Article Citation: Adigbuo, Ebere Richard (2019). Authoritarianism and Regime Change: The Case of Egypt (2011-2018). DEGEL: The Journal of the Faculty of Arts and Islamic Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1. ISSN 0794-931
AUTHORITARIANISM
AND REGIME CHANGE: THE CASE OF EGYPT, 2011-2018
By
Adigbuo,
Ebere Richard
Department of History and International Studies
Delta State University, Abraka.
Abstract
To assert that Egypt, prior to the fall of
President Hosni Mubarak in 2011, was deeply entrenched in authoritarianism,
would amount to stating the obvious. Indeed, scholars had arrived at a
consensus that authoritarianism was indeed compatible with the Egyptian
society. However, the outbreak of the 2011 uprising in Egypt and the resultant
ouster of Mubarak appeared to open a new vista for the prospect of regime
changes in authoritarian societies. It is debatable to state that authoritarian
rule in Egypt ended with the exit of Mubarak. The finding in this study is
negative. Egypt is unlike authoritarian states like China and Singapore, whose
credentials in governance have yielded stupendous socio-economic
transformations. To ascertain whether the authoritarian accusations levelled
against Mubarak in 2011 continued till 2018, the qualitative research method was used. This method helped to examine
and synthesize the extant literature on
authoritarianism and regime changes in contemporary African international
studies. The paper argues that beyond the negative connotations of
authoritarianism, the need for a strong leader and a strong state is the only
alternative between the Egyptians and anarchy. Again since the post Mubarak era is also
authoritarian, this study recommends for a re-examination of the thesis, which
postulates that authoritarianism is a necessary precursor of regime changes.
Introduction
The contemporary debate about how Egypt has evolved over
time has placed great premium on the structure of the state and the place of
the authoritarian agent in that structure. To assert that modern Egypt prior to the fall of President
Mubarak in 2011 was deeply authoritarian, would amount to stating the obvious. Indeed, scholars had arrived at a
consensus as regards the prevalence of authoritarianism not only in Egypt, but
in the Arab world as a whole. While democracy had become a desired currency in
global political marketplace, it was not so in the Arab world before 2011
uprising. Egypt was no less among its Arab neighbours in disgusting democracy
as the country for a number of years
was yoked under authoritarian regimes.
Egypt,
officially known as the Arab Republic of
Egypt, is a central country in the Arab world, both for its
demographic and geopolitical importance[1] as
well as its reputation as
one of the earliest civilizations of the world. The country’s modern era could be traced to the 19th
Century when it passed from being a province in the Ottoman Empire to become
a British overseas territory. In 1922, Egypt gained her independence and
became a constitutional monarchy. The monarchy was however overthrown in
1952 when a secret society in the
Egyptian army called the Free Officers, led by General Gamal
Abdel Nasser, took control of the government in an almost bloodless coup.[2]
Egypt has ever since passed
through three authoritarian regimes,
starting from Nasser’s which ended in 1970. Nasser was succeeded by Mohammad Anwar al-Sadat who ruled till 1981 when he was assassinated by Islamist extremists. After
the assassination of al-Sadat,
Hosni Mubarak took over governance. During the three regimes, Egypt was largely governed under Emergency Law (Law No.
162 of 1958) which
extended the powers of the police,
suspended certain constitutional rights and as well legalized censorship.[3]
While other peoples in the global
community had embraced democracy to
reasonable extents, Egypt, like
its sister-Arab-states was rather glued to the authoritarian machine. Egyptians yearned for democracy and political liberalization but were silenced by
the coercive apparatus of the Egyptian state.
In 2011 however, a watershed was recorded in Arab history,
as the seemingly invincible authoritarian edifice of President Zine el-Abidine
Ben Ali of Tunisia had bowed to days of popular protests. To the Egyptians, this
was not just a news story but a call
for action. Inspired by events in neighbouring Tunisia, Egyptians took to the
streets in protest against the prevalence and resilience of authoritarianism in Egypt under President Mubarak. With the
instrumentality of online social
media, protests were organised and
co-ordinated so that within 18 days of
an unprecedented spontaneous public uprising, the 30-year authoritarian
leadership of Mubarak came to a close. [4]
The anti-authoritarian regime protests that came to be known as the ‘Arab
Spring’ gained more popularity and spread to other Middle East countries.
The ‘Arab Spring’ has been linked to several intended and
unintended consequences including the ongoing migrant crisis in Europe and the
United States.[5]But
how has authoritarianism aided regime changes particularly in Egypt post 2011?
It is a known fact that removal of the President Mubarak has not ended
authoritarian regimes in Egypt. Mubarak’s regime ended by a popular uprising
and the ascendency of Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood actually
signalled the success of liberal democracy. However, Morsi’s overthrew and
imprisonment, has questioned the authoritarianism-regime change paradigm. The
consequent ascension to power of another military officer, Abdel Fattah
al-Sisi, has demonstrated a challenge to all the assurances of the Arab and
more especially the Egyptian revolution. It is against this background that
this paper reconsiders the view of many analysts that authoritarianism is the
necessary precursor of regime change.
In
order to achieve its objectives, the paper is essentially divided into four
main segments: the first gives a conceptualization of authoritarianism; the
second segment looks at how the authoritarian tendencies of President Mubarak
triggered the Egyptian revolt in 2011; the third examines post Mubarak
administrations – Morsi and Sisi and their indulgences towards
authoritarianism; the fourth is the lesson and conclusion. This paper is guided
by the following research questions. What
is authoritarianism? How authoritarian was the Egyptian government and why has the authoritarian system of
governance lasted for so long in that country? How were regime changes effected in Egypt from 2011 to 2018? What lessons, if any, does regime change in Egypt hold for the study of international studies?
Conceptualizing
Authoritarianism
A
glance at the dailies, displays the gloomy side of democracy in the world. In
Africa and Middle East, Russia and China, Turkey, Singapore and North Korea,
authoritarian states are getting more authoritarian, and some democratic
states are shaky. This attests to the idea that Western liberal values have
their limits of relevance.[6]
This is particularly shown with the stupendous successes of authoritarian
states like Singapore and China. Just seventy years ago, Singapore was a
war-battered British port with a poor and uneducated population residing mainly
in slums. It was under that muddled condition that it struggled to be
independent in 1965. But today, the life expectancy of Singaporeans in 2018 is
83years.[7]
None is homeless; while the unemployment rate is as low as 2.01 percent as at
June 2018.[8]
All these were achieved through three decades of an authoritarian regime of Lee
Kuan Yew, the country’s founding father. The successes of Singapore can never
be compared to that of China, that through an authoritarian communist party,
the leadership has made China the second largest economy in the world with the
hope of displacing the United States. These and other states have actually
displayed authoritarian tendencies and an increasing attrition of civil
liberties. The Chinese President Xi Jinping that assumed the leadership of his
country in 2012 had to silence his critics and reminded his country’s
journalists that their job is to “serve and promote the Communist Party”.[9]
Does it mean that authoritarianism should be encouraged?
In
2011, authoritarianism was one of the easily mentioned factors that analysts
used in explaining the outbreak of the Arab Spring that took its tolls in
Egypt. Authoritarianism in this sense is taken to mean any system of government
where the governing body exercises absolute authority without being
constitutionally responsible to the people. According to the Encyclopaedia Britannica, it is conceived as a principle or system that demands
blind submission to authority, while power is exercised arbitrarily.[10]
However,
Garret Norris[11] observed that despite half a century of
dedicated scholarly attention, still no adequate or universal agreement has been
reached, since many analysts have viewed the concept of authoritarianism
differently. Before Norris, analysts like Lewis[12],
Martin[13],
Rosier and Willig[14],
have written passionately about authoritarian personality. Thus, in
a bid to provide a framework upon which authoritarianism could be adequately
assessed, Randall Baker offered a 13-point attribute of the concept which
includes:
•
Centralized authority and decision-making structures.
•
Presence of a control structure to stifle dissent and maintain order
•
Top-down rule from leader to citizens through a
•
bureaucratic structure.
•
A powerful bureaucracy charged with making and
•
distributing tangible goods.
•
A civil service that represents the centre down to the
•
local level.
•
Prevalence of nepotism over merit as basis for
•
hiring decisions in civil service.
•
Opportunities created by bureaucracy for
•
corruption or “unofficial income.
•
Preference for official cover-up of system shortfalls
•
over correction.
•
Presence of a civil service of unquestioned loyalty.
•
Regime enhancement of elite power and privilege.
•
Poor horizontal state coordination.
•
General public distrust of civil service.
•
Bureaucratic secrecy that builds regime cohesion
•
through mutual suspicion.[15]
Furthermore,
Sarah Rennick offers a six-dimensional approach to understanding what the
concept of authoritarianism entails. These include:
• The lack of popular confidence in the
• performance of public institutions.
• The quasi-unanimous spread of
• favouritism in public employment.
• Increase of corruption in public
• institutions.
• The maltreatment of the political opposition, arbitrary
arrests, and abuse of
detainees.
• The inability to organize public meetings and
demonstrations, and
• The increase in public expenditure on security rather than
education and health care.[16]
In this sense, therefore, an authoritarian regime may be
described as political system with limited but not responsible political
pluralism, without intensive or extensive political mobilization, and a system
where a leader or a small group usually exercises power within formally
ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones.[17]
Such a regime usually begins with the ‘theft’ of public office and powers,[18]
where instead of representing the entire citizenry, authoritarian regimes
rather focus on representing the interest of a sub-group of the population,
usually the elite and the privileged.[19]
Different typologies of authoritarianism are identified by
Ezrow and Frantz.[20]
These include grey zone regimes where formal democratic institutions are used
to cover up for the reality of authoritarian domination. According to Diamond[21],
this variant of authoritarianism usually involves elections which are however
usually fraught with electoral malpractices. He further stresses that in such
systems, winners are usually determined before polls are conducted.[22]
The Gambia [1996 and 2006 election], Nigeria [2003 and 2007 elections] and
Zimbabwe elections during President Mugabe tenure, particularly from 1985, are
useful examples. Another variant of authoritarianism is identified as
competitive authoritarianism. In this kind of political system, formal
democratic institutions are established while leaders are duly elected through
reasonably free and fair elections. However, upon assumption of office,
incumbents begin to violate the rules of democracy, so much so that the regime
falls short of the minimum standards of democracy.[23]
Similar to competitive authoritarianism is electoral authoritarianism, in which
case there are the legislative and executive arms while periodic elections are
conducted to choose leaders.[24]
However, while democratic practices are imbibed in such societies, human rights
and civil liberties are usually restricted, while discriminatory policies are
widespread.
Certain factors have over the years been observed to offer a
favourable breeding ground for authoritarian regimes. Notable among such
factors is the role of natural resources like oil; it is ascertained that
countries with abundant natural resources usually experience deficit in
democracy and human rights.[25]
Huntington offers useful explanation when he stressed that oil-rich states do
not rely on taxation for income generation.[26]
Huntington understands that resource rich states do not solicit the
acquiescence of their citizenry in income generation, a scenario that has the
propensity towards authoritarianism. People in such regions will demand
representation only when there is taxation.[27]Diamond
also sees rich resource states as more inclined to spending heavily on
state-security apparatuses ─ used to stifle opposition.[28]
Islam has been adduced to play an important role in
authoritarianism both in Egypt and other Islamic states. Islam is not only a
religion. It is also a political ideology. An ideology is the safest guarantor
of authoritarianism world over.[29]
For instance, it is recorded that in the 47 countries with Islamic majority,
only 11 have democratically elected governments, while 110 of the 145
non-Islamic States are electoral democracies.[30]It
is based on this statistical data that Fish concludes that countries with
Islamic majority are remarkably more authoritarian than non-Muslim societies.[31]
It must however be noted that while some countries with majority Muslim
population had at least made attempts at shifting towards electoral democracy,
the Arab world had simply shrugged in indifference, preferring instead to
remain entrenched in authoritarianism up until the outbreak of the recent Arab
Spring.
Widespread illiteracy and poverty is another useful
explanation for the prevalence of authoritarianism in some countries of the
world. This is because with illiteracy, individuals are mostly unaware of their
constitutional as well as fundamental rights and as such cannot demand such
rights. On the other hand, poverty is linked to authoritarianism where an
improved socio-economic condition of the people is considered as a danger to
regime stability.[32]
This point is adequately explained by Magaloni[33]
who notes that the authoritarian regime in Mexico in its bid to sustain itself,
introduced a range of policies targeted at preventing rural peasants from
escaping poverty. She stresses, that with such policies, the PRI authoritarian
regime in Mexico was able to secure the loyalty of the rural dwellers through
state patronage and clientilist practices.[34]
Thus, from Magaloni’s arguments, the point to stress is that
since poor people are more likely to depend on the regime for the provision of
basic needs, widespread poverty is therefore favourable for the survival of
authoritarian regimes as it creates regime-dependent loyal citizens. This view
is equally shared by Helle and Rakner[35]
who explained the resilience of Uganda’s authoritarian regime with the
prevalence of rural poverty in the country. These scholars however added that in Uganda, prevailing rural
poverty has helped to sustain the country’s authoritarian regime since rural
dwellers often do not care so much about their political leadership, especially
at the national level.[36]
Thus, it was in view of the above understanding of
authoritarianism that the Arab world was singled out as the unchallenged
bastion of durable authoritarianism across the globe.[37]
For instance, during the 23-year old dictatorship of Ben Ali in Tunisia,
government stifled all forms of political opposition and defiance with the
instrumentality of a 130,000-strong security force, while the country
functioned in reality as a single party state under the Democratic
Constitutional Rally (RCD).[38]
In the same manner, Hosni Mubarak in Egypt orchestrated state brutality through
a coercive security apparatus and the Emergency Law[39],
while Muammar Gaddafi’s regime in Libya was marked by a lack of political
pluralism due to strong prohibition of opposition and the presence of a robust
and coercive security apparatus. The regime expected unquestioned loyalty from
the citizenry while governing the country through a constitution
single-handedly authored by Gaddafi. Other Middle Eastern states had
authoritarian regimes, a phenomenon that appropriately gave rise to the
outbreak of the Arab Spring.
Added to the above listed factors is how relative
deprivation exacerbated by a clash between expectations and reality offers an
insightful explanation for authoritarianism that led to the outbreak of the
Arab Spring.[40]
In this case, the ever-increasing population of educated youth had moved to the
urban areas seeking “to do not only as well, but better than their parents had
before them.”[41]
The people’s expectations were however hindered by widespread unemployment[42],
as well as their inability to afford what to eat as a result of rising food
prices.[43]
In a study conducted on the eve of the uprising, it was reported that on an
overall basis, over 120 million persons out of a total of 250 million persons
in the entire Middle East region were dissatisfied with their living condition.[44]
The place of the social media in the outbreak of the Egypt
Spring cannot be ignored. Daniel Byman[45]
highlights the role of the internet, particularly Face book, Twitter and
YouTube for mass mobilization during the conflict. In Egypt, in particular, it
was usual for the government to arrest leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood as
well as the El Ghad party whenever there was a manifestation of civil
disobedience. However, with the rise of online social media as a new political
actor, it had become absolutely unnecessary to round up on the usual suspects,
as they (members of the opposition groups) knew little or nothing about the
events.[46]
Other factors that equally explain the outbreak of the Arab Sprig include:
freedom and good governance deficit,[47]
democracy promotion agenda of Western powers,[48]
as well as neo-liberal reforms which weakened the capacity of the authoritarian
regimes to maintain a firm grip over their respective States.[49]
As was the case in the Middle East, Egypt was indeed no
exception. The regimes of Nasser, Sadat and Mubarak had clearly exemplified the
authoritarian tendencies and it is on this basis that this discourse would
focus on authoritarianism in Egypt during the regime of Hosni Mubarak vis-Ã -vis
regime change in the state.
Authoritarianism
and Mubarak’s Egypt
Prior
to Mubarak’s accession to power in 1981, a constitutional amendment in 1980 bad
practically extended the tenure of the President to lifetime as it stipulated
that the President could seek re-election for as many times and he kept his
country under emergency law.[50]
It was therefore upon this constitutional framework that Hosni Mubarak became
Egypt’s President, serving in that capacity for about three decades.
Nonetheless, in examining Egypt’s socio-political climate during the Mubarak
regime, the four-way analysis presented by the Egyptian sociologist Galal Amin
becomes pertinent. These include the ‘Soft State’ theory, the nature of the
ruling elite, and wealth distribution as well as widespread corruption.
The
theory of the Soft state was first introduced by Gunnar Myrdal to describe a
state of general societal indiscipline which manifests itself by “deficiencies
in legislation and in particular law observance and enforcement.”[51]
Galal Amin however applies this theory to Egypt where in his observation, “the
elites can afford to ignore the law because their power protects them from it,
while others pay bribes to work around it.” The situation is such that laws
only apply to the poor populace that may not afford to bribe law enforcement
agents, while licences and permits are granted on pay rather than on merit.[52]
Having
enriched themselves with bribes and unofficial income, government officials
including law enforcement agents are known to turn blind eyes to societal ills.
For instance, it is on record that in 1992 when an earthquake struck Cairo, the
government had been contemplating on what strategies to adopt in solving the
ensuing housing problem. Lack of prompt attention to the needy gave the Muslim
Brotherhood an opportunity to provide disaster reliefs to the persons directly
affected by the earthquake. Indeed, Brotherhood members were said to have
rapidly set up shelters and medical tents, provided food, clothing and blankets
to residents of the city, and donated US$1 000 to every family whose home had
been destroyed.[53]
Also,
to understand the nature of authoritarianism in Mubarak’s Egypt, it is
pertinent to understand the nature of the ruling elite. First, President
Mubarak had prevented the emergence of competition among elite factions through
steady, large- scale patronage of the political elite. This is given the belief
that competition among the elite would weaken the regime and could even lead to
an eventual breakdown of the regime.[54]Hamdy
Hassan argues that the ruling elite under Mubarak like their predecessors, are
loyal to the President but however lack interest in politics and public affairs
thereby making the President the sole administrator of the entire country.[55]
An
examination into the privileges and activities of the National Democratic Party
(NDP) is also necessary in understanding the nature of authoritarianism during
the regime of President Hosni Mubarak. Established by President Anwar Sadat in
1978, the NDP existed as a de facto single party in Egypt as it wielded an
uncontested power irrespective of the fact that the country was officially
designated as a multiparty state.[56]
In fact, it is the party that determines what other political parties are
qualified to be registered. The party as well enjoys the privilege to make
recommendations for the dissolution of a political party whenever such a party
poses a threat to NDP’s continued dominance. It is only from the NDP of all
political parties in the world that one party, in a sham of democracy, fields
multiple candidates in a parliamentary election.[57]
Moreover,
the NDP, with its control of over 70% of the parliament as well as its status
as the party of the President of the Republic, there is hardly any
differentiation between the government and the party so that legislations are
made often to keep opposition in check. For instance, membership in opposition
parties is not allowed above a total of 400 persons so that it becomes roundly
impossible for an opposition of 400 members to oust a regime in power in a
country of 80rnillion.[58]
The
role of Egypt’s security system in the sustenance of authoritarianism during
the regime of President Hosni Mubarak cannot be undermined. Mubarak maintained
a pervasive and fiercely loyal security apparatus that disrupted any internal
opposition activity before it could fully mobilize a call for change.[59]
In effect, Mubarak security apparatus had always rounded up on members of the
Muslim Brotherhood as well as the El Ghad Party of Dr Ayman Nour whenever these
groups revealed signs of championing a course for regime change.
The
security apparatus was an integral part of the regime. This consisted of
paramilitary, riot police, the secret service, and many other sections whose
job it was to efficiently repress the population.[60]
It is on record that while in power, Mubarak created one of the world’s largest
state security forces, equalling in size that of China.[61]
Detention facilities were built in isolated deserts and in a number of
instances, many Egyptians were thrown into jail without trial, especially when
they exhibited anti-regime feelings. It was all of these that had characterised
the Mubarak regime thus earning the description of authoritarianism.
Also,
distribution of wealth during the Mubarak regime in Egypt was largely unequal.
The introduction of a set of neo-liberal economic reforms had created a new
class of wealthy citizens who amounted to a meagre 9% of the population. As a
consequence, a large proportion of the populace wallowed in want and scarcity.
Unemployment soared while over-population had begun to bring an increasing
crime rate in the country. In the face of this situation, corruption had
assumed a monstrous role as bribes were not uncommon in the Egyptian society.[62]
Regime Change in Egypt
The Arab Spring
ushered a renewed scholarly interests as to why some regimes fail while others
succeed. The 2011 social upheaval brought the downfall of Ben Ali of Tunisia,
Hosni Mubarak of Egypt, and Muammar Gaddafi of Libya as the rioting citizens
demanded their replacements. Protests in Syria and Yemen resulted in long drawn
wars. The Arab Spring found expression in societal dissatisfaction, which the
relative deprivation theorists propagate. Though criticized for lacking the ability to measure the perception of
the discrepancy between the actual needs of the people from their perceived
needs, yet this school of thought has been
fundamental in explaining the societal dissatisfactions that gave rise to
regime changes in the region. The proponents of this theory are Ted Gurr (1968, 1970) and lately
Francis Stewart (2000). Another theory that gives credence to regime change in
Egypt is the elite theory. To elite theorists, in every society there exists a
small group of people whether in the military, political party or even in the
corporate world with specified interests to protect at any point in time. The
interest of the state is most of the time defined by the ruling elites. The
scholars that have long argued for elite unity as an important determinant to
regime changes are Pareto (1935), Aron (1950), Putnam (1976) and Huntington
(1984). Higley and Burton (1989) attempted similarly to form a new elite
paradigm that explains regime change. They contend that a divided national
elite, produces unstable regimes that oscillate between authoritarian and
democratic systems of government.
Mubarak
governed Egypt for three decades. To ensure survival, he instituted coercive
security apparatus, weakened the civil society groups, and ran a rentier
economy. However, the success of a popular uprising against an identical regime
in neighbouring Tunisia had inspired Egyptians on the need to effect a regime
change in their own country via mass protests. Thus, as it happened in Tunisia,
millions of Egyptians marched through the streets demanding an end to the
Mubarak regime. The uprising in Egypt was triggered by many causes, principal
among which were the need to put an end to the authoritarian regime of Hosni
Mubarak as well as the enthronement of democracy.[63]
The Egyptians loathed the Mubarak regime for authoritarian features including
widespread corruption and a soaring of food prices; the cost of food prices for
the urban poor dwellers appreciated by 40 percent.[64]
The other reasons were the increasing rate of youth unemployment, state
brutality as orchestrated by the security forces, as well as the Emergency Law,
a piece of legislation which negated the principle of democracy, under which
the state had been governed for quite a number of decades.[65]
The Egyptian protesters wanted democracy; they wanted liberty; they wanted
freedom of expression as well as the enthronement of the rule of law under
which they hoped to have a limitless economic opportunity opened to them.
Among
the immediate sparks of the uprising was the torture and consequent murder of
Khaled Said, a 28 year-old Egyptian who was allegedly beaten to death by the police on June 6, 2010.
Said was a United States’ trained computer programmer who was arrested from a
cyber cafe in Sidi Gaber area of Alexandria and was thereafter tortured to
death before a crowd.[66]In
protest against police brutality, many Egyptians took to the streets but were brutally suppressed by the state’s security forces; many protesters were arrested.
Meanwhile, with the instrumentality of the online media, the Khaled Said affair had attracted international attention as his
picture began to feature in international concerts of Said including a Pink Floyd concert in Florida.[67]
As the Khaled Said
affair gained publicity, inspired by protests in Tunisia, Wael Ghonim, a Google executive, via online social media
particularly Face book, YouTube and Twitter, encouraged Egyptian youths to march out for protests on January
25, 2011.[68]
That day, over half-million
people heeded to the call,[69]
and for 18 days, Tahrir Square
in Cairo and the streets of Alexandria were filled with thousands
of frustrated but dynamic youths
who were growingly interested in talking about citizenship and democracy
in their country.[70]
In response to popular uprisings, Mubarak offered concessions to protesters in a bid to secure his office. Among such concessions was a declaration on February 1, 2011, not to
seek re-election at the expiration of his tenure. Nine days later, he re-iterated his decision not to run for the next presidential election but asked
the protesters to allow him ‘shoulder’
the responsibility of organizing a ‘peaceful transition.[71]
All of these had however fallen
on deaf ears as the protesters
strengthened their stance.
Side
by side the offer of political concessions, Mubarak employed certain coercive
measures with which he hoped to get the protesters into quiescence. For
instance, on January 28, the Google executive who created the “We are all
Khaled Said” fan page was arrested while access to the internet across the
country was limited.[72]
By February 5, about 300 protesters had lost their lives while another 500 had
died within the next six days following police brutality. Finally,
on February 11 2011, with mounting pressure both at home and abroad, Mubarak
reluctantly resigned after thirty years in office. Power was handed over power
to the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) which was therefore to
conduct general elections for the country.
Thus,
after many twists and turns, on November 28, 2011, the first post Mubarak
parliamentary elections were held with Islamist parties recording an
overwhelming majority.[73]Then,
by June 16 and 17, Presidential elections were held with Mohammed Morsi and
Ahmed Shafiq as the two candidates for the election. On June 24, 2012, the
Supreme Presidential Elections Commission (SPEC) announced Mohammed Morsi of
the Muslim Brotherhood as the winner of the election, having secured 51.7%
votes as against Shafiq’s 48%.[74]
On Saturday, June 30, Mohammed Morsi was sworn in as Egypt’s new President
as he promised a new era for Egypt while resigning his membership from the
Muslim Brotherhood, in keeping his pledge to represent all Egyptians during his
years in office.[75]
Thus, the Mubarak authoritarian regime had come to an end as members of the
regime had been put on trial with Mubarak imprisoned for life. Has
authoritarianism ended in Egypt with the exit of President Mubarak?
President Mohamed Morsi and
Warped Authoritarianism
Mohamed
Morsi was elected the President of Egypt after the 2011 social uprising. His
presidency spanned from June 2012 to July 2013. Though he was desirous to
introduce some reforms, many analysts accused him of “incompetence” possibly
for policy reversals and mismanagement of the economy[76]
and was unable to understand the political intrigues needed in democratizing a
richly divided Egyptian society.[77]
Though democratically elected, Morsi in November 2012, edged towards
authoritarianism as he retired some top military officers[78]
and went ahead to issue decrees that were exempted from review; as a
consequence widespread demonstrations coerced him to backtrack.[79]
The protests left seven people dead.[80]
Morsi was accused of favouring his Islamists groups; he buttressed the
allegation by appointing his Islamist brothers as state governors.[81]
He harassed and threatened opposing voices, and worsened the situation by
detaining some secular activists, like Ahmed Maher[82] that brought him to power.
As months of distrust rolled by, Egypt under Morsi became what Nathan Brown
termed a wide state.[83]
Morsi
lost favour from the powerful elites that kept the Egyptian polity, even under
Mubarak. His earlier pledge to achieve the “revolution's goals”[84]
started waning the moment he failed to recognize the need for inclusive
democracy and government; the constitution-drafting committee was dominated by
the Islamists that ultimately brought out a totally flawed and parochial
framework for the country. The draft constitution was criticized as designed to
achieve the Muslim interpretation of Egyptian laws.[85]
The
Amendments to Egypt’s Constitutional Declaration, announced by President Morsi
on November 22, 2012 was criticized by Amnesty International as designed to
trample Egypt’s resolve on rule of law and to herald governmental repression.
Morsi’s decree also robbed the judiciary of its power to dissolve the
Constituent Assembly and the upper house of parliament (Shura Council).[86]
The judiciary rejected Morsi meddling into its domain; as protests continued,
the military gave its warning.[87]
Morsi’s authoritarian credentials was warped or to say the least thin; but as
he presided over an economy that was sputtered with a high rate of unemployed
youths, the very reasons for the 2011 uprising, his tenure can best be
described as a Frankenstein’s monster. Morsi was shown the exit door by the
military before a protesting and cheering crowd.
President
Abdel Fattah al-Sisi Authoritarian Abuses
Analysts like Hamdy Hassan appreciate that Egypt is
historically authoritarian.[88]
Hassan traced the present authoritarian tendencies of modern Egypt to
antiquity, a phenomenon that can be linked to the pharaonic tradition. Thus,
any democratization process by any contemporary Egyptian regime is stymied and
inevitably degenerates to authoritarianism.[89]This
authoritarian affirmation is descriptive of President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who, as a military autocrat
ousted an elected President Morsi in July 2013, and has been ruling Egypt
autocratically till date. Sisi has administered Egypt as a deep state, running
the country with the support of top military officers, intelligence
agencies, security forces, senior bureaucrats and occasionally judges. For the
last five years, Sisi has governed Egypt by establishing institutions to
control the state and maintain some form of legitimacy.
Sisi started by neutralizing the Muslim Brotherhood and
other Islamic groups through significant repressions. Ousted President Morsi
was detained.[90]Tough
security measures were inflicted on the university campuses. The activities and
funding of nongovernmental institutions and civil society groups were
curtailed.[91]
On November 29, 2016, the parliament passed hastily, a Non Governmental
Organization (NGO) law that hamstrings the activities of the civic groups. The
draft criminalises any research or work that injures public morals or order,
national unity or security. No legislative clarifications were made of these
terms, thus giving the authorities the latitude to frame any charges against
any group. Such ambiguities allow the authorities to file charges against
almost any group. The prohibitions against the right to associate and assemble
without governmental interference definitely violates the people’s rights as
enshrined in the constitution and international statutes ratified by Egypt.
Elaborately, all non-governmental activities must conform to the state’s plan
and developmental priorities.[92]
Protests by the public as well strikes from the organized
labour unions were outlawed. The media houses were compelled to present
pro-government programmes and to indulge in self-censorship. Government
restrictions were also placed on the social media that brought Mubarak to his
heels. From 2013, when Sisi took over the reins of government, suppression of
dissenting voices had been persistent.[93]Sisi’s
repressive measures raised an international outcry.[94]
Sisi has never been known for the establishment of a ruling party as his
predecessors did. Rather, what was put in place was an amorphous political
structure that is till date, pro-regime.[95]Sisi’s
authoritarian credentials were worsened on 21 June 2019 as Morsi collapsed
and died inside a soundproof glass cage on charges of espionage.[96]
This
study has focused on the domestic determinants of authoritarianism and regime
change in Egypt. It is one side of the coin. Systemic factors that include
among others, the role of the West and in particular, the United States of
America, in turning blind eye to authoritarian regimes in the region cannot be
over-emphasized. Mubarak was a key ally of the US. So is Sisi. It is ironical
that when Morsi’s democratically elected government was overthrown by a
military junta, the US and its allies kept mute. In effect, foreign interests
in Egypt and the entire region have actually helped to sustain authoritarian
regimes. It is against this backdrop that Sara Khorshid postulated that the Western leaders are promoting
dictatorship, not democracy, in Egypt[97]
Conclusion
It
has been shown in this study that Egypt is actually steeped in
authoritarianism, going from antiquity. Regime change has been a recurring
decimal that started with the orchestrated overthrow of the Egyptian monarchy
in 1952. The coup d’état was stage
managed by a group of soldiers led by Nasser. Ever since, the country has been
governed by soldiers who in Mubarak’s era gave an artful nod to the Third Wave
of democratization by introducing elections which were albeit manipulated.
Attempts at regime change through the ballot had failed [except for Morsi],
while plots for military coup d’état have been nipped in the bud, thanks to
Egypt’s well-funded intelligence service.
Thus,
learning from the Egyptian experience, it could be stated that the contemporary
society is presented with a wide range of opportunities for regime change in
authoritarian societies as the people could easily gather themselves through
the internet and arrange for popular protests, when the need arises. More so,
whereas authoritarian governments do censor print and broadcast media,
censorship of the internet is a harder task given the international nature of
cyber space. As such, given the 2011 Egyptian upheaval, it could then be said
that the internet has opened up opportunities to the possibility of regime
change in closed societies with authoritarian regimes.
This study offers valuable ideas in the field of
international studies (IS) literature that is interested in how domestic
political structures are linked to foreign policy through regime studies
(democracy or autocracy). Over the years, students of international studies
have explored foreign policy-regime type nexus. It is hoped that this study has
brought some literary insights in the lexicon of IS theory. This informs the
examination of the role of political elites in sustaining authoritarian rule in
Egypt. Thus, the IS literature is further enriched by exploring the strategies
used in quelling the political crises in Egypt from 2011 when the uprising
started to 2018 when another authoritarian leader in the person of President
Sisi was elected for a second term.
It must however be noted that this paper does not argue that
regime change in Egypt has brought about democratization of the country given
the continuance of popular demonstration in protest of some of the policies of
Morsi’s administration. The study acknowledges that the post 2011 Egyptian
polity has been profoundly authoritarian, though Morsi’s style was warped.
Mubarak and Sisi are two sides of the same authoritarian coin. Sisi has been
elected for his second tenure in March 2018, after he had used draconian
measures against his opponents. He silenced them after projecting Egypt’s image
as one under deadly threats from terrorists operating within the country and in
particular the Sinai region.
Sisi has not taken the draconian steps without the support
of the military, bureaucracy, the parliament and the judiciary, thus making
Egypt a deep state. This authoritarian order allows for the continued emergency
laws, all to the disdain of the civil society groups and the international
community. But many Egyptians believe that a strong leader and state is the
only alternative between them and chaotic situations.
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[4]Samer Shehata, “Egypt After
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[10] Encyclopaedia Britannica
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[13]J.L. Martin, “The Authoritarian Personality,
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[15] Randall Baker,
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[21] Larry Diamond, “Thinking About Hybrid
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[22] Ibid.
[23]Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, “The Rise
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[24]M.Bogaards, "How to Classify Hybrid
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[25] Larry Diamond, "Why are there no Arab
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[26] S.P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century.
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991): 65
[27] Ibid.
65
[28] Diamond, "Why are there no Arab
Democracies?" 98.
[29]H. Albrecht, and Oliver Schlumberger,
“Waiting for Godot’: Regime Change
Without Democratization in the Middle
East," International Political Science Review 25.4 (2004): 371-392.
[30] A. Karatnycky, “The 2001 Freedom House
Survey: Muslim Countries in a Democratic Gap.” Journal of Democracy 13.1 (2002): 103.
[31] S.M. Fish, “Islam and Authoritarianism.” World Politics, 55 (2002): 27-43.
[32] Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1968): 56.
[33] B. Magaloni, Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and its Demise in Mexico
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006):39.
[34] Ibid.
39
[35] Helle. Svein-Erik, and L. Rakner, “The
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[38] A. Honwana, “Youth and the
Tunisian Revolution” CODESRIA (New
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[39] M. El-Bendary The Egyptian Revolution: Between Hope and Despair: Mubarak to Morsi
(New York: Algora Publishing, 2013).
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[47]A. Richards, “Democracy in the Arab Region:
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[48]G.M. Selim, “The United States and the Arab
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[49] Breisinger, and Al-Riffai, “Economics of
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[50] Ibid.
[51] G. Myrdal, The
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[52] Galal Amin, Egypt in the Era of Hosni Mubarak 1981–2011 (Cairo: American
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[53]L.Caromba and Hussein S, Understanding
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[58]J. P. Montada, “Oppositional Movement in
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[64] K.V. Nagarajan, “Egypt’s Political Economy
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[67]Wael Eskandar, “Roger
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[71]Anderson Lisa, “Demystifying the Arab
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[72]Wilson Rodney, “Economy: The Root of the
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[73]Fish M. Steven, “Islam and
Authoritarianism,” World Politics 55 (October
2002):22.
[74]Beck Martin. “The Debate on the Middle East”
in The
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[81]Bessma Momani, “In Egypt, ‘Deep State’ vs.
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