Cite this article as: Ibrahim, M., & Muhammad, D. (2025). The politics of naming and ideological framing among Muslim clerics in Northern Nigeria. Sokoto Journal of Linguistics and Communication Studies (SOJOLICS), 1(1), 64–72. www.doi.org/10.36349/sojolics.2025.v01i01.009
THE POLITICS OF
NAMING AND IDEOLOGICAL FRAMING AMONG MUSLIM CLERICS IN NORTHERN NIGERIA
By
Mikailu Ibrahim, PhD
Landmark College of Health Sciences and Technology,
Talatan Mafara, Zamfara State.
&
Dikko Muhammad, PhD
Department of
English and French
Umary Musa
Yar’adua University, Katsina.
Abstract
This paper explores othering in the acts of naming in
the dialogical frames that are shaping the discursive practices across
religious scholars and their own followers. A unique language style is used by
religious scholars to other, appropriate, and deislamizedeach other
across different sects in Northern Nigeria. Since the last century, the region
has evolved as a deeply contested ideological space for varied sectarian
orders. It began with the arrival of Tijjaniyya order that contested for space
against the dominant Qadiriyya order which has been in the region for centuries
and that has been hegemonized by the Jihad of Sheikh Usman bn Fodiyo and the
Caliphate it established after 1804. In the 1970s, the Salafi-Izala, officially
named as Jama’atulIzalatilBid’ahwaIqamatis-Sunnah emerged in the region.
Puritanical in outlook, it soon established itself as a radical Islam that
challenged both the Tijjaniyya and the Qadiriyya orders. Among the fringes were
the Qur’an-only sect that propped up in the region around late 1960s through
the 1980s becoming confrontational with authorities and prompting state
intervention to crush it, leading to the death of its leader at the time, Malam
Marwa popularly known as Mai-Tatsine. However, as this paper demonstrates, the
use of language in the act of naming the Otherhas become a site for an
ideological warfare among sects, each one claiming to be the sole and purest
form of Islam. While each sectarian order has named itself, it has also been
named by others. A multiplicity of vocabulary has been created in the process,
each registering a position of a sect in the eye of its other. The paper is
built on data from the speeches of different Islamic scholars and their
followers sourced from Facebook pages and analysed through the lens of Critical
Discourse Analysis.
Keywords: Naming, Discourse Analysis, Salafi-Izala, Qur’an-Only, Ideology,
Identity
1. Introduction
This paper explores the linguistic and ideological
functions of naming the self and the other by religious establishment of
Northern Nigeria. It situates the politics of naming of scholars through the
lens of different sectarian prism in the region. It locates the diverse names
of clerics from the Sufi order, the Salafi-Izala movement and the camp of
“Qur’an-only” (Qur’aniyyun or Qur’ani Zalla) in the region.Northern Nigeria is
a site of contestation for power and legitimacy which manifest itself in the
politics of naming. The region has witnessed centuries of socio-political
upheavals. From the pre-Jihad internecine wars to the 1804 Jihad. The conquest
of the region by the British forces turned bloody in some instances due to the
strong religious inclination of the people who saw the encroachment of the
British as an intrusion of Christianity into their Islamic way of life. When
these anticolonial forces were contained, the British introduced the Indirect
Rule system that situated the remnants of the political structure of the Sokoto
Caliphate within the colonial system. This arrangement was opposed by people
like Sa’aduZungur who drew attention to the contradiction in the blending
ofIslamic institutions with a political system established by the same British
forces who defeated the Caliphate. The legitimacy of the rulers was questioned
in the process.
After independence, the region continued to experience
religious contestations that often disrupt the disrupt public order and peace.
In the discourse on role of religion in the public space in Nigeria, most
academic discussions are centred on inter-religious, namely the tensions
between Muslim and Christian faithfuls and the interfaith dialogue that exists
between the two group for peaceful coexistence. However, there are
intra-religious tensions often sidelined because much as they also get out of
hand and result in wanton destruction of lives and property. Islamic adherence
in Nigeria is far from monolithic in disposition as posited byDowd (2016, p.
622), “Nigeria's Muslim population, like the country's Christian population, is
diverse. Over the years, intra-Islamic tensions have mounted, pitting those
whom Paden (2005,2008) calls the anti-innovation reformists against the two
major Sufi brother hoods (i.e., the Qadiriyya and the Tijaniyya) and northern
Nigeria's religious establishment.” The anti-innovation group referred to here
are the Jama'atIzalat al-Bida wa Iqamat al Sunnah (Society for the Eradication
of Evil Innovations and the Reestablishment of the Sunnah), sometimes known as
Salafi-Izala. The group emerged in the 1970s under the leadership of Sheikh
Abubakar Mahmud Gumi. It questioned the dominant Qadiriyya and the Tijjaniyya
sects, expanding into the realm of politics where it criticised political
leaders for their refusal to introduce Islamic law. Thus, right from their
emergence, the Salafi-Izala sect was deeply confrontational as it contested for
space in a religious sphere dominated by the Qadiriyya and Tijjaniyya of sufi
order. However, this does not mean that the before the emergence of
Salafi-Izala the two dominant sects were at peace with each other. The
contestation among religious sects increased with the important role played by
religion in politics. As Dowd (2016, p. 622) further stated, “since the late
1970s and early 1980s, religious identities have become more politically
important and competition between religious groups has become increasingly
intense.” While the country sees itself as a secular state run by a
constitution, religion has continued to be a deciding factor across social and
political relations. These contestations have created a deep animosity within
the religious establishments foregrounding an intellectual warfare fought
through the naming of the other.
Naming system among clerics is rooted in sectarian
identity that has become the defining feature of Northern Nigeria. It is a
point of mass mobilisation and a tool for political contests. Islamic clerics
command reverence from their followers. As a result of this, their influence
goes into the realm of politics. They are point of call of politicians
canvassing for votes and sometimes, they are needed to persuade people to
accept government policies and programmes. There is no question that such
clerics enjoy respect and admiration that people with elective positions would
envy. Thus, religion occupies an important place in the socio-political
structures of Northern Nigeria. In fact, “Recent events in northern Nigeria
have profoundly proved, though on sporadic basis, Islam to be a vehicle for the
mobilisation of the discontented, marginalised and oppressed through many
religious conflicts and violence,” (280).
The religious establishment is an important part of
political order of Northern Nigeria. The political and economic privileges and
prominence given to clerics are enough reasons to create disharmony among
clerics and their followers. This tension manifests very clearly in the
language employed by the clerics in naming others of different sects. The
ideological differences have created alliances and communities of people with
the same ideological leaning, often across many states of the region. These alliances
are foregrounded through different fora including public lectures, educational
classes taking place in mosque, and in other times, at religious festivals such
as maulud, an annual event celebrating the birth of Prophet Muhammad
(SAW).
Naming is a core area of identity formation. It is
also the battleground for legitimacy in a highly contested intellectual space.
As stated by Bhatia (2005, p. 6-7), “the politics of naming is about this
contest, examining how names are made, assigned and disputed, and how this
contest is affected by a series of global dynamics and events.” All sects in
Northern have named themselves and have equally been named, quite pejoratively,
by others. Individual clerics have continued to foreground themselves, using
names that registered not just legitimacy but also the necessity of accepting
them. They also name others in order to delegitimize them. This is a recurring
politics that deserve critical attention. The contention for attention, for
legitimacy, and sometimes for validation, necessitate the politics of naming.
Naming, in this way, becomes a site through which the clash of ideology is
framed. As further argued by Bhatia (2005, p. 7), “The purpose of the
discursive conflict is to attain a victory of interpretation and ensure that a
particular viewpoint triumphs.” This paper aims to present how these discursive
conflicts are foregrounded through naming practices by Islamic scholars across
sectarian divides in Northern Nigeria
2. Theoretical Framework
This paper situates these practices within Critical
Discourse Analysis (CDA) of Fairclough,1995). Texts are traditionally
considered to be in the realm of the written, but Fairclough (1995, p. 4)
argues that their conception is extended to mean “either written or spoken
discourse.” This extension enables this paper to adopt CDA as a framework even
though the data analysed exist as spoken discourse. It is foregrounded through
the prism of Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) which emerged in the 1980s largely
from the works of Norman Fairclough, Ruth Wodak, Teun van Dijk, and others.
“The purpose of CDA is to analyse‘opaque as well as transparent structural
relationships of dominance, discrimination, power and control as manifested in
language" (Wodak 1995:204 in Blommaert, J., and Bulcaen2000: 448). This
theory is interested in the use of language as a tool of power, dominance,
inclusion and exclusion. Through the medium of language, people construct
themselves, social categories are formed and these affect social realities.
Through an understanding of discourse patterns, we can uncover social relations
as they relate to power relations, ideological groupings, and power and agency
associated with the use of language. As demonstrated byBlommaert (449)
CDA's locus of critique is the nexus of
language/discourse/speech and social structure. It is in uncovering ways in
which social structure impinges on dis course patterns, relations, and models
(in the form of power relations, ideolog ical effects, and so forth), and in
treating these relations as problematic, that researchers in CDA situate the
critical dimension of their work. It is not enough to lay bare the social
dimensions of language use. These dimensions are the object of moral and
political evaluation and analyzing them.
It is important to note that CDA is not merely an
intellectual theory of discourse. From its inception, it is hoped to be
socially relevant. It is not a theory interested in intellectual and
philosophical abstraction. It is often a critique of the weaponisation and
manipulation of language by exploitive social structures. As argued further by
van Dijk, T. A. (1993: 252), the theory “is primarily interested and motivated
by pressing social issues, which it hopes to better understand through
discourse analysis. Theories, descriptions, methods and empirical work are
chosen or elaborated as a function of their relevance for the realization of
such a sociopolitical goal.”This study uses CDA as its prism to study spoken
discourse in the religious sphere, and the use of language in ideological
framing to establish power, legitimacy and hegemony. It investigates the
different ways of naming the other in the discursiverelations among clerics of
different sects in Northern Nigeria.
3. Methodology
One interesting thing about Critical Discourse
Analysis is its acceptance of wide-ranging ways of collecting data from news
reportage, interviews, etc. This paper collects data from Facebook, a social
media platform and analyse it to explore the delegitimization of the other. The
paper looks at the language used by these actors to describe themselves
vis-à-vis the language used by people on the comment section to describe the
same actors. Attention is given to the politics of exclusion, the politics of naming,
and the general processes of identity construction and hegemony construction.
The paper further identifies traces where power is encoded for legitimacy or
for the intention delegitimise the other. “The general bias in CDA is toward
linguistically defined text-concepts, and linguistic-discursive textual
structures are attributed a crucial function in the social production of
inequality, power, ideology, authority, or manipulation” (van Dijk 1995 in Blommaert
J., and Bulcaen, 2000: 450). One interesting thing about the social media is a
space of effacement where people use language often without the limits of
political correctness. Language is used in its rawness to describe one’s
feelings towards the other. Language used in the context of social media gives
important insights into power asymmetries, ideological underpinnings,
manipulation, etc. The data is sourced from the videos of Sheikh Yahaya
Masussuka, written messages of other scholars of the Sunni-Izala sects such as
Sheikh Jalo Jalingo. There are also screenshots of followers commenting on
posts by Sheikh Yahaya Masussukaon the way he names other clerics and the names
given to him by the commentators on his posts. All the comments discussed have
been provided in the order of which they appear in the paper. The identity of
the commentators has been protected to ensure the safety of the commentators
considering the sensitivity of the matter. Video links have been provided as
references to the places in which Sheikh Masussuka has named other clerics. The
data is sourced using search words on the pages of Sheikh Yahaya Masussuka
manually. These names were identified, their semantic features explicated, and
the ideological function involved in the process is foregrounded in the paper.
4. Data Presentation and Discussion:
This section provides the data sourced from Facebook and the analysis carried out by the study.
4.1 Naming as Self-Fashioning and as Delegitimization
of the Other
MK Adler in Bhatia (8) argues that “To name is to
identify an object, remove it from the unknown, and then assign to it a set of
characteristics, motives, values and behaviours.” Naming in ideological and
religious discourse is far more than a linguistic exercise, it is aperformative
act that shapes perceptions of self and other, legitimacy and deviance. It
foregrounds the construction of identity between the Self and the other. In
Northern Nigeria, a closer look in the discursive process through which language
is invoked presents a recipe for crisis in a region that is already battling
with socio-economic problems. As argued by Agbiboa (2013: 20), “[c]onflicts
motivated by religious identity have the reputation of being among the most
intractable, given the often obsolutist views to which they are tied.” This
paper is prompted by that concern – the weaponisation of language in a process
of delegitimating the other. WithinIslamic reformist movements, the politics of
naming often determines who is recognized asa bearer of religious truth and who
is cast as an imposter. Tags, labels and descriptions are part of the
linguistic tropes that are employed to carry out this process of othering.
Ideology “refers to the system of ideas that each person possesses, which does
not depend on physiological causes but on historical-political ones,”
(Filippini 2017: 7). There is an inherent relationship between power and
ideology. As argued by Fuchs (2020: 222), Ideology defines an exploitative
class’ or dominative group’s aims, actions, identity, membership, norms,
resources, and values. There is always a relationship to a subordinated class
or group. The power of the dominative group or exploitative group is justified
and naturalised by the use of particular ideological strategies.” Naming
process embodies the ideology of the naming agents, and it registers the
relationship that exists between the naming agency and the named entity. In the
acts of naming, “one assigns virtue to one's own identity and decisions, and
draws on a series of negative traits to describe an opponent,” (Bhatia 15).In
religious ideological framing, the virtues attached to one through
self-fashioning are numerous from piety to the bearer of truth, the monopoly of
genuine interpretation of a religious issue. To the other, pejoration from
lies, deceit, disrespect to other religious figures to outright heresy are all
names, descriptions and insinuations ascribed to the other. Thus, there is
already a lot of nuances in the politics of naming that this paper intends to
foreground and analyse. Attention to this phenomenon is imperative in the
efforts to understand this ideological crisis and employ the required language
in the efforts to find peace.
In Northern Nigeria, theemergence of Sheikh Yahaya
Masussuka and his ideology of “Qur’an-only” or “Qur’aniyyun” in Arabic and Qur’aniZallain
Hausa, provides a striking example of how naming becomes a discursive
battleground for powerand legitimacy. “Qur’an only” is the naming form of
self-affirmation of the sect of Sheikh Yahaya Masussuka. That is, this is the
name that the sect gives to itself. It encodes legitimacy since it demonstrates
the group’s recognition of the Qur’an as the sole, only and final authority
text for the Muslim.Masussuka’s discourse rejects the interpretive authority of
mainstream Salafi-Izalaclerics, claiming that the Qur’an alone suffices as
divine guidance without reliance on hadith which is considered as the secondary
source of exegesis for the mainstream Muslims. Masussuka does not limit himself
to naming his ideology. He also attacks other sects. Hisrhetorical strategy
involves rebranding revered scholars with derisive names, transformingfigures
of respect into symbols of corruption. While their self-naming endeavour has
given them legitimacy, what is given to them externally delegitimized them and
exclude them from the mainstream Muslims.
Figure 1: Ƙala-ƙatoas reference to Qur'ani Zallah
(https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1DMrr8V1mX/)
Figure 2 Ƙala-ƙato as reference to Qur'ani Zallah
(https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1KxUq9vnLa/)
The followers of Qur’an only sect have been given historically charged
names such as Ƙala-ƙato and Yantatsine. as Ƙala-ƙatois a
tag given to the hadiths or the saying of Prophet Muhammad (SAW) by the
followers of Qur’an only. The name referenced their rejection of these
traditions because they are from people whom they referred to as ƙato
(singular, a derogative term for an uncultured person). They mocked the
traditions of the Prophet from the manner of its narrations; that is its
chains. Hadiths are usually quoted from their narrators, being with “from”
followed by the name of the narrator. Now to delegitimise this, they changed
this to Ƙala-ƙatowith “Ƙala”meaning, “from” in Arabic and “ƙato” meaning
some unnamed, unknown and uncultured person. Through this process, they strip
the hadiths off their authenticity. However, this name was then used against
the sect, beginning from the 1980s when they emerged and preached against the
hadiths. The ideological effect of the process is to register the sect’s
shocking rejection of the traditions of the Prophet; evoking memories of
heresy, rebellion, and violence. They are considered heretical and rebellious
to Islam. The name also reminds one of the violence unleashed by the group
across places mentioned earlier in this paper.
Figure 3: Yan Tatsine as reference to Qur'ani Zallah
(https://www.facebook.com/share/p/19HM1DEx7a/)
In other instances, the group is called “Yantatsine” which reminisced
the hostile manner of preaching of its former leader, Malam Muhammad Marwa.
Malam Marwa had a way of cursing everyone, with the phrase “Allah Ta-tsine”.
This name is part of the process of delegitimisation. It casts the group as
violent, hostile and dangerous with a damaging history. It is important to note
that when the sect has called itself Qur’aniyyun, people outside it has refused
it the agency to name itself. To accept its self-naming process is to give it
legitimacy because of the centrality of the Qur’an in the religion of Islam.
Now, when the names Ƙala-ƙatoandYantatsineare historically
embedded, there have been other semantic inventions to the leader of the group
today, Sheikh Yahaya Masussuka.
However, nearly all sects have been pejoratively named by others from outside. For instance, while the Salafi-Izala followers are the staunchest critics of the Qur’an only sect, they also faced similar critique from the others. In fact, even Salafi-Izala itself can be considered pejorative in some ways. There are many scholars who do not ascribe to the Salafi-Izala group, they do not attend its meetings, and they have never part of its leadership. They simply call themselves Ahlus-sunnah. However, accepting them in this label automatically grants them legitimacy because they are attached to the deeds, sayings and traditions of Prophet Muhammad. To delegitimise them, they are all branded as ‘yan ƙungiya. This term is associated with division which the Qur’an admonishes Muslims from. Islam required Muslims to be united under one umbrella. In this name, the sect is critique for its confrontation with other Muslims. It also registers intolerance because the Salafi-Izala, according to people from outside it, considers itself as the only legitimate group. It accuses all the others as heretical. In addition, the name yan ƙungiyais invoked to refer to the sect’s closeness with the political establishment. Here, it is critique for patronising corrupt leaders for materialistic gains. This name is usually used when people comment on the profiting from religion by clerics. The word maula or begging is also used to refer to the group to register its tendency to beg for money to build mosques and Islamic schools. Atypical semiotic feature is used in a photoshopped picture of the government house of Kano State with the inscription that signifies the closure of access to the public wealth on the Salafi-Izala clerics. While these exemplified the naming process of self-affirmation by groups and the delegitimisation involved when the same sect is named by others, the naming process extends to the level of individual, where clerics are given names by others. A classical example is the names given to Salafi-Izala clerics by Sheikh Yahaya Ibrahim Masussuka and the names that the Salafi-Izala followers reciprocatively give him.
Figure 4: Salafi-Izalaas ‘Yan ƙungiya.
Figure 5: Salafi Izala as 'Yan Maula
Figure 6: Sheikh Yahaya Masussuka as MasussukatulKazzab
The appearance of Sheikh Masussuka has transformed sectarian
relationships in the region. While there are videos of his criticism of saints
and figures across other sects, including Shi’ah and Tijjaniyya, he is more
critical of Salafi-Izala these days. He announced that his appearance will lead
to the retirement of Salafi-Izala clerics. His slogan has been “Ritaya Dole”
meaning “retirement is inevitable.” This infuriates a lot of Salafi-Izala
followers. They responded by inventing and ascribing pejorative names to the
group. One of these names are “MasussukatulKadhab”. This morphological
inflection is done to tie Sheikh Masussuka to the historical Musaylimah
al-Kadhab (Musaylimah the Arch-liar), a claimant of false prophethood in the
7th century Arabia. He is regarded by Muslim as an arch-liar. Now, this
inflection extends the meaning of Musaylimah’s name and actions to Masussuka.
This is another process of delegitimisation. It inscribes the belief that
Masussuka’s types have been around in Islam. Thus, his claim to the position of
Islamic scholar is as false as Musaylimah’s claim to prophethood. A similar
process is “YahyatulKazzab” where the same pattern of naming is foregrounded
only that here, the actual name of the cleric, Yahya is used in the semantic expansion.
The overall objective here is to present Sheikh Masussuka as an arch-liar and
such lies has resonance in the history of Islam. His theological stance is
eroded in the process.
Figure 7: Sheikh ZahayaMasussuka as MasussukatulKazzab
4.2 Masussuka in the Naming of the Other
Masussuka’s rhetoric demonstrates a systematic effort
to undermine the authority ofestablished Salafi-Izala clerics through mocking
sobriquets. Names such as Uban Daba(“Gang Leader”), Farfesan Zato (“Professor
of doubt”), Girma ya Riga Wayo (“Big for nothing”), and Bunsuru da Babbar Riga
(“decorated he-goat”) perform what van Leeuwen(2008) calls discursive exclusion,
denying social actors’ legitimacy through negative recontextualization.In
transforming titles of reverence into ridicule, Masussuka symbolically inverts
traditionalhierarchies of religious authority. The act of renaming serves to
expose, in his narrative, the hypocrisy and intellectual pretensions of
mainstream scholars. This is consistent withFairclough’s (1995) view of
discourse as a site of ideological struggle where linguistic choices encode
social power.
It is important to note that this process of naming
does not stop at the level of ideology. There are moments when one’s physical
appearance is invoked in naming him pejoratively. While Masussuka has been a
subject of naming pattern, he also seems to pioneer the process of naming
clerics in the othering process not by their ideology but by their looks.
He refers to Sheikh Ahmad Tijjani Yusuf Guruntum as Bunsuru
da Babbar Riga meaning a he-goat in a traditional garment (https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1BqUyWcqza/) .For viewers to understand the person being referred
to, Masussuka will have the picture of the cleric placed just above his video.
The cleric earns this name for his long white beard that has turned grey. This
example contains a lot in semantics with meaning beginning from the cultural to
ideological realms. A he-goat is considered the most uncultured and obscene
animal the way it bleats and sexually harassed its mother in public. Giving
this name to any person is considered very insulting. Now, at the ideological
level, this is not just the mockery of a beard, it is an erasure of the
position of beard among Muslims. Many Muslims consider keeping a beard as an
emulation of a practice of the Prophet. But this practice itself is narrated
through the hadiths which Masussuka repeatedly rejects. Thus, by his mockery of
the beard of a scholar from the Izala sect, Masussuka mocks the practice of
keeping beard, and erases its place among the Muslims.
Another example is Malam Tunkuza used by
Masussuka to refer to Sheikh Haifan
(https://www.facebook.com/share/v/17KwG46k53/). He does not use Haifan’s name. He uses the word
Tunkuza to refer to him and viewers could understand the referent as Masussuka
uses his picture on top of the video and he played an audio from his phone of a
fatwah given by Sheikh Haifan. The word Tunkuza connotes inactivity, stillness
and lack of wisdom. Sheikh Musa Yusuf Asadus-sunnah is named by Sheikh
Masussuka with the phrase girmayarigawayau
(https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1A7yE5ZFGL/). This is also related to the
physique of the person. In Hausa, physical growth and mental growth are
expected to be organic. There is a problem when a person grows in physique
without adequate intelligence to compliment it. The Sheikh who has been given
this name is fully built and he speaks with bluntness that Masussuka finds as
lack of intelligence. This is also an example of containment, silencing and
delegitimisation. Even if Asadus-sunnah is a scholar, his lack of mental
stability erases him from any authority. Intellect is very important
consideration among the Hausa of northern Nigeria. It is among the qualities
that give authority, legitimacyand validity. When its absence is noted in one,
the person loses credibility. In fact, whatever the person said is dismissed.
The head of Salafi-Izala sect, Sheikh Bala Lau is
named as Uban Daba
(https://www.facebook.com/share/r/1Zq1Gx3GPa/). Daba
means a criminal territory or an enclave of criminals. In this semantic
construction, Salafi-Izala is referred to as criminal enclave. Thus, the
process of naming is furthered into invalidation and criminalisation. The group
is delegitimised through linking it with criminal activities in the process of
naming. The secretary of the Salafi-Izala movement, Sheikh Kabir Gombe is named
by Masussuka as Tulun Gombe(https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1ZFi4ub2rh/)
or the water pot of Gombe. While there is nobody about the body shape of Sheikh
Bala Lau in his name, Sheikh Kabir Gombe’s name is constructed with close
reference to his bodily figure. He is a short and stout man. This image is
taken to link him with water pot. It also carries a reference to his protruding
stomach. While this is denigrative, it does not carry as much weight as
he-goat. Sheikh Kabir is also referred to as Majidadin Uban Daba(https://www.facebook.com/share/v/1ZFi4ub2rh/)
or the caretaker of the Leader of Criminal Enclave. This is due to the
closeness of Sheikh Kabir Gombe to Sheikh Bala Lau. They are always seen
together whether in Nigeria or outside the country.
Both Salafi-Izala sect and Qur’an only have named
Sheikh Professor Maƙari as Farfesanzatoor the Professor of Doubt
(https://www.facebook.com/share/r/1D11nYsAwH/). This is in reference to the
Professor’s tendency to delay judgment, to refuse conclusion haphazardly. He
has a tendency to be closer to the Ahlus-sunnah one day and back to the sufi
order the next. Sometimes, he approaches issues from varied angles. This is why
the Ahlus-sunnah or the Salafi-Izala group gives him the name Farfesan Zato because
he embodies doubt, undecidability, and inconsistency. This reciprocal renaming
constitutes astruggle over symbolic capital (Bourdieu, 1991) and ideological legitimacy.
Itargues that naming in Masussuka’s discourse operates as both a weapon of
delegitimation and a shield of self-affirmation.
On the other hand, Farfesan Zato, (the
professor of assumption) is also used in Masussuka’s discourse to describe
Prof. Sani Rijiyar Lemu who is a Professor of Hadith at Bayero University Kano
(https://www.facebook.com/share/r/1EGEzWF5pw/). This is a double-edged strategy
because it lampoons both the person and the area of his specialisation. The
Qur’aniyyunhas no regard for hadith as a tradition therebyascribing the name
‘zato’ (assumption) to it. This naming process has inscribed the sect’s
position on hadiths which can be assumed even when it is not explicitly stated.
This shows Fairclough’s (1995. p. 6) position that “ideologies are generally
implicit assumptions.” To drive his points further, in some video clips,
Masussukaalluded to the bad timing for the professorial recognition of Rijiyar
Lemu because it came at a time when he (Masussuka) came all out with superior
argument to make hadith irrelevant. He urged Rijiyar Lemu to look for a new
area of specialisation. The word zatoalready registers the ideological
grounds of Sheikh Masussuka. The thesis of his sect regarding the position of
hadiths can be located in this naming process.
Radicalism is a term ascribes to the Izala sect due to
its confrontational relationship with other sects. It accuses the Tijjaniyya,
Qadiriyya and many others of deviating from the true teachings of Islam as
taught by the prophet and his companions. It also points to the fact that these
two sects have introduced certain innovation into the religion of Islam.
However, it needs to be pointed out that the Izala sect wasn’t the first
introduction of radicalism in the region. Tijjaniyya was suppressed by colonial
agents for being radical (Alabi 282). In fact, the sect of Qur’an Zalla, when
it emerged in 1980, was very radical to the point of physical violence as
argued by Alabi (295):
the Maitatsine riots broke out as a result of
differences in Koranic interpretations between some Islamic fundamentalists
under the leadership of Mohammed Marwa who denounced the religious practices of
the Kadiriyya and Kubulu sects and labelled them as pagans. Their differences
degenerated into violence and in the process, many lives and property were lost
Thus, a discernible pattern is that a late-arriving
sect into the region is always confrontational and hostile to the dominant
ones. It aggressively competes with them until it has gained grounds. This is
how the Tijjaniyya sect came in. The Izala was more hostile and provocative to
both Qadiriyya and Tijjaniyya to the point of condemning them as infidels. Now,
with the arrival of Sheikh Yahaya Masussuka with his Qur’an only ideology, the
pattern becomes completely recurring. What makes a sect strong and recognisable
is its aggressiveness and hostility towards the dominant ones. It creates a
space for itself in this manner.
5. Discursive Implications
1. Authority and Power Relations: Naming reflects the
distribution of power in thereligious sphere. Power in the religious space is
not symbolic. For Masussuka, naming and renaming function as linguistic
resistance, challenging theepistemic monopoly of Salafi-Izala scholars and
re-centering interpretive authority aroundthe Qur’an itself. For the
Salafi-Izala scholars, naming functions as a tool of exclusion and
delegitimisation. It foregrounds the inherent flaws in the argument of the
Qur’an only followers.
2. Identity Construction and Boundary-Making: For
Masussuka’s followers, these namesreinforce group identity through moral
polarization—defining “true Qur’anists” in opposite onto “corrupt scholars.”
The act of naming thus becomes a boundary ritual marking insidersand outsiders.
It also a space in which Salafi-Izala scholars inscribe their ideological
identity. Naming enables them to define and monopolised the “genuine” Islamic
identity. Thus, identity construction becomes contestation for legitimacy.
3. Discursive Polarization and Moral Politics: The
reciprocal exchange of labels intensifiesideological polarization. Each side
linguistically constructs the other as morally illegitimate,transforming
theological disagreement into moral warfare. As Wodak and Meyer (2016)observe,
such polarized labeling is a hallmark of ideological discourse. This moral
warfare is enhanced by the utilisation of technology through social media
platforms. Audio-visual materials are used to reinforced ideological standpoints
as these clerics take turns condemning each other and quoting each other from
past sermons.
6. Conclusion
This paper has foregrounded the politics of naming
across religious establishment of northern Nigeria. Naming is a tool of
exclusion, delegitimisation, and the creation of the other. While Religious
groups and sects have named themselves through self-fashioning and
self-affirmation, they have also been named by others from outside. For
instance, the Salafi-Izala group has been very critical of other sects but had
also been named by others. Clerics of the Ahlus-sunnah group have been named by
others, especially the Qur’an only sect. In Sheikh Yahaya Masussuka’s
“Qur’an-only” discourse, naming functions as both adiscursive sword and a
protective shield. Through pejorative renaming, Masussukadelegitimizes
established clerical authority, while through self-naming, he and his
followersconstruct a purified ideological identity. Naming is used as a tool
for ideological warfare. Ultimately, the paper has demonstrated that the
politics of naming in this context exposes how language operates as aweapon of
ideology, a tool for construction and deconstruction of identity, negotiating
legitimacy, and redrawingthe boundaries of orthodoxy and deviance. Masussuka’s
rhetorical practice exemplifieshow religious authority is not merely claimed
through doctrine but performed throughdiscourse, where every name becomes a
battleground for truth, power, legitimacy and inclusion. The volatility of the
region requires that attention be given to this field of naming the other.
History has shown that human atrocities are constructed in the realm of
language before they materialised into violence.
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