Article Citation: Shu’aibu Shehu ALIYU (2023). Crisis and Changing of Settlement Pattern in Kaduna from 2000 -2011. DEGEL: The Journal of the Faculty of Arts and Islamic Studies, Vol. 20, No. 1 & 2. ISSN 0794-9316
CRISIS AND CHANGING OF SETTLEMENT
PATTERN IN KADUNA FROM 2000 TO 2011
By
Shu’aibu Shehu ALIYU
Abstract
Changing
settlement pattern could be considered as a veritable mechanism that sharply
polarizes societies and communities that hitherto cohabit in a particular place
amicably for decades or centuries. These are largely engendered by so many
factors, which include political, social-economic and religious considerations.
The dominant factor to the persistence crisis in Kaduna are largely attributed
to the cosmopolitan and bustling population of the city. This created over
congestion and acute shortage of available space to accommodate the population.
To make matters worse river Kaduna became the major dividing line, which came
to serve as the historical Rubicon with particular ethnic and religious group
aligning to the north and others aligning to the south. This made it difficult
for people across the religious divide to move freely beyond the Rubicon and
partake in economic activities. This process began with the most historic
religious crisis that engulfed the state in 1987, the movement of people at
that period to either Southern or Northern parts of the metropolis was not as
sporadic as the 2000 Shari’ah conflicts has provoked and generated. The most
critical areas that served as safe haven for the refuges were Gonin-Gora to the
south and Rigasa to the north. Consequently, these areas have become
flashpoints for conflicts and the population has blossomed to unprecedented
proportion triggering other socio-economic crisis for the city and constitutes
a serious challenge to urban planning and administration. This paper provides a
critical analysis of the socio-economic transformations to the changing
settlement pattern to lasting peace and security in the Kaduna metropolis. The
study uses historical methodology for the research, using interviews and focus
group discussion from the two geographical divides. This helped in having a
proper grasp of the major factors that influenced the relocation to either
south or north. The paper concludes by making findings on the decline of
population of areas considered as volatile, which consequently, altered the
demography of the city along similar faith. The effects of the realignment to
the socio-economic well-being of the communities. The impact on government
policies, especially on urban planning and administration. And more
importantly, the sprouting of squatter and unplanned urban villages along the
divides that posed a serious threat to sustain peace and security of the state.
Introduction
Kaduna
emerged in 1913 from a cluster of small settlements into a bustling
cosmopolitan town within the span of a few decades of its establishment. The
making of Kaduna as a garrison town; the headquarters of northern protectorate
and later the seat of power of northern regional government has succeeded in
galvanizing, massing and absorbing diverse socio-economic groupings and made
Kaduna their permanent abode for almost a century. Though, social and economic
drivers were considered as catalysts for urban growth and expansion throughout
history, the fluidity of the ethnic groups gave the colonial city a unique
posture, quite distinct from other towns in Nigeria. Though, it has been argued
that colonial cities are considered as the cradle of contemporary ethnicity and
product of those historical experiences. Kaduna provides enabling environment
for diverse social groupings to press their perceived grievances and
aspirations (Nnoli: 1987). Additionally, Kaduna assumed leadership position in
the politics of northern and Nigeria as a whole. This was emboldened by the
large concentration of industries, advanced transport system, especially the
railway system; the plethora of educational institutions; the military
formations; and lastly the presence of the pioneer military academy amongst
others (Abdu: 2010). These contributed significantly in the ethnic texture and
played a critical role towards attracting waves of migrations into Kaduna. The
opportunities Kaduna provided for auxiliary services, which include artisans,
clerks, petty traders, and semi-skilled workers has turned it into a unique
town (Obasanjo: 2014). Kaduna, for close to a century, was one of the most
peaceful and bustling cities of Nigeria. For instance, during the 1959 general
elections troops were deployed to many cities. Conversely, troops were posted
out from Kaduna to other towns, presumably more vulnerable to conflict
(Obasanjo: 2014). Hence, Kaduna enjoyed relative peace and tranquility up to
the late 1980s.
The
dominant ethnic groups that made up the population of Kaduna include amongst
others, Hausas, Fulanis and Gbagy is as the majority and Yorubas, Igbos and
tribes that cut across the length and breadth of the Nigerian nation as the
minorities (Oyedele: 1987, 37). Unfortunately, the relative peace enjoyed by
the city has become a mirage and engendered with the division of the town along
religious lines, with the eruption of Shari’ah crisis in 2000. Thus, this study is a modest
contribution in a spirit to sketch out briefly a subject of vital importance
for the promotion of peace and security of Kaduna metropolis polarized along
south and north divide.
Review of Related
Literature
A lot of studies have been
conducted on ethno-religious conflicts affecting Kaduna metropolis, which seek
to analyze the historicity of the conflicts from diverse perspectives. (Toure,
2003, Osagie, 2001, Nnoli, 2003, Abdu, 2008, Mpofu, 2013 and UN-Habitat, 2008)
argued that cities have always been crucial centers for economic growth,
innovation, and abundant employment. This has been shattered in Kaduna in the
last decade. Little studies focused on segregation of the metropolis along
religious line. The most prominent include: Larry O. Enukora, 2005, and Abdu H.
2008. However, the dominant studies on Kaduna were largely concentrated on the
urbanism and cosmopolitan nature of the town, which developed from the colonial
experience. Other literatures argued that rural-urban drift was the corner
stone of the social crisis bedeviling Kaduna in the last few decades. It is
further contends that the rainbow nature of Kaduna ethnic groups depicting a
mini Nigeria contesting for scarce resources was the catalyst for social
conflicts. Other school of thought argued that Kaduna owing to its strategic
location as the capital of the defunct Northern Region, has played host to a
myriad of interests, who largely believed that it was the most appropriate
place to express and convey their grievances of whatever form to the entire
country (Shehu: 2011). For instance, Kaduna, became one of the foremost
contesting grounds for political activities in Northern Nigeria, right from the
beginning of the emergence of party politics in Nigeria, particularly, between
the Northern People Congress (NPC), and Northern Element Progressive Union
(NEPU). The Kaduna politics was overheated with the aftermath of the 1953
general election, which gave NEPU victory over most of NPC candidates in all
the four town council’s that existed at the time (Shehu: 2011). It was in
response to that and in an effort by the NPC led government to consolidate its
influence and dominance over Kaduna politics that a bill was passed by the then
Northern House of Assembly for the creation of Kaduna Capital Territory.
The law came into effect in
1957. (KCT, Law, March, 1956: No. 8) the Law stipulated that Kaduna should
cease to be part of Zaria province and provide a separate administration for
the metropolis. In this regard, an administrator was appointed to exercise some
regional functions and other responsibilities were transferred to the Governor
in council of the Northern Region. The making of Kaduna Capital territory
enhanced in no small measure the political relevance and influence of NPC in
Kaduna. The trend of Kaduna politics continued to be sustained and reinforced
even after the aborted coup of 1966, and became the melting pot of northern and
Nigerian politics to this day. (Often referred to as Tumbin Giwa, Kowa yazo ya diba) (Shehu, 2011).
It has been observed that a
significant number of the northern retired civil servants and para-military and
military officers who worked in the former Northern Region or in the federation
have made Kaduna a permanent home or have owned properties in Kaduna.
Consequently, Kaduna represents a battle ground for socio-economic and
political strife into position of prominence. This bolstered and strengthened the
class interest. Therefore, whatever goes on in Kaduna affects the other parts
of the country. The most powerful political brokers, often refers as the Kaduna
mafia became the dominant gladiators of Kaduna politics and economy for several
decades. Though, their activities have gradually diminished with the passage of
time, the role the group played in the Nigerian question is very critical in
making the town to assume the status of being the epicenter for addressing
topical national issues. (Shehu, 2011). It was on this pedestal that it was
argued that Kaduna represented the problem of the whole country, and unless and
until the Kaduna problem is resolved, it is going to be very difficult for the
north to become solidified as a unified entity, in comparison with the Southern
part of the country.
The city also served as the
hub centre of northern business activities. More importantly the serenity and
compact nature of the environmental setting of the colonial city helped greatly
in bustling the population of the town. The convergence of these diverse
interests, undoubtedly contributed in no small measure towards the rapid
development of Kaduna state both politically and economically and fostered
robust competition for scarce resources. It led to the spate of ethno-ethnic
and religious conflicts that have deeply afflicted hardship and suffering to
the people of Kaduna metropolis in the last three decades and tremendously
affected the demographic structure of this historical city. Kaduna is reputed
to occupy a volatile strand in the history of ethno-religious tensions and
conflicts in Nigeria in recent times. This has become more manifests when trust
and confidence amongst different ethnic and religious groups further
degenerates; no trust; no confidence anymore. Neighbours have become enemies
(Abdu, 2010).
At the early period of the
creation of Kaduna it had attracted diverse ethnic groups from all walks of
life and from all parts of the country, and had gone through the most part of
the 20th century peacefully without any sort of ethnic, religious,
or geographical segregations (Obasanjo, 2011). However, recent development,
especially beginning from the late 1980’s to the new millennium has seen, this
old age peaceful co-existence assume different dimensions and character,
leading to loss of lives and property worth billions of Naira. It precipitated
demographic transformations of the city. This degeneration has also succeeded
in polarizing the city along two lines or blocks. This triggered Muslim
communities of the town now to move and populated the northern part of the
town, particularly from the Kaduna River to as far as Jaji, (interview Alhaji
Saleh Musa, age 76). On the other hand, the Christian population moved to the
southern part of the town from Kaduna to Kachia. Though, there are still
pockets of settlements of the Muslim communities in the southern part,
especially around Barnawa, Kakuri, Nasarawa and Makera, presumed to be settlements
founded by Hausa and Fulani communities in the pre-colonial period. (Oyedele,
1987) Similarly, there are experiences in the northern side with a quite number
of settlements, still inhabited by Christian communities. These include places
like, Unguwan Kudu in Unguwan Rimi, Kabala west adjacent to Unguwan Mu’azu.
There are also Unguwan Gwari behind one division of the Nigerian army, and
Unguwan Yero close to Unguwan Dosa and Malali. (Interview Abbas Gajere, age 58)
These Christian groups still live harmoniously within these communities,
despite the fact that they are surrounded by Muslim communities. Despite these
realignments economic activities by these two groups continues to linger on
till date. For instance, there are many Muslims communities that move to Sabon
Tasha to earn a living and return back to their new abode, likewise, the
Christian women constitutes the bulk of those that sell roasted maize in
predominantly Muslims areas till date without any molestation and threat to
their lives. Thus, the crisis was entirely a manipulation by the elites for
political relevance.
The worst part of the current
scenario, which is largely ignored wittingly or unwittingly is the danger it
portends, because the data available to this research indicates that the Muslim
population from whatever ethnic or religious persuasions moved and concentrates
in Maraban Jos, which is the gateway to any passenger entering Kaduna or in
other words travelling to the capital city of Abuja or Lagos from the northern
axis of the country or vice versa. Similarly, the Christian from whatever
ethnic or religious denominations of Christianity, became the dominant settlers
of Gonin Gora (flash point and the most terrorizing area) an exit point for
people travelling to Abuja or the east. It became the most terrorizing
settlement in the period of crisis. Thus, this paper is an attempt to provide
an explanation and possible implication to future peace and security of the
State.
Methodology
The principal instrument used
for data gathering and collection for the writing of this paper is the
literature review and structured and unstructured interview method. The
structured interview targeted individuals, organizations and government
officials and draws a wide range of perspectives on the scale and magnitude of
influx of communities westwards and southwards following the 2000 religious
crisis. Focusing more on its implications and the lessons to be learned. The
unstructured interview relied heavily on Focus Group Discussion (FGD) strategy
and elicited responses from diverse strata of interest, class and social
groups. And the research focuses on four local government areas. These include,
Igabi (that received the highest number of migrants/refugees from the southern
part) Kaduna North, Kaduna South, and Chikun (that received the largest
influxes from the northern part). The selection techniques were made randomly
without any barrier to age and sex of the respondents. The research also
considered and studied the secondary source materials, which include,
government white papers, newspapers, magazine and other periodicals and these
documents assisted greatly in shedding light on the concomitant effect of the
movements on deepening the polarization of the town along religious
affiliation.
Crisis and changing settlement pattern in
Kaduna Metropolis
There was extensive research
on segregation of settlements along ethnic line, but very few on settlement
pattern along religious line existed. In the developed economies, in both
United Kingdom, France, and America there were evolution of settlements purely
on ethnic background. For instance, in America towns and settlements like
Little Italy, Little Havana, Irish town, Jew town, and Greek town emerged as
ethnic communities. Thus, the concept and ideology of ethnic residential
segregation is not a new concept in highly advanced countries and even African
settings. For instance, in ancient societies and pre-colonial formations, there
were the evolutions of ethnic settlements in Africa. For instance, in Kano
there are Madabo quarters, Salgawa quarters and in Zaria, Tudun Jukun and
Unguwan Nufawa are important examples. There are also, Lafiyan Barebari in
Nasarawa State and more importantly, the emergence of Sabo Ibadan. The thesis
of J.A.Works is also a classical study of Hausa communities in Chad. This has
necessitated the reinforcement of communities that share history, family,
emotions, interest, language and organizational lives, hence a cardinal role in
the establishment of communities along ethnic lines. These ethnic communities
regarded themselves as integral part of the society they lived and contributed
proportionately towards the growth and development of that society. The
colonial regime was also accused of institutionalizing and initiating
segregation policy along ethnic line. For instance, settlements like Tudun
Wada, Sabon Gari were direct products of colonial establishments. These
settlements were prevented from interacting, intermingling and moving to the
so-called native settlers throughout the colonial period.
However, in the case of
Africa we witnessed the emergence of communities based on religious
consideration with total disregard to ethnic background and empathy. The best
example of this type that can be easily fathomed is the polarization of Kaduna
arising from the 2000 Shari’ah crisis. The main causes of the conflict are
outside the scope of this paper. The major focus is on the outcome,
particularly, the spontaneous and sporadic movements of people southwards and
northwards. Undoubtedly, the Shari’ah crisis played a key role in the
snowballing of movement in all direction outside and within Kaduna, which
helped greatly in transformation process of the town from all fronts. It led to
massive relocation and realignment along religious divide. This triggered
communities to recreate homes in different directions, in areas regarded as
safe haven or predominated by people of similar faith.
The mass exodus along
religious lines by both the Muslim and Christian population was one of the
detrimental factors to have befallen Kaduna for almost four decades. This
radically transformed and polarized the town into two camps. The division took
the form of movement away from the places or settlements dominated by the
opposite religious groups and river Kaduna was considered as partially the
historical Rubicon. The movement into each side of the divide was first
consummated at a micro level after the Zangon Kataf crisis of 1992. However,
the unprecedented dimension at macro level never expected in human history was
brought about by the 2000 Kaduna Shari’ah crisis. This has inflicted a
permanently entrenched division, hatred, discord and animosity amongst
communities who hitherto lived at peace with one another. The communities that
suffered most are the families with mix social identity of Muslim and
Christians. In most cases, it was difficult for someone to move freely to visit
his kith and kin in their new locations. This mostly affected the Yoruba,
Igala, Edo and Igbira communities (Ema Abu, age 52). There are many that lost
their lives in an effort to see their brothers and sisters in the other divide.
This reinforced the arguments that the recent transformation of Kaduna was
purely on religious consideration.
The magnitude of the crisis
consumed virtually thousands of lives and billions of naira worth of
properties. It occurred twice in the same year February and May, 2000. The
socio-economic and psychological havoc it created was exceptional. It unleashed
permanent scars in the minds of the communities involved.
The field work is quite
illuminating. The degree of emotions in which informants responded to some of
the questions fielded, or showed their deep sensations, frustrations and
traumatic experiences on the issues is revealing. The division has greatly dislocated
the socio-economic conditions of the affected communities. For instance, those
aligned to the south found it difficult to continue pursuing their old-age
economic activities and more complex to chart a new one. Because, it led to
pauperization of many families; some lost their properties and belongings;
others were turned into tenants; some were transformed into glorified beggars;
the worst part is the economic misfortunes it generated. It produced myriads of
social crisis, children were turned into orphans, and others were forced into
prostitution and use of drugs. Those who earned their economic wellbeing and
subsist on menial jobs were radically altered into the state of hopelessness
and systematically subjected to untold hardship and miseries without anything
to assuage their future. The residential segregation has really reorganized and
repositioned the economic activities of the city. It has compelled some
communities to explore other means of livelihood, which they regarded as a
confines to other ethnic groups. For instance, it was quite difficult to find a
Hausa man in occupations relating to motor mechanic, spare parts business,
welding, vulcanizing and so many others. Likewise, commercial motor operators was
a dominant business of the Hausa communities, but the polarization has forced
other ethnic groups in the south to engage.
However, the research has
ascertained that till date there are significant number of people from all the
divide that moves every day to both direction (north-south and south to north)
to earn a living and retired to their so-called safe haven in the evening.
There are several case studies of people residing at Rigasa and Maraban Jos who
move to Sabon Tasha on daily basis to pursue their economic activities
(interview Alhaji Saleh Musa, age 85, Mallam Muhammad Sani Sa’idu, age 65).
Similarly, there are a number of micro commercial activities that were still
the preserve of the Muslim ethnic groups in the south. For example butchering
and selling of suya (roasted meat).
Similarly, there are many Christian women that engage in the selling of roasted
maize and the likes in places dominated by the Muslim communities (Mallam Musa
Salihi, age 53). Mallam Usman Salihu confided that he cannot survived without going
to Sabon Tasha, where he was born. Mr. Bulus asserted that his wife always
accused and castigated him of relocating to an area where she found it
difficult to pursue any kind of economic activity. Hence, the relocation
reinforced her misery, because she lost her means of subsistence. Similar cases
are bound, which cannot be captured completely in this paper.
Table: I: Direction of movements
within and outside Kaduna
|
Areas |
Percentage
(%) |
|
Out of Kaduna |
20 |
|
North-South |
30 |
|
South-North |
50 |
Source: Larry O. Enukora, 2005
Pie Chart: 1
The
table above clearly illustrates the direction of the movement immediately after
the 2000 Shari’ah crisis. The
Christian population largely relocated from the northern part of the metropolis
to the southern part, especially to communities that are predominantly of
similar or related faith. They were estimated to constitute about 30%. On the
other hand, the Muslim communities were forced to relocate to the northern end,
which was inhabited by the Muslim’s population. This group constitutes about
50%. The third group comprises mostly the ethnic groups from the South west,
east and pocket of other tribes from North Central Nigeria. It was estimated
that 20% of this groups moved out of Kaduna. They ended up at Lagos, Jos,
Rivers, Enugu, Umuahia, and Ibadan (Larry O.E: 2005). This was on the hope that
safety, peace and tranquility could be attained in the new homes (Shedrack.
G.B: 2007). This movement further deepened the polarization of the town along
religious lines and took a firm grip on the socio-religious configuration of
the historic town. The religious diversity is further manipulated to become an
emotional tool, which significantly played a key role in the transformation and
the challenges of growth Kaduna is facing in recent times. The pattern of the
movement has succeeded in drawing an iron curtain reminiscent of the famous
Berlin wall that separated western and eastern Germany and the Korean peninsula
that has polarized Korea into north and south to the extent that despite the
ethnic homogeneity of the Korean people they have been at each other’s throats
due to ideological differences for almost a century.
The Activities of
Pseudo-scholars
Scholars
and scholarship are the dominant reflections of the society. They play crucial
roles towards illuminating and directing the course of human societies. On this
note, political leaders relied heavily on the wise counsel of the clergy. The
dominant source of knowledge of the religious inspired scholars are the
divinely revealed scriptures. Both within the domain of Islamic scholarship,
Christendom, and Judaism. These scriptures are supposed to serve as instruments
for guidance of the societies away from doom to light. However, in recent times
the proliferation of sham and pseudo scholars further escalated the Kaduna
division. They turned the pulpit into a market place and profit making
ventures. Many mosques and churches sprang up overnight, with total disregard
to the bond of fraternity that bound most communities together (White Paper on
Kaduna Crisis, 2001). These scholars engage in hostile preaching, largely
predicated on perceived emotions and sentiments and under the pretext of
unsubstantiated allegations of marginalization. Hence, they tread on the
sensibilities of their followers to fuel their prejudices. These types of
scholars found Kaduna to be a comfortable place to pursue their clandestine and
mischievous activities. For many decades they succeeded in deepening the wounds
rather than providing the surgical operation necessary for the resolution of
religious grievances. They instilled pathological hatred and ethnic chauvinism
amongst their adherents.
These preachers refused to
provide any platform for reconciliation and dialogue. Thus, they have become
the greatest beneficiaries of the divide both economically and socially.
Consequently, they engage in kindling the embers of discord, which add more salt
to the injury. They have become an anathema to the society and hence their
activities most be curtailed. Because, the role these preachers played in the
transformation of Kaduna into south and north divide is unprecedented.
Consequently, policies of regulating the sporadic expansion of religious places
must be initiated by government.
Situational Analysis of
Changing Settlement Pattern
It
should be admitted from the onset that, all the data, which formed the backbone
of analysis of this section was derived from fieldwork. That is from extensive
interviews conducted. It clearly revealed the push and pull factors of the
movement. And the major factor that determined the push and the pull was the
issue of provision of security within the religious divide. There was absence
of any other factors, like economy, ethnic background, and political
inclinations in determining the movements across the “iron curtain”. It should
also be admitted that religious tension is more subtle than ethnic perceived
divisions and conflicts like the current South Sudan crisis that was sunk on
ethnic cleavages. This has clearly demonstrated the potency of ethnic conflicts
to deepen grievances and acrimony against religious skirmishes. Since religious
conflict could be easily addressed through dialogue, persuasions and
discussions, the Kaduna polarization could be resolved and normalcy could
return if government takes a pragmatic approach. Despite the fact that majority
of those interviewed have lost hope of relocating to their old settlement
(interview: Mal. Barau Usman, age. 85: Maraban Jos, and Mal. Mu’azu Sabon
Tasha, age 80). It is clear that the realignment had profound economic and
social effects on the affected communities. Many people have been forced to
abandon their cherished settlements where they earned a living to
rehabilitation camps, tents and porches. Consequently, it confounded the social
conditions of the ever increasing orphans and widowers who had nobody to fend
for them.
Table II: Distribution of refugees to the
northwards
|
S/N |
|
Percentage
(%) |
|
1 |
Rigasa |
60 |
|
2 |
Rigachikun |
40 |
|
3 |
Maraban Jos |
40 |
|
4 |
Jaji |
30 |
|
5 |
T/Wada |
20 |
|
6 |
U/Muazu |
20 |
|
7 |
U/Dosa |
15 |
|
8 |
Badarawa |
10 |
|
9 |
U/Sanusi |
10 |
|
10 |
Dan Mani |
5 |
|
11 |
Dan Bushiya |
10 |
|
12 |
Nasarawa/Kakuri |
10 |
|
13 |
Mando |
20 |
|
14 |
Barnawa |
15 |
|
15 |
Sabon U/Namai Gero |
40 |
Source: Interview with Alhaji Sale Usman, age 85
The table above suggests the direction of movement and
settlement or relocation of communities from the south to the north. The area
that received the highest refugees was Rigasa with the Abuja road taking the
largest number, especially of people from Sabon Tasha. While immigrants from
Gonin Gora, Maraban Rido, Romi, concentrated along Lokoja road, Rigasa. The
second most populated area after Rigasa is Maraban Jos and Rigacikun.
(Interview Alhaji Saleh Musa, age 78, Alhaji Shehu Sarkin Baka, age 82, Mallam Ali
Mai Lambu, age 85) The significance of these two places cannot be over
emphasized, because the two settlements are situated at the entry points from
the northwest and northeast parts of the country, constituting threats to
people of other faiths traveling to the Southeast, Southwest and the Federal
capital territory, Abuja or vice versa. Thus, relocation of aggrieved people to
these strategic entry or exit, clearly portends danger for permanent peace to
reign in the state. The least community at the hierarchy of recipients of
people from the southern part is Hayin Danmani, despite its proximity to Rigasa
as buttressed by table II above.
The movement of these communities and subsequent settlements
in their areas more convenient to their continued survival has significantly
deepened and reinforced the religious division of the town. This has remarkably
shattered the economic and social wellbeing of the affected communities,
creating perpetual scars and sorrow due to the gravity of loss of property and
lives. People were massacred in the presence of their relatives and loved ones
and such imprint cannot be wiped out or reversed on a platter of gold. This
turned Rigasa into a theatre of war and ethnic cleansing as a vendetta and
reprisal. It has become a safe haven for all aggrieved Muslim and a Siberia (in
Bosnia) to all Christians from whatever ethnic background. It has become
tantamount to committing suicide for any Christian to visit his/her relative in
Rigasa. However, there was absence of stopping and killings of passersby
compared to Gonin Gora and Sabon Tasha.
Table III: Distribution of Refugees in the
Southwards
|
S/N |
Ward |
Percentage |
|
1 |
Sabon Tasha |
40 |
|
2 |
Gonon Gora |
50 |
|
3 |
Maraban Rido |
40 |
|
4 |
Narayi |
30 |
|
5 |
Kidandan/Kakau |
20 |
|
6 |
Kujama |
15 |
|
7 |
Zokarika-Zokarika |
20 |
|
8 |
U/Namai Gero |
20 |
Source: Mr. Ema
Abu and Mr. Luka Bulus, age 52 and 65 respectively, residents of Kudendan and
Gonin Gora.
The table above
illustrates the direction of the movement of people from the northern part to
the southern part considered as safe haven to the Christian population. These
movement was described as spontaneous and sporadic in context and nature. There
were basically no internal movements of communities from Kaduna South and
Chikun local government. The largest area that received influxes were Sabon
Tasha and Gonin Gora. (Interview, Madam Yellow, age 62 and Mr. Paul Thomas,
age, 57) These places are very significant in the study of urban conflicts. The
places are strategically located economically and politically. For instance,
Sabon Tasha is situated adjacent to the famous Kaduna refinery. The dominant
workforce of the refinery cut across diverse ethnic and religious groups whose
livelihood were significantly jeopardized and threatened by the continued mass
influx of homogeneous religious group into Sabon Tasha. This has evoked the
redrawing of a new map of residential segregation and instilled fears in
refinery workers. Consequently, it forced many to seek for transfer to other
sub-stations of the downstream sector (interview with Alhaji Abu Ali, a retiree
of refinery, age 72 and Alhaji Sale Usman, age 83).
In the case of
Gonin Gora, it has become a nightmare for travelers and motorists moving to the
southeast and southwest, and to Federal capital city, Abuja. Available records
indicates that Gonin Gora was depicted as the most dangerous settlement with
high risk of conflict eruption and a theatre of war in the state. It served as
the gateway to Abuja, and passersby became easy prey to the communities. The
settlement of Gonin Gora has become very notorious, to the extent that any
crisis erupted will take a national dimension. It harbors peoples from various
ethnic backgrounds who are deeply aggrieved, traumatized and frustrated, hence
looking for slight opportunities to avenge such grievances. (Mr. Okon Ekong
Udo, age 67) Thus, vendetta has become the dominant features of conflict in
Gonin Gora, targeting prominent personalities. The killing of a member, House
of Representative, Major Ibrahim Abdullahi from Sabon Gari local government,
during the Shari’ah rioting is still fresh in people’s memory (interview with
Mallam Musa Salihi, age 56).
Many other
settlements sprang up within that period, and others had their population
shooting up astronomically. These include, Maraban Rido, Kidandan, Kamazo, Romi
and Kwangila. The movement has shattered the economic and social conditions of
many communities without a corresponding provision of getting them back. The
traumatic experiences of settlers of Rigasa, Gonin Gora and Television and
those who moved to Maraban Jos call for concern. (Mr. Ema Abu, age 52).
Recommendation
The dominant
religious institutions Jama`atu Nasral
Isalam (JNI) and Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) should be amply
utilized and involved in the setting up religious places of worship. To ensure
that any priest that proposes to establish a mosque or church must be certified
by these bodies. These institutional bodies should be empowered to determine
the emotional state, psychological status, and educational background of those
aspiring to become priests. The recommendations contained in the reports of the
Commission of Inquiry of 2000 Shari’ah crisis should be revisited and
implemented fully. Government must be firm on this to ensure compliance. They
need to be fully rehabilitated psychologically, socially, and economically. And
the authorities concerned should map out and initiates the process and
strategies for reorganizing the pattern of these flashpoints settlement.
Lastly, there is the need to establish army barracks in most of these
settlements. In this regard, government should initiate ways of reintegrating
communities along ethnic lines. This could be achieved through formation of ethnic
communities, like Yoruba, Igbo, Jaba, Ikulu, Igbira and Hausawa quarters as
used to be during pre-colonial and colonial periods. The classical example of
places like Unguwan Nufawa, a quarter established by Nupe people, and Sabo
quarters in Ibadan for the Hausas should be considered as a prototype. Government
should also intensify efforts to develop cottage industries in the rural areas
and also to engage in sound rural development. Similarly, government should
provide business apprenticeship, vocational training to teeming unemployed
youth and micro-credit should be made available. A clear cut policy on building
mosques and churches should be evolved throughout the country and the places of
worship should be repositioned as a community development outfits. The
authorities at both State and Local Council should make concerted efforts to
enhance community policing; community and religious leaders should be involved
and held accountable and responsible in intelligence gathering and peace
initiatives. Lastly, Kaduna is noted as industrial city, hence concerted
efforts should be made to resuscitate the ailing industries and boost the city
economy. This will go a long way towards curbing unemployment.
Conclusion
The paper
concludes by establishing the fact that segregation of communities along ethnic
lines has been the dominant features of human societies world over. However,
the spectacular nature of Kaduna experiences has been its transformation along
religious line and this portrayed unhealthy situations for peaceful
reintegration and mutual understanding in the city. The paper recommends that
for a permanent peace to reign in the state, the conclusions and
recommendations of all the white papers of tribunals and commissions of
inquires constituted by government must be revisited and implemented from 1987
to date. The culprits prosecuted in a court of law who were accused
perpetrating act of murder and setting ablaze properties of fellow citizen in
the name of religion or ethnicity. Nobody should be above the law, to serve as
a warning to others no matter how placed he may be in the society.
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