– 19th November 1978.
ECOWAS, Decisions of the council of
Ministers on “Functioning of the Institutions of the community,” C/DEC14/11/77,
18th – 19th November 1978.
ECOWAS, Report on the second meeting of
the committee of ECOWAS ambassadors, Lagos, 31st October 1978.
ECOWAS Council of Ministers: Directive
on “Financial Controller’s Report,” C/DIR9/4/78, 18th – 19th
November 1978.
ECOWAS, Protocol relating to Free Movement of Persons, Residence and Establishment, Executive Secretariat, A/P.1/5/79, 1979.
[1] The original fifteen
founding Member States of the ECOWAS are; Benin, Burkina Faso, Gambia, Ghana,
Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Ivory Coast, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, Togo, Mauritania.
[2] U. Joy Ugwu and O. Alli
Warisu, Three Decades of ECOWAS: Milestone in Regional Integration in U. Joy
Ugwu and O. Alli Warisu (ed) ECOWAS: Milestone in Regional Integration,
Nigerian institute of International Affairs, Lagos, 2009, p. 9.
[3] ECOWAS: Treaty of the
Economic Community of West African States, 1975, Article 52 (a-f), p. 37.
[4]Y. Gowon, "The Economic Community of West African
States: a study in political and economic integration." PhD Thesis
Submitted to University of Warwick, Coventry CV4 7AL, 1984, Pp. 433- 434.
[5] Ibid., p. 446.
[6] Ibid., p. 455.
[7] C. North Douglass,
Institutions, Institutional change in Economic Performance, Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 5.
[8] Bah Essa, "An
Examination into the Quality of Regional Trade Institutions: The Economic
Community of West African States (Ecowas); a Historical, Theoretical and
Modelling Perspective." University of Bradford, 2017, p. 10.
[9] Ibid.
[10] Y. Gowon, ‘The Economic Community,’ Pp. 24 –25.
[11] ‘Two-thirds of West
African states fall within the World Bank's category of "low income"
countries. See, Rimmer,
Douglas. "Growth and Anti‐growth in West Africa," Journal of Contemporary African Studies Vol.
2, No. 2, 1983, p. 244.
[12] Guy, Martin, "The
Franc Zone, Underdevelopment and Dependency in Francophone Africa", Third World Quarterly, Vol. 8, No. 1
1986, 205-35, p. 7.
[13] M. Arie Kacowicz,
“Regionalization, globalization, and Nationalism: Convergent, Divergent, or
Overlapping?”, Alternatives, Vol. 24,
No. 4, 1999, p. 530.
[14] Y. Gowon, ‘The Economic
Community of West African States,’ p. 462.
[15] See, Article 8 and 61,
‘ECOWAS, Treaty of the Economic Community’ pp. 11 and 44.
[16] See, Articles 50, 51 and
52, ‘ECOWAS: Treaty of the Economic Community,’ pp. 37 – 38.
[17] See, Article 51 paragraph
2 and 3, ‘ECOWAS: Treaty of the Economic Community,” p. 37.
[18] See, Article 2, items a-g,
‘The ECOWAS Protocol Relating to the Fund for Cooperation, Compensation and
Development,’ Lomé, 5th November 1976, p. 3.
[19] See, ‘The ECOWAS Protocol,
relating to the Fund for Cooperation,’ Article 13, pp. 72-73.
[20] Y. Gowon, ‘The Economic Community,’ p.462.
[21] See, Article 4e and 11,
1&2, ‘ECOWAS: Treaty of the Economic Community,’ Pp. 9, and 12 – 13.
[22] E. Harrel-Bond Barbara,
“ECOWAS: The Economic Community of West African states,” American University
Field staff, Hanover, NH, BHB-1-79… 1979. /No6.
[23] Barbara, “ECOWAS: The
Economic Community, p.465.
[24] Due to official
procedures, the funds from the Nigerian government to finance the take-off of
the secretariat were delayed. The executive secretary decided to approach his
home government for financial assistance ‘until such time as the host government, Nigeria, would authorize payment of the
full amount required …. Nigeria, as the host country responsible for ensuring
the smooth and successful running of the Secretariat advised Dr. Ouattara to
return the temporary loan to the Ivory Coast, and immediately released the full
amount required for the operations of the Secretariat - until such time as the
contributions from member states became available.
[25] From 1964-1969 Horton
served as the first minister (secretary) for commerce and transport in the
Tubman government. He also founded the Department of public Administration and
became the first Dean of the Collage at the University of Liberia. See BHB_! _’79/4
and Hurrell, “explaining the resurgence of regionalism in world politics.”
[26] Y. Gowon, ‘The Economic Community,’ p. 468.
[27] See, Article 56, ‘ECOWAS:
“Treaty of the Economic Community,” p. 51.
[28] See, Article 11, ‘ECOWAS:
Treaty of the Economic Community,’ pp. 12-13.
[29] See, Article 8 paragraph
1- 10, ‘ECOWAS: Treaty of the Economic Community,’ p. 11.
[30] Article 8 paragraph 1- 10, ‘ECOWAS: Treaty of
the Economic,
[31] Andrew Hurrell,
“Explaining the resurgence of regionalism in world politics.” p. 340.
[32] Ibid.
[33] Jana Maftei, and Coman
Varvara, "Interpretation of Treaties," Acta Universitatis Danubius. Juridica No. 8 (08/01 2012). pp. 1-6.
[34] According to article 27,
paragraph 7, “The Managing Director shall be the legal representative of the
Fund.” while paragraph 8 stated that; “The Managing Director shall be the Chief
Executive of the Fund and shall conduct the current business of the Fund under
the direction of the Board of Directors. He shall be responsible for the
organization, appointment and dismissal of the officers and staff in accordance
with regulations made by the Board of Directors.”
[35] C/DEC 5/7/77 ‘Decisions of
the council of Ministers on Relations between the secretariat and the Fund,’ 18th
– 22nd July 1977, p. 6.
[36] C/DEC 4/ 7/77 ‘Decisions
of the council of Ministers on Framework of functions and Appointments,’ 18th
– 22nd July 1977, Pp. 2-5.
[37] Y. Gowon, ‘The Economic Community,’ p. 486.
[38] C/DEC13/11/77, Decisions
of the council of Ministers on “Staff Appointments,” 18-19 November 1978, p. 3.
[39] C/DEC6/11/77, Decisions of
the council of Ministers on “technical Assistance and Cooperation with
International Organizations,” 18-19 November 1978, p. 1.
[40] C/DIR7/11/77, Decisions of
the council of Ministers on “Functioning of ECOWAS Institutions,” 18-19
November 1978, p. 3.
[41] C/DEC14/11/77, Decisions
of the council of Ministers on “Functioning of the Institutions of the
community,” 18-19 November 1978, p. 3.
[42] Ibid.
[43] C/DIR9/4/78, Directive of council of Ministers on “Financial Controller’s Report,” 18-19 November 1978. p. 4.
[44] Report on the second
meeting of the committee of ECOWAS ambassadors, Lagos, 31 October 1978. p. 2.
0 Comments