The Nigerian State and National Security

Cite this article: Olaniyi, R. 2025. “The Nigerian State and National Security”. Sokoto Journal of History Vol. 13, Iss. 01. Pp. 63 – 79. www.doi.org/10.36349/sokotojh.2025.v13i01.007

THE NIGERIAN STATE AND NATIONAL SECURITY

By

Rasheed Olaniyi

Department of History, University of Ibadan

Introduction

Nigeria's conception of national security has changed dramatically since gaining its independence in 1960. The political, ethnic, religious, and economic forces that have affected Nigeria's state's efforts to preserve security. Nigeria's security environment is characterised by ongoing crises and official responses, ranging from the military takeovers of the 1960s to more recent issues like terrorism, banditry, and corruption. Examining significant historical occurrences and trends that have affected national security is crucial to comprehending the intricate interactions between these elements. Nigeria's population are feeling increasingly insecure on a daily basis. Not only are more people committing crimes, but these crimes are also becoming more brutal, cunning, and desperate. New violent crime patterns have emerged since the start of the current democratic regime. These include ransom kidnapping, pipeline vandalism, political violence, terrorism, and, most recently, the Fulani herdsmen killings. The military has had numerous difficulties in carrying out its missions since gaining independence in 1960. Some of these issues are excruciating and posed a litmus test for the military’s capability to preserve and protect Nigeria’s territorial integrity. These challenges include the civil war in Nigeria, military takeovers and the military's involvement in politics, developing a workable defence strategy, having civil authorities control the military, having a large defence budget and military spending, and defending the country against armed militias and religious insurgents, among other things.

Military Coups of 1966/67 and Prelude to the Nigerian Civil War

The military coups of 1966 represented watershed moments in Nigerian history. On January 15, 1966, a gang of young army officers, largely from the Eastern Nigeria, carried out a coup that culminated in the killing of important political leaders, including Prime Minister Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, Northern Nigeria Premier Ahmadu Bello and Chief Samuel Ladoke Akintola of Western Nigeria.  This coup, viewed as ethnically motivated because to the involvement of mostly Igbo officers, sparked hostilities between ethnic groupings, particularly between Igbos and Hausa-Fulani in Northern Nigeria.  ‘Throughout the name of the Supreme Council of the Revolution of the Nigerian Armed Forces, I announce martial law throughout the northern provinces of Nigeria.’ Major Chukwuma Nzeogwu's speech announcing the coup on January 15, 1966, began with these words. 

Since that day, much has been said and written about Nigeria's first military coup; yet, despite the abundance of material, including written works by some of the coup participants, the truth about the coup remains difficult to comprehend, if not accessible. In retrospect, this is understandable: the coup was completely unexpected, given the state of Nigeria at the time, and its consequences were far-reaching, well beyond what its planners anticipated—and fifty-six years later, Nigerians have struggled to find closure. First, Major Adewale Ademoyega discusses in his book "Why We Struck" how he met Nzeogwu and Ifeajuna, who were already in the army, when he enrolled in 1961. The three politically conscious young men advocated for a military revolution to "shake up" the new Nigerian state, which many radicals and left-wing intellectuals considered as an extension of British neocolonialism. Over time, the trio's ambitions hardened into a conspiracy, and as politicians' misgovernance intensified, the officers drew additional recruits into their ranks. 

Other stories claim that the political turmoil that enveloped Nigeria following the massively fraudulent 1964 general elections prompted some of the 1966 plotters (and even those who did not engage in the coup) to consider military intervention. Major Ifeajuna and Lieutenant-Colonel Victor Banjo, who did not take part in the January coup but supported it, were accused by Nigerian security agencies of plotting a military intervention to break the deadlock caused by the disastrous election. During the January coup, Major Nzeogwu notified an army commander, Major Alexander Madiebo, that he had prepared an operation to sedate high military officers attending the 1964 army shooting competition. It failed because the brass, who were most likely wary of the heated situation or just concerned about security, did not attend the ceremony.

Regardless, the inner circle, concerned about the country's happenings, began recruiting officers. Given the delicate nature of a coup and the consequences of detection or failure for plotters, the January Boys, as they are informally known, were cautious.  Nzeogwu, however, was known to warn new officers at the Nigerian Military Training College in Kaduna, where he was the principal instructor, "Wait until the day you will look at the senior officers through the sights of your rifle." One officer was sufficiently worried to notify Nzeogwu to his superiors, Colonel Ralph Shodeinde and Brigadier Samuel Ademulegun. Shodeinde, who did not take any action against his immediate subordinate, observed that "there is never smoke without fire, even if it is smouldering fire." In response to Shodeinde's assessment, Brigadier Ademulegun, commander of the army's first brigade located in Kaduna, stated that Nzeogwu was a young man in a hurry who should be constantly monitored. Both guys paid the ultimate price for their careless approach to the allegation in the early hours of January 15. 

Contrary to popular belief, the coup was actually planned by more than five majors. Here is a list of the prominent players in the coup: Majors Chukwuma Kaduna Nzeogwu, Emmanuel Arinze Ifeajuna, Adewale Ademoyega, Donatus Okafor, Humphrey Iwuchukwu Chukwuka, Timothy Onwuatuegwu, Christian Anufuro, and John Obienu. Captains: Ben Gbulie, Emma Nwobosi, Ogbonna Oji, Ganiyu Adeleke, and Emmanuel Udeaja. Lieutenants Amechi Okaka, Edwin Okafor and Fola Oyewole Olafimihan. Second Lieutenants: Cyril Azubuogu, Harris Eghagha, Godfrey Ezedigbo, Ozoemena Igweze, Patrick Ibik, Bob Ikejiofor, John Atom Kpera, Emmanuel Nweke, Samson Emeka Omeruah, and Dag Waribor.

Why Did the Plotters of January 15 1966 Strike?

To fully understand the motivations behind the coup, it is important to recognise the motivations behind such a group of individuals who did resort to armed conflict against their nation's leadership. The motivations for the coup may stem from the plotters' resolve to terminate the instability and violence resulting from the crises that ensued after the heavily manipulated 1965 regional elections in the Western area and the 1964 nationwide elections.  The conspirators perceived the existing administration as inept, oblivious, and progressively authoritarian. In this context, they were not alone. Since 1962, the country has had a series of crises that the government has ineptly managed. The crises encompassed the Western Region Parliament dispute of 1962, the census controversy of 1963, the general strike of 1964, and the Tiv rebellion of 1964.  The conspirators were incensed by the deployment of the military to suppress dissent among factions of the populace opposed to the government. Numerous conspirators participated in these actions and attributed the crisis and improper utilisation of the military to the politicians. 

Massive corruption and venality among the ruling elite also enraged the conspirators. The plotters (and a few other military commanders) were outraged by the ruling class's politicisation of the military and lowering of standards in an attempt to weaken the south's reliance on the army. During the colonial era, southerners, particularly the Igbo, flooded the army, particularly the officer corps, since the British prioritised qualifications.  Unfortunately, the majority of the north was educationally disadvantaged, therefore most northerners who entered the army ended up in fighting infantry, whilst southerners were placed in technical services and advanced to officer level. Following independence, the northern-dominated government attempted to reform things, resulting in disequilibrium. 

Many of the plotters were educated individuals who sought to spread left-wing ideology in Nigeria, which was popular in many regions of Africa and Latin America at the time. Interestingly, the plotters stated that they had no ambition to take over the government. Nzeogwu, the coup's spokesman, stated, "Neither I nor any of the other lads were interested in controlling the country. We were soldiers, not politicians. We had decided who would be who based on a list that every soldier in this operation was familiar with. Chief Obafemi Awolowo, for example, was to be released from prison immediately and appointed as Nigeria's executive temporary president. We planned to appoint civilians who had demonstrated honesty and efficiency to conduct all of the governing.” 

The counter-coup in July 1966, carried out primarily by Northern officers, resulted in the assassination of the then-military head of state, Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi, an Igbo. Lieutenant Colonel Yakubu Gowon of the Middle Belt gained power. This paved the way for more ethnic conflicts and violence, including attacks on the Igbo community in Northern Nigeria.  These events served as a prelude to the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970), as Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu, the military ruler of the Eastern Region, declared the region's secession as the independent state of Biafra in May 1967. The Nigerian Civil War, also known as the Biafran War, resulted in huge casualties and increased ethnic divisions, the consequences of which are still evident in Nigeria's security difficulties today.

The Nigerian Civil War

The Nigerian civil war was a disaster that shook the newly formed Nigerian state from 1967 until 1970. The 30-month civil war was preceded by a series of pre- and post-independence issues. The origins of the civil war might be traced back to a variety of factors, including the distant military coups of January 15 and July 29, 1966.  Other remote factors include the regional election crisis in Western Nigeria in 1965, the Tiv riots of 1964, the Federal Elections of 1964, the killing of Igbos in Northern Nigeria from May to September 1966, the structural imbalance of the Nigerian federation, and, most importantly, the asymmetrical distribution of power among the various ethnic and geopolitical groups. 

Lieutenant Colonel Odumegwu Ojukwu declared the state of Biafra on May 30, 1967, which sparked the civil war. Prior to this proclamation, Nigeria was geographically separated into three regions. These are the North, West, and East regions. Igbos are of Eastern origin. Ojukwu's announcement effectively removes the eastern part of Nigeria from the federation. Thus, the civil war in 1967 was sparked by the federal government of Nigeria's attempt to prevent the east's secession from the federation, as well as Ojukwu's resolve to assure Biafra's survival.

The Nigerian civil war, like all civil wars, was distinctive in terms of national history. This is because it was the most visible manifestation of a nation turning against itself. The Nigerian civil war, like other countries' civil wars, can be analysed in terms of a revolution. As a revolution, it is quite unique in the context of Nigerian history; it is the only revolution to have happened in Nigeria's chequered history.  Thus, if revolution as a concept and revolutions in history are taken into account, the argument that the Nigerian civil war may be considered a 'revolution' is not farfetched.

The Maitatsine Riots of the 1980s

The Maitatsine riots were a string of violent uprisings that started in Kano in 1980 and extended throughout the 1980s to Yola, Maiduguri, and Kaduna in Northern Nigeria. Mohammed Marwa, also known as Maitatsine, was the movement's leader. A radical Islamic preacher, he opposed modernity and the Nigerian government while promoting stringent religious changes. His adherents, who were primarily young people without jobs and disenfranchised, carried out violent assaults on the military, police, and civilian targets.

It is possible to see the wave of unrest that preceded Islamic fundamentalism's emergence in Nigeria in the early 1980s as a transitory stage of underdevelopment.  This represents the reality of Third World nations, particularly those in Africa, where a succession of inept administrations have led to the creation of a populace at odds with itself. This is exacerbated by the continent's underdeveloped economy, sociopolitical life, and high rate of regime turnover, all of which involve mismanagement of government, military autocracies, and democratic dictatorship. If not immediately put an end to, these disturbances may escalate into something more dangerous, such to the battle in the Chad and Ogaden desert or the uprisings in Shaba. The riots that occurred in a number of Northern Nigerian states, particularly in Kano (1980), Bulumkutu (1982), and Jimeta Yola (1984), are noteworthy. The same riots caused fear in 1982 in other major Northern towns, such as Bauchi, Jos, Zaria, and Sokoto. The previous Northern Region headquarters, Kaduna, had skirmishes with the police as well. It was there that an Assistant Police Commissioner was slain after being taken prisoner by the rioters.

Mallam Muhammadu Marwa (Maitatsine) was widely recognised as a national of Cameroon. His moniker Maitatsine originated from his utterance in faltering Hausa, "Wanda bata yarda ba Allah ta Tchine," meaning "May Allah curse the one who disagrees with his version," which evolved into Mai Tachine and was then refined to Maitatsine. He resided in Nigeria for an extended period, originating from the First Republic. Throughout the years, he established himself as a distinguished Islamic scholar, earning recognition and respect from the community in which he resided.  He received respect from the populace of Kano State and was esteemed by the political leaders of subsequent administrations and regimes, from whom he benefited from preferential treatment. Due to the excessive reverence and esteem granted to him as an erudite Mallam and distinguished Islamic scholar, he garnered numerous adherents who not only placed their faith in his teachings but also regarded him as a genuine prophet, rendering his pronouncements sacred directives to his followers. The Maitatsine adherents purportedly seek the cleaning and purifying of Islam. They oppose mandatory prayer hours and the habit of orienting towards Mecca during prayer. They are reportedly opposed to materialism, including individual ownership of goods like as houses and even the possession of wristwatches. Muhammadu Marwa allegedly declared himself the authentic and sanctioned prophet. His disciples were barred from mentioning the name of Prophet Muhammad (SAW) whom they referred to as an Arab.

Muhammad Marwa professed to be a prophet, and his teachings were extremely unconventional. His supporters in Kano rose up in December 1980, sparking a near-civil conflict that left 4177 people dead, including Maitatsine. A fresh uprising occurred in October 1982 at Bulumkutu, which is located far to the east, 15 km from Maiduguri. 3,350 people lost their lives. In the village of Rigasa, which is close to Kaduna, fighting also started and soon extended to the city. Between 500 and 1,000 people died in a violent outburst that occurred in Yola, the capital of Gongola State, in March 1984. Over a hundred people were slain during a second uprising in Gombe, Bauchi State, in April of 1985. Typically, those who follow him are referred to as "Maitatsine"; the movement is also called Kalo Kato.

Ethnic Militias, Warlords, and Electoral Violence

The emergence of ethnic militias in Nigeria is a long-term phenomenon. It developed as a result of certain political conditions that the common people could no longer put up with. The nation has previously seen agitations for secession or various forms of ethnic militancy. The mid-1960s Agbekoya revolt in the Western region, the Tiv riots, Adaka Boro and his allies' attempt at independence in the Niger-Delta, and, of course, the fratricidal Biafran war of self-determination between 1967 and 1970 are just a few examples. 

In 1995, a group of Yoruba intellectuals led by Beko Ransome-Kuti, a human rights activist and fellow medical doctor, became the national treasurer of this militant socio-cultural Yoruba organisation. Fredrick Fasehun, a former presidential candidate on the platform of the defunct Social Democratic Party (SDP), founded the organisation.  The June 12 presidential elections' annulment, Yoruba unification, and the establishment of a "Oduduwa Republic" served as the main initial sources of opposition.

According to a different account, Tony Ngrube, an Ijaw, is credited with coming up with the idea for the OPC. He met with Fasehun and Ganiyu Adams, who is currently in charge of a more militant faction following a split, and pitched the idea to them, claiming that the Yoruba needed to organise a militant group to hold Abacha accountable for his harsh actions against them. Initially perceived as a spokesperson for Yorubas seeking self-determination in southwest Nigeria, the organisation included the Elders Council, the National Executive Council, which served as its think tank, and the Eso, or foot soldiers as they were known in the area. It also supposedly had a pseudo-guerrilla arm that had to be methodically dismantled because other geopolitical zones in the country were so keen to have the southwest field a presidential candidate for the 1999 elections that they eclipsed the original plan, which could have signalled a potential secession. A significant split in its operations happened in 1999 when renowned Esos member Ganiyu Adams declared he had kicked Fasehun out of the main group.  In response, Fasehun declared that Adams had been banished. Thus, there are currently two OPC groups. The group, which was founded by well-known Yoruba intellectuals from Nigeria, was originally intended to be an intellectual think tank. However, the army of unemployed, combat-ready Area Boys took control of it and are now using it as a platform to commit acts of violence across the Yoruba homeland. 

Fasehun, the original founder, had difficulties after accepting and honouring an invitation from retired General Obasanjo, the Peoples Democratic Party's (PDP) presidential candidate at the time.  He observed that by going, particularly in a boisterous and self-advertising style, Fasehun demonstrated a lack of political sagacity, since a leader of a powerful social movement should not be simply, readily, and publicly accessible. One probable explanation for Fasehun's meeting with Obasanjo is that, as a dissident member of the political elite and an economic player, he does not want the country to become embroiled in ethnic conflict. However, to the majority of his newfound constituency, the miscreants and miscasts, the outcasts and casual riff-raff on the outskirts of society, and those who are already down and out, this was a betrayal of the highest level in terms of spiritual dimension and political incorrectness.  With the embers of revolt ignited by other dissident members of the political elite with personal animosity towards Obasanjo and the entire political system, the falcon would no longer listen to the falconer, and Fasehun is now in risk of being recorded as a casualty of his own cause. It appears that what began as an ethnic movement has split along class lines. This may explain why, despite the Yoruba's vast intellectual, cultural, and political resources, a 30-year-old semi-literate furniture maker named Ganiyu Adams is now the leader of the most powerful social force accessible to them. Williams further pointed out that, in addition to ethnic grandstanding, the OPC is a social and political insurrection against a dormant Yoruba political elite.

The OPC grew increasingly militant in its actions beginning in 1999, following a split in its ranks. In fact, its focus progressively shifted towards vigilante services in the southwest. Since then, Nigerians in the southwest have been held prisoner by this organisation due to regular skirmishes with law enforcement and other ethnic groups in Lagos, a highly urbanised city.  Some of these clashes include the Ijaw-OPC clash, the OPC-port workers clash in Lagos, the kidnapping and subsequent murder of a senior police officer in Lagos, the attempted coronation of a Yoruba Oba in Ilorin, a contentious historico-political action, and the carnage in Ajegunle, a Lagos suburb populated by various ethnic groups with low income levels. By 2000, the Nigeria Police estimated that the OPC was responsible for 60% of the 200 violent conflicts reported countrywide since 1999.  Indeed, with the return of civilian control, the OPC became more visible, loud, and brutal in its operations. They did, in fact, take their call for a sovereign national meeting to the streets, where they engaged the police in violent clashes. Since 1999, 200 violent clashes have been registered countrywide. Indeed, with the return of civilian control, the OPC became more visible, loud, and brutal in its operations. They did, in fact, take their call for a sovereign national meeting to the streets, where they engaged the police in violent clashes.

Movement for the Actualisation of the Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB)

The Igbo-dominated regions of South Eastern Nigeria serve as the base of operations for this fictitious militant group. In 2000, 41-year-old Ralph Uwazurike, a professional lawyer and political science graduate from the University of Bombay, founded MASSOB, a purported civil rights organisation. Uwazurike lived in India for eleven years and served as the Nigerian Students Organization's president in Bombay at one point. In 1988, he went back to Nigeria.  Despite the organization's claims to be non-violent, there is a great chance that members may behave violently given Nigeria's unstable social and political climate. Its claim to being pacifist could be attributed to the civil war experience of the people of this area who engaged the federal government in a struggle of self-determination in the late 1960s. Since the Igbos are by far the largest scattered ethnic group in the nation, it's possible that this contributes to the ethnic group's repeated experiences of violence, whether it be political, religious, or cultural, even in cases where they are not directly involved in the disputes that arise.

To put it simply, the group must be structurally ready to use violence if necessary because the threat or use of violence is so obvious. The group however continues to assert that their fight is a fight for freedom, analogous to Nigeria's fight for independence. In essence, the organization's operations are supported financially by private donations received from both the local community and the diaspora. It's also noteworthy that MASSOB has effectively taken its fight global, which has unnerved the federal authorities. For the purpose of coordinating its operations internationally, the group has set up a "Biafra House" in Washington, DC, USA.  On May 22, 2000, the movement gained traction in Aba, Abia state, when the Biafra flag was symbolically raised, drawing the attention of the government, numerous Nigerians, and foreign onlookers. The organisation voiced their concerns in the declaration regarding the implementation of Shari'a in northern Nigeria as well as the extremely unsettling federal government's silence on the matter. It also expressed concern over the killing of over 5,000 people of Eastern Nigerian origin as a result of the fallout from the introduction of the Shari’a legal system, and noted that the Biafran war of 1967–70 was not necessarily a war of independence but a defensive mechanism to save and accommodate Eastern returnees who were being massacred in many parts of the country. To this group, it looks, and evidence abounds that the pre-conditions for the civil war of 1967 are being repeated. Interestingly, MASSOB asserts that it has prepared roughly twenty-five steps for the nonviolent, non-exodus actualisation of a new Biafra state and that there was never a moment in the history of the nation when the various ethnic groups debated creating a Nigerian state. 

The core causes of MASSOB's formation are the lengthy years of Igbo "marginalisation" from meaningful participation at the federal level and the federal government's disregard for infrastructural provision, particularly after the civil war ended. The government's reconciliation, reconstruction, and rehabilitation effort was regarded in some quarters as a complete failure, with the Igbos continuing to face discrimination in Nigerian politics, economics, and society.  Whatever reconciliation exists today was achieved over time, and not necessarily as a result of government action. However, numerous minority ethnic groups, notably those in the Niger Delta, have long complained of marginalisation. However, some Igbo would swiftly point out that they are the only group of people in Nigeria with a case of "abandoned property," as the Nigerian government proclaimed the Igbo's property outside of Igboland abandoned after Biafra surrendered to federal forces in 1970.  This means that such property cannot be returned to its rightful owners. However, some Igbo in Kano actually regained their property after the Nigerian Civil War. This was also the case in Ibadan.

Others will reference the story of an Igbo man, Gideon Akaluka, who was murdered by a Muslim mob in a federal prison in Kano in front of prison officials for allegedly desecrating the Koran as another example of Igbo persecution.  MASSOB therefore sees it as part of its goal to mobilise the Igbos to be aware of their plight and to be able to defend themselves against injustice in the near term while seeking a Biafran state in the long run through peaceful means. Despite its stance on nonviolence, the MASSOB leader, Uwazurike, was arrested on July 21, 2001, along with several of his aides by a Nigerian Army and police squad. He was released after ten days of interrogation in police custody in Abuja, and he swore that the war for Biafra would continue. More than 40 MASSOB members were once on trial for accused treason, which carried the death penalty. MASSOB accused the Obasanjo administration of dragging its feet on the OPC issue and using excessive force to persecute its members. MASSOB further observes that, rather than tackling the forces of disintegration endangering Nigeria's fragile democracy, the government is preoccupied with apprehending innocent and law-abiding former Eastern Nigerian members and civil rights activists.

The Bakassi Boys

The "Bakassi Boys" are another militant group in the eastern region of Nigeria. While they are primarily an efficient and successful vigilante group, there is a great chance that they will also be used for political and ethnic purposes.  In hindsight, the Bakassi Peninsula in the state of Cross River was the site of a territorial conflict between Nigeria and Cameroon, which is whence the name "Bakassi" originated. Nigeria has gathered troops in the oil-rich peninsula since hostilities with her southern neighbour erupted in the 1980s in order to quell the Cameroonian gendarmes' persistent stubbornness. With the tension this created, it didn't take long for the locals to start using the term "Bakassi" in everyday speech. Naturally, people began to link vigilante operations with the Bakassi Boys. 

However, the phenomena known as the Bakassi Boys initially surfaced in Aba, the state of Abia, a major trading hub, in response to the threat posed by ruthless armed robbers who not only stole traders' and citizens' hard-earned money and property, but also frequently murdered their victims. In 1999, the gang received formal support from the administration of Orji Uzo Kalu, the youthful governor of Abia state, who saw that the outfit was successful in containing the operations of criminals in his state. The gang effectively drove out offenders from Aba, the state capital, but robberies continued to rise like wildfire in the neighbouring Eastern commercial hubs of Onitsha and Owerri.  The "Bakassi Boys" were then invited by the beleaguered citizens of Onitsha to come to their aid. The gang has only operated in Igbo-populated areas, despite being associated with a traditional cult of the small Ogoni ethnic minority. The Nigeria Police had lost favour as the go-to law enforcement agency in the key southeast commercial hubs of Aba, Onitsha, and Owerri prior to this event. In addition to being perceived as being unable to handle the rising crime rate, the police force was also widely believed to be complicit. As a result of the police's incompetence, the Bakassi Boys emerged, primarily composed of young people who were unemployed, merchants, and uneducated or semiliterate. Armed with weapons and their favoured weapon, the machete, and claimed to deploy mystical skills in identifying robbers, the vigilantes normally operate with the cooperation of the local governors in the Igbo-dominated states of Abia, Anambra and Imo.  To act as a deterrence, bandits who have been apprehended and proven to be criminals typically have their heads and limbs severed, piled high, and burned fire in the open.

Militant Ethnicity in the Middle-Belt

The Tiv, Idoma, Jukun, Gwari, Igala, and Ebira are a few of the numerous minority ethnic groups that inhabit Nigeria's Middle Belt. This region is home to approximately 130 of the nation's estimated 250 ethnic groups. According to Bala Takaya, a Middle-Belt political leader (Orinya and Atabo, 2000:27), the cultural Middle-Belt includes the core central zone of Kogi, Nassarawa, Plateau, Benue, Kwara, the Federal Capital Territory Abuja, and the ethnic minorities of Bauchi, Gombe, Southern Borno, Southern Yobe, the entire Taraba, Adamawa, and Southern Kebbi stretching from Zuru in the south to Mubi in the east.  This categorisation is significant since it demonstrates that a single, unified North does not exist in reality. Politicians from the Middle Belt have recently complained about "internal colonialism" in the North and are currently devising political initiatives to secure some form of political autonomy for the region.

They, along with the ethnic minorities of the Niger Delta in the South, are frequently seen as the glue that holds the three major ethnic groups (Hausa, Fulani, Igbo, and Yoruba) together. As in other parts of the country, this area is plagued by inter-communal disputes, which have worsened since the smooth transition to civil rule in 1999, causing the federal government great concern. The terms "ethnic Tiv militia men" and "Jukun militia" have recently gained popularity. Though some communal conflicts have lasted more than ten years, such as the Tiv-Jukun conflict, the situation has now deteriorated to the point where federal security forces sent to separate the warring parties have become their common enemy. This was the case during the Tiv-Jukun community violence in October 2001.

The roots of the ongoing military battles between the Tivs and the Jukuns can be traced back to the colonial period, specifically the 1920s. The Tivs were traditionally an agrarian community and can still be found in Nigerian states such as Benue, Plateau, Nasarawa, and Taraba. On the other hand, the Jukun were primarily riverine people who relied on fishing for a living. They can currently be found in Plateau Nasarawa and Taraba states. As a result, there was no conflict of interest for a long time after the two groups met geographically around Wukari and Takum in what is now Taraba State. However, as the population grew and colonial power brought contemporary politics, where population size matters, the two ethnic groups' contradictions became more pronounced.  This was about more than just property ownership and use; it was also about local political authority. Furthermore, because the two ethnic groups are now more intertwined in the southern section of Taraba State, not even the establishment of more states and local administrations has been useful in reducing violence. It is important to remember that there is still a huge constitutional issue in Nigeria in terms of determining who is a citizen. The subject of who is a 'settler' and who is not, who is a state's indigene and non-indigene, and the consequences of this for access to political power at the local level is still hotly debated and remains a significant component of Nigeria's national dilemma.  This, like in the Tiv-Jukun dispute, is a key source of conflict that frequently necessitates the use of militias to defend what they regard to be ethnic turf.

The ethnic Tiv militia, which was dispatched on a peacekeeping mission to put an end to hostilities between the Tivs and the Jukuns over land, was blamed for the crisis in Benue state in October 2001. The group kidnapped 19. After the 19 troops were discovered dead in the village of Zaki-Biam, soldiers retaliated by killing at least 100 members of the Tiv ethnic group and setting their villages on fire—a reaction that was understandable given the circumstances. The soldiers' retaliatory attack on unarmed residents was primarily concentrated on nearby villages, including Vasae, Anyiin Iorja, Ugba, and Sankera, which are all situated in the two local government districts of Logo and Zaki-Biam.  Not even General Victor Malu (rtd.), the renowned commander of the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) and the former head of the Nigerian Army, his family house was spared. Unfortunately, this fury also claimed the lives of the village chief and his spouse. Benue's predicament was similar to what happened in Odi, Bayelsa state, Southern Nigeria, in November 1999, when soldiers destroyed the entire town and massacred numerous citizens in an attempt to exact revenge for the murder of 12 police officers by local armed groups. Before this specific occurrence, fighting had broken out in June 2001 in Nassarawa state between the Tivs and their primarily Hausa-speaking neighbours, resulting in at least 100 deaths and about 50,000 displaced people. In September 2001, there were also riots in Jos, the capital of Benue state, between Christian Tivs and Hausa Muslims due to a political appointment made by the state governor that did not sit well with the native Tivs. In addition to the militias, the Middle-Belt is home to a few pseudo-political groups that want to give the area its own identity. The Middle-Belt Forum, Middle-Belt Patriots (MBP), Middle-Belt Progressive Movement (MBPM), Middle-Belt Youths Association (MBYA), and Association of Middle-Belt Academics are a few of these. All of these groups seem to be working towards the same goal, which is to achieve the goal of the Middle-Belt political zone through nonviolent means by severing political relations with the core North.  The most extreme of the MBYA's crusades has been its outspoken criticism of the North's political subjugation of the Middle-Belt for its own self-serving purposes over the years, as well as the elite's collaboration with the North.

The Arewa Peoples Congress (APC)

After many meetings in Kaduna and Kano on December 4 and 5, this group was formally established on December 13, 1999. Sagir Mohammed, a former member of the Nigerian Army's Directorate of Military Intelligence, is the brains behind this group. When the All Progressives Congress (APC) was established in Kano with the express purpose of quelling the pan-Yoruba O'odua Peoples Congress's militancy and any potential challenges from other ethnic-based groups, he became a focal point. Mohammed was able to organise a group of Northern traditional leaders, retired senior military personnel, retired judges, retired solicitors, retired labour and student leaders, traders, farmers, and politicians to form a committee. It was decided to "carry out activities aimed at protecting and promoting the cultural, economic, and political interests of the northern states and their peoples", among other things, following the meetings hosted by these diverse interest groups. The 23 final resolutions of the APC include one which declares that the maintenance of Nigeria as “a corporate entity” with its current makeup is “not negotiable”. 

In actuality, the APC's motto is "to preserve the indivisibility of the country."

The Hausa and Fulani people are somewhat rivalled by the political minority Kanuri. In actuality, Borno was not included in the political and theological sphere of the Sultan of Sokoto since the British colonial government acknowledged this distinction. Finally, there are the non-Muslim groups, who have long opposed Islamization and Fulani overlordship. They are found in areas that are more susceptible to influences from the West and Christianity. Christianity has consistently functioned as a counter-ideology to fight the Hausa-Fulani northern elite's use of Islam to maintain pan-Northern unity. 

The APC warns that, despite maintaining that the major focus of its actions would be dialogue, it will, if necessary, employ force to defend Northerners wherever necessary in the nation since they feel they are capable of doing so. Even the defence of Shari'a in the North is considered a legitimate objective that may require immediate action in this balance of terror that is currently taking place in the Nigerian state.  However, in Kaduna and Kano, the Shari'a issue has already resulted in a notable level of bloodshed. Around 750 Nigerians, mostly Igbo Christians and other Southerners, are thought to have died in Kaduna after a riot broke out during a protest against the state's implementation of Shari'a.

This led to the burning of a mosque and a reprisal attack on Northern Muslims in Aba, the Igbo homeland. The federal government is still unsure about how to handle this politically contentious matter as of right now. Under Governor Ahmed Sani, the Shari'a legal system was initially improved and made state law in Zamfara state in January 2000. Since then, despite opposition from Christians and the Nigerian government, almost a dozen states in northern Nigeria have implemented either full or partial Islamic rule. Among other things, the law forbids prostitution, gambling, stealing, drunkenness, adultery, and public dancing. The issue lies in the fact that its use in the multicultural towns of the North, where individuals of various religions and nationalities reside, is troublesome in the sense that it could spark devouring confrontations. 

The Niger Delta Militias

Numerous historical and modern factors have contributed to the rise of ethnic militias in Nigeria's Niger Delta. The dynamics of minority politics in Nigeria, which are in some ways the logical result of the country's growing ethnic consciousness, are inextricably linked to the emergence of militias and proto-militia groups such as the Egbesu Boys of Africa, the Ijaw National Congress (INC), and the Movement for the Survival of Ogoni People (MOSOP), among many others.  Ethnic unions were formed in the 1950s and 1960s as a result of this awareness, and by the late 1990s, ethnic militias had also emerged. Minority anxieties of being marginalised by the main ethnic groups in each region were heightened by the 1954 constitution, which established a federal framework for the nation and granted residual powers to the regional administrations.  This bolstered the desire for the creation of states at that time. Not much was accomplished even after the Sir Henry Willinks committee of inquiry was established in 1958 with the mandate to gather information regarding minority worries throughout Nigeria and suggest strategies for easing them, regardless of how legitimate the fears were.

The Isaac Adaka Boro insurrection in Nigeria's riverine province in 1966 was the nation's first armed threat to the post-colonial state. Former police inspector Boro, a chemistry student, and the president of the University of Nigeria Students Union declared the Niger Delta Peoples' Republic to be an independent Ijaw nation. However, the force of a highly professionalised Nigerian military and the remaining power of the state were so great that the protagonists were quickly subdued and found guilty of treason. This served as a precursor to the resurgence of riverine nationalism, which was directed away from the state and towards what was thought to be Igbo overlordship in the Eastern area with the support of the federal government.  It was successful in keeping the country's eastern section segregated and likely broke the resistance of the Biafran people. Williams did point out that this tactic unlocked the door to ethnic mistrust, though. Very few people can truly claim that the Igbo political elite has a structured political philosophy and a messianic worldview for local imperialism, beyond the primarily peaceful pursuit of materialism and acquisitiveness. This is due in part to demographic pressure that forces Igbo people to relocate from their ancestral homeland and in part to a cultural legacy that values individual accomplishments, which makes the ordinary Igbo person extremely individualistic, hard-working, and gregarious. To this extent, the Igbo are resistant to being readily manipulated or coerced into supporting a group based only on identity in an attempt to achieve political hegemony of any kind. However, because they had been so severely demonised, this stayed, and the mainstream Igbo leadership was unable to come to any sort of understanding with its southern neighbouring minority. 

In the latter part of the 1950s, oil was first found in commercial quantities in the Ijaw town of Oloibiri in the state of Rivers, which is home to a minority population. Since then, the Niger Delta has contributed more than 85% of the federation's total crude oil production. The varied ethnic minority communities in the region have led the political agitation for the advancement and defence of the economic and ecological rights of the oil producing areas, having suffered at the hands of the nation's unfair revenue sharing and distributive politics.  In an environment of extreme poverty, the minority ethnic groups of the Niger Delta are currently engaged in conflict not just with the federal government but also with the multinational oil companies operating in the region and among themselves. Ironically, despite having abundant oil resources, this region suffers from extreme poverty and has the most basic social infrastructure. This could be the reason for the people's discontent, which borders on aggressiveness and desperation.  The actions of the different political and pseudo-militant groups in the Niger Delta pose arguably the biggest threat to the Nigerian state. It's astounding how many different political organisations and ethnic militias there are in the Niger Delta. These include the following: the National Youth Council of the Ogoni People (NYCOP), the Ethnic Minorities Organisation of Nigeria (EMIRON), the Movement for the Survival of the Itsekiri Ethnic Nationality (MOSIEN), the Urhobo Youth Movement (UYM), the Movement for the Reparation of Ogbia, the Movement of the Oroh People, the Elimotu Movement, the November 1895 Movement, Meinbutu, and a plethora of other organisations. There are countless items on the list. There is undoubtedly a serious issue here.

Under the Ijaw National Congress (INC), there are two militant groups operating in the Niger Delta: the Niger Delta Volunteer Force (NDVE) and the Egbesu Boys of Africa (EBA). Ijaw nationalism has gained strength locally and internationally in recent years, thanks to the influence of the younger and more militant Ijaw Youth Council (IYC).  Through affiliate groups including the IYC, EBA, INC, and NDVF, the Ijaw militants carry out their operations.

Like the Ogoni, who on August 26, 1990, drew up an Ogoni Bill of Rights, and who, exactly a year later, issued an Addendum, the Ijaws articulated the core of Ijaw nationalism in the Kaima Declaration of December 11, 1998.  On the mentioned day, representatives of more than forty Ijaw clans convened in Kaima, the hometown of their late secessionist hero, Adaka Boro, to discuss finding answers to issues related to what they referred to as “our present enslavement in the fraudulent contraption called Nigeria”.  The Kaima Declaration was the outcome. A portion of this Declaration stated that it no longer recognised any undemocratic laws that deprived "our communities of the right to ownership and control of our lives and resources, which were enacted without our participation and consent" and that "all land and natural resources (including mineral resources) within the Ijaw territory belong to Ijaw communities and are the basis of its survival." The Land Use Decree of 1976 and the Petroleum Tax Decree of 1969 are mentioned in these decrees. Therefore, the conference called for "all military forces of occupation and... stoppage of all oil companies' exploration and exploitation of gas and oil work in the Ijaw area" to be immediately removed from Ijaw land. It was only through the efforts of well-meaning Nigerians that the Declaration was limited to a statement of intent. Although action was halted, the proclamation has since caused the various Ijaw ethnic groups to intensify their violent attacks on Niger Delta oil operations.

As for the Egbesu Boys, it is thought that they take their spiritual and objective purpose from the cultural background of the name “Egbesu”. The organisation, which is currently present in numerous Ijaw-populated areas across the nation, including Lagos, is commanded by a man named Alex Preye. Since the middle of the 1990s, the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People's activities have been adequately documented. This Ogoni self-determination arm was able to vividly depict the issues facing not just the Ogonis but the entire Niger Delta, bringing the challenges to the attention of many Nigerians and the global audience. It developed into a very strong force opposing the Nigerian Nation-state concept and calling for a restructuring of the federation and the Nigerian state's methods of operation under the dynamic and capable leadership of the late Ken Saro-Wiwa. Because the Ogonis had never lost a war before the arrival of the British, the MOSOP case was one of historical pride.

The Ogoni Bill of Rights was draughted following extensive talks with various Ogoni social strata, relying on the archetypal inheritances of the people, demonstrating the enormous grassroots support for the Ogoni fight. The Bill sought compensation from the federal government for a number of reasons, including the extraction and exploitation of oil and the contamination of Ogoni territory. It argued that it was morally right and justifiable for the Ogoni to want control over their oil-rich land. The Movement's grassroots support gave MOSOP the confidence to take on Shell and the Nigerian government. In addition to a flag, MOSOP had a national anthem that encapsulated the goals of the Ogoni People.  There is no doubt that the seeds of revolution seeded by Ken Saro-Wiwa and his compatriots would one day grow into dramatic changes in the Niger Delta, despite MOSOP's tendency to retreat into itself since the legal murder of Saro-Wiwa and his kinsmen on November 10, 1995. One of the main characteristics of the unrest in the Niger Delta that is commonly ascribed to the different extremist factions is the abduction of local and foreign employees of multinational oil corporations. Usually, demands for ransom follow this. Sometimes, these organisations engage in repeated invasions and blockading of oil sites. At least a hundred communal disturbances affected Shell's operations and infrastructure in 1993, resulting in the loss of around 12 million barrels of crude oil.

Banditry and Kidnapping

The multifaceted issue plaguing Nigeria's north-central and north-west areas is a result of long-standing conflicts between ethnic and religious groups as well as criminal organisations and armed bandit attacks, which include kidnapping and highway robberies. The situation has gotten worse in recent years due to an upsurge in bandit attacks that have caused significant relocation in the area. Inter-communal violence in northern Nigeria, especially in the north-western states, has been increasing since 2011. Growing violence in farming and herding communities has been attributed to an increase in armed groups and gangs. Organised attacks involving cattle rustling, rape, looting, pillage, kidnapping, and murder are carried out by these armed organisations. Armed banditry claimed at least 4,900 lives between 2018 and 2020, and it also resulted in hundreds of thousands of internally displaced people (IDPs) in the northwest. For example, armed bandits raided several communities in Zamfara State between January 6 and 8, 2022, murdering over 200 people and uprooting 10,000 more. These and other incidents have taken many lives and seriously damaged the economy.

Armed bandits are not just found in Nigeria's north-west; they are also heavily represented in the north-central areas of the nation. In 2021, there were over 1,000 documented occurrences of kidnapping for ransom. In March 2022, a train travelling from the Federal Capital Territory (FCT), Abuja, to Kaduna was ambushed by armed bandits operating in the state's northwest. Eight people lost their lives in the train attack on the Abuja-Kaduna route, while numerous more were taken hostage.  The majority of the North American states, particularly those in the northwest, have been living in constant fear as a result of these and other incidents, such as bandit attacks against airports and military bases, which have exposed the increasing complexity of these groups and their capacity for lethal operations. Without considering the factors that have led to climate change, migration brought on by the environment, disputes between indigenous people and settlers, disputed land and grazing rights, competition for control of discovered gold and other resources, poorly governed areas with little administrative presence, and the politicisation of the conflict, this crisis trend cannot be fully understood. These factors have combined to create a deadly crisis that threatens national security. 

The most pressing national security issue facing Nigeria today is armed banditry, which is typified by rape, cattle rustling, kidnapping, murder, and armed robbery.  Here, Katsina, Sokoto, Kaduna, and Zamfara states in the northwest are the most severely impacted by the actions of armed bandits. Furthermore, there is a growing collaboration between armed robbers and Islamist terrorist organisations like Boko Haram when it comes to recruiting, training, logistics, ammunition, and assaults on susceptible areas. The area's uncontrolled areas provide information about some of these assaults, emphasising how susceptible the general public is to kidnapping and ransom demands. Furthermore, it is challenging for security personnel to respond to locals' distress cries in the bandits' ungoverned enclaves. Massive forests like Kunduma, Falgore, Subudu, Kamara, Kiyanbana, and Kamuk woodlands conceal the armed bandits from state security interventions, making it take several hours for the state to react. In addition to uncontrolled areas, relative impoverishment is a major factor contributing to armed banditry in the northwest.

Although the precise number of armed bandits in the northwest is impossible to pinpoint, it is believed that approximately 30,000 bandits are connected to several gangs that operate in the area and have anywhere from a few to over a thousand combatants. The extent of bandit violence in northern Nigeria is indicative of the failure of both community- and state-led efforts to alleviate the disproportionate destruction inflicted upon women and children as well as the population as a whole. Because of their multifaceted goals and decentralised organisational structure, it is challenging to engage with armed bandits and resolve the situation through dialogue. There is also minimal to no coordination between the many groups that they belong to. The bandits behave similarly to flies in that they prey on weak targets and can quickly hide in woods and settlements. As a result, it is difficult for security agencies to deal with them effectively without endangering human rights and the environment. 

There is a growing body of literature on armed banditry, most of which focusses on historical accounts of cattle rustling and gold mining in Nigeria's north-west and other places. Cattle theft by criminal syndicates, as well as non-state actors' illicit extraction and competition for natural resources such as gold, create a climate conducive to armed banditry. Furthermore, various scholarly studies have addressed the issue, with arguments centred on Fulani pastoralists as key actors in armed banditry. This essay departs from prior narratives by investigating the diverse range of actors involved in armed banditry in this region. Against this backdrop, the article investigates the forces of terror, focussing on the distance and immediate causes, visible and invisible actors in the multifaceted threat of armed banditry, and the ramifications for peace and security in northwestern Nigeria. It employs secondary data sources and conducts qualitative analyses. As a result, the following sections of this paper will cover conceptual clarity, distance, and immediate causes of armed banditry, as well as enablers of crises in the northwest. The article then discusses the security implications of armed banditry before concluding.

Conclusion

The historical trajectory of Nigeria’s national security challenges reveals a nuanced interrelations of political instability, ethnic and religious tensions, socio-economic disparities, and weak governance structures. From the military coups of 1966/67 to the ongoing crises of terrorism, banditry, and corruption, Nigeria's security environment has been shaped by a mosaic of pressures that reflect the broader struggles of a post-colonial African state navigating the challenges of nation-building. The military coups of the 1960s, especially the events leading to the Nigerian Civil War, underscore the fragility of Nigeria’s post-independence political order. The failure of political elites to manage ethnic diversity and distribute power equitably led to violent confrontations and deepened divisions among Nigeria’s major ethnic groups—the Hausa-Fulani, Igbo, and Yoruba. These early fissures not only resulted in the devastation of the Civil War but also laid the groundwork for future ethnic tensions that continue to threaten national cohesion. Even today, the ghosts of Biafra persist in the form of separatist agitations, highlighting the need for inclusive governance that addresses the grievances of marginalized groups.

The Maitatsine riots of the 1980s marked the rise of radical religious insurgencies in Nigeria, setting a precedent for future groups like Boko Haram. These uprisings exposed the socio-economic roots of insecurity, as the followers of Maitatsine were largely disenfranchised youth, alienated by the state and susceptible to extremist ideologies. The Nigerian government’s failure to address the underlying issues of poverty, unemployment, and poor governance during this period created a breeding ground for future instability. The Maitatsine crisis demonstrated that security threats in Nigeria are not just military problems but also deeply linked to economic and social inequalities.

Ethnic militias, warlords, and electoral violence have further destabilized the political landscape. The rise of militias, often tied to ethnic or regional interests, reflects the inability of the state to mediate conflicts and foster a sense of national unity. Electoral violence, which has become a recurring feature of Nigerian politics, points to the dysfunctionality of democratic processes, where political elites manipulate ethnic and religious identities to secure power. The inability to conduct peaceful elections undermines public confidence in the state and perpetuates cycles of violence and instability. Militancy in the Niger Delta presents a distinct but related security threat rooted in resource control and environmental degradation. The region’s grievances are tied to the exploitation of oil resources by multinational corporations, with little benefit accruing to the local population. The state’s initial military response to the militancy exacerbated tensions, but the 2009 amnesty program provided temporary relief. However, without addressing the environmental and economic marginalization of the region, militancy remains a potential flashpoint.

The rise of terrorism, particularly Boko Haram, is arguably the most significant threat to Nigeria’s national security in recent years. Boko Haram’s insurgency, driven by religious extremism and socio-political alienation, has ravaged the Northeast and posed a challenge not just to the Nigerian state but to the entire Lake Chad Basin. The group’s ability to exploit weak state institutions, porous borders, and local grievances underscores the multifaceted nature of security threats in Nigeria. Banditry and kidnapping, especially in the North-West and North-Central regions, have further complicated Nigeria’s security landscape. These criminal activities, driven by a combination of economic desperation, weak law enforcement, and local conflicts over resources, have overwhelmed the capacity of security agencies and exposed the state's vulnerability.

Finally, corruption remains a central impediment to Nigeria’s national security. The embezzlement of funds meant for military and police operations has weakened the state’s capacity to respond to security challenges. Corruption permeates all levels of government and security agencies, creating a culture of impunity that undermines public trust in the state's ability to protect its citizens. Until corruption is addressed, Nigeria’s security apparatus will continue to be compromised, leaving the country vulnerable to both internal and external threats. Nigeria’s national security challenges are deeply rooted in its historical trajectory of political instability, ethnic divisions, economic disparities, and governance failures. While military responses are necessary, they are not sufficient to address the country’s security challenges. Sustainable solutions require comprehensive reforms that address the underlying socio-economic drivers of insecurity, promote inclusive governance, and strengthen the rule of law. Only through such holistic measures can Nigeria hope to achieve lasting peace and security.

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