Comprehending Audience Motivations and Gratifications for Sharing Disinformation on Social Media in North West Nigeria

Cite this article as: Salihu M. (2025). Comprehending Audience Motivations and Gratifications for Sharing Disinformation on Social Media in North West Nigeria. Zamfara International Journal of Humanities,3(3), 80-96. www.doi.org/10.36349/zamijoh.2025.v03i03.010

COMPREHENDING AUDIENCE MOTIVATIONS AND GRATIFICATIONS FOR SHARING DISINFORMATION ON SOCIAL MEDIA IN NORTH WEST NIGERIA

Murtala Salihu

Department of Mass Communication
Zamfara State University Talata Mafara

Abstract: This study was anchored on three objectives: (i) to examine how social media users succeed in disseminating disinformation in North West Nigeria; (ii) to evaluate the motivations of spreading disinformation by the social media users in North West Nigeria; and (iii) to ascertain the gratifications derived by the social media users from spreading disinformation in North West Nigeria. To this end, a qualitative methodology was employed to collect data through focus group discussions (FGD). The sample was purposively chosen from professional journalists located in Sokoto, Kebbi and Zamfara states. A total of 18 participants engaged in the discussion, organized into three groups of 6 professional journalists from each state. Each group consisted of 3 representatives from print media and 3 from broadcast media houses. Findings of this study uncovered some reasons why disinformation has become a present day phenomenon in North West Nigeria. Politics is one of the major reasons because politicians have misused social media to promote political agenda by hiring youths to defame the opposition party or to gain popularity from the voters. Sadly, many of these energetic youths often lack the proper education or maturity necessary to critically evaluate information and consider it thoughtfully before sharing it with others. As such, this study recommends for awareness campaigns through workshops and conferences that promote responsible social media usage. These campaigns should emphasize the importance of verifying information before sharing and the potential consequences of spreading disinformation.

Keywords: Fake news, Disinformation, Social media, Motivations, Gratifications

Introduction

Over the years, social media has made people more connected than ever because of the speed at which information travels. Hence, the world has turned in to a global village as predicted by Marshal Mcluhan in 1960s, that whatever happens even in the farthest part of the world becomes known to all everywhere and at the same time regardless of geographical boundaries. This new information age has certainly “created a virtual surrounding with loads of information, a large part of which is reliable with the more significant chunk unverifiable. Thus, discerning truth from hear-say has become an enormous task” (Wilson & Umar, 2019. P.2). Certainly, Lies and spreading of false information are as old as human existence in the world, but have never been possible to be spread so easily in the past than presently through social media platforms.

This has given rise to the proliferation of disinformation circulation via different social media platforms, which many countries of the world are now battling to contain. Although social media platforms do not originate content per se, yet this study believes that they play a significant role in creating, transmitting and amplifying such contents generated by others. Corroborating this viewpoint, The UK Parliament (2018) posits that the proliferation of disinformation is not a recent occurrence; nonetheless the advent of the online environment has facilitated its exponential growth in terms of scope, quantity and dissemination.

In Nigeria, disinformation sharing is not a new phenomenon. In 2002, there was a rapid dissemination of a false story in North West Nigeria, alleging that the administration of polio vaccine was linked to infertility and was a component of a larger scheme adopted by the western world aimed at reducing the population of the Muslims in the area. Due to that reportage, a significant number of individuals and prominent figures were persuaded by the falsehood, leading them to participate in the boycott of the polio vaccine initiative. Ozohu-Suleiman (2014) affirmed that the governments of Zamfara, Kaduna, Bauchi, Kano and Niger states abruptly suspended the polio immunisation programmes in their respective states. Consequently, there was a notable increase in the incidence of polio cases in those states.

In 2017, a grand moment of confusion ensued in Nigeria emanating from a disinformation circulation that President Muhammadu Buhari had died during his medical check in London and that he had been replaced by a clone, Jubril from Sudan. According to Okoro and Emmanuel (2019), the President was actually ill but taken to the United Kingdom using sloppy and clandestine arrangements that caused widespread concerns among Nigerians. This situation encouraged people to peddle his rumoured death in social media because there were insufficient facts from the presidential aides as to whether the president was alive or dead. As such, the “supposed death of President Muhammadu Buhari in contrast spread like wildfire on Twitter, Facebook and WhatsApp, so much so that he had to address the claim at a news conference” (Wisdom, Aduke & Adekunle, 2019. p. 5). But sadly, even after severally refuting such false stories, their circulation still prevail in the internet for a very long time.

Similarly, in the year 2019, a video clip emerged on social media showing how Hausa farmers from the Northern Nigeria were treating their beans with pesticide before being transported to the South Eastern part of the country. The aim was to preserve the produce from pests such as weevils before embarking on a long journey to the South. However, interpretations from mischief-makers in the social media claimed that the farmers were sprinkling poison, not pesticide in order to kill innocent Igbos after consuming the beans. According to Hassan and Hitchen (2020), any typical person who does not care to make enquiries or even verify the news would believe this version of the story and share it with others who are also likely to believe it and this can escalate clashes between Hausas and Igbos.

The recent unrest in Kaduna metropolis and Kasuwan Magani as narrated by Ibrahim and Garba (2019) was largely caused by disinformation. Following rumours circulated on social media that the abducted Chief of Agara in Kaduna South had been assassinated. As such, 22 people were killed in reprisal between Muslims and Christians within some hours after circulating the story. The story circulated was that the then Governor El-Rufa'i of Kaduna state summoned the chief to a meeting and told him that his chiefdom would be converted to an emirate (a Muslims chieftaincy title). When the chief objected to this decision, the governor pledged to deal with him. Afterwards, the governor was suspected of arranging the abduction of the chief while he was returning to Kachia. This was what sparked the crises, which in the end was found to be false.

Elsewhere in Sokoto state, the killing of Deborah Samuel, a Christian student in the Northern Nigerian city of Sokoto on Thursday 12/05/2022 for alleged blasphemy led to the proliferation of disinformation. Soon after the incidence, a war of words erupted on Twitter and Facebook between some Muslims and Christians in the country, with each side accusing the other of intolerance and extremism. Two days after the killing, a peaceful protest in Sokoto turned violent, with demands for the release of the suspected killers of Ms Samuel. Numerous fabricated images, videos, and posts have been disseminated by social media users with the intent to provoke violence and exacerbate divisions within the nation. Many of those fake stories were accompanied by comments and hate speeches on the needs to divide Nigeria between the predominantly Muslims’ north and Christians’ south. The likelihood for this sort of interethnic discord driven in part by disinformation, varies on a state-by-state or community-by community basis with a view to intensifying the long existing regional and religious crisis in the country.

Away from security and inter-tribal conflicts matters, another disinformation on social media emerged recently which accused the Zamfara state Governor, Dauda Lawal of spending 400 Million Naira for the furniture in his house barely six months after assumption of office as the governor. The news this time around originated from a popular online news website, Sahara Reporters, which commands huge readership and followership in the country. However, the governor's spokesperson, Sulaiman Bala Idris stated that mischief-makers concocted the report in order to distract the state administration. This story is worrisome considering the fact that it emanated from a well-known online news website, Sahara Reporters that specializes in investigative reporting and breaking news stories in Nigeria. While breaking news sounds like a good idea, yet, the implication is that Sahara Reporters sometimes sacrifice accuracy and authenticity of a news story in achieving quick reporting (Salihu, 2016).

The list of disinformation being in circulation on social media in North West Nigeria is endless as different occurrences keep emerging. Certainly, the purveyors of previously mentioned examples of disinformation are doing so because of some reasons and motivations. Thus, due to the grievous implications of disinformation circulation in Nigeria, the Federal Government has since launched campaign against fake news and hate speeches as championed by the then Minster of Information and Culture, Alhaji Lai Mohammed. The essence of the campaign as buttressed by Afemfuna, Macben, Akeem and Daniel (2019) is to raise awareness among all Nigerians regarding the threats that fake news poses to the peace, security and overall unity of Nigeria. Furthermore, the bill emphasises that every Nigerian has a responsibility to play in combating the proliferation of false information on social media.

The foregoing discussions provided concrete evidences about proliferation of disinformation on social media in North West Nigerian context. Therefore, in order to mitigate the spread of disinformation and fake news in general, it is imperative to acquire an understanding of their creation and dissemination processes, as well as the underlying motivations and gratifications associated with their circulation. This is because, disinformation cannot be stopped unless we understand how and why it is created and disseminated. To this end, understanding the factors that motivate people to spread disinformation and the subsequent gratifications derived by the purveyors from its circulation on social media in North West Nigeria; serves as a reason for the conduct of this study.

Statement of the problem

Despite the positive contributions of social media towards information dissemination, the worry of this study stemmed from the negative roles of social media platforms in Nigeria through dissemination of disinformation. This has resulted in to aggravating farmers/herders clashes, religious intolerance, communal clashes (Okworie, 2020), social unrest (Edwin & Yalmi, 2019; Okoro et al. 2018), electoral offences, hate speeches, violence (Ojebode, 2018) and recently invasion in to privacy of the people (Salihu & Gusau, 2021).

While providing a platform for people to broadcast anything, social media is gradually eroding the traditional gatekeeping and norm-preserving role of conventional media. Nowadays, the media gates that were previously manned by professionals have been replaced with a public space without guards (Okoro & Emmanuel, 2019). This situation necessitates the emergence of what European Parliament (2021) refers to as more severe ‘digital violence’ which means the use of mobile phones, computers, video cameras, and other electronic devices with the intent to intimidate, insult, humiliate, or otherwise harm another person. In recent years, there has been a noticeable increase in the sharing of disinformation among social media users in Sokoto, Kebbi and Zamfara state. This trend mirrors a global phenomenon where individuals, particularly young adults, are frequently exposed to and often share disinformation on social media. A study by Guess, Nyhan, and Reifler (2019) found that younger adults are particularly susceptible to sharing disinformation due to their high social media engagement and lower levels of media literacy.

The implications of disinformation sharing are multifaceted and profound. At the societal level, the spread can exacerbate social divisions, fuel conflicts, and undermine public trust in legitimate news sources. In order to address these numerous problems of disinformation, this study sets out to specifically focus on Sokoto, Kebbi and Zamfara states in North West Nigeria to provide another view of understanding what motivate individuals to disseminate disinformation on social media. This is with the hope that it bridges the gap of the limited literature on disinformation sharing habits and motivations in Nigerian context.

Objectives of the study

The objectives of this study are stated hereunder:

        i.            To examine how social media users succeed in disseminating disinformation in North West Nigeria.

      ii.            To evaluate the motivations of spreading disinformation by the social media users in North West Nigeria.

   iii.            To ascertain the gratifications derived by the social media users from spreading disinformation in North West Nigeria.

Literature review

Conceptual dilemma in defining fake news

Being it as a new emerging field of research study, fake news proliferates with different definitions. However, scholars have attempted to define the concept by taking in to cognisance of its purpose and formulation as well as it is relative circulation mostly on social media platforms. To this end, after carefully examining many literatures on fake news, this study notices a clear picture of conceptual dilemma due to different terms used by academics, journalists and policymakers to describe various aspects of fake news phenomenon.

For instance, Duffy, Tandoc and Ling (2019) described it as concocted information, Egelhofer and Lecheler (2019) pseudojournalistic disinformation, Gelfert (2018) misleading claims, Glenski, Weninger and Volkova, (2018) deceptive news, McGonale (2017) fabricated information, Ilahi (2019) hoax news, Chakraborty (2017) Clickbait, Afemfuna et al (2018) sensational news stories, Alcott and Gentzkow (2017) misleading news articles, Collins Dictionary (2017) false information, Lewandowsky (2021) disinformation, Jerit and Zhao (2020) misinformation, European Parliament (2021) propaganda, Tolosana (2020) deepfakes, Okoro and Emmanuel (2019) manufactured deceitful information, Kovic (2018) non-journalistic material, and Chang, Mukherjee and Coppel, (2021) questionable content. The foregoing provides an insight in to how the definition of fake news was contested among journalists, scholars and policy makers.

Therefore, in order to mitigate this fragmentation and comprehend various intricacies of the fake news phenomenon, some “scholars now discourage the use of fake news, [and] that may be one of the reasons for the decline in the use of the concept. In 2019 for instance, about 2,700 articles published on Goggle Scholar used fake news in their titles but the number dropped to 1,860 as at Nov. 2021, while the use of misinformation in titles rises from 514 in 2019 to 1,150 as of Nov. 2021” (Nasidi, 2021, P.6). Furthermore, there is also a growing consensus among various stakeholders to eschew the usage of the phrase 'fake news' and instead adopt the term 'disinformation' to characterize what is commonly recognised as the deliberate production and dissemination of false or misleading information with the purpose to inflict harm on others or for financial gains (European Parliament, 2019).

In a similar vein, the UK Parliament Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee of the House of Commons recommended to the British government that it refrains from using the term "fake news," and instead put forward an agreed definition of the words "misinformation" and "disinformation". According to the committee, “the term ‘fake news’ is bandied around with no clear idea of what it means or agreed definition. The term has taken on a variety of meanings, including a description of any statement that is not liked or agreed with by the reader”. (UK parliament Digital, Culture, Media, and Sport Committee 2018, p.2). This recommendation was contained in the committee’s fifth Special Report on disinformation and fake news to the British Government covering a session of 2017-2019.

Congruent with the position of UK Parliament, in a special report on fake news and disinformation by the independent High-Level Group of Experts (HLEG) established by the European Commission, the term “fake news was deliberately avoided because it cannot adequately capture the complexity of disinformation in the modern society” (Okoro & Emmanuel 2019, p. 8). HLEG therefore conceives fake news as a form of disinformation which includes “false, inaccurate, or misleading information designed, presented and promoted to intentionally cause public harm or for profit” (EU 2018, 11). In this definition, HELEG very slightly used fake news almost synonymous with disinformation.

Reiterating this viewpoint, other authors like Wardle and Derakhshan (2017), in one of the most influential texts on disinformation, rejected the use of “fake news” for two reasons. First, because this term is inadequate to describe the complex phenomenon of “information pollution” and second, because politicians and other powerful actors around the world have since found solace in characterizing any media coverage they do not like as fake news. To this end, Wardle (2017) emphasised the role of intention in defining fake news by positioning it within the larger context of misinformation and disinformation.

Therefore, in an attempt to resolve this conceptual dilemma, Scholars like Ireton and Posetti (2019), Nasidi 2021, Ohaja and Okujeni (2022), Pate, Gambo and Ibrahim (2019), Shu, Wang, Lee, and Liu, (2020) offered three distinct categories of fake news typology that comprise disinformation, misinformation, and mal-information. Disinformation refers to intentionally fabricated information with the purpose of causing harm to individuals, social groups, organisations, or countries. Misinformation, on the other hand, encompasses false information that is not intended to cause harm. Lastly, malinformation refers to factually accurate information that is strategically employed to inflict harm upon individuals, social groups, organisations, or countries.

Wardle, (2018) as cited by Nasidi (2021, p. 9) defined disinformation “as false information that is deliberately created or disseminated with the express purpose to cause harm. Producers of disinformation typically have political, financial, psychological, or social motivations”. Nasidi further avers that disinformation refers to the deliberate dissemination of false or misleading information with the intention to hurt people physically or mentally. It is a common practice for governments to provide misleading information to both its population in order to further national interests or partisan political agendas.

From the afore-mentioned definitions, the basic deducible features in defining disinformation by scholars are the fallaciousness of information and the deliberate intention to mislead the audience. Building on these previous definitions, this study concludes that disinformation is intentional generation and dissemination of fabricated information in order to deceive and mislead recipients, with potential motivations including inflicting harm, pursuing political objectives, or attaining personal or financial benefits. More so, disinformation occasionally is presented in a form of textual, graphical or visual contents by adopting journalistic modes of presentation which is expected to be regarded as the truth. Therefore, this study use the term disinformation to designate fake news contents published deliberately with evil motive in order to cause harm.

Empirical review

Ohaja and Okujeni (2022) conducted a study entitled ‘Disinformation, ethics and reality: Appraisal of the duties and functions of press secretaries in Nigeria’. The objective of the research was to ascertain whether press secretaries in Nigeria comply with ethical stipulations, specifically with regard to the dissemination of truth as opposed to disinformation. The authors utilised a survey design by employing a purposive sampling technique to select 187 lecturers from five universities in Abuja and its surrounding areas. The primary data collection instrument utilised in their research was a questionnaire. The results indicated among other things that majority of the respondents believe press secretaries engage in disinformation and prioritise the economic benefit of their principals over the public interest. The study suggests that the Nigeria Union of Journalists (NUJ) and Nigeria Institute of Public Relations (NIPR) should regularly conduct training sessions to remind their members of their job responsibilities and ethical standards. The study also recommends that members who work as press secretaries and violate these standards should be penalised instead of being rewarded for hobnobbing with those in the corridors of power.

The European Parliament conducted another investigation in 2021 regarding the impact of disinformation on democratic processes and human rights in the world. The report examines strategies for the European Union (EU) to enhance its capacity in addressing global disinformation while safeguarding human rights. The study focuses specifically on recent and ongoing EU initiatives to address disinformation in third world countries. The research technique involved doing a thorough evaluation of current literature on disinformation, human rights, and democracy. The review was based on four categories of sources: official documents, communication from stakeholders, scholarly literature, and press articles. The study found that diverse levels of response are required to effectively combat disinformation which include corporate commitments, formal legal measures and regulations, and civil society action. Similarly, the study found that the legislative and executive branches in numerous nations have taken action to regulate the dissemination of disinformation. The study presents recommendations on how the European Union can harmonise its global human rights and democracy policies with counter-disinformation efforts.

Okoro and Emmanuel (2019) conducted another study entitled “Beyond misinformation: Survival alternatives for Nigerian media in the “post-truth” era”. To achieve this, the study investigated the perceptions of journalists and media users in Nigeria regarding the post-truth era and explores strategies to enhance the democratic function of media in a time when the public is increasingly rising against facts and truth. The study utilised a qualitative research methodology, employing data-source triangulation to enhance the comprehension of the investigation. The data collection process involved conducting interviews and making direct observations. Additionally, secondary data was obtained from relevant literature, reports, and periodicals. Based on the foregoing, 20 people were purposefully selected and interviewed, with 10 from the media practitioners and the remaining 10 from media audience communities. University lecturers and students dominated media user samples. Finding of their study reveal that the exponential growth of online information platforms has exacerbated the prevalence and impact of misinformation, as its dissemination is now more rapid and extensive. The study suggests that it is the duty of Nigerian media and professional journalists to combat this hydra-headed phenomenon that is progressively eroding information structures. The media's struggle against misinformation is not only crucial for the advancement of democracy, but also for its own survival.

Furthermore, scholars like Apuke, Omar, Tunca and Gever (2022) in another separate study employed a modeling approach to analyze the factors that promote the spread of false information among individuals who use social media platforms by specifically focusing on users from Nigeria. The authors employed a descriptive survey research methodology to identify the elements linked to the dissemination of fake news among social media users in Nigeria. An online survey using Survey Monkey was utilised to gather data from participants. The data was retrieved over the period from October 2021 to December 2021. The data was collected from 385 social media users who were 18 years old or older by utilising the respondents-driven sampling (RDS) chain referrals technique.

According to the findings of the study, it appears that Nigerian social media users obtain information from their peers and families, which contribute to the spread of misinformation. Furthermore, the intensity of social media usage was identified as the second most reliable predictor of false information dissemination. This implies that increased reliance on and utilisation of social media platforms are linked to the dissemination of fake news. In order to combat misinformation dissemination, the authors suggested that individuals who regularly access news through social media platforms ought to exercise greater caution regarding the content they seek and disseminate, given that these platforms have become fertile ground for various types of misinformation.

Theoretical framework

This study was anchored on Uses and Gratification Theory (UGT). The theory was propounded by Elihu Katz, Jay Blumler and Michael Gurevitch in the year 1970s. The major assumption of this theory is that individuals utilise media in order to derive personal gratifications and fulfill their needs. As noted by Rossi (2002), the UGT assumes that the audience is an active participant who proactively pursues particular media and content in order to attain specific gratifications that fulfill their individual needs. In other words, the theory holds the views that audience members are not passive recipients of media messages, akin to empty vessels waiting to be filled with meaningless information. On the contrary, the audience possesses significant influence in their choices, reception, interpretation, and integration of media messages into their personal lives.

Today, the emergence of the internet and its subsequent integration with social media platforms has expanded the scope and applicability of the uses and gratifications theory. Given the proliferation of media platforms and content offered by both traditional and new media, this theory is regarded as one of the most suitable for examining the factors influencing audience preferences regarding exposure to diverse media channels. Specifically, what causes individuals to have a preference for certain media content while having a negative inclination towards others? The theory places emphasis on the choices of audiences in determining which media they prefer over others by taking into consideration the diverse pleasures derived from the media that cater for their specific social and psychological needs (Severin & Tankard, 1997).

Scholars such as Asemah, Nwammuo, and Nkwam-Uwaoma, (2022) support adoption of UGT- for evolving studies because it offers an analytical framework that elucidates the motivations behind consumer engagement with media. Hence, this theory has application across diverse research domains, particularly in studies pertaining to media utilisation and adoption. For instance, it can be employed to examine the uses and gratifications of social media among young individuals. Therefore, the proliferation of disinformation on social media has consequently prompted an expanding collection of researches like this one that employs Uses and Gratification Theory.

Research methodology

In this study, qualitative research method was used to generate data using focus group discussion (FGD). Focus group discussion method is applauded and widely used in recent times mainly because it offers the opportunity to interview several respondents systematically and simultaneously (Babbie, 2011). It also provides information about a range of ideas and feelings that individuals have on certain issues, as well as illuminating the differences in perspectives between groups of individuals (Rabiee, 2004).

Normally, focus groups consist of six to ten persons who, with the guidance of a moderator take part in a question-and-answer sessions. However, Krueger (1994) recommends that a focus group should consist of not more than seven participants when the issue at hand is complex. By adhering to Krueger’s recommendation, the sample of this study was purposively selected from professional journalists in Sokoto, Kebbi and Zamfara states. The rationale behind basing this sample selection on professional journalists in these states is because of their presumed familiarity with the proliferation of disinformation through social media. Furthermore, as experts in media, they may possess a deep understanding of ethical principles and are adept at proposing some strategies to curtail the spreading it, given the potential threat disinformation poses to the national unity of Nigeria.

To this end, a total of 18 participants engaged in the discussion, organized into three groups of 6 professional journalists from each state. Each group consisted of 3 representatives from print media and 3 from broadcast media houses. In qualitative studies, there is a lack of scientifically proven guidelines for determining sample size. Scholars such as Patton (1987, p. 184) maintains that “there are no rules for sample size in qualitative inquiry. Sample size depends on what you want to know, the purpose of the inquiry, what’s at stake, what will be useful, what will have credibility, and what can be done with available time and resources”. Thus, the credibility, significance, and knowledge derived from qualitative research are mostly influenced by the depth of information included within the chosen case study as well as the observational and analytical skills of the researcher, rather than the size of the sample (Patton, 1990).

Altogether, the FGD took place face to face using 3 sessions with the participants in the capital cities of Sokoto, (Sokoto state), Birnin Kebbi, (Kebbi state) and Gusau, (Zamfara state). The FGD took place in 3 days. 1 day session in each state between 5th -7th August 2024. Discussions lasted for 3 hours 30 minutes, 1 hour 10 minutes in each state and covered the following general topics: social media use habit, the prevalence of disinformation on social media, factors that motivate people to share disinformation in their respective states, gratification obtained from sharing disinformation and possible solutions to existing problems of sharing disinformation.

During the conduct of FGD sessions, recordings were done using digital tape recorder. Afterwards, the recordings were transcribed and coded in different themes according to responses obtained from each respondent. The transcription provided a way to examine similar perceptions and themes that are relative to each respondent. On the other hand, the analysis of the data was conducted at two distinct levels. The first stage of analysis involves examining the data at a manifest level. This is providing a descriptive account of the data, without making any interpretations or assumptions about it. The focus is solely on what was explicitly stated, documented, or witnessed (Hancock, Ockleford, & Windridge, 2007, p. 24). The second level of analysis pertains to the latent level which involves an examination of the conceived meaning, interpretations and implications of the response.

Data presentation and analysis

a.      How social media users succeed in disseminating disinformation

The results of this study indicates that all of the respondents nowadays frequently visit social media to obtain information especially Facebook, WhatsApp, Twitter (X) and YouTube. Similarly, all the respondents acknowledged encountering disinformation on social media platforms. They also expressed a consensus that social media is not a credible source of information and as such, they accused it as being an agent of disseminating disinformation. Below are the views of the respondents:

The rise of social media increased the proliferation of disinformation, particularly because the internet has empowered the citizens. Now, virtually everyone is a journalist due to ownership of smart phones and internet connectivity. People visit the internet to post whatever that comes their way without any restriction (Respondent 8).

In addition, the respondents think that disinformation is disseminated with a view to discrediting a certain person, a group of people or harming the image of an institution.

Because some social media users hate a person, his tribe, religion, political party or business, people will just go in the social media especially Facebook to create all sort of lies against him or her. This is too bad. All this happened because no one gate-keeps what is posted on social media. This is unlike in conventional media where there are line of editors who verify the authenticity of the story before publishing (Respondent 2).

Disturbed by the proliferation of disinformation in North West Nigeria, majority of the respondents suggested regulating the social media to stop allowing people posting malicious information. One of the participants attributed lack of significant action taken by the Nigerian government.

In order to guard against proliferation of disinformation, any social media user who wishes to open social media account must come to the Ministry of Information and Culture in their state to register himself. Yes, let his details, his everything, his picture and fingerprint and everything be captured. In the event that he or she posts lies that can cause religious or tribal conflicts in the country, he can easily be detected and sanctioned. I think that is the best way to handle these culprits. This will stop them from posting lies against anyone with impunity in future (Respondent 15).

In contrast, only one of the respondents antagonised regulating social media. To him, putting a sanction is tantamount to violating freedom of expression.

Yes, I know in some countries like China, North Korea, Iran, Syria and so on they regulate social media. But in Nigeria here, I am not in support of imposing any restriction on social media use in the country. This is because our politicians can hide behind it and be arresting the opposition. I am not also in support of anyone to blackmail people on social media. But the best way is to enlighten the social media users about the dangers of disseminating disinformation which can set the country on fire. (Respondent 1).

b.     Motivations of spreading disinformation by the social media users in North West Nigeria.

Majority of the respondents opined that mischief making, phenomenon of politics, unemployment, media illiteracy and youthful exuberance served as great motivations for spreading disinformation in North West Nigeria. They emphasized that some of these youth hired by politicians have already built several hundred networks for their principals to promote political propaganda.

Nowadays, virtually all elected politicians like governors, senators, Local Government chairmen or councilors, they have social media aids who trail them everywhere they go. They snap the pictures of their political godfathers and upload those pictures in the internet instantaneously. And you know that politicians like publicity. So, today we are in a political era, where political manipulations exist and a lot of social media platforms are available for those who are interested in promoting their candidates, political parties against opponents and so on (Respondent 12).

Lamenting further on political motivations, another respondent wonders how some politicians accord high priority to their social media aids in terms of news coverage and publicity ahead of professional journalists.

Here in Zamfara state, let me tell you the truth! Many government officials and political leaders are no longer inviting us being the professional journalists to cover their events. Instead, they are hiring small boys in the name of social media aids. They buy very fancy and expensive phones for them as well as put the bill of their internet connection. These boys do not have any media literacy and as such they will be thinking that blackmailing political opponents does not have any ethical implication. This is very sad! (Respondent 18).

Corroborating the above viewpoint, another respondent said politicians are exploiting youth because of poverty and lack of employment.

Many factors contribute to the sharing of disinformation in North West Nigeria. Number one, we have economic factors because poverty and unemployment lead to the circulation of disinformation. You see, these youths that are trailing politicians in the name of social media aids are jobless. So, because of poverty and joblessness they do not have any option but to blackmail anyone that go contrary to the interest of their ogas (principals). Sometimes they can go to the extent of using derogatory languages against their opponents without knowing the implications of what they are doing due to their youthful exuberance (Respondent 3).

A few respondents expressed concerns about polarisation of our society as a factor that motivate sharing of disinformation.

Well, I think, uhh, disinformation is being spread everywhere in this part of the country, like here in Sokoto state, for some reasons. One of which is the polarisation of our society. This is because we are divided in the northern part of the country along tribal, ethnic, religious and political lines. Therefore, everyone wants to promote or protect his or her interest religiously, politically, socially, and what have you. They are using social media like WhatsApp where they can easily share lies to hundreds of group members at a go. As such, widespread use of aahh, social media itself where disinformation can spread easily and quickly is now the order of the day (Respondent 6).

However, only one of the respondents considers fun and entertainment from the popularity seekers as a factor that contribute to the sharing of disinformation on social media.

Yeah, absolutely yes. Some social media users are after making name. They are just interested in becoming popular, being recognized by others…..They want to register their presence online so that people consider them as social media influencers. Therefore, they post one thing or the other. In fact, some can go extra mile in fabricating a story just to achieve that goal, which is making a name, to be popular within their peers or within the society they operate. In addition, some are just after fun and entertainment to share disinformation. Uhhh, just to make people feel happy, provide a kind of leisure, so they will just share whatever that comes their way without trying to understand or even appreciate whether that information is just for fun or it carries an inflammatory message. So fun and entertainment could also be a factor or the reason why some people share disinformation especially in TikTok (Respondent 13).

However, another respondent raised concern in Kebbi state where mischief-makers are using the current insecurity to peddle all sort of disinformation in order to blackmail the government on power.

In some cases, you will see that a security incident may happen in Argungu Local Government Area about Lakurawa or bandits attacking a community today. Then this type of people who are using social media especially Facebook and WhatsApp, they will enter their social media platform or any platform of their choice. They will photoshop pictures of gory incidents that happened for instance in Chad or Somalia and say it exactly happened in Argungu LGA, whereas all those disgusting pictures and videos emanated from Chad or Somalia. So, that is the problem we are facing in some North West states. And when politicians see that post, then they will induce their followers to be inciting bad comments against the government in power in order to portray it is failure. So, it is unfortunate for the politicians to be playing politics with the deteriorating security matters in North West Nigeria (Respondent 4).

c.       Gratifications derived by the social media users from spreading disinformation in North West Nigeria.

The data generated during the FGD sessions revealed that those responsible for sharing disinformation derived some gratifications from doing that. However, respondents’ opinions differs about nature of gratifications derived ranging from monetary gains, desire for public fame, fun and entertainment, sponsorship, political appointments and political partisanship. In the long run, the data provided an insight in to why some people in Nigeria continue to peddle lies on social media.

Majority of political leaders and governments officials in Sokoto state employ social media aids. They put them on a monthly salary payroll. And the salary they pay them is in most cases higher than what civil servants are earning. So, because of that monetary gains, these young boys hired are very much ready to do the bidding of what this politicians want. There is a popular adage that says ‘he who pay the piper calls the tune’. And this young boys while in their attempt to impress their political god-fathers, they may end up blackmailing what other political opponents are doing by sharing lies against them (Respondent 11).

Corroborating the above viewpoint, another respondent identified purchasing of handsets, cars and motorcycles by politicians to their social media aids as another gratification that can encourage dissemination of disinformation on social media.

Even apart from monthly salary and other allowances, the politicians here in Zamfara state usually by expensive smartphones for their social media users. They also take responsibility of providing internet connection; they donate cars or motorcycles to them sometimes. Yes, of course, let me even site an example. These politicians motivate all these young guys who are just coming up. They can buy a fancy phone of N300, 000, N500, 000, N600, 000 or 1 million Naira to motivate them. So from that, if these boys have fancy phones; certainly it will be something of pride to them even among their peer groups. And one interesting thing to know is that, these young guys are posting all sort of lies and nonsense about anybody with impunity because they know that even if they are arrested, their political god fathers will do everything possible to bail them out (Respondent 15).

Furthermore, virtually all the respondents identified high status given to social media handlers of government officials and politicians as a gratifying factor that may contribute to the sharing of disinformation.

Let me share with you one annoying thing in Kebbi state. These social media boys of politicians sometimes get information in advance ahead of professional journalists. Not only that, there were many instances where social media aids get some important information that even some commissioners of ministries did not know yet. This is because, these social media aids are always together with governor or the deputy governor. Sometimes, government officials have to wait for the arrival of these social media boys before they can commission any project or start any programme despite the presence of professional journalists. In short, they are underrating conventional journalist nowadays. So. This status accorded to them by elected politicians is gratifying to them also (Respondent 9).

Another gratification derived by mischief makers from disseminating disinformation relate to tribalism or religious differences. One respondent ventilated his opinion about that.

Because of mischief making, some social media users can create a false video or picture depicting people of different tribe or different religion that they are the one that do this and that. Some social media users are technology savvy. As such they can photoshop or edit the voice of for instance Sokoto state governor and say the governor was the one that do this. Or to say that it is Izalah or Darika Islamic scholars responsible for this and that. Until after circulating the doctored video on social media, then you hear rebuttal from the governor or a particular Islamic scholar, trying to dissociate self from the video or edited voice recording. Similarly, we see severally on TikTok how for instance Yorubas are portraying Hausas as poor or illiterate. Or you see how Yorubas are depicted as gluttony and Igbos as desperate to make money. This is a type of mischief making from tribal or religious bigots. They gained gratifications when they see people of different tribes exchanging verbal missiles in the comment section of their posts (Respondent 17).

Discussion of findings

One of the most prominent findings of this study was that all the 18 respondents use social media regularly, with most spending between 1-3 hours per day on most frequently used platforms like Facebook, WhatsApp, YouTube and TikTok. The ubiquity of social media usage among people in North West Nigeria makes these platforms the primary means through which they encounter disinformation. A recent study has identified a correlation between the extent of social media usage and the dissemination of false information (Hou et al., 2020; Huynh, 2020). Previous studies also indicate that many young adults heavily rely on social media for their daily information intake, often stumbling upon news incidentally while scrolling through their feeds (Boczkowski et al., 2017). While social media facilitates easy access to news, this study argues that it also fosters the rapid spread of disinformation.

Moreover, findings of this study uncovered some reasons why disinformation has become a present day phenomenon in North West Nigeria. Politics is one of the major reasons for this. According to Arisanty, Wiradharma and Fiani (2020). Disinformation is often used to change how people think, change the outcome of elections, or hurt the reputation of political opponents. Another study conducted by Edwin and Yalmi (2019, p.28) revealed that politicians in Nigeria “have misused WhatsApp for the use of promoting political agenda by hiring youths to spread their political campaign and fake information to defame the opposition party or to gain popularity amongst its voters”. These youth hired by politicians have built several hundred networks for their principals to promote political propaganda.

Economic reason was also another factor uncovered by this study that disinformation can be used to make money through clicks or the spread of sensationalised information. This is in consonance with the views expressed by Brennen (2020, p. 23) that false information is deliberately created and disseminated in order to “either influence people's views, push for a political agenda or cause confusion and can often be a profitable business for online publishers”. Finding of this study conforms to another study conducted in the US context where Rebecca and Alice (2017) identified a variety of motivations for disinformation, including financial or political interests, the agendas of state actors, mischief making, disruption, and sometimes the desire for fame.

Finally, findings also identified lack of job opportunity for the teaming youths as another reason for the spread of disinformation in the country. This corresponds with the study conducted by Apuke and Omar (2020, p.323) which “revealed that many who access smartphones and social media in Nigeria are young and often jobless, giving them a lot of idle time online. They get a lot of false information and share it quickly amongst themselves, sometimes without even reading it”. Unfortunately, many of these energetic youths often lack the proper education or maturity necessary to critically evaluate information and consider it thoughtfully before sharing it with others.

Conclusion and Recommendations

This study uncovered that many people in Nigeria rely on social media for information seeking and dissemination. Today nobody can gainsay the fact that social media play a significant role in transmitting, organizing, and amplifying information generated by others. The joy of obtaining information faster, cheaper, and more frequently through social media platforms has undoubtedly made it the most popular information channel in modern times. However, the concerns expressed by this study is that social media has become a two-edged sword. This is because in one hand, social media is cheap, simple to use and allows for the rapid distribution of information. On the other hand, it promotes the rapid dissemination of disinformation, which seriously poses challenge to the peaceful coexistence of Nigeria as a one country.

This study has contributed to the body of knowledge by exposing the nature of disinformation, which mimic genuine news presentation but mischievously presented along ethnic, tribal, religious and political lines. Hence, findings of this study will help further discussions and academic debates on whether or not there is need for social media regulations in Nigeria. Certainly, the truth of the matter remains that many people have begun to see reasons and wisdom behind enacting such regulations in order to combat disinformation dissemination in Nigeria. See for instance (Abati, 2019).

This study also contributed to the academic discourse regarding the necessity for comprehensive policy review of Nigerian media environment. To this end, the findings of this study would help in curbing the negative effect of disinformation on National security, hate speeches, inter-tribal conflicts, religious violence, and political tension with a view to suggesting long lasting solutions to the problem. The Federal Ministry of Information and Culture (FMIC) in particular, could utilise suggestions in this study as a guide to formulate national action policies on disinformation sharing in Nigeria.

Theoretically, this study broadened our understanding of audience motivations and gratifications for circulating disinformation on social media in Nigeria using the lenses of Uses and Gratification Theory. This theory was suitable for this study because it demonstrates its capacity to accommodate evolving technologies like social media within the realm of mass communication. Originally, this theory was primarily focused to address researches on conventional media. However, it has now expanded to encompass investigations pertaining to emerging forms of social media. Therefore, the proliferation of social media globally has consequently prompted an expanding collection of researches like this one that employ Uses and Gratification Theory. Hence, this study contributes to knowledge for theory development, by adding to the existing scarce literature on disinformation sharing habit in Nigerian context.

Ultimately, this study provides a foundation for future research, highlighting the need for continued efforts to address disinformation in Nigerian context. Therefore, in order to mitigate the spread of disinformation and fake news in general, it is imperative to acquire more understanding of their creation and dissemination processes, as well as the underlying motivations and gratifications associated with their circulation. Therefore, future researches can work further on this topic by concentrating on other Nigerian contexts. This is necessary because addressing the spread of disinformation effectively requires comprehensive strategies grounded in a deep understanding of the human behaviours and motivations that drive disinformation sharing.

Arising from the foregoing therefore, this study recommends for awareness campaigns through workshops and conferences that promote responsible social media usage. These campaigns should emphasize the importance of verifying information before sharing and the potential consequences of spreading disinformation. Policymakers in Nigeria could consider collaborating with social media companies to promote responsible information-sharing practices, including fact-checking resources and warning labels on potentially disinformation content.

Given the role of peer pressure as a key driver in the spread of disinformation, peer-to-peer education should be encouraged. To this end, social media influencers could be mobilised to promote responsible sharing habits and to act as role models for their peers. By leveraging peer influence, youths can be encouraged to fact-check information and think critically before sharing it on social media.

Methodologically, longitudinal studies could be used by future studies in order to offer valuable insights into how motivations for sharing disinformation evolve over time, especially in response to major events, such as elections periods in Nigeria or inter-tribal conflicts. Tracking changes in disinformation sharing behavior over extended periods could help researchers identify patterns and factors that either reinforce or reduce the likelihood of disinformation sharing in Nigeria.

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