Proliferation of Irregular Routes and their impact on security threat along Katsina–Zamfara Border Area, 2010-2020

Cite this article as: Salisu Y. (2026). Proliferation of Irregular Routes and their impact on security threat along Katsina–Zamfara Border Area, 2010-2020. Zamfara International Journal of Humanities, 4(2), 194-206. www.doi.org/10.36349/zamijoh.2026.v04i02.018

By

Yusuf Salisu

Postgraduate School, NDA, Kaduna.

Abstract: This paper examines the proliferation of irregular cross-border routes and their impact on security threats along the Katsina–Zamfara border area of the Nigeria–Niger frontier between 2010 and 2020. It argues that these routes, which historically facilitated trade, migration, and social interaction, have increasingly been exploited by transnational criminal networks involved in arms trafficking, banditry, kidnapping, cattle rustling, and the smuggling of illicit goods. The study adopts a historical and analytical approach to trace the evolution of these routes from pre-colonial mobility corridors to contemporary security hotspots. It further demonstrates that weak border governance, inadequate manpower, poor inter-agency coordination, corruption, and limited community participation have allowed irregular routes to proliferate and undermine national security. The findings show that insecurity in the Katsina–Zamfara borderlands cannot be explained solely by the existence of porous borders but also by long-standing institutional weaknesses and the limited capacity of the state to regulate border spaces effectively. The paper concludes that reducing security threats in the region requires a comprehensive border governance strategy that combines improved surveillance, stronger institutional capacity, active community participation, and sustained bilateral cooperation between Nigeria and Niger. Such an approach would not only curb the misuse of irregular routes but also promote long-term peace, security, and stability in the borderlands.

Keywords: Irregular Routes; Border Security; Border Governance; Banditry; Nigeria–Niger Borderlands.

Introduction

Nigeria’s north-western borderlands have, over the past two decades, emerged as one of the most volatile security theatres in the country. The Katsina–Zamfara border areas, which form part of Nigeria extensive and historically fluid boundary with the Republic of Niger, have become epicentres of armed banditry, transnational smuggling, irregular migration, and other forms of organised criminality. Central to the persistence of these threats is the proliferation of irregular cross-border routes, unguarded footpaths, bush tracks, and informal corridors, that operate beyond the effective reach of state authority. Historically, these routes predate colonial boundary demarcation and served legitimate economic, social, and cultural functions, facilitating trade, pastoral transhumance, and kinship interaction across the borderlands. However, in the contemporary period, their character and efficacy have been profoundly transformed.[1] Weak border governance structures, limited state presence, corruption, and poor inter-agency coordination have enabled these routes to evolve into conduits for the movement of small arms and light weapons, armed groups, illicit goods, and criminal networks. In the Katsina–Zamfara axis, this transformation has directly contributed to the escalation of insecurity, mass displacement of rural populations, and the erosion of local and national security.[2]

Along the Zamfara–Katsina corridor, cross-border movement that had long been socially embedded became entangled with counterterrorism, anti-smuggling, and migration-control agendas driven by both regional governments and external actors.[3] This shift has produced a central paradox in border governance. While borders have been fortified to contain perceived transnational threats, the disruption of traditional mobility systems has often intensified local grievances, eroded trust between communities and the state, and pushed migration, trade, and pastoral movements into more clandestine and dangerous routes. In this sense, irregular cross-border routes are not simply a symptom of weak enforcement but a direct outcome of governance strategies that prioritize securitization over inclusion and regulation. The main argument here is that the persistence of irregular cross-border routes is not simply a function of geography or terrain, but rather a manifestation of profound institutional weaknesses in border governance frameworks across the Sahel and West Africa. These weaknesses are rooted in chronic underfunding of border management institutions, inadequate manpower, weak inter-agency coordination, and the absence of modern surveillance and monitoring infrastructure.[4] Collectively, these structural deficiencies undermine the capacity of states to exercise effective territorial control and regulate cross-border mobility. These institutional shortcomings are especially pronounced along the Zamfara-Katsina border areas. Border management agencies face severe operational constraints in monitoring expansive and rugged terrains characterized by dense forests, rocky outcrops, and semi-arid landscapes. The spatial configuration of border infrastructure further compounds the problem: official border posts are few, widely spaced, and largely concentrated along designated formal routes.[5] This leaves hundreds of informal and historically entrenched crossing points effectively ungoverned, creating vast governance vacuums along the borderlands. The inability of border institutions to project authority into these peripheral spaces not only facilitates illicit flows of arms, livestock, and contraband, but also enables the cross-border circulation of violent actors who capitalize on weak enforcement and limited intelligence sharing between Nigeria and Niger.

This paper situates irregular cross-border routes at the centre of Nigeria’s national security dilemma in the North-West. It argues that the persistence of insecurity in the Katsina–Zamfara border areas cannot be adequately understood without examining the institutional weaknesses that undermine effective border management. These weaknesses include inadequate manpower and logistics among security agencies, overlapping mandates, weak intelligence-sharing mechanisms, and the marginalisation of borderland communities in security governance. The result is a security vacuum that armed bandits and transnational criminal actors exploit with relative ease. The paper, therefore, discusses issues surrounding irregular border routes and border governance in the Zamfara-Katsina border areas of the Nigeria-Niger borderlands. It moves beyond state-centric explanations of insecurity to the more focus on the interaction between formal and informal spatial practices and institutional weaknesses along the borderland communities. The paper demonstrates that irregular routes are not merely geographical structures but political and institutional outcomes, reflecting the limits of state authority and the contested nature of sovereignty in the Nigeria-Niger border regions.

Conceptual clarification

i. Irregular Cross-border Routes

Irregular cross-border routes refer to unofficial, unregulated, and informal pathways through which people, goods, and resources move across national boundaries outside the control of state authorities.[6] In the Nigerian context, particularly along its extensive land borders with Niger, Chad, Benin, and Cameroon, these routes are deeply embedded in historical patterns of mobility that predate colonial boundary demarcations.[7] While initially facilitating legitimate socio-economic activities such as trade, pastoral transhumance, and kinship interaction, irregular routes have increasingly been appropriated by criminal and armed groups. These routes now function as strategic corridors for arms trafficking, banditry, kidnapping, illegal mining, and the movement of insurgents. Their persistence reflects both the mismatch between imposed colonial borders and indigenous mobility systems, as well as the inability of the state to effectively regulate borderland spaces. As such, irregular routes are not merely physical pathways but socio-political constructs shaped by history, marginalisation, and governance deficits, with profound implications for Nigeria’s national security.

ii. National Security

National security refers to the protection of a state’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, institutions, and the safety and well-being of its citizens against internal and external threats. In contemporary Nigeria, national security extends beyond conventional military defence to encompass threats arising from transnational crime, irregular migration, arms proliferation, and internal displacement. Irregular cross-border routes pose a direct challenge to Nigeria’s national security by undermining state control over territorial space and enabling non-state actors to operate with relative impunity.[8] The unchecked movement of armed groups and illicit goods across porous borders weakens the state’s monopoly over the legitimate use of force and erodes public confidence in government authority. Consequently, insecurity in border regions often spills over into the national core, affecting economic stability, social cohesion, and political order. Understanding national security in Nigeria therefore requires a borderland perspective that recognises how insecurity is produced and sustained through irregular mobility and weak border regulation.

iii. Trans-border Security

Transborder security is a set of security measures put in place to curb criminal acts whose perpetrators and repercussions go beyond territorial borders. Such security measures are aimed at checking drug and human trafficking, money laundering, arms smuggling or trafficking in weapons, cross-border terrorism, illegal oil bunkering, illicit trafficking in diamonds and other banned commodities and business fraud amongst others.[9] Apart from the physical or hard security measures, trans-border security also involves soft security measures to tackle organized criminal groups or individuals who carry out their illicit activities using major technological tools such as information networks, the financial system and other sophisticated means.[10]

Proliferation of Irregular Routes

Irregular cross-border routes along the Nigeria–Niger frontier are deeply shaped by long-standing socio-cultural, economic, and institutional dynamics rather than by geography alone. In the Zamfara–Katsina axis, these routes are sustained not only by dense socio-cultural affinities among Hausa-speaking traders, transporters, and border officials, but also by the strategic positioning of numerous border communities that serve as operational nodes within informal mobility networks. On the Zamfara side, villages such as Tsanu, Rukudawa, Zumburum, Mayasa, and Gurbi, alongside high-risk locations like Kwashabawa and Mashema, which are reportedly exploited by armed groups and bandits for cross-border movement into Niger, function as key transit and logistical corridors. Correspondingly, on the Katsina side, border communities within Jibia Local Government Area, including Dan Abdallah, Hamago, Dabura, Unguwar Rumji, and Inyalwa, play complementary roles in sustaining these cross-border flows. These localities collectively form an interconnected web of informal routes that facilitate both licit and illicit movements across the frontier.

These routes are further reinforced by socio-cultural linkages across regions such as Maradi, Katsina, Kano, and their adjoining communities, where shared language, kinship ties, religious affiliation, and long-established commercial trust continue to underpin cross-border interactions. [11] Historically embedded patterns of exchange have enabled trade to persist despite formal regulatory constraints imposed by the state. Such affinities have given rise to a distinctive form of cross-border commerce often described as a “border-relay” system, in which traders transport goods to designated border points and transfer them to counterparts across the boundary for onward movement and negotiation with national authorities. This arrangement minimizes exposure to multiple checkpoints, road harassment, and bureaucratic bottlenecks associated with formal trade routes.[12] Consequently, rather than being curtailed by official border controls, trade and mobility are reconfigured around informal crossing points and discharge zones concentrated in these border villages.

Irregular cross-border routes along the Nigeria–Niger frontier are deeply shaped by long-standing socio-cultural, economic, and institutional dynamics rather than by geography alone. In the Zamfara–Katsina axis, these routes are sustained primarily by dense socio-cultural affinities among Hausa-speaking traders, transporters, and border officials on both sides of the boundary, particularly in Maradi, Katsina, Kano, and adjacent communities. Shared language, kinship ties, religious affiliation, and commercial trust have historically underpinned cross-border trade relations, enabling economic exchanges to persist despite formal regulatory constraints imposed by the state.[13] These affinities have given rise to a distinctive form of cross-border commerce often described as a “border-relay” system. Under this arrangement, traders from one country transport goods to the border and transfer them to counterparts across the boundary, who then assume responsibility for onward transportation and negotiation with national administrative agencies. This system significantly reduces exposure to road harassment, multiple checkpoints, and bureaucratic delays that characterize formal trade corridors. As a result, rather than being eliminated by border controls, trade is reorganized spatially and institutionally around informal crossing points and discharge zones.[14] This practice helps explain the persistence and expansion of irregular routes, even in areas where formal border posts exist.[15]

Socio-cultural networks also play a central role in the circumvention of state regulations, particularly restrictions on cereal exports that have periodically been imposed by both Nigeria and Niger. Informal trader associations frequently negotiate collectively with border officials on behalf of their members, blurring the line between formal regulation and informal accommodation. In border towns such as Jibiya, locally based associations, such as the Jibiya People’s Forum, serve welfare and commercial functions that indirectly facilitate cross-border trade by coordinating activities, resolving disputes, and mediating relations with authorities.[16] These institutions, while informal, often prove more effective than state agencies in regulating everyday economic life in the borderlands.

However, the effectiveness of socio-cultural affinity in sustaining cross-border trade diminishes as traders move beyond the Hausa-speaking zones associated with the Kano–Katsina–Maradi (K2M) corridor. Deeper into non-Hausa regions of both Nigeria and Niger, linguistic barriers weaken trust-based networks, limiting the willingness of traders to cross borders directly. Consequently, most large-scale transactions continue to rely on relay mechanisms that link culturally proximate actors on either side of the border.[17] This pattern explains why border markets and informal “discharging points” flourish along ECOWAS borders and why trade concentrates around nodal towns such as Jibiya, Mai’adua, Illela, and their Nigerien counterparts.

Oral evidence from border communities further indicates that villagers actively support the movement of goods through irregular routes. Residents provide logistical assistance, local intelligence, and concealment, thereby facilitating the secure passage of commodities across the border.[18] This collaboration has strengthened inter-communal relations but has also entrenched informal governance structures that operate independently of the state. Youths constitute the backbone of these activities, primarily through transportation services. Motorcycles and aging vehicles capable of navigating bush paths, especially during the rainy season, are widely used to move goods through unofficial crossings that bypass formal checkpoints.[19]

The proliferation of these irregular routes reflects not only social cooperation but also the weakness of border governance institutions. According to informants, the enforcement of customs and immigration regulations is highly selective and inconsistent, making it extremely difficult to halt illicit imports.[20] The involvement of influential individuals in clandestine trade further undermines enforcement efforts. As a result, border control becomes fragmented, with authority dispersed among state officials, community actors, and commercial networks. Competition over access to routes and profits has, at times, generated mistrust and tension among neighboring border communities. The spatial configuration of the Nigeria–Niger border further reinforces these dynamics. Many border settlements exist as “twin towns,” physically and socially integrated despite their formal separation by an international boundary. As one informant explained, Nigerien towns such as Hirji, Mai Daƃaro, and Hwaru lie within meters of Nigerian communities, while markets on both sides of the border operate in near indistinguishable fashion.[21] In such settings, the border is experienced less as a line of separation than as a shared socio-economic space. This proximity renders rigid enforcement both impractical and socially disruptive, encouraging reliance on informal crossings. The functioning of this largely informal trade system rests fundamentally on mutual trust. Credit-based transactions dominate, with wholesalers supplying semi-wholesalers on credit and payments deferred until goods are sold. This trust extends across borders, allowing large traders in Niamey to procure thousands of tons of cereals within days without advance payment or formal guarantees. Social and kinship networks underpin these arrangements, reinforcing the resilience of informal trade and reducing dependence on formal regulatory institutions.

Impact of Irregular Routes on National Security Threats

As already highlighted in the previous sections, irregular cross-border routes constitute one of the most critical channels through which insecurity is transmitted across the Nigeria–Niger borderlands. These routes are not new creations as many of them predate colonial boundary demarcations and are embedded in long-standing social, economic, and cultural networks that historically supported informal trade, pastoral mobility, seasonal migration, and everyday interaction among border communities.[22] For decades, these pathways functioned as lifelines for local economies and social relations rather than as security threats. However, in the contemporary security environment, the character and use of these irregular routes have changed significantly.[23] Weak border governance, limited state presence, and poor surveillance capacity have allowed these pathways to be increasingly appropriated by armed non-state actors, criminal networks, and violent groups. In the Katsina–Zamfara–Niger corridor, irregular routes now serve as conduits for the unregulated movement of small arms and light weapons, illicit commodities, and armed bandits operating across national boundaries.

A key factor in this transformation is the inability of border institutions to effectively monitor and control vast, rugged, and sparsely populated terrains. Dense forests, open savannahs, and long stretches of unmarked boundary lines make sustained patrols difficult. Formal border posts are few and concentrated along major highways, leaving numerous informal crossings ungoverned. As a result, armed groups exploit these gaps to move men, weapons, and supplies with minimal risk of detection. Evidence from the borderlands shows that bandit groups operating in Zamfara and Katsina frequently use irregular cross-border routes to their strategic advantage. These routes provide what may be described as strategic depth: the ability to launch attacks on Nigerian communities, such as cattle rustling, kidnappings, and village raids, and retreat swiftly into less-policed areas across the border in Niger. Once across the border, pursuit becomes difficult due to jurisdictional limitations, weak bilateral coordination, and the absence of joint operational frameworks capable of sustaining hot pursuit.[24]

This cross-border mobility has significantly complicated counter-banditry operations by Nigerian security forces. Military and police interventions tend to be reactive and territorially constrained, while bandit groups operate with fluidity and local intelligence. The irregular routes also enable bandits to fragment into smaller units, blend into civilian populations, or disperse across multiple pathways, further reducing the effectiveness of conventional security responses.[25] In many cases, security operations clear an area temporarily, only for armed groups to re-enter through alternative routes once troops withdraw. Beyond banditry, these routes facilitate the circulation of arms and ammunition sourced from regional conflict zones. The porosity of the Nigeria–Niger border allows weapons trafficked through the Sahel, often originating from Libya, Mali, or Chad, to filter into northwestern Nigeria. This steady inflow of arms has increased the firepower of bandit groups, intensified violence, and prolonged insecurity in rural communities.[26] The availability of weapons, combined with weak law enforcement, has lowered the threshold for violence and enabled criminal groups to challenge state authority.

Importantly, irregular cross-border routes also benefit from varying degrees of local support or acquiescence. Some border communities, historically dependent on cross-border mobility for survival, view state restrictions as disruptive and selectively cooperate with armed actors either out of fear, economic necessity, or shared social ties. Youths, in particular, are sometimes drawn into logistical roles such as guiding movements, transporting goods, or providing intelligence. This further blurs the distinction between criminal activity and everyday livelihood practices, making enforcement politically and socially sensitive. The cumulative effect of these dynamics is the transformation of the Nigeria–Niger borderlands from zones of interaction into spaces of persistent insecurity. Rather than functioning as buffers of protection or regulated interfaces between states, border areas increasingly operate as semi-governed spaces where state authority is weak, contested, or negotiated. In such environments, armed groups enjoy operational flexibility, while local populations remain exposed to recurring violence and insecurity. Irregular cross-border routes are, therefore, not merely symptoms of insecurity but active enablers of it. Their persistence reflects deeper institutional weaknesses in border governance, including inadequate manpower, limited intelligence sharing, corruption, and insufficient regional cooperation.

Cross-Border Collaboration as response to the threats of Irregular routes

Cross-border collaboration in the Katsina–Zamfara areas of the Nigeria–Niger borderlands is deeply rooted in long-standing inter-community relations that predate the colonial partition of the region. Long before the imposition of international boundaries, communities across this corridor were integrated through shared language, culture, religion, kinship networks, and economic exchanges. Despite the formal presence of a national border, these ties have endured, enabling border communities on both sides to continue interacting as socially connected and economically interdependent groups. These shared identities have sustained dense and resilient networks of cooperation that shape everyday responses to insecurity in the borderlands. Some of these cross-border collaborations are discussed in the following sections.

i.   Informal Institutions and Social Platforms of Cooperation

In many instances, border residents rely more on communal norms, traditional authority, and informal communication channels than on formal state institutions to manage security threats. According to Secretary, Jibiya Youth Mobilization Association:

From our position as a youth-based civil society organization working in Jibiya, it is clear to us that insecurity along this border is not accidental; it is sustained by neglect, weak collaboration, and the abuse of irregular cross-border routes.[27]

This assertion is particularly significant in contexts where state presence is limited, security agencies are overstretched, or institutional responses are slow and uneven. Under such conditions, inter-community relations have emerged as critical mechanisms for maintaining social order, providing early warning, and mitigating cross-border crime. The Chairman of the same association made similar concern where he states that:

Based on our collective experience, government security agencies appear lukewarm and uncommitted when it comes to working with CSOs at the border. This lack of engagement creates the perception among many community members that the government may not be genuinely interested in ending the conflict. When civil society groups that are closest to the communities are excluded, irregular routes become ungoverned spaces where criminal networks operate freely.[28]

Importantly, these collaborative practices play a vital role in addressing the challenge of irregular border routes. While such routes are often exploited by criminal networks and armed groups, border communities also engage in various forms of cooperation aimed at monitoring movements, sharing intelligence, and restricting the use of these routes for illicit purposes.[29] In the absence of effective formal mechanisms to regulate illegal border routes, local communities have developed a range of informal strategies to maintain social order and facilitate interaction. Traditional authorities, including the Sarakuna and Hakimai, continue to play a central role in conflict resolution and local governance, while cultural festivals, sporting events, and community-based associations such as the kungiyoyin sada zumunta serve as platforms for cross-border engagement and cohesion.[30] Spatial arrangements, exemplified by settlements like Faru in Niger, specifically designed to encourage interaction across national boundaries, further reinforce communal ties and facilitate the exchange of goods and information. Complementing these traditional and social mechanisms, mobile phones and social media have emerged as critical tools for real-time intelligence sharing, enhancing the capacity of border communities to monitor, coordinate, and respond to emerging challenges.[31]

Through collective action and mutual trust, communities attempt to balance the necessity of mobility for livelihoods with the need to prevent the abuse of border spaces by violent actors. The discussion that follows examines six key levels of cross-border collaboration through which border communities in the Katsina–Zamfara border areas collectively respond to shared social, economic, and security challenges. Looking at these layered initiatives, the section demonstrates how local actors actively contribute to regulating mobility and confronting the menace of irregular border routes, often compensating for gaps in formal border governance structures.

ii.   Community Vigilantism and Grassroots Security Arrangements

Another important dimension of cross-border collaboration involves community-based security initiatives. In response to rising insecurity and limited state protection, border communities have organized vigilante groups that operate with the tacit approval of traditional leaders. In Jibiya, the Jibiya People’s Forum coordinates the activities of Yan Sakai and Yan Banga, who conduct night patrols, monitor suspicious movements, and assist in securing markets and farming areas.[32] According to key informants, these groups often extend their surveillance beyond national boundaries, sharing information with counterparts in Niger. While such arrangements lack formal legal recognition, they reflect pragmatic responses to insecurity rooted in local knowledge of terrain, routes, and social networks. However, their informality also raises concerns about accountability and the potential for abuse, underscoring the need for careful integration with formal security frameworks.

iii.  Formal Security Cooperation: Joint Border Patrols

At the state level, Nigeria and Niger have sought to institutionalize cooperation through Joint Border Patrols established under the 2015 Memorandum of Understanding on Security Cooperation. These patrols aim to enhance border surveillance, facilitate intelligence sharing, and coordinate responses to cross-border crimes such as smuggling, banditry, and human trafficking. Empirical evidence from the study suggests that these patrols have produced tangible security gains. Respondents in Magama and Jibiya recalled joint operations that led to the arrest of criminal elements and a noticeable reduction in attacks along specific border axes, particularly the Magama–Dan Issa–Maradi corridor. The symbolic significance of joint patrols is also noteworthy: they signal state presence and cooperation, which can deter criminal activity and reassure local populations.

Advances in communication technology have further strengthened these efforts. Mobile phones and social media platforms now enable real-time information exchange between Nigerian and Nigerien security personnel, improving coordination and response times. As one Nigerian officer noted, these tools have become indispensable in managing security challenges across a highly mobile and porous border.[33] Nevertheless, joint patrols face serious structural constraints. Limited funding, inadequate equipment, insufficient manpower, and poor infrastructure restrict their operational effectiveness, particularly in remote areas. Changes in political leadership and shifting security priorities also affect continuity. These challenges highlight the fragility of formal cooperation in the absence of sustained political will and institutional investment.

iv. Border Control Practices and Community Perceptions

While collaborative initiatives exist, the study also exposes widespread dissatisfaction with border control practices. Many community members view immigration and customs checkpoints as sites of corruption rather than protection. Accounts from Jibiya and Magama describe routine extortion, where small bribes enable the passage of contraband goods. Such practices undermine the legitimacy of state institutions and weaken deterrence, reinforcing reliance on informal arrangements and irregular routes.[34] This gap between formal authority and lived experience contributes to a hybrid governance environment in which state and non-state actors coexist uneasily. Community-based initiatives fill critical security gaps, but their effectiveness is constrained by the absence of institutional support and regulation.

V.   Regional and International Dimensions of Collaboration

Beyond the local and national levels, cross-border collaboration is embedded within regional and international frameworks. Nigeria and Niger participate in ECOWAS-led initiatives such as the West African Police Chiefs Committee (WAPCC) and the Inter-Ministerial Action Group against Transnational Organized Crime (GIATOC).[35] These platforms facilitate intelligence sharing, policy coordination, and joint strategies against transnational crime. International partners, particularly the European Union and the United Nations, have further supported cooperation through funding and technical assistance. Programs such as the ECOWAS Cross-Border Cooperation Programme, the EU-funded Niger–Nigeria Support Project, the ECOWAS Border Management and Security Strategy, and the Trans-Border Security Programme aim to strengthen border governance, enhance surveillance, and promote socio-economic development.[36] The Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP) complements these efforts by addressing underlying vulnerabilities through livelihood support and social services.

Conclusion and Recommendations

This paper has shown that the proliferation of irregular cross-border routes has become a major driver of insecurity in the Katsina–Zamfara borderlands. Although these routes originated as legitimate corridors for trade, migration, pastoralism, and social interaction long before colonial rule, they have increasingly been exploited by bandits, arms traffickers, kidnappers, and other transnational criminal networks. Their continued use reflects not only the porous nature of the Nigeria–Niger border but, more importantly, weak border governance, inadequate institutional capacity, poor inter-agency coordination, corruption, and the limited involvement of border communities in security management. The study further demonstrates that insecurity in the borderlands is rooted in historical and institutional realities rather than geography alone. The persistence of irregular routes reflects the inability of state institutions to effectively regulate border spaces while accommodating the legitimate social and economic needs of border communities. Consequently, reliance on military operations alone cannot provide a lasting solution. Sustainable border security requires a comprehensive approach that combines effective governance, institutional reform, intelligence gathering, community participation, and stronger bilateral cooperation between Nigeria and Niger.

To address these challenges, Nigeria should adopt a more proactive and intelligence-driven border management strategy. Lessons from the Moroccan Berm system demonstrate the importance of maintaining a permanent security presence in vulnerable border corridors through strategically located outposts supported by surveillance technologies such as drones, long-range cameras, sensors, satellite monitoring, and integrated intelligence-sharing platforms. Such measures would improve situational awareness and reduce the operational freedom of criminal groups. Nigeria can also draw useful lessons from the Pakistan–Afghanistan border, where selective physical barriers have been used to restrict movement through known infiltration routes. Rather than attempting to seal the entire border, targeted earthworks, trenches, or other physical obstacles could be constructed along identified smuggling and bandit corridors to channel movement toward monitored crossing points. These measures should be implemented alongside strengthened joint patrols, intelligence sharing, and closer security cooperation with the Republic of Niger. Similarly, the Egyptian experience in the Sinai Peninsula highlights the importance of combining physical border infrastructure with institutional coordination. Terrain modification, effective surveillance, coordinated checkpoints, and intelligence-led policing can significantly reduce the operational space available to criminal networks when integrated into a broader border governance framework.

Beyond physical security measures, strengthening state legitimacy in border communities is equally important. Expanding access to education, healthcare, markets, roads, and communication infrastructure would reinforce public confidence in government institutions while reducing the economic incentives that sustain illicit cross-border activities. Traditional rulers, community leaders, civil society organizations, and local vigilante groups should also be incorporated into formal early-warning and intelligence systems, as they possess valuable local knowledge of irregular routes and emerging security threats. Finally, improving security in the Katsina–Zamfara borderlands requires a shift from reactive, militarized responses to an integrated border governance framework that balances security, development, and community participation. Only through stronger institutions, sustained cross-border cooperation, and inclusive governance can the proliferation of irregular routes be effectively managed and long-term peace and stability achieved along the Nigeria–Niger border.

 

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Regional Development and Protection Programme (RDPP). Support to ECOWAS Regional Peace, Security and Stability Mandate (EU-ECOWAS PSS). Brussels: European Union External Action, 2019.

Samaila, A., and M. T. Usman. "Ungoverned Spaces of the Unsecured Borderlands: Trade Relations and Armed Banditry along the Nigeria-Niger Border." In Global Insecurities: Challenges and the Ways Forward, edited by A. Sama'ila, O. S. Eloyi, and B. Kwaghga, 160–180. Akure: Science and Education Development Institute (SEDInst), 2021.

SWAC/UNICEF. Food Security and Cross-border Trade in the Kano-Katsina-Maradi (K2M) Corridor: Joint Mission Report. Paris: Sahel and West Africa Club/UNICEF, July 2006.

Usman, M. T., and A. Samaila. "Periodic Markets and the Development of Intercommunity Relations along the Nigeria-Niger Border." Degel: The Journal of the Faculty of Arts and Islamic Studies 17, no. 2 (2019): 123–140.

Yaqub, N. O. "Comparative Perspective on Cross-border Armed Banditry into Nigeria: The North-East and North-West Experience." In Cross-Border Armed Banditry in the North-East, edited by B. E. Ate and B. A. Akinterinwa, 210–234. Ibadan: Nigerian Institute of International Affairs (NIIA), 2011.

F) Unpublished Sources

Kwaire, M., “A History of Tuaregs Migration from Niger-Republic to Sokoto Metropolis,” PhD diss., Usmanu Danfodiyo University, Sokoto, 2002.

 

 

Kassim, A. “The Evolution and Development of Jibia Town to 1980.” Unpublished M.A. Thesis, Bayero University, Kano, 1992.

Thom, Derrik J., The Niger-Nigeria Boundary, 1890–1906: A Study of Ethnic Frontiers and a Colonial Boundary, Ohio University, 1975.

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[1] N.O. Yaqub, ‘Comparative Perspective on the Cross-border Armed Banditry into Nigeria: The North East and North-West Experience’, in B.E. Ate and B. A. Akinterinwa, (Eds.) Cross-Border Armed Banditry in the North-East,(NIIA, Polygraphic Ventures, Ibadan, 2011), P. 210.

[2] Samaila, A. & M.T. Usman, ‘Ungoverned Spaces of the Unsecured Borderlands: Trade Relations and Armed Banditry along the Nigeria-Niger Border’, in Sama’ila A., O.S. Eloyi and B. Kwaghga, Global Insecurities: Challenges and the Ways Forward, (Science and Education Development Institute (SEDinst), Akure, Ondo State, 2021), P. 166

[3] . Our data from the field reveals that many of the forests in the areas of study straddle border-adjacent local government areas, notably Zurmi, Maradun, Anka, Bukkuyum, Gummi (Zamfara) and Jibia, Dan Issa, Batsari, Kankara, Safana (Katsina), and continue seamlessly into Maradi and Mada-Runfa departments in Niger Republic. Oral Interview with anonymous Officers, Nigeria Customs Service (NCS), Magama-Jibiya Border, 41 Years; Anonymous, Nigerian Immigration Service NIS, Border Drill, Illela-Konni Border, 38 Years.

[4] Oral Interview with anonymous Officers, Nigeria Customs Service (NCS), Magama-Jibiya Border, 41 Years; Anonymous, Nigerian Immigration Service NIS, Border Drill, Illela-Konni Border, 38 Years.

[5]. The paper identifies four major irregular routes connecting Nigeria-Niger communities; Zurmi–Sububu–Mada Runfa Axis (Zamfara–Niger); Anka–Bukkuyum–Gummi Forest Complex; Jibia–Magama–Hirji–Firji Corridor (Katsina–Niger); Kukar-Babangida–Dan-Ta-Mande–Maradi Axis.

[6] LeenaKoni Hoffman & Paul Melly, (2018), Incentives and Constraints of Informal Trade between Nigeria and its Neighbors, West African papers, No.16, OECD Publishing, Paris), P.12.;SWAC/UNICEF, Food security and Cross-border trade in the Kano-Katsina-Maradi (KM²) Corridor, Joint Mission Report, July,2006, www.africacrossborder.org (Retrieved, September 18, 2010); (Hoffmann&Melly, 2018:12)

[7] . evidence of these interactions are available in the following archival files; NAKSOKPROF/1655/1910 ‘Anglo-French commission for the Delimitation of the Frontier of the East of the Niger, Northern Nigeria’ 1911; KSHCB/346, Katsina Emirate: Description, Historical Notes and Assessment Reports, 1946.

[8] Asiwaju, A.I., “Borders and National Defense: An analysis”, in Ate, B.E. and B.A. Akinterinwa, (eds.). Nigeria and Its Immediate Neighbors: Constraints and Prospects of Sub-regional Security in the 1990s, Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, 1992.

[9] Akindele R.A. & Akinterinwa, B.A., Cross-Border Security …

[10] Na’Allah K.,“Sanitizing Trans-Border Relations for Effective Economic Integration in West Africa: a Case Study of Illela (Nigeria)/ Birnin Konni (Niger) Republic Borders” (Unpublished M.I.S. Project Report, 2010),15.

[11]. M.M., Inuwa, “The Nigeria-Niger Boundary 1890 – 1906: Evolution and Implications on Transborder Socio-economic Activities” In Asiwaju, A.I., and Barkindo, B.M., (eds.), Nigeria-Niger Trans border Cooperation, Lagos, 1993. P.55.

[12] . M.T. Usman & A. Samaila,, (2019), Periodic Markets and the Development of Intercommunity Relations along the Nigeria-Niger Border, Degel: The Journal of the Faculty of Arts and Islamic Studies,17 (2), 2019, pp. 123-140, http://www.degeljournal.org

[13]. M.M., Inuwa, “The Nigeria-Niger Boundary 1890 – 1906: Evolution and Implications on Transborder Socio-economic Activities” In Asiwaju, A.I., and Barkindo, B.M., (eds.), Nigeria-Niger Trans border Cooperation, Lagos, 1993. P.55.

[14] . Oral Interview with Alhaji Ibrahim Sade, Member, Traders Association, Jibiyan-Maje,Katsina, 53 Years, 22/01/2026

[15] . M.T. Usman & A. Samaila,, (2019), Periodic Markets and the Development of Intercommunity Relations along the Nigeria-Niger Border, Degel: The Journal of the Faculty of Arts and Islamic Studies,17 (2), 2019, pp. 123-140, http://www.degeljournal.org

[16] . Orla Interview with Abbas Bishir Jibiya, Secretary, Jibiya Youth Mobilization Association, 48 Years, 22/01/2026

[17] Oral Interview with Alhaji Ibrahim Sade, Member, Traders Association, Jibiyan-Maje, Katsina, 53 Years, 22/01/2026

[18]. Alhaji Lawali Shuaibu, Chairman, Motor Cycle Riders Association, Jibiya, 42 Years, 26/01/2026

[19]. Alhaji Ibrahim Sade, Member, Traders Association…

[20] .This Information was obtained and corroborated through FGD at Magama-Jibiya border area from the following: Alhaji Abdullahi Garba, Chairman, Motorcycle Transporters, Dan Issa, Niger Republic; Amba Magaji Gide, Transporter, Firji, Niger Republic; Abdulmajid Yusuf, Secretary, Magama Security Committee, Katsina-Nigeria; Alhaji Aminu Lawal, Village Head of Magama, Katsina-Nigeria, 26/01/2026.

[21] . Oral Interviews with Umaru Abdullahi and Umaru Muhammadu each aged 72 and 75 years respectively, Hirji, Niger Republic, 27/01/2026

[22]. NAK/SOKPROF/571, Concessions in French Territories, (1947 and 1948)

[23] Oral data obtained from the field suggest that the proliferation of insecurity along the Zamfara-Katsina border areas of Zurmi and surrounding villages often originates through these routes. Criminal groups move seamlessly across borders, attack communities in Zamfara, and disappear into bush corridors leading northwards, beyond the immediate reach of Nigerian security forces. Group interview on Gada–Zurmi Border Corridor, Zamfara State, January, 2026; Alhaji Lawali Shuaibu, 42 Years, Chairman, Motor Cycle Riders Association, (yan Kabu-Kabu), Gada Local Government; Alhaji Shehu Dan Auta, 48 Years, Chairman, N.U.R.T.W., Gada Local Government, motor park station; Alhaji Tukur Kyadawa, 51 Years, Secretary, Cross-Border business association; Alhaji Ya’u mai maciji, 47 Years, Chairman, Security Vigilantee, Yan banga; Alhaji Mainasara Magaji Maina, 50 Years, Chairman, P.C.R.C.

[24] Across Magama, Daddara, Kukar-Babangida, and Firji, (border villages connecting Nigeria and Niger) irregular routes have evolved from survival paths into strategic infrastructures of insecurity. They enable; Arms and ammunition trafficking; Movement of bandits between Zamfara, Katsina, and Niger; Human trafficking and drug trade; Illegal gold mining networks and an escape routes from security operations. Group Interview; Aliyu Lawal, Magama-Jibiya Community Vigilante (VGN) Nigeria; Kabir Haruna (Member Jibia security volunteer JSV), Nigeria; Abubakar Usman (Member Jibia security volunteer JSV), Nigeria; Nafisa Lauwali, Trader, Dan Issa, Niger republic; Musa Yusuf, Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS); Najib Musa Faru, Revenue collection Officer, Dan Issa, 28/01/2026.

[25]. Oral Interview with Abubakar Ibrahim, Ex-Custom Personnel, Jibiya, 53 years, 18/01/2026

[26] . Oral Interview with Ahmed Rufa'I, Farmer, Dan Issa, Niger Republic, 37 Years, 18/01/2026.

 

[27]. Oral Interview with Abbas Bishir Jibiya, Secretary, Jibiya Youth Mobilization Association, 48 Years, 22/01/2026

[28] . Oral interview with Abbas Bishir Gado, Chairman, Jibiya Youth Mobilization Association, 51 Years, 22/01/2026

[29] .Oral Interview with Muhammad Auwal, Secretary, Kabu-Kabu Transport Association, Magamar-Jibiya, Katsina State, 37 years, 22/01/2026

[30] . Abbas Bishir Jibiya, Secretary, Jibiya Youth Mobilization Association

[31]. Oral Interview with Muhammad Auwal, Secretary, Kabu-Kabu Transport Association…

[32]. Oral Interview with Abbas Bishir Jibiya, Secretary, Jibiya Youth Mobilization Association,

[33] . Anonymous, Nigerian Immigration Service NIS, Border Drill, Illela-Konni Border, 38 Years.

[34] . Group Interview; Aliyu Lawal, Magama-Jibiya Community Vigilante (VGN) Nigeria; Kabir Haruna (Member Jibia security volunteer (JSV), Nigeria; Abubakar Usman (Member Jibia security volunteer JSV), Nigeria; Musa Yusuf, Nigerian Immigration Service (NIS); Najib Musa Faru, Revenue collection Officer, Dan Issa, 28/01/2026.

[35] . Regional Development and Protection Pro gramme (RDPP). European Union External Action. EU. (2019). Support to ECOWAS Regional Peace, Security and Stability Mandate (EU-ECOWAS PSS).

[36] . European Union External Action. EU. (2019). Support to the ECOWAS Strategy for Border Management and Security (ECOWAS- BMS).