From "Hausawa Zalla" to Cyber-Ethnic Division: A Study of Social Media, Hate Speech, and the Fracturing of Hausa-Fulani Identity in Nigeria

Article Citation: Sani, A.-U., & Aminu, A. (2026, August 21–24). From "Hausawa Zalla" to cyber-ethnic division: A study of social media, hate speech, and the fracturing of Hausa-Fulani identity in Nigeria [Paper presentation]. International Conference on Rethinking Ethnic Relations in Nigeria and Bridging the Gaps: From Cultural, Linguistic and Literary Perspectives, Federal College of Education (Technical) & Federal University Gusau, Zamfara, Nigeria.

FROM "HAUSAWA ZALLA" TO CYBER-ETHNIC DIVISION: A STUDY OF SOCIAL MEDIA, HATE SPEECH, AND THE FRACTURING OF HAUSA-FULANI IDENTITY IN NIGERIA

By

Abu-Ubaida SANI, Ph.D.
Department of Languages and Cultures,
Federal University Gusau, Zamfara, Nigeria
Email: abuubaidasani5@gmail.com | abu-ubaidallah@fugusau.edu.ng
ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6447-4334 | WhatsApp: +2348133529736 

And

Abdulmalik Aminu, Ph.D.
Department of African Languages and Cultures
Ahmadu Bello University, Zaria, Nigeria
Phone: +2348138402892 | Email: aaminu@abu.edu.ng 
ORCID: 0000-0002-3483-6725

Paper Presented at the International Conference on Rethinking Ethnic Relations in Nigeria and Bridging the Gaps: From Cultural, Linguistic and Literary Perspectives organized by the School of Secondary Education (Languages), (FCET) & the Department of Languages and Cultures (FUGUSAU), 21st – 24th August, 2026

Abstract

This paper examines the emerging phenomenon of digital hate speech targeting the historically intertwined Hausa and Fulani ethnic identities in Nigeria, with particular focus on the "Hausawa Zalla" ("Pure Hausa") movement's online activities. The term "Hausawa Zalla" signifies a deliberate ideological position asserting a "pure" Hausa identity distinct from and opposed to Fulani influence, representing a rejection of the centuries-old Hausa-Fulani synthesis initiated by Kaltume Alumbe Jitami. Drawing on a qualitative netnographic analysis of publicly available content across Facebook, TikTok, X (formerly Twitter), YouTube, and WhatsApp (comprising 250 group/page names, 350 hashtags, 300 posts on the nature of criticism, and 200 posts on rhetorical frames), this study analyses how digital platforms have become arenas for ethnic rhetoric that threatens one of Nigeria's most enduring ethnic alliances. The findings reveal that the movement employs coordinated digital strategies characterised by consistent branding, strategic hashtag usage, historical revisionism targeting figures like Shehu Usman Ɗanfodiyo, anti-Islamic rhetoric, and systematic suppression of dissent through locked profiles, pseudonyms, and deletion of opposing views. The paper argues that these digital campaigns represent a dangerous distortion of Nigerian history and a threat to national cohesion, while also acknowledging that the movement's grievances emerge from genuine challenges of political marginalisation, economic inequality, and security crises in Northern Nigeria. The study recommends a multi-stakeholder approach involving platform accountability, counter-narrative campaigns, educational interventions, digital literacy programmes, legal frameworks, and inter-ethnic dialogue initiatives to counter the spread of "cyber-ethnic" division.

Keywords: Hausawa Zalla, Hausa-Fulani identity, hate speech, social media, ethnic division, cyber-ethnicity, Northern Nigeria, digital activism, historical revisionism, netnography

1.0 Introduction

The relationship between the Hausa and Fulani ethnic groups in Nigeria represents one of the most remarkable examples of ethno-cultural synthesis in African history. For over two centuries, these communities have been politically, culturally, and religiously integrated through intermarriage, shared Islamic scholarship, economic cooperation, and common political institutions. Lawanti (2025, para. 4) observes that "the Hausa and Fulani have been politically, culturally, and religiously integrated for over two centuries" – a social relation that gave life to "a region that was able to resist colonial manipulation and build a strong socio-political synthesis guided by the religious and cultural beliefs that shaped governance, education and spiritual life of the region" (Lawanti, 2025, para. 4).

However, the digital era has brought unique pressures to bear on this longstanding cultural unity. On platforms like Facebook, TikTok, and X (formerly Twitter), algorithm-fueled agitators are systematically disseminating hateful rhetoric, derisive commentary, and provocative content designed to recast Hausa-Fulani relations as a narrative of division, suspicion, and betrayal. At the heart of this shift is the rise of the "Hausawa Zalla" (Pure Hausa) movement. That is a label that embodies a deliberate ideological stance, promoting an exclusionary vision of Hausa identity that consciously rejects and opposes Fulani heritage.

This paper examines the phenomenon of social media groups promoting Hausawa Zalla ideology and their role in fostering hate between Hausa and Fulani communities. The analysis situates this phenomenon within the broader framework of rethinking ethnic relations, exploring how digital platforms have created new vectors for ethnic division while also offering potential avenues for peacebuilding and reconciliation.

2.1 The Hausa-Fulani: A History of Integration and Coexistence

The Fulani, known as Fulɓe in their own language, are a diverse group found across multiple West African countries including Mali, Senegal, and Nigeria. In the Hausa context, they are traditionally classified into two broad categories: the Fulanin Daji (Bush Fulani, also known as Bararoji), who are pastoralists engaged in cattle herding and transhumance, moving from place to place in search of pasture and water for their livestock. On the other hand, there are the Fulanin Soro (Settled Fulani) comprising various sub-groups including Torankawa, Sulluɓawa, and Jahunawa, among others (Ibrahim, 1978, p. 103).

The Fulani are believed to have begun arriving in Hausaland during the reign of Sarkin Kano Yakubu, who ruled between 1452 and 1463 CE (Ibrahim, 1970, p. 103). The pastoral Fulani traditionally remained in the bush and rural areas, maintaining a relationship with the Hausa primarily through economic exchange - trading milk, butter, and cattle for salt, potash, and other goods. The settled Fulani, however, established themselves within urban centres, engaging in Islamic scholarship and learning. Among them was Malam Musa Jakollo, the grandfather of Shehu Usman Ɗanfodiyo, who resided in Birnin Konni in the ancient Gobir kingdom (Ibrahim, 1978; Talatan Mafara, 1999).

A profound transformation in Hausa-Fulani relations occurred following the successful jihad of Shehu Usman Ɗanfodiyo in the early nineteenth century, which established the Sokoto Caliphate and transferred political authority in Hausaland to Fulani leadership. This political realignment (placing former rulers and those who had assumed power in close proximity) created an intense and intimate interaction between Hausa and Fulani communities, giving rise to extensive intermarriage and cultural exchange as highlighted by Talatan Mafara (1999). This integration was so profound that the Hausa and Fulani came to exist as a distinct socio-political bloc, with colonial authorities subsequently designating them as the "civilised group" and superimposing them over minority groups classified as "pagans," a dominance that persists as a "social reality" in Northern Nigeria's socio-political structure (Ugbem et al., 2019, p. 103).

Adesina (2005, p. 18) observes that the retention over time of a political consciousness that glorified cultural identity and solidarity "precluded the growth of a national consciousness," with political elites across ethnic divides spending considerable energy on creating enemies out of compatriots rather than fostering national cohesion. The present challenge to the Hausa-Fulani construct by movements like Hausawa Zalla thus represents not merely a historical revision but a continuation of the identity politics that have characterised Nigerian political leadership since the colonial era.

2.2 The "Hausawa Zalla" Movement: Ideology and Emergence

Hausawa Zalla translates literally to "Pure Hausa" or "Purely Hausa," signifying a movement that seeks to divest the famous "Hausa-Fulani" identity construct from one of its key components – the Hausa component. This movement challenges what Ibrahim (2026) describes as "one of the most famous identity constructs in Nigeria." For decades, the hyphenated "Hausa-Fulani" identity has been the dominant socio-political identity of Northern Nigeria.

The rise of the Hausawa Zalla movement should be understood within the context of deepening tensions between Hausa farmers and Fulani herders. Ibrahim (2026) notes that "the increasing rate of clashes between Fulani herders and Hausa farmers in northern villages has resulted in the mass killings of, and the displacement of, hundreds of thousands of farmers." The rise of banditry, championed mostly by Fulani men, has centred this conflict, with bandit leaders like Bello Turji, Dogo Giɗe, and others (each one known as Kachalla (Leader)) claiming the loss of cattle and grazing grounds as motivations.

The most prominent and influential vehicle for the Hausawa Zalla ideology is the Hausawa Tsantsa Development Association (HTDA), a pro-Hausa socio-cultural group that has emerged as the leading force in promoting ethnic essentialism and challenging the historical Hausa-Fulani synthesis (Yusuf, 2025). Led by the outspoken activist Hajiya Kaltume Alumbe Jitami, the HTDA has taken a hardline stance against Fulani influence, using platforms such as social media to call on indigenous Hausas to launch what she describes as a "final stand" against what she brands as centuries of Fulani domination (First Weekly Magazine, 2025). The association maintains a YouTube channel, Jaruma Hausa TV (youtube.com/@jarumahausatv360), which features content that promotes the separation of Hausa from Fulani identity and frequently disparages Islamic religious authorities and practices.

Picture 1: Extract from Jaruma Hausa TV YouTube Channel

Source: youtube.com/@jarumahausatv360/videos

The screenshot from Jaruma Hausa TV exemplifies HTDA's hate speech with homophobic slurs and ethnic insults. It also includes derogatory references to Islamic scholars, including the late Sheikh Dahiru Usman Bauchi, Sheikh Abdullahi Bala Lau, and Malama Juwairiyya Usman Sulaiman, among others. It also includes a series of videos promoting ethnic segregation, urging Hausa and other groups to avoid Fulani scholars, traditional rulers, and politicians, while accusing Fulani of immoral cultural practices. This content reinforces the movement's pattern of dehumanisation, collective guilt attribution, and calls for ethnic separation that threaten national cohesion.

The group has issued quit notices targeting Fulani communities in Hausaland and has been accused of promoting inflammatory rhetoric that threatens inter-ethnic peace (Independent Newspaper Nigeria, 2025), which is mostly not true. Truth is a factor that makes a good man. Kirk-Greene (1973) stated that the term “Mutumin Kirki” never comes amiss in Hausaland; it is in social intercourse alone, in relationships with his fellow men, that the accolade of mutumin kirki is awarded by the Hausa. The quotations relating to the term ‘Truth,’ such as the theme chosen by Abubakar Imam in his literature Gaskiya Ta Fi Kwabo’ (Truth is Worth More than a Penny), made by Kirk-Greene are well articulated in his book Mutumin Kirki.  ‘Who are the Hausa?’ is a topic discussed in the book ‘The Hausa Factor in West African History” by Adamu Mahdi as a good reference to what made the term Hausa and its people in Nigeria and beyond. 

Unfortunately, however, the HTDA's activities are centred on a formal request for federal recognition and separation of Hausa and Fulani communities in all national records, arguing that the historical merger has resulted in "disadvantages in education, employment, and political representation" (Jitami, 2025). The HTDA has also condemned what it perceives as the distortion of Hausa history by academics, rejecting the continued use of the "Hausa-Fulani" construct as an artificial political division (Leadership, 2026).

These tensions have prompted a profound re-examination of the bond between two ethnic groups whose histories are deeply intertwined. The mounting resistance to the Hausa-Fulani designation signals a more fundamental crisis of political representation in northern Nigeria, wherein certain Hausa factions contend that the longstanding alliance now undermines their interests, erodes their distinctiveness, and fails to adequately address the prevailing insecurity. This inevitably raises a pivotal question: at what point does a collective identity cease to reflect lived reality and begin instead to mask underlying power imbalances as well as conceal disparities in influence and control? The simple answer to the question is that, never in the history of the world where an assimilation of two or more distinct cultures been reversed; hence, the northern Nigerian bloc with two major ethnic groups (Hausa and Fulani), which has fused slowly over a long period of time, reached the point of no return. 

2.2.1 Key Characteristics of the Movement

Investigative reports have documented the activities of the Hausawa Zalla group across social media platforms. Bashir Yahuza Malumfashi, in a series of investigative articles, identifies several distinctive characteristics of the movement:

a. Historical Revisionism: Adherents of the Hausawa Zalla movement frequently direct disparaging remarks at the revered Islamic scholar Shehu Usman Ɗanfodiyo, twisting historical accounts and levelling unfounded accusations against him. According to Y. A. Gobir (personal communication, September 17, 2025), observers note that those who follow these online spaces will invariably come across a steady stream of vitriolic and slanderous content originating from the group. This revisionist campaign specifically targets the esteemed religious figure Shehu Usman Ɗanfodiyo, whom established historical records acknowledge as a pivotal architect of Islamic resurgence and the founder of a vast and influential West African empire.

b. Anti-Islamic Rhetoric: The movement members persist in assailing his character, distorting factual records, and propagating fabricated narratives about him, while their discourse frequently devolves into denigration of the Islamic faith and vilification of respected religious authorities. One notably widespread video featured a woman named Kaltume, who presents herself as the global leader of the Hausawa Zalla movement, delivering incendiary statements against Islam and its followers. In the footage, she explicitly announced her rejection of the faith and called on Hausa people to abandon customary Arabic greetings and holds onto the Hausa traditional “gafarar ku dai” – an expression standing for “excuse me.”

c. Alignment with Separatist Movements: The group has reportedly shown explicit backing for the separatist organization Indigenous People of Biafra (IPOB) and has voiced opposition to the legal proceedings taken against its leader, Nnamdi Kanu (Yusuf, 2025). To this regard, it has staged protests in international locations, including Berlin, which prompted the Arewa Community Germany to formally disassociate itself from the group's activities, warning that the protest's message conflicts with its core values of unity and mutual respect (Sulaiman, 2025).

d. Ethnic Essentialism: Members of the movement consistently seek to stoke division and animosity among Muslims, maintaining the position that all Fulani people are terrorists and that Hausa communities should therefore mobilize, take up arms, and confront them collectively. (Malumfashi, 2026).

3.0 Methodology

This study adopts a qualitative netnographic approach (Kozinets, 2020) to investigate the digital activities of the Hausawa Tsantsa Development Association (HTDA) and the broader Hausawa Zalla movement. Data were drawn from publicly accessible content across Facebook, TikTok, X (formerly Twitter), YouTube, and WhatsApp, where the movement maintains an active presence. A purposive sampling strategy was employed to select content based on relevance to Hausa-Fulani ethnic relations, promotion of Hausawa Zalla ideology, or presence of anti-Fulani hate speech. Content with high engagement metrics was prioritised to capture the most influential messages.

Table 1: Data Sources and Sample Distribution

Platform	Content Analysed	Sample Size
Facebook	Group/page names, posts, comments, hashtags, usernames	250 names, 300 posts
X (Twitter)	Hashtags, tweets, retweets	350 hashtags
YouTube	Channels, video titles, descriptions, comments	300 posts
TikTok	Video content, captions, hashtags	200 posts
WhatsApp	Groups, channels	Observational

 Table 2: Analytical Focus by Category

Analytical Category	Platforms Involved	Sample Size	Focus
Group/Page Names/Channel	Facebook, WhatsApp, YouTube	250	Frequency of movement branding
Hashtags	Facebook, TikTok, X (Twitter)	350	Ideological messaging and engagement
Nature of Criticism	Facebook, YouTube, TikTok, WhatsApp, TikTok	300	Targets of critical content
Rhetorical Frames	Facebook, YouTube, TikTok, X	200	Recurring narratives and framing devices
Digital Practices	Facebook, WhatsApp	Observational	Moderation, identity concealment, dissent suppression

Data analysis followed a qualitative content analysis approach guided by the works of Amadi & Samuel (2026) and Akinwande et al. (2022), with themes emerging organically through iterative reading and viewing of content. The study adheres to ethical guidelines for digital research (Kozinets, 2020; Markham & Buchanan, 2012), analysing only publicly available content and anonymising identifying information in reporting.

4.0 Data Presentation and Discussion

1. Frequency of Group and Page Names

A content analysis of social media platforms revealed a hierarchy of naming conventions used by members and sympathizers of the Hausawa Zalla movement. The following table presents the most frequently occurring names in group and page titles, ranked by frequency of use.

Table 3: Most Frequent Group and Page Names

Rank	Name	Frequency (n=250)	Percentage (%)
1.	Hausawa Zalla	68	27.2
2.	Hausawa Mu Farka	47	18.8
3.	Hausawa Mun Farka	39	15.6
4.	Hausawa Gari Ya Waye	33	13.2
5.	Hausa Zalla	28	11.2
6.	Fulani Most Go	22	8.8

 

The predominance of Hausawa Zalla (27.2%) as the most frequently used name reflects the movement's deliberate assertion of a "pure" Hausa identity. The variations Hausawa Mu Farka and Hausawa Mun Farka (translating roughly to "Hausa, We Are Awake") suggest a mobilizing rhetoric that positions Hausa identity as under threat and in need of awakening. "Fulani Most Go" (8.8%) explicitly signals the movement's anti-Fulani sentiment, serving as a direct call for the exclusion or removal of Fulani people from the region.

2. Frequency of Hashtags

Hashtags serve as digital rallying points, enabling content aggregation and ideological signaling. The frequency of specific hashtags provides insight into the movement's core messaging priorities.

Table 4: Most Frequent Hashtags Used in Posts

Rank	Hashtag	Frequency (n=350)	Percentage (%)
1.	#HausawaZalla	89	25.4
2.	#HausawaMuFarka	62	17.7
3.	#HausawaMunFarka	51	14.6
4.	#HausawaGariYaWaye	43	12.3
5.	#HausaZalla	37	10.6
6.	#FulaniMostGo	29	8.3
7.	#HausaRevival	21	6.0
8.	#ArewaMustChange	18	5.1

 

The hashtag frequency closely mirrors the group and page naming patterns, reinforcing the movement's branding consistency. "#HausawaZalla" leads with 25.4%, highlighting its centrality to the movement's identity. The emergence of broader hashtags like "#ArewaMustChange" (5.1%) suggests an ambition to expand the movement's appeal beyond ethnic grievance to encompass wider political discontent in Northern Nigeria. However, the consistently high ranking of anti-Fulani hashtags indicates that ethnic antagonism remains the primary mobilizing force.

3. Nature of Criticism

The movement's digital content targets a range of individuals and institutions. A thematic analysis of 300 posts revealed the distribution of criticism across various categories.

Table 5: Distribution of Critical Content by Target

Target	Frequency (n=300)	Percentage (%)
Religious Leaders	72	24.0
Past Political Leaders	56	18.7
Shehu Usman Ɗanfodiyo	48	16.0
Current Political Leaders	45	15.0
Islamic Teachings/Practices	39	13.0
Traditional Leaders	28	9.3
Other Targets	12	4.0

 

The data reveals that religious leaders (24.0%) are the most frequent targets of criticism, followed closely by past political leaders (18.7%). Notably, Shehu Usman Ɗanfodiyo, the revered 19th-century Islamic reformer, attracts significant criticism (16.0%), reflecting the movement's historical revisionist agenda. The fact that Islamic teachings and practices are targeted in 13.0% of posts indicates a troubling anti-Islamic undercurrent, consistent with observations of members openly renouncing Islamic identity. Traditional leaders (9.3%) receive comparatively less criticism, possibly because they are perceived as less politically influential than religious figures and politicians.

4. Ideological Weapons and Rhetorical Framing

The movement employs several recurring narratives to legitimize its criticism and mobilize support. These "weapons" function as framing devices that simplify complex socio-political realities into digestible grievances.

Table 6: Recurring Rhetorical Frames Used in Content

Rhetorical Frame	Frequency (n=200)	Percentage (%)
Fulani Domination	68	34.0
Terrorism/Banditry Association	52	26.0
Historical Erasure	40	20.0
Religious Subversion	28	14.0
Economic Exploitation	12	6.0

 

The predominance of the "Fulani Domination" frame (34.0%) suggests that the movement primarily constructs its identity around opposition to perceived Fulani political hegemony.  The data might not be accurate considering the unavailability of genuine facts to support the commentators’ arguments, possibly due to inadequate background knowledge of the political history of Nigeria from the commentators. The "Terrorism/Banditry Association" frame (26.0%) is particularly dangerous as it employs ethnic generalization, painting an entire group as criminal. This framing directly contradicts the shared historical and religious bonds that have traditionally united Hausa and Fulani communities. The "Historical Erasure" frame (20.0%) emphasizes the movement's revisionist campaign against figures like Shehu Usman Ɗanfodiyo, as dismantling shared historical narratives is essential to constructing a separate Hausa identity. The ignorance of Ajami Scripts on peacebuilding written in both Hausa and Fulfulde languages by Shehu Usman Ɗanfodiyo among those championing the movement is another factor that falsifies their claim.

5. Questionable Digital Practices

An examination of the movement's online conduct revealed several practices that raise concerns about transparency, accountability, and the democratic character of their digital engagement.

Table 7: Observed Digital Practices of Movement Affiliates

Practice	Description
Locked/Private Profiles	A significant number of movement affiliates maintain locked Facebook profiles and WhatsApp groups, which restrict public access to their activities and limit external scrutiny of their digital behavior.
Use of Pseudonyms/Fake Names	Many operatives use fictitious names and anonymous handles across platforms, making it difficult to trace their real identities or hold them accountable for their content.
Deleting Opposing Comments	Critics and dissenting voices frequently report that their comments are deleted from posts and pages associated with the movement, effectively suppressing alternative viewpoints.
Insulting/Blackmailing Opponents	Individuals who publicly oppose the movement often face direct personal attacks, character assassination, and threats of exposure or blackmail, creating a chilling effect on dissent.
Removing Opposing Members from Groups	WhatsApp and other closed-group administrators routinely expel members who express disagreement with the movement's ideology, ensuring that group conversations remain ideologically uniform.

The digital conduct of movement affiliates reveals a consistent pattern of opacity and intolerance for dissent. The widespread use of locked profiles and pseudonyms is particularly striking, as it allows individuals to disseminate inflammatory content without assuming personal responsibility – a practice that sits uncomfortably with the movement's public claim to represent the authentic interests of the Hausa people. As Malumfashi (2026) observed, the deliberate concealment of identity raises fundamental questions about credibility and motives.

Equally telling is the movement's approach to managing discourse. The systematic deletion of opposing comments and the removal of dissenting members from closed groups suggest a preference for echo chambers where ideological purity is preserved, and uncomfortable questions are avoided. More concerning still is the documented pattern of personal attacks and intimidation directed at critics, which goes beyond robust debate into the realm of coercion. These practices collectively depict a movement that prioritizes control over conversation and intimidation over persuasion – hardly the hallmarks of a genuine grassroots struggle for justice, but rather the tactics of a digitally enabled campaign of ethnic polarization.

5.0 Findings

 i. Ideological Coherence and Ethnic Essentialism

The movement demonstrates a clear ideological coherence centered on the assertion of a "pure" Hausa identity opposed to Fulani influence. The consistent use of core terminology across groups, pages, and hashtags indicates strategic coordination in branding and messaging. However, this ideological position is fundamentally essentialist, reducing complex ethnic identities to simplistic binaries and ignoring centuries of intermarriage, cultural exchange, and shared history between Hausa and Fulani communities.

 ii. Historical Revisionism as a Strategy

The movement systematically engages in historical revisionism, particularly targeting Shehu Usman Ɗanfodiyo, a figure whose legacy is central to the Islamic and political history of Northern Nigeria. This strategy appears designed to dismantle the shared historical narratives that underpin Hausa-Fulani unity, thereby creating space for an exclusive Hausa identity. The 16.0% of critical content directed at this historical figure underscores the centrality of this revisionist project.

 iii. Anti-Islamic Undercurrents

The targeting of religious leaders (24.0%) and Islamic teachings (13.0%) indicates that the movement's anti-Fulani sentiment has extended into religious territory. This is particularly concerning given that Islam has historically served as a unifying force across ethnic lines in Northern Nigeria. The open renunciation of Islamic identity by movement leaders, as observed in the case of Kaltume, suggests that the movement risks alienating the very religious constituencies that have traditionally provided social cohesion.

 iv. Coordinated Digital Operations

The movement's online activities exhibit signs of strategic coordination, as evidenced by the consistent use of locked profiles, pseudonyms, and content moderation practices that suppress dissent. These tactics reflect an awareness of platform vulnerabilities and a deliberate effort to evade accountability while maximizing reach. The algorithmic amplification of divisive content further compounds this effect, as platforms' recommendation engines tend to favor engagement-driving content regardless of its social cost.

 v. Alignment with Broader Separatist Agendas

The movement's reported sympathy for IPOB and opposition to legal actions against Nnamdi Kanu suggests a broader alignment with separatist and anti-establishment forces across Nigeria. This interconnection of ethnic and regional grievances poses a significant challenge to national cohesion, as disparate movements may find common cause in opposition to the federal structure.

6.0 Recommendations

 i. Platform Accountability

Social media platforms (Facebook, TikTok, and X) should enhance their content moderation mechanisms to more effectively identify and act upon hate speech, ethnic incitement, and historical revisionism. Algorithms should be calibrated to demote rather than amplify divisive content. Transparency reports on enforcement actions taken against anti-Hausa-Fulani hate speech should be published regularly. Nationality, legitimacy, morality, and competency of the ethnic group page creators on social media platforms should be checked and screened periodically by the government agencies concerned. ‘Whistle blowing’ from individuals should be introduced or enhanced to monitor and report the unwanted postings and/or comments in the ethnic groups in cyberspace. 

 ii. Counter-Narrative Campaigns

Civil society organizations, religious institutions, and traditional leaders should collaborate to develop and disseminate counter-narratives that emphasize the shared history, intermarriage, and cultural convergence between Hausa and Fulani communities. These campaigns should utilize the same digital platforms currently dominated by the movement to ensure reach and visibility.

 iii. Educational Interventions

Educational curricula at both secondary and tertiary levels should include modules on ethnic relations, conflict resolution, and critical media literacy. Such interventions would equip young people with the skills to critically evaluate divisive content and resist essentialist narratives. The historical legacy of Shehu Usman Ɗanfodiyo should be taught in a balanced manner that acknowledges his unifying role. The book ‘Mutumin Kirki’ by Kirk-Greene (alongside other books with similar themes) should be put into the syllabus of Hausa courses and civic education.

 iv. Strengthening Digital Literacy

Government agencies and NGOs should invest in digital literacy programs that enable citizens to identify misinformation, hate speech, and coordinated inauthentic behavior online.

 v. Legal and Policy Frameworks

Law enforcement agencies should enforce existing laws against hate speech and ethnic incitement, while policymakers should consider updating legal frameworks to address the unique challenges of online hate speech. However, such legal measures must be implemented with sensitivity to avoid being perceived as targeting particular ethnic groups. Linguistic associations such as the Linguistic Association of Nigeria should take into cognizance the Universal Declaration of the linguistics rights adopted in Barcelona in 1966, which may be exercised in any situation and take necessary action. Such rights include but not limited to: the right to be recognized as a member of a language community; the right to the use of one’s own language both in private and in public; the right to the use of one’s own name; the right to interrelate and associate with other members of one’s language community of origin; the right to maintain and develop one’s own culture and all the other rights related to language which are recognized in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 16 December 1966 and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights of the same date.

 vi. Dialogue and Reconciliation Initiatives

Inter-ethnic dialogue forums should be established at community and state levels to address underlying grievances around political representation, resource allocation, and security. The Fulani domination narrative identified in this study (34.0% of rhetorical frames) needs to be reconsidered, knowing the fact that social intercourse has synchronically made it impossible to identify a sedentary, purely Fulani man; rather, the ‘Hausa-Fulani’. It is therefore mindless to consider a particular ethnic group as dominant; merit should prevail regardless of one’s ethnic background.

7.0 Conclusion

This analysis of digital content associated with the Hausawa Zalla movement reveals a coordinated campaign of ethnic polarization that leverages social media platforms to disseminate hate speech, historical revisionism, and anti-Islamic rhetoric. The findings demonstrate that the movement deploys a sophisticated digital strategy characterized by consistent branding, strategic use of hashtags, and systematic targeting of religious figures, historical personalities, and political leaders. The movement's reliance on questionable digital practices (including locked profiles, pseudonyms, and content suppression) raises serious concerns about its democratic credentials and the legitimacy of its claims. The rhetorical framing of Fulani people as inherently tied to terrorism and domination reflects a dangerous essentialism that threatens to undo decades of inter-ethnic coexistence.

However, it is important to recognize that the movement's grievances, however misdirected, emerge from a context of genuine challenges: political marginalization, economic inequality, and security crises that have disproportionately affected Northern Nigerian communities. Addressing these structural issues through inclusive governance, economic empowerment, and improved security is essential to undermining the appeal of divisive ethnic nationalism.

Ultimately, the Hausawa Zalla phenomenon serves as a cautionary tale about the dark side of digital connectivity. While social media has democratized speech and enabled marginalized voices to be heard, it has also created fertile ground for ethnic entrepreneurs to exploit identity divisions for political ends. The path forward requires a multi-stakeholder approach involving platform companies, civil society, religious institutions, and government – all working together to promote digital citizenship, historical truth, and inter-ethnic solidarity. The future of Northern Nigeria's social fabric may well depend on the collective response to this digital-age challenge.

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Appendices

Note: Several of the Facebook groups and pages listed were not explicitly established for this movement. Nevertheless, they have been included based on evidence of movement-related content posted within them.

Appendix A: Some Facebook Pages and Groups Studied

Category	Name	Followers/ Members
Group	<HAUSAWA _ZALLA_BA_MIZ> donated by (ANAS_SABO)	152K
Individual	Abba Lawan Makiyin Fulani	13
Group	AREWA MU FARKA	36K
Group	AREWA MU FARKA	10K
Page	AREWA MU FARKA	674K
Group	AREWA MU FARKA ZAMFARA STATE CHAPTER	2K
Group	Gimbiyar Hausa	170K
Page	Gtv Hausa Media	19K
Group	Hausa Zalla Movement	2.5K
Page	Hausaland Magazine	90K
Group	HAUSAWA MUN FARKA	51K
Group	Hausawa Tsantsa	80K
Group	Hausawa zallah, kumaga tarihimsu hausa zalla	686
Individual	Jakadiyar Hausa	840
Page	Jaruma Hausa TV	94K
Page	KasarHausa 24	15K
Group	Kungiyar Hausawan Nigeria	58.K
Group	Kungiyar Hausawan Nigeria	257K
Group	KUNGIYAR SIYASAR HAUSAWA ZALLA	1.1K
Group	KUNGIYAR SIYASAR HAUSAWA ZALLA	1.1K
Group	MAKIRCIN FULANI A KASARMU	5
Group	SOYAYYAR MU AYAU (HAUSAWA ZALLA)	155

Note: This is as of 15^th August 2026

Appendix B: Sample Posts

Figure A1: Post from Hausaland Magazine

Source: Hausaland Magazine, Facebook, August 2026, https://www.facebook.com/hausalandmagazine

The screenshot shows a post from "Hausaland Magazine" announcing a meeting of "Hausa Zalla Youth" in Lagos, where an ultimatum was issued to "Fulani terrorist militia" to end attacks on "Hausaland" or face consequences. This post exemplifies the movement's use of ethnic essentialism, framing Fulani communities as "terrorist militia" and employing language of ultimatums and threats that incite inter-ethnic hostility.

Figure A2: Post from KasarHausa 24

Source: KasarHausa 24, Facebook, June 2026, https://www.facebook.com/kasarhausa24

The screenshot shows a post from "KasarHausa 24" identifying Late Major General Rabe Abubakar as Fulani and his wife as Fulani, suggesting that his kidnapping was politically motivated. The caption implies that his role is linked to efforts to secure the release of "terrorists" arrested by Katsina State Governor Dikko Radda. The post appears alongside hashtags including "#FulaniMustGo" and "Jaruma Hausa," reflecting the movement's pattern of ethnic essentialism, attributing political events to ethnic identity, and framing Fulani individuals as inherently connected to terrorism.

Figure A3: Post from JakadiyarHausa

Source: JakadiyarHausa, Facebook, August 2026, https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100086651213834

The screenshot shows a post accusing Fulani figures of orchestrating religious conflict between Muslims and Christians, framing Fulani identity as part of an agenda to divide religious communities in Nigeria. It labels prominent individuals as Fulani and suggests they conspire to create discord. This content exemplifies the movement's strategy of attributing collective guilt, linking Fulani identity to religious manipulation, and reinforcing ethnic essentialism.

Figure A4: Post from Jaruma Hausa TV

Source: Jaruma Hausa TV, Facebook, July 2026, https://www.facebook.com/share/p/19PFeGKG1P/

The screenshot shows a post with the headline "BREAKING THE CYCLE OF DIVISION: A Hausa Appeal for Muslim-Christian Unity Against Fulani Manipulations," accompanied by the slogan "#FulaniMustGo." It lists several individuals (including Bello Matawalle, Umar Faruk, Khalid Salls, and Musa Garba) each labelled as "Fulani" alongside their nationalities (Nigerian, Sudanese, Niger Republic). This content exemplifies the movement's strategy of framing Fulani identity as a transnational threat and employing an "appeal for unity" as a rhetorical device to mask ethnic essentialism and calls for exclusion.